INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Fernando Manfredo, Panamanian Representative;
Prof. Juan Antonio Tack, Panamanian Alternate Representative;
Ward P. Allen, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Telecommunications Dispute in Panama

The Panamanian representatives explained at some length the nature and background of the current dispute and pointed out that INTERCOMSA is not represented on the Panamanian Delegation. INTERCOMSA, they report, was formed by two prominent politicians, each of whom owns a TV station, and is controlled by three families. The former Foreign Minister is president. They have also formed a company to handle internal traffic by microwave.

INTERCOMSA is thus a purely private closed corporation and the Government has no regulatory powers or control over it, the Panamanian corporations law being archaic and weak.

INTERCOMSA therefore has a monopoly. They have sought to force All American Cables and Tropical Radio to suspend use of the cable constructed in 1962 in order to force all traffic through INTERCOMSA's earth station. This station was constructed for INTERCOMSA by Paige Company which continues to manage it under contract. The present Panamanian Government is anxious to find ways to break or regulate this monopoly so as to permit other private companies to use the earth station and so as not to force All American Cables and Tropical Radio eventually to cease operations. The representatives are hopeful that somehow this conference or the U.S. will be of some help.

I stated that I am, of course, completely unfamiliar with the problem and not in a position to do more than listen sympathetically. I pointed out that since INTELSAT is primarily concerned with the space segment and sets the charges for its use, INTELSAT as an international organization would not be in a position to inject itself in the arrangements within each country for the control of the earth station. I explained the relationship of COMSAT to U.S. Government. I suggested that the Panamanians explore with their colleagues from other Latin American countries the organization in each country for the construction, management and operation of the earth stations and the relationship or control of the respective governments. I asked if they had discussed the matter with Ambassador Adair, and Mr. Manfredo replied that they had but not extensively.

COMMENT: While it was not clear as to what help they expect from the conference or the U.S. Government, they nevertheless seemed anxious for some sort of assistance from us. I was sympathetic but non-committal, suggesting this seemed primarily a matter for the Government of Panama.

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March 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Vladimir Minashin, Chief of Department, Ministry of Communications, USSR, Observer, INTELSAT Conference.

Vladimir Aldoshin, Counselor of ;the Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR, Observer, INTELSAT Conference.

Leonard H. Marks, Chairman, INTELSAT Conference.

Mr. Minashin, the leader of the Delegation from the Soviet Union called on me to review the work of the Conference and to express the viewpoint of his Delegation on the progress to date.

At the outset, he complimented me on the manner in which the Conference had been organized, the businesslike approach that had been taken, the large agenda which had been reviewed, and the great amount of work which the Committees performed in three weeks.

He referred to our earlier conversation in which he agreed with my concept that international communications must be handled in a cooperative manner by all countries. During the discussion, he referred to his attached statement of yesterday (Committee I 108) and repeated the statements.

He said categorically that "the Soviet Union supports the principle of a single global system."

He then stated that a commitment to the above principle should not preclude the right of each country to have a domestic satellite, nor of areas to have a regional satellite system. I told him we had supported these principles and that there were no basic differences between our respective countries on these points, although we might differ on the mechanism to carry out these objectives.

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When I asked Mr. Minashin whether his Delegation had formed an opinion on the desirability of joining the INTELSAT system, he responded by stating this would require consultation with his associates in Moscow but that he could see "great usefulness" from an alliance.

I then asked what problems were presented by the current negotiations. In response, he stated that the United States appeared to have a strong and inflexible position which would stand in the way of any cooperation between our countries. Specifically, he referred to the adherence by the United States to the principle that only ITU could join INTELSAT. We talked candidly about East Germany, North Korea, North Vietnam and Communist China as the principal countries affected and I asked him whether he wished me to conclude that the USSR supported a "universal" approach which would make all of the foregoing eligible for INTELSAT membership. He stated that that was their position.

I then inquired whether a change in attitude by the Conference on that point would permit the Soviet Union to join. He stated that it would go a long way but that we would still have to recognize the Assembly as an important policy-making body for INTELSAT.

Mr. Minashin then stated that these were the principal points but that there were others of lesser importance which would have to be discussed in further detail before the Soviet Union could join INTELSAT.

He then asked about the interim arrangements which I described and stated that the Soviet Union would be very interested in having an Observer present or receiving the documents if Observers were not permitted.

There was some small talk about the possibility that we could meet again in Moscow where he could be host and continue the discussion. I told him that I would be resigning as Chairman of the Conference but that I would continue my interest in the work. He stated that that would not preclude our further discussion and might, in fact, be a help to the informality of further discussions.

At the conclusion of our discussion, Mr. Minashin warmly thanked me and the United States Delegation for the very generous hospitality which we had afforded and the attitude which we had shown to him and other Observer delegations. He stated that he was impressed with our sincerity, our belief in trying to accommodate countries who have not yet indicated their desire to become associated with INTELSAT, and his expectation that the next session of the Conference would result in a constructive agreement.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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March 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Sribhumi Sukhanetr, Representative, Thailand Delegation
Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Comsat

I talked this morning with Mr. Sukhanetr. After a routine exchange of pleasantries, I asked him how he felt the conference was proceeding. He said that he thought we were near a deadlock on several issues. I asked him particularly how he viewed and other delegations viewed the issue of Comsat as Manager. He said that he could see absolutely no alternative to Comsat as the operator and technician. He thought that there might be some means of compromising that could meet the concerns of other delegations, although he thought most of the developing countries would agree with him that there was no other entity which could operate the system. Most of the difficulty, he thought, came from European opposition which was continuing.

I tried to draw Mr. Sukhanetr out on history of the difficulty in the hope of getting him to comment on the issues discussed by Mr. Ananda Sharnprapai with Mr. Marion Gribble. He did not, in any way, pick up on my rather leading questions and such criticism as he voiced was, in fact, in Thailand fashion, put in the mouths of others. From all indications, he is on the side of Comsat, would like to have the problem compromised out without loss of Comsat as a major operating force but has no clear idea how to achieve this result.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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March 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Moshe E. Berman, Representative, Israel Delegation
Mr. Asher Ende, U.S. Delegation

In the course of a conversation with Mr. Berman regarding general telecommunications problems, I asked him how his country conducted its communications with Romania. He told me that at present such communications were relayed via Bern, Switzerland. He then said that the Romanian delegation had approached the Israelis to ask whether Israel would be prepared to handle communications between the two countries via satellite by 1971 or 1972. I, of course, expressed interest in the agreement for the use of satellite communications but made no further comment on the subject.

It appears from the foregoing conversation that Romania is apparently serious about the building of an earth station and the use of INTELSAT facilities. It is not clear whether Romania was speaking for itself or had cleared this with the USSR. At any rate, it is certainly worth serious consideration and detailed follow-up as it might be the first real crack in the Eastern Bloc solidarity against INTELSAT.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Clas Nordstrom, Representative, Swedish Delegation
Mr. Asher Ende, U.S. Delegation

In the course of a conversation with Mr. Nordstrom on the work of Working Group I-B, he stated that the Russians had advised him that they were impressed with the Swedish draft (Conference Document 8). According to Mr. Nordstrom, the Russians felt that the Swedish approach could solve their problem regarding INTELSAT because it differentiates between the public activities of the organization and the commercial activities. Mr. Nordstrom then asked whether the U.S. Delegation would be prepared to approach the Russians to see if they would be interested in joining INTELSAT on the basis of an agreement patterned after the Swedish document. I replied that it might be more appropriate if he could prevail upon the Russians to approach Ambassador Marks and indicate the basis upon which the USSR might be interested in affiliating with INTELSAT. I told him that the U.S. Delegation had been impressed by the attitude of the USSR at this conference and would be prepared to give serious consideration to any reasonable proposal of the USSR which did not impair with the efficiency and ability of the organization to perform its functions (at this point I said he knew, of course, that included in efficiency was our view regarding the managership), and it respected the rights of all countries including the LDC's to have an appropriate voice, as contemplated by our Document 10. Mr. Nordstrom indicated he would consider this and, if it was determined appropriate by his delegation, attempt to suggest this course of action to the USSR.

The above conversation plus that of the statement reported in a separate paper by Mr. Berman regarding Romania's interest in satellite communications with Israel indicate to me that the Russian bloc is seriously interested in finding an appropriate mechanism, which, with proper face-saving, could permit them at least to make use of INTELSAT facilities if not actually to become members.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. John E. Killick (United Kingdom Delegation)
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (United States Delegation)

I had a brief chat with John Killick of the British Delegation (an old friend) this morning. He reviewed the work of the Conference over the last several weeks saying he was sure he was regarded as public enemy no. 1 by Comsat. He wanted me to know, however, that the U.K. had introduced its paper, not with the thought of adding fuel to the fire but with the idea of calming down a number of delegations which were tending to go in irresponsible directions. The U.K. had become the leader in a surprising way of those favoring internationalization of the management. This was unintentional and unplanned but perhaps had been useful from a tactical point of view. In other words, things could have been much worse under other circumstances.

Mr. Killick is convinced that the Conference has isolated issues and that the U.S. will ultimately have to accept something like the Australian proposal. Mr. Killick wanted to be sure that we recognize that the Australian proposal gives lip service to certain directions -- transition, internationalization, etc. It was not, however, in his opinion a situation with which we could not live and that we on the American side must be prepared to go in this direction or we would find ourselves facing even less palatable solutions.

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INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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March 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Hedi Zghal, Alternate Representative from Tunisia
Mr. H. A. Bingham, Comsat

Subject: Internationalization of the Manager

Date/Time: Thursday, March 13, 10:00 a.m.

Mr. Zghal discussed his statement in the first week of the conference which strongly recommended total internationalization of the Manager. He stated that in effect the ideal of internationalization is uppermost in the minds of his Government. However, efficiency is also a very important aspect of the INTELSAT organization and cannot be sacrificed for total internationalization, he said. The retention of Comsat as Manager under contract to INTELSAT which includes arrangements for changing the Manager and terminating the management contract at the discretion of the Governing Body would satisfy the ideal of international control for the Tunisian Government. (This seems to indicate that the Tunisians are more flexible with respect to internationalization than they had appeared to be in the early statement by the Tunisian representative.)

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE March 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Kone Bangali, Observer from Ivory Coast
Mr. H. A. Bingham, Comsat HAB

Date/Time: March 11, 1:00 p.m.

Mr. Kone informed me during a luncheon conversation that his statements concerning regional satellites in committee session (supporting the principle of separate regional satellite systems) were based on an estimation that it would be less expensive for smaller countries to join regional systems which had a lower total system investment cost. I pointed out that the circuit cost and the cost of participation for small countries would actually be greater with separate regional systems which had a smaller number of participants, that actually circuit costs decrease rapidly with larger satellites in the global system. Moreover, small antennas would be more costly when higher circuit charges are taken into account, while the standard earth station costs are declining and are indeed viable in many countries which do not yet have earth stations such as the Ivory Coast. Mr. Kone stated that his views on this question were subject to revision and that, indeed, it did seem plausible that a global system would be less expensive and much more efficient. In addition, he appreciated the point that the global system provides direct access to all continents without relying on transiting through other countries which would be required if separate regional systems were established.

On the question of Ivory Coast accession, Mr. Kone stated that the joint venture with France Cables and Radio has been fully negotiated and is awaiting signature at present. The Ivory Coast intends to join INTELSAT once the creation of the joint venture has been legally and

procedurally completed. He does not expect that the Ivory Coast will wait until the definitive arrangements have been established before acceding.

Generally, the Ivory Coast supported Comsat as Manager of INTELSAT and Mr. Kone sees no practicable alternative to the present Manager. He stated that efficiency and economy are utmost in the minds of his Government. He stated that his Government is seeking to break away from the strong hold on telecommunications which the French have had in their country since independence and that, nevertheless, it was important to have good relations with the French. (This could be interpreted as meaning that the Ivory Coast will make statements pleasing to the French only for political reasons while agreeing that the system should be efficient and global in concept. Thus, if the Ivory Coast should join INTELSAT before the end of all conferences, their vote might be favorable to the U.S. positions despite statements to the contrary during this present conference.)

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. C. James Gill, United Kingdom Delegation

Mr. Stephen Doyle, United States Delegation
Mr. Marion Gribble, Office of the Chairman, United States Delegation

SUBJECT: United Kingdom Conference Tactics

In the context of Mr. Gill's assertion that the U.S. and U.K. positions on procurement in Committee IV were absolutely different, Mr. Gribble asked if it was on that note our meeting would end. Mr. Gill replied that "we" weren't going to seek to reconcile the several individual issues (the implication extended beyond Committee IV), but would wait until there was a whole package from which to seek "trade-offs."

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INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: March 12, 1969

To: The Record

From: John Messing

Subject: Deliberations of Working Group B of Committee I

For a few brief moments this afternoon I stepped into Working Group B of Committee I to observe the proceedings. In reply to a question by the Chairman, Mr. Loy was in the process of elaborating his concept of a Director-General possessing administrative functions, as a way to achieve internationalization in management under the definitive arrangements. Mr. Loy suggested that the following functions could be given to a Director-General: all legal functions associated with the management of INTELSAT, certain financial administrative functions, such as billing signatories and receiving funds on behalf of signatories, making all calculations associated with billings. In addition, the Director-General would perform a record-keeping function for the Board of Governors, and would prepare economic and traffic data studies as requested by the Board of Governors (this latter would appear to include some operations functions as well as financial functions). Finally, the Director-General would perform the secretariat and public information functions on behalf of INTELSAT.

With regard to procurement, Mr. Loy stressed that a large number of procurement functions require technical expertise, and that therefore procurement functions should not be within the duties performed by the Director-General. Mr. Loy also suggested that this division of functions should be spelled out in some detail to permit the continuation of a dual relationship between the Director-General and the manager under the definitive arrangements well into the future.

In response to a question posed by the Chairman, in which the Chairman asked Mr. Loy if he would be available to make written replies to written questions of delegations, Mr. Loy suggested that this might not be the most appropriate way to proceed. At the suggestion of the Chairman, a redacteur general would undertake to summarize the United States views. The redacteur general suggested

that his draft could be made available to the U.S. Delegation for any changes that it may wish to make, but Mr. Loy expressed his fullest confidence in the ability of the redacteur general to perform his assigned task, thus implying that the U.S. Delegation would not review this summary before it became a Conference document.

J. Messing

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador Rafael de la Colina
(Delegation of Mexico)

Mr. Ward P. Allen
(Delegation of United States)

Subject: Elements of Agreement on Basic Issues at INTELSAT Conference

Agreeing that this week is the week of decision, Ambassador de la Colina responded to my question as to what those decisions should be by outlining the following:

1. International Organization Versus Consortium
While the organization is really a hybrid, there is such a strong feeling that it is sufficiently international organization to be given some sort of legal personality. He feels that if the United States would accept the idea of legal personality (in return for other concessions), this would open a number of doors to agreement on other matters which would still protect the interests of the United States and the legitimate interests of Comsat. (He wondered whether some solution within the U.S. Government could not be found to the tax question and I stated only that we were studying all aspects of the problem of legal personality.)

2. Management Although he had indicated general agreement in Committee I with the Canadian-German-Indian Proposal (Com. I/26), he disagrees with their approach to the manager and had indeed resisted their efforts to have Mexico join in cosponsoring the paper. He agreed with me as to impossibility of the five-year, piecemeal transitional

shift from Comsat to internationalized management as proposed by India. He suggested that a solution might be found in accepting the idea of a Director General and a staff which would concern itself primarily with administrative, legal and similar matters but with Comsat as technical and operations manager under a fixed term for a "substantial" number of years. At the end of that period, there would be an extraordinary session of the Assembly which would review the situation and decide either to renew the contract or to work out some other arrangements. He felt confident that if Comsat should continue to do the efficient job it has done to date, (though he hoped with more "tact" and "political sensitivity") the contract would undoubtedly be renewed. He had not thought out in detail the exact relationship between the Director General and Comsat as manager but agreed that Comsat's managerial contract should be with the Governing Body.

3. He believes there should be no real difficulty in obtaining for the Governing Body the functions now performed by ICSC nor in obtaining approximately the U.S. proposed composition and voting formula provided we would "dress it up a little bit" (by which it turned out he meant no veto and no imposition by one single or group representative).

4. Assembly He feels the four-tier approach is unnecessarily cumbersome and believes that as a part of a general package we could obtain a weak Assembly with roughly the functions the United States has proposed, but with one-nation one-vote. He agrees the Assembly should be as weak as possible and suggested it should meet only once every two years.

5. He returned several times to the conceptual question of international organization versus consortium (i.e. legal personality). He felt that a combination of U.S. acceptance of legal personality plus a Director General would bring a majority of the countries to general support of the United States.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Conference Decision-taking and Internationalization of the Manager

Participants: Ananda Sharnprapai, Adviser, Thailand Delegation
(Assistant Manager of Satellite Project, Department of Post and Telegraph)
Marion L. Gribble, Office of the Chairman, U.S. Delegation

Date/Place: March 11, 1969, Conference Delegates Lounge

After chit chat about mutual acquaintances in Thailand, I asked Khun Ananda how he thought the conference was going. He replied that there seemed to be too much talking; he expressed the fear that the same parties would reiterate the same positions all over again in our eventual plenary sessions. In answer to my question, he indicated that he would prefer recourse to voting in the plenary meetings, rather than a consensus approach.

Asked if the emerging conference issues presented any real problems for Thailand, Khun Ananda -- somewhat uncomfortably -- responded in the negative. Then, after some hemming and hawing, he observed that most delegations favored meaningful internationalization of the manager. He interjected, "Comsat has gone about this wrong. They have taken too strong a position and have made many countries unhappy." Asked for clarification, he complained that Comsat had been cavalier in its relations within the ICSC. He also suggested that they had prejudiced their role as manager by undertaking a campaign against cable traffic.

Khun Ananda said that, if an agreement is reached at this conference, he could not imagine how Comsat could avoid its role being reduced more to that of a technical contractor. He added

that Comsat should have anticipated this attitude and have taken the lead in proposing a more defensible role for themselves under an internationalized manager.

I defended Comsat's performance and noted that most, if not all, delegations supported the objective of efficiency. Noting that Ananda had referred consistently to Comsat rather than the U.S. Delegation, I reminded him that Comsat's role in INTELSAT derived from U.S. statute and that the entire U.S. Delegation in its position must be guided by such statutory definition. Ananda conceded that an international manager might be less efficient and that it was apt to be no more responsive to individual country's interests than Comsat. Nonetheless, he seemed unable to accept the proposition that Comsat should continue in its present role.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 10, 1969

TO: U.S. INTELSAT Delegation

FROM: Ward P. Allen WPA

SUBJECT: Utilization of INTELSAT System by the United Nations

The United Nations is seeking an arrangement which would permit it access to the INTELSAT space segment for UN operational and informational telecommunications requirements. The case is set out in detail in a memorandum which the UN Observer, Mr. D'Arcy, is discussing with other Delegations and plans to circulate this week. In brief, it is as follows:

1. The UN has been given the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and for promoting the economic and social development of its members. It now has in the field five major regional offices, four military peacekeeping missions and four other major sub-offices. In addition there are a number of short-term visiting missions of subsidiary organs of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council and the Security General, plus technical assistance missions and Resident Representatives of the UN Development Program in many countries. It is also charged with a public information program in the member countries and has some 50 UN Information Centers throughout the world.

2. It was originally envisaged that the UN should have its own international radio and telecommunications system. This has not materialized. Instead, provisional, stop-gap arrangements have had to be utilized (short wave from New York headquarters to Geneva and on to a few points in the Middle East, Asia and Africa), but with no north-south communications and limited geographic coverage. These are unreliable (having failed in several Middle East emergencies), inadequate, insufficient (given the enlargement of membership) and expensive for operational requirements. Existing arrangements for informational services consist of UN diplomatic pouch to the 50 Information Centers, air shipment of tapes

and films and for radio some short wave transmitters leased from the U.S. and three other countries. Live TV coverage of UN meetings is possible only in North America.

The memorandum concludes:

"The Organization has been entrusted by the international community with tasks of overriding importance, such as the maintenance of international peace and security and the achievement of global economic and social development. At the same time, it has been repeatedly and explicitly recognized that these tasks cannot be successfully accomplished without reliable communications between UN Headquarters and the various UN missions and offices in the field; nor can they be accomplished without the continuous support of a well-informed world public opinion. However, neither in the operational nor in the informational communications sphere does the United Nations today possess anything even remotely approaching adequate facilities for meeting these obvious basic requirements, and the UN Member States have far outdistanced their international organization in the utilization of modern communications technology."

3. As indicated above, the original UN decision in 1947-48 to approve "in principle the establishment of a UN telecommunications system" and to set up the UN "as an operating agency in the field of telecommunications" has never been implemented. Recently the UN General Assembly has in three successive resolutions (1961-2-3) unanimously endorsed the use of communications satellites for UN operational and informational requirements. The paper considers three alternative suggestions to carry this out:

a) a separate global communications satellite system for exclusive UN use -- rejected because it is duplicative, prohibitive in cost and unjustified by the UN's limited requirements;

b) UN lease of transmission time on the INTELSAT system on commercial terms -- rejected as an additional strain on the limited UN budget (which the US, under

congressional strictures, has taken the lead in keeping limited) and as amounting largely to a "wash" operation for those who are members of both Organizations; and

c) an agreement between the UN and INTELSAT which, within specified conditions and limits, would provide cost-free UN access to INTELSAT for the UN's operational and, eventually, informational requirements, thus implementing a 1950 UNGA Resolution authorizing the Secretary General to establish a UN telecommunications network "provided that the capital expenditure does not constitute a net addition to the budget of the UN" and to accept "voluntary contributions" from any source for the purpose.

As is pointed out, there are precedents for providing free services and privileged treatment to the UN, both in the UN Charter and in the International Telecommunications Convention and Conference recommendations. The fact that under the 1947 UN-ITU Agreement the UN alone is, in effect, a non-voting member of the ITU would prevent this arrangement from becoming a precedent for other international organizations. The ITU supports the UN position, according to Mr. D'Arcy.

4. To indicate the limited dimensions of the UN's requirements, the paper presents in detail a projected three-phased plan over a period of six or more years for implementing the UN's requirements progressively as INTELSAT's capacity increases, of which Phase One would consist of one-way teleprinter channel and two-way telephone circuit between UN Headquarters and twelve designated UN overseas locations. Since the UN proposal would, of course, cover the space segment only, the UN intends to seek separate arrangements with the individual countries for the ground segments and is not seeking endorsement of the principle of cost-free access to the terrestrial portions.

5. It is proposed that a provision be included in the Definitive Arrangements endorsing the principle that the UN should be granted permanent, free-of-charge multiple access to the INTELSAT system for its operational and informational requirements, in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between INTELSAT and the UN Secretary General setting forth the limits and conditions.

6. The UN Representative is consulting widely among the other delegations and reports generally favorable reactions, particularly among the LDCs. He has received general support from the Middle East-African countries, Japan, Italy and Latin America (except for Chile which irritated its latin brothers by admitting that Chile is "making money" from its "investment"! of agreeing to host UN agencies /ECLA and the LA regional office of FAO/ in Santiago).

The UK, French, Netherlands, and Belgian representatives are reportedly sympathetic, but their P.T.T.'s (along with Sweden's) are not. Aldoshin (USSR) told D'Arcy that he would be glad to cable Moscow for instructions, but advised against it since he feared the Soviet reply might be to criticize the Secretary General for launching the idea without prior General Assembly approval.

7. Recommendation: In my view, in the overall United States interest in the United Nations and our political position at this Conference, the U.S. Delegation should warmly support the inclusion of a provision in the Definitive Arrangements along the lines of paragraph five above, notwithstanding the expected reservations of certain European P.T.T.'s.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Barouh Grinberg, Bulgarian Observer Delegation (Counselor, Bulgarian Embassy)
Mr. Marion Gribble, Office of the Chairman, United States Delegation

SUBJECT: Bulgarian Comment on the INTELSAT Conference

DATE & PLACE: March 7, 1969; Comsat Reception

I asked Mr. Grinberg how he and "his friends" regarded the Conference. In the ensuing, frequently repetitive, but entirely cordial, twenty minutes conversation Grinberg made the following points:

1) He and his "friends" do, in fact, desire a single global system -- smilingly, he noted that the USSR would be happy with the savings that would accrue to them if this were possible. However, such system would have to incorporate the principles put forward in the Intersputnik proposal.

2) He asked how could Bulgaria and her "friends" join INTELSAT, if it were to be organized along lines opposed even by the United States' allies?

3) He referred specifically to the "pre-eminent" role accorded Comsat by the United States. He explained that it was understandable that parties to the organization would desire to insure continued efficiency -- he implicitly conceded the capable role performed by Comsat -- and that abrupt tinkering with the manager would not be conducive to a high level of performance. However, said Grinberg, your position does not even permit modifying or replacing the present manager after "ten or twenty years." He argued that the veto implicit in our proposals concerning the Governing Body would insure that Comsat was permanently unassailable.

Concerning the Comsat role, I referred Mr. Grinberg to the United States Delegation's "general observations" contained in Com. I/41 and Mr. Loy's statement of March 6 in Committee I.

As for differences between the United States and its "allies," I expressed assurance that an agreement acceptable to them and us would obtain. If the Intersputnik sponsors' interest in a single global system was to be realized, it might be timely for them to suggest proposals addressed to the (realistic) concerns of all parties, rather than periodically to reiterate their general position. I assured him that while the United States was profoundly concerned that the efficiency and viability of INTELSAT's recent past be retained, we had neither desire nor intention to impose a unilateral arrangement; we would consider soberly all constructive proposals that might contribute to an efficient single global system.

Mr. Grinberg noted that Bulgaria was only a small country -- he added smilingly "you might call us a satellite" -- and was unable to speak for her "friends." He asked if I would like to continue this discussion with the Soviet Representative who was standing nearby. Replying that I assumed the delegate from the USSR was already aware of our views, better articulated by more senior members of our delegation, I declined.

COMMENT

The "ten or twenty years" cited by Grinberg may contain a hint that the Intersputnik countries would accept an agreement that contains assurances of a genuine reexamination of Comsat's role after a period of several years.

cc: Ambassador Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:MLGribble:bl
3/10/69

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE March 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Marion L. Gribble, Office of the Chairman, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Swiss Views on Legal Personality and INTELSAT Structure

Mr. Ernest Andres, Representative of Liechtenstein (First Secretary, Swiss Embassy), explained that a large number of Governments simply are unable to conceive of an international organization without its own legal personality. "Speaking hypothetically", Mr. Andres asked if the Conference were to accept the U.S. proposals concerning the Manager, would it not be feasible to add a small secretariat which -- together with the Assembly and Governing Body -- would have legal personality; Comsat could then continue in essentially its present role -- and legal status -- until some yet to be defined time in the future.

Drawing on Mr. Loy's statement in Committee I of March 6, I expressed concern that the insertion of the secretariat might interfere with the Manager's requisite efficiency.

Mr. Andres stressed again the difficulty Euopean Governments have in conceiving of an international organization without a distinct legal personality. He suggested, "supposing our maximal position" were to permit adoption of the U.S. proposals for the organization's structures -- accepting the exclusion of a secretariat -- could not the Assembly and the Governing Body be assigned legal personality, and Comsat retain its present legal status? I replied that I was sure this question was being thoroughly examined in the Conference's Working Groups.

Comment:

I interpret Mr. Andre's remarks to indicate Swiss willingness to accede to the essential U.S. position on structure, provided at some point we yield to some degree on legal personality. I have known Mr. Andres for four years and am confident that, despite the informality of our exchange, he would not exceed the Swiss position. This assumes, of course, our sticking to our guns on structure and the timing of whatever modification we might make on legal personality.

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (for distribution)

US DEL:MLGribble/bk

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Berhanu Dinka of the Ethiopian Delegation

Mr. Berhanu informed me that Ethiopia approved of the United States draft agreements and the position concerning the manager as stated therein. However, he felt that the general consensus would ultimately support the arrangement proposed in the draft submitted by India, Canada, and West Germany.

H. A. Bingham

cc: Ambassador Marks
Ambassador Battle
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H. A. Bingham:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 7, 1969
Time: 9:55 AM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Amar Dahmouche, Representative from Algeria
Mr. H. A. Bingham, COMSAT

Mr. Dahmouche offered the opinion that a broad international Assembly together with broad representation in the Governing Body (at least as broad as in the ICSC) would provide sufficient internationalization from the Algerian point of view provided that some language would allow a practicable possibility of changing the manager at some future date.

He stated that there is no practical alternative to having COMSAT remain as manager of INTELSAT in the immediate or foreseeable future. But looking further down the road, he felt that due to COMSAT's large vote in the Governing Body and COMSAT's being the incumbent manager at any future time, it would be practically impossible to ever change the manager against COMSAT's will. This disturbs the Algerian Delegation, but they would accept COMSAT as manager if there were a real means of changing the manager under the definitive arrangements.

Mr. Dahmouche asked how we felt about the Russian position and Russian participation in INTELSAT and volunteered that he did not think the Russians would join INTELSAT unless a "truly international" organization and manager were created. I replied that we welcome them on the same basis as other countries in the organization, with weighted voting based on their percentage of investment in and use of the satellite system. He said that perhaps they would be a detriment once their use and investment share grew. I pointed out that they (the Russians) can never hope to catch Europe, Japan, or other free and open societies

whose telecommunications traditionally grow at a rate of between 15 and 20 per cent per annum.

Mr. Dahmouche stated that Algeria was definitely in favor of creating a cooperative and efficient organization for the mutual benefit of all participants and seemed quite prepared to have COMSAT remain as manager.

cc: Ambassador Marks
Ambassador Battle
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HABingham:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Wilson Okwenje, Representative from Uganda
Mr. H. A. Bingham, COMSAT

Mr. Okwenje, in an informal conversation this morning, stated that Kenya's position as articulated in the speech by their representative on Thursday, March 6, was independently made and did not represent the views of the East African community as a whole. In fact, he stated emphatically that Uganda's views were different from those of the Kenyan Representative and that the Kenyan Representative was acting under instructions from Nairobi which gave him no choice to compromise with the other East African representatives. Therefore, Uganda's position on internationalization of the manager is more favorable from the United States point of view than that of Kenya.

cc: Ambassador Marks
Ambassador Battle
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HABingham:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mongolia

Mr. Dmbyn Garam-Ochir
Deputy Minister of Communications, Mongolia

Mr. Ludevdorjyn Khashbat
First Secretary, Permanent Mission
of Mongolia to the United Nations

United States

Ambassador Leonard Marks
Mr. Ward P. Allen WPA

(Separate Conversations)

Mr. Ward P. Allen
Mr. Joseph Lorenz

Subject: Mongolia's Interest in Conference and INTELSAT

The Mongolian observers called at their request, first on Messrs. Allen and Lorenz and then on Ambassador Marks. The substance of both conversations was essentially the same.

Mr. Garam-Ochir was very warm in his expressions of appreciation for having been invited to attend the Conference, the first invitation from the United States Government which his country had ever received, since formal relations do not exist. He stressed several times the importance Mongolia attaches to a global satellite telecommunications system so as to make direct communications possible among all countries despite political differences. In the earlier conversation, he indicated that his Government has an earth receiving station under construction in Ulan Bator, with Soviet help, which, through linking with the

Orbita system, will permit them to receive TV broadcasts from Europe. He indicated, in response to a question, that it would be technically feasible to adjust that station to receive communications directly from INTELSAT. When this was again mentioned in the meeting with Ambassador Marks, the latter agreed but added that it was very expensive.

After reviewing the differences between a geo-synchronous and random orbit satellite, Ambassador Marks asked Mr. Garam-Ochir, as an engineer, which he felt was preferable. His reply was that the geo-synchronous satellite system is preferable. Ambassador Marks expressed the hope that at some time Mongolia would have an earth station connected with the INTELSAT system and while Mr. Garam-Ochir's verbal response was vague, he gave the strong impression that he shares the hope.

In response to Ambassador Marks' questions, Mr. Garam-Ochir indicated that for Mongolia, with its 600,000 square miles and scattered population, satellite communications are of particular importance as they are less costly and more satisfactory than either cable, microwave, or UHF. Mongolia does now have a telephone system which links all parts of the country but it is not automatic. Upon completion of the receiving earth station (which should be in 1970) he indicated that they hoped to complete a sending station by 1973.

When asked for comments or impressions on the work and progress of the Conference, Mr. Garam-Ochir cautiously limited himself to stating that he felt it too early to be able to make a meaningful appraisal and he could not yet judge the likelihood of the Conference reaching final agreement by March 21.

He and Mr. Khashbat, who acted as interpreter, are returning to New York, Friday, February 7 and at his request, Conference documents will be sent to him in care of the Mongolian UN Mission. He expects to return to Ulan Bator about March 20 and thought it unlikely unless there were some special need that he would be returning to the INTELSAT Conference.

Mr. Garam-Ochir received his training in the USSR as a telephone engineer, but without formal study has since sought to become a radio and general telecommunications engineer. He is from Ulan Bator and speaks Russian, Georgian and Mongolian. His wife is Georgian. They have a four-year-old daughter who, he proudly says, also speaks all three languages.

cc: Ambassador Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)
EA - Mr. Wm. Thomas
EA/ACA - Mr. Kreisberg

US DEL:WPAllen:bl
3/6/69

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

MAR 5 1969

TO : ComSat - Mr. John A. Johnson

FROM: INTELSAT - Frank E. Loy

The French are stating to a number of Delegations that the costs to them of the communications they need would be less under Project Symphonie than under the INTELSAT system. This becomes clear from my conversations with the Lebanese as well as from Mr. Bingham's memcon dated February 26 of his conversation with a delegate of Senegal. See also the memcon of the conversation between Mr. Jordan and Ambassador Marks of February 26. They are also saying this to various Francophone countries in their capitals.

The argument seems to be based on the proposition of the lower costs of a directed beam system utilizing smaller, cheaper earth stations.

Could ComSat prepare a talking point paper concerning this subject that would answer the French claims, and that would also indicate what traffic level (i.e. circuit requirement) will be needed in, let us say 1970, to warrant developing countries using INTELSAT earth stations for their various international needs. We have talked in the past about 6, 12 or 24 channels. It seems to me the French argument is relevant in two contexts. It is intended to and may dissuade some Africans from joining INTELSAT for the time being; and it may make some Africans believe that the right to establish relatively unlimited regional systems linking Africa and the Near East with France, not subject to any INTELSAT constraints, is in their strong interest.

cc: INTELSAT - Amb. Marks
Mr. William Miller
FCC - Mr. Ende
ComSat - Mr. Colino

INTELSAT:FELoy:fbp

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Dr. Madan Gopal Kaul, Minister of Indian Embassy
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (Comsat)
Mr. Richard Colino (Comsat)

At the request of Dr. Kaul of the Indian Delegation, Mr. Colino and I met with him on March 5 to discuss Document 1/26 submitted by the Delegations of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and India. We based our comments on the paper dated March 5 by Mr. Colino and simply raised questions and concerns expressed in that paper, as well as indicating general agreement where possible. Dr. Kaul said the discussion was useful and he would go back to his delegation with the questions and comments we had made and would, in due course, attempt to clarify them if possible.

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Samuel H. Butler, Observer for Liberia
Mr. H. A. Bingham, COMSAT

In a general lunch discussion with Mr. Butler, I was informed that the African countries in joint meetings together have expressed a certain degree of feeling that the manager should be internationalized. In addition, the feeling has been expressed frequently that the role of COMSAT is too dominant in the voting process.

I asked Mr. Butler whether he felt the efficiency of the organization would not suffer if the manager were internationalized, and he stated that it probably would suffer. Moreover, he went on to say that generally the African countries would like to see the organization continue with a commercial orientation and remain an efficient, pragmatic enterprise, but that somehow the role of COMSAT should be less dominant under the definitive arrangements.

He implied that the African nations probably would be happy if COMSAT's vote were reduced below 50 per cent and if COMSAT were not named expressly in the agreements as manager. Then, he felt, the manager might be a private corporation such as COMSAT under contract to INTELSAT which contract could be terminated at the discretion of the Governing Body, upon notice.

Generally there is satisfaction on the part of the African countries regarding the job COMSAT has done in the past, but they are concerned about tying themselves into a continuing arrangement with COMSAT expressly.

He said that the Africans seem to agree with the U.S. position that there should be equal voting in the Assembly and weighted voting in the Governing Body.

HAB

H. A. Bingham

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: UAR, Afghanistan, and Other Delegations
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (U.S. Delegation)

SUBJECT: Reaction to Draft Agreements

I have tried to ascertain the views of the UAR, Afghanistan, and several other delegations with respect to the U.S. draft agreements that have been circulated. Each of these delegations stated that they had not had a chance to study the agreements but would do so and talk with me again. Most of these conversations occurred on March 3.

cc: Amb. Marks
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LDB

US DEL:LDBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

Tues. a.m.
March 4, 1969

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Nigerian Alternate Representative
Mr. H. A. Bingham (Comsat)

The Nigerian Alternate Representative discussed his one reservation to the U.S. draft Intergovernmental and Operating Agreements as follows:

(a) he admitted ignorance as to the intention of paragraphs 226 and 227 of the ICSC Report (also Article VIII(e) of the U.S. draft Intergovernmental Agreement, Doc. 10).

(b) when advised that this language would simply empower INTELSAT to provide satellite services for national security or military purposes (in the case of paragraphs 226 and 227) or a Party to establish satellites for such purposes (in the case of the U.S. draft), he stated that he certainly could see no objection to this language if that is its meaning in each case.

cc: Amb. Marks
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H.A.Bingham/bk

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Toki Hachifuju (Delegation of Japan)
Mr. Piero Fanti (Delegation of Italy)

Mr. Lucius D. Battle (Delegation of U.S.)
Mr. John A. Johnson (Delegation of U.S.)

Mr. Johnson and I had a brief talk with Mr. Hachifuju of Japan and Mr. Fanti of Italy. They urge that the U.S. be adamant on a limited function for the Assembly and that we resist any effort to remove powers from the Governing Body and put them into the Assembly.

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:LDBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Toki Hachifuji (Delegation of Japan)
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (Delegation of U.S.)

Mr. Hachifuji (of Japan) came out of the meeting of Committee I this morning to see me. He said that he had asked to see General McCormack but would talk with me instead. He referred to the fact that the U.S. agreements circulated indicate flatly that we want COMSAT to continue as manager. He said that while Japan agreed with our goal, the Japanese did not consider it wise to so indicate in the body of the agreement. The Japanese prefer to follow the line of the ICSC Document and to refer to management by a single entity in the context of a 3-tiered organization. To this basic agreement would be added a supplemental agreement indicating COMSAT would continue for a fixed period of years. He said that the Japanese would speak along these lines and he wanted to be sure that we understood what was in their minds.

He also asked that I inform the other members of our delegation of the Japanese attitude. I said that I would do so.

cc: Ambassador Marks
General McCormack
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:LDBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Atsuhiko Yatabe (Delegation of Japan)
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (Delegation of U.S.)

SUBJECT: Reaction Concerning Draft Agreements

I talked briefly this morning with Mr. Yatabe of Japan. I asked what reaction he had heard from various delegations concerning the release by the U.S. of the draft agreements. He said he felt the reaction was favorable and that delegations now had something specific and overall to address themselves to. He considered it helpful that we had taken this step.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:LDBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BATTLE

Subject: New Zealand - Conversation with Mr. A. W. Brockway, Director, Overseas Telecommunications Services, and Mr. L. D. Bewley, Assistant Engineer in Chief Post Office Headquarters.

1. The U.S. Delegation should make a strong pitch now for their continued position as Manager. The method of presentation should be palatable to the delegates but should be based on past performance, capabilities and anything else that could be thought of to prove the point. The New Zealand Delegates do not feel that an international body would be capable nor should be put in the position of Manager.

The New Zealand Delegation says that there is a strong movement afoot to internationalize the Manager activity and, unless something is done soon, this position will be crystallized and it will be difficult if not impossible to swing the Office of Manager back to the United States.

2. I was asked how much importance Comsat was putting on the efforts towards weather satellites, aeronautical satellites and meteorological satellites and other programs. Before I could comment, the delegate stated that he felt that at this point in time during the conference we should not push these outside activities but rather should confine the most of our activities to the primary purpose -- commercial traffic over the present system. If Comsat wants to pursue these outside programs and bring them into the INTELSAT committee meetings as the projects develop, this is acceptable. It appears that the idea is not to bring into the conference any of these side issues.

cc: Mr. Gribble

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RBRandle/bk

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BATTLE

Subject: Indonesia - Conversation with Major General Rubiono Kertopati, Chairman, Telecommunications Council

The General has the strong impression that the U.S. Delegation is not for a regional satellite system nor are they for the domestic satellite system. The result is that he, the General, feels that he must push for these systems not only for Indonesia but also for Southeast Asia.

I attempted to convince him that Comsat was not opposed to these systems. The only desire was that any regional system be compatable with the INTELSAT system and be able to work into that system. It is also the desire of the U.S. that anyone desiring either a regional or domestic system would pay for the satellite involved in such a system and, of course, the ground stations.

cc: Mr. Gribble

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RBRandle/bk

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. O. H. Mohammed (Delegation of Pakistan)
Mr. Lucius D. Battle (Delegation of U.S.)

I talked with Mr. Mohammed (of Pakistan) at his request just before the Working Group of Committee I met this afternoon.

Mr. Mohammed said that he was concerned that the word "international" was popping up in the Preamble and in general usage in a manner which suggested to him that domestic services would be subordinate to the international services. Moreover, he had noted that Canada had proposed that domestic services purchased by a country from INTELSAT would not increase its share of the total structure. He expressed the hope that I would do what I could to alert the U.S. Delegation to this problem and to return to the use of single global system leaving out the word "international."

I told Mr. Mohammed that we had not used international in the context that disturbed him. Moreover, we considered any services purchased from INTELSAT properly to be part of its investment share. I agreed however to talk with the U.S. Representative on the Working Group before the Committee meeting and to alert him to the fears of the Pakistanis on this point.

I told Mr. Asher Ende of the foregoing and arranged for him to talk with Mr. Mohammed just before the meeting.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:LDBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 3, 1969
Time: 11:30

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Dr. Nicholas C. Kariambas, Delegation of Greece
Dr. Costa P. Caranicas, Delegation of Greece
Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Delegation of U.S.

I talked for a few minutes this morning with the two listed members of the Greek Delegation. I asked whether they had had an opportunity to go over the draft agreements which we had circulated over the weekend and said I would be grateful for their reaction.

Dr. Kariambas said that he had studied the proposals and had talked with several members of the European delegations about the agreements. The reaction, except for the U.K. and one or two others, is extremely negative. The general opinion is that the documents had been circulated too early and they could not even be accepted at this time as a basis for discussion. At least one delegation has asked for additional instructions from his government and the U.S. will find no country in the European delegation eager to proceed on the basis of these documents at least at this time.

cc: Amb. Marks
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LCB

US DEL:LCBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

March 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Clas Nordstrom, Delegation of Sweden
Ambassador John Hayes, Delegation of U.S.

I spoke for a few minutes with Mr. Clas Nordstrom of Sweden. He made the following five points:

1. Mr. Nordstrom wanted to express his appreciation that the U.S. had distributed its working paper so early. He said it is very fair for the U.S. to have done so because even though Sweden disagrees with many of the American positions, the action of the U.S. Delegation in releasing its paper now makes it possible for the Conference to proceed much more expeditiously in the full knowledge of where the U.S. Delegation stands.

2. He is concerned lest the U.S. Delegation and others think the Swedish position is "anti-American." He wished to point out that this is not the case.

3. He is equally concerned that an impression might have arisen that the Swedish position is "anti-COMSAT." In this connection, Mr. Nordstrom states that this impression is not so and he will in the course of this Conference make a public acknowledgement as to the efficiency of past COMSAT operations.

4. Sweden regrets that it could not serve as a member of the current Working Group for Committee I but would like very much to serve as part of the Working Group to be set up to deal with "structure."

5. Insofar as the future of COMSAT is concerned, the Swedish position is that it is extremely unlikely any other group will have the technical competence of COMSAT, and for his part Mr. Nordstrom would be willing to see it continue in its technical operating capacity. However he does not believe it should be built into the "constitution" of the new organization which he hopes will emerge from this Conference. He would not, however, object to seeing COMSAT spelled out in some "codicil" in the hoped for new agreement.

US DEL:JHayes:bl

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date of Meeting: March 1, 1969

Participants: Mr. Moshe E. Berman, Representative of Israel
Mr. Asher Ende, U.S. Delegation

On Saturday afternoon, March 1, Mr. Berman of the Israeli delegation approached me to discuss one phase of the U.S. draft agreement (Document 10). He expressed concern that our agreement seemed to indicate that as soon as the definitive arrangements became effective, investment shares would be recomputed on the basis of the previous year's use of the space segment. He indicated that Israel and many other smaller countries which have joined INTELSAT and received quotas under the interim arrangements do not yet have and will not have earth stations operational for some time. He felt that it would not be proper to substantially reduce the quotas of such countries from their present levels to .05% upon becoming effective of the definitive arrangements. He felt that instead there should be a reasonable transition period before such reallocation of investment shares took place. In this connection he noted that many countries expected to have operational earth stations in the period 1970-1971. Thus, he pointed out, their investment quotas could be substantially reduced for a realtively short period of time and then increased again as their earth stations became operational and they made substantial use of the space segment. He stated that insofar as his country is concerned actual experience indicates that their share of international traffic will considerably exceed that upon which their quota was based. Finally, he stated that there was an elementof inequity involved in the case of a country which for five years had invested in accordance with its original assigned quota at a time when INTELSAT operations were not profitable to now find itself relegated to an infinitesimal percentage because its earth station was not yet operational.

I thanked Mr. Berman for his views and told him I would convey them to the U.S. delegation for consideration.

Asher Ende

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COMSAT

Date: March 1, 1969

To: The Executive Committee

From: William D. English

Subject: Committee II - Legal Status

There are several points which I would like to make with respect to the consideration of legal status in Committee II and in its Working Group.

1. Legal status cannot be considered as an isolated, esoteric legal issue. Five representatives have urged establishment of an international legal entity. These proponents are, in my view, projecting the concept for one purpose only, to provide a basis for shifting the control and management of the organization from the individual partners to an international civil service organization, with independent financing and ownership capability.

2. Mr. Nordstrom, the head of the Swedish delegation, candidly stated in the Working Group this morning, that the decision of whether to maintain the present legal structure can only be decided in the context of the important policy decisions to be taken elsewhere in the Conference. Mr. Nordstrom conceded that the present legal system is workable as a legal framework, but it is essential to establish a formal international structure which could act on its own, independent of the dominance of Comsat.

3. Therefore, totally apart from the taxation question, I would urge that no break in the U. S. position on legal status be indicated, either formally or informally, until there has been a final U. S. determination of the organizational structure of INTELSAT, including the management function. Further, I would like to emphasize that, as a legal matter, the joint venture structure can effectively accommodate any practicable organizational restructuring of INTELSAT. If anyone should feel a need of explanation on the latter point, I am available.

cc: Messrs. Charyk
Acheson
Doud
Greenburg
O'Malley
Small

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

O'Connell

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 28, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador A.F.K. Hartogh (Netherlands), Vice Chairman, INTELSAT Conference
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

I met this morning with Dr. Hartogh ostensibly for the reason of discussing his visit yesterday with the European Bureau. He was generally pleased with his reception at the meeting.

The conversation began to develop along the lines of "possible approaches" looking toward the "ultimate solutions" to "what appeared to be the major problems confronting the conference."

(a) Hartogh makes the strong observation that too many Americans talk of INTELSAT as though INTELSAT were "the United States." So long as this continues, it is difficult for Europeans to accept the premise that they have to seek "American permission" in the field of space communications.

(b) It follows from this that if INTELSAT could achieve an international"flavor" or "posture", Europeans then seeking to enter the space communications field would not be requesting such "American permission" but, rather, would be applying appropriately to a properly constituted international body.

(c) When there is discussion about a "European satellite" Hartogh feels that there are three pressing needs insofar as the Europeans are concerned: first, they seek to create a space industry; secondly, they wish the experience gained in building a communications satellite,

and thirdly, having put together the facilities and having gained the experience in building a satellite, they wish experience in operating it.

(d) Hartogh talked about "the possibility" that perhaps such industrial technology and operating knowledge could be gained through the use of a satellite limited to television service within Europe which would be built and operated as a regional European communications satellite (and with a small limited earth station within each European country) with non-television use a part of a universal INTELSAT system. Hartogh stated if this comes into being, it is logical then to think of such a satellite as a "domestic television satellite." He admits however that even though this position might pick up considerable European interest, there are as yet some Europeans who believe that if such a European satellite is construed as "domestic", it should be "domestic" within the same context as an American domestic satellite, assumedly servicing both non-television and television requirements within the United States.

Hartogh then raised the question as to whether a European domestic television satellite should be available to service Africa and Quebec. He believes Quebec is "unrealistic" but is one of the French objectives. Where Africa is concerned, Hartogh feels that if European-African traffic can be adequately handled by INTELSAT, there is no need to adopt the French position. At the moment, though, he is unclear as to whether the French, when they speak of African service, confine themselves to thinking only of television and not other "commercial" services.

Finally, Hartogh observed that if INTELSAT achieves "an international character" it would be far easier for such an international body to give the French a negative reply on Quebec and, if necessary, on Africa than if INTELSAT remains construed as, at present, "American."

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:JHayes:bk/bl

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1969

SUBJECT: European and U.S. Positions at INTELSAT Conference

PARTICIPANTS: A. F. K. Hartogh, Chief Representative,
Netherlands Delegation to INTELSAT Conference

D. I. Newman, CETS Secretary
Abraham Katz, Director, EUR/RPE
Stephen H. Rogers, EUR/RPE
Harry C. Blaney, EUR/RPE

COPIES TO: INTELSAT - Ambassador Hayes (2)
E - Mr. Loy
IO - Mr. Allen
EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy
INTELSAT - Mr. Gribble
E/TD - Mr. Miller
EUR/RPE (cc)

Mr. Hartogh is chairman of the caucus of countries belonging to CETS, the European Telecommunications Satellite Conference.

Mr. Hartogh expressed concern, which he said was widely shared among European delegates, about U.S. domination of INTELSAT. While this concern took different forms in different countries, it was fundamental and strong. For the Netherlands, it was commercial and technological; for France, political. This concern was reflected in European positions on voting procedures, ComSat's role as the INTELSAT Manager, regional systems, procurement, and the scope of services.

Hartogh said that, despite the existence of a CETS position, the Europeans did not completely agree among themselves on any single issue. Nevertheless, France, standing at one end of the spectrum of feelings, had considerable support, for instance, on regional systems. He thought France's stabilizing influence in its former colonies was a reason for extending European regional coverage to Africa. He had some doubts about including Quebec, but noted that France in this case was interested only in "cultural TV" and not normal commercial telecommunications traffic. He asked why the U.S. should worry about this kind of competition.

EUR/RPE:HCBlaney:dn 3/3/69
(Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM DS-1254
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Hartogh said there was a technical reason for a regional satellite telecommunications system in Europe. The CETS system would be adapted to European needs using mainly small ground stations compared to INTELSAT's dependence on relatively few, large ground stations. Mr. Hartogh suggested the CETS system might be also more appropriate technically for the African countries. However, he was not well versed in the technical aspects of the question, which he suggested Bignier of the French delegation could discuss.

Mr. Katz said there was no certainty that the U.S. would accept a provision for regional systems. Mr. Hartogh said this would make agreement impossible. Mr. Katz and Mr. Hartogh agreed, however, that full discussion of the issues and reasonable compromises should make a satisfactory outcome possible.

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Arne Raberg, Swedish Delegation
Mr. Asher E. Ende, U.S. Delegation

Subject: General Views regarding Conference, at the U.S. Reception Wednesday Night

I was approached by Mr. Raberg, who entered into general conversation regarding the conference and the Swedish proposal. In the course of this conversation, he indicated clearly that the PTT's could very well have accepted the U.S. approach if originally there had not been the Intergovernmental Agreement. He felt, however, and indicated that his view was shared by many PTT officials in Europe, that once an Intergovernmental Agreement had been established there was irresistible pressure for a one-nation, one-vote approach, at least in the Assembly, as well as a very strong thrust to internationalize the Secretariat. In response to a question of what could be done if the Managership were to be internationalized immediately, he indicated appreciation of the difficulties involved and said that a "very long" transition period would be necessary. I received the very strong impression that even in the European area many of the PTT's would have preferred a system not inconsistent with the ad hoc consortiums which have been established to plan, install and operate the transoceanic cables.

In other words, there is, in my opinion, a vast amount of latent sympathy among PTT and operating officials for the

U.S. approach. However, all of these individuals are apparently under strict foreign office constraints to favor the one-nation, one-vote approach, at least in the Assembly, which these foreign offices visualize as the basic policy-making group, as well as for an internationalization of the Manager.

Mr. O'Connell

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Clas Nordstrom
Alternate Representative of Sweden

W. T. Olsson
Advisor, Delegation of U. S.

On February 26, 1969, I had a very interesting discussion with Mr. Nordstrom from Sweden which helped me to better understand their draft agreement paper.

Mr. Nordstrom indicated the objective of the agreement paper was to present a formulation of a politically feasible institutional framework which would attract the Soviets and others to join in the Consortium.

The essence of Mr. Nordstrom's remarks about the draft paper are summarized below:

-- His view that the Intergovernmental Agreement is the political "facade" which serves to establish membership in the Consortium (club), and that it is designed to mask the true contribution of the real work which would be treated in the Annex A element of their paper.

-- His idea is that the implementation of the goals set by the Intergovernmental Agreement, as a practical matter, should be done by competent industrial activities like the proposed "International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation."

-- He believes in the idea of the Single Global System and that Sweden purposely avoided the issue of "Domestic and Regional Systems" in their paper.

-- He recognizes the competence of COMSAT and that for practical reasons the Consortium will need COMSAT to carry out the implementation effort.

-- He feels the Swedish proposal for an "International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation" is a logical institutional mechanism for the work of COMSAT.

I thanked Mr. Nordstrom for his explanation of the concept of the Swedish proposal and wished him well during his stay in Washington and work in the Conference.

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

Tom

US DEL: WTOLSSON: bks

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Memorandum of Conversation

February 27, 1969

Participants: Erik Andersen, Danish Delegation (Assistant Department Head, Danish Foreign Office)

William K. Miller, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Swedish Draft Agreements

Mr. Andersen said the Swedish drafts are Mr. Nordstrom's personally. He said he and others, at a pre-conference Scandinavian meeting, had tried to talk Nordstrom out of submitting the drafts. His objection was not to submitting a draft but to the content and, particularly, to the extent of power which Nordstrom's draft would give to the Assembly. Andersen said he thought, and be believed most of the Europeans thought, the real power should rest with the Governing Body.

WKMiller:alk

Memorandum of Conversation

Orlando, Florida
February 27, 1969

Participants: Fernando Franco Feijo, Portuguese Delegation

William K. Miller, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Portuguese Concern re Traffic with Overseas Territories

With reference to earlier conversations of the Portuguese Delegation with Ambassador Marks, Ambassador Hayes, Mr. Loy and me, I said we had discussed the Portuguese thoughts further within the U.S. Delegation and we think it would be a mistake to take any positive action along the lines they were considering regarding the priority of domestic traffic and membership for the overseas territories.

The first Portuguese idea was to seek a provision specifically giving domestic traffic equal priority with international traffic. The second was to say that "members of the ITU" (to include Portugal's overseas territories) rather than "States members of the ITU" could join Intelsat.

I made the following points:

1. There has been no problem up to this time with regard to the status of domestic traffic (i.e., it is not regarded as lower priority) and we see no reason to think there will be a problem.

2. This is especially true since we believe there will be plenty of capacity.

3. The U.S., which is already a heavy user, Pakistan, with east and west wings, and the UK, with an earth station projected in Hong Kong, all have a strong interest in "domestic"

traffic and could hardly tolerate second-class treatment for domestic traffic. Neither the U.S. nor (I thought) the UK had seen any need for Intelsat membership for overseas territories.

4. To raise the matter at all could give rise to a political or politically motivated struggle which would be in no one's interest. It would be obvious why the wording changes were raised, even if, or especially if, the Brazilian representative took the initiative (as he told me he was willing to do with respect to the priority question).

5. If someone is going to challenge Intelsat communications between Portugal and Angola/Mozambique, the motive will be political, and the Governing Body will be a less political forum than this conference.

I also said (with reference to 2 above) that I wanted to talk further with Comsat and then with Mr. Feijo in the light of the figures he produced from the TAT-5 debate, showing Atlantic capacity fully utilized in 1975.

Mr. Feijo said he was inclined to give a great deal of weight to these arguments. He asked if we had talked with the British. He thought they were inclined to support the idea of equal priority for domestic traffic, but was not sure they had really thought it through. He asked that I do so, and I said I would.

WKMiller:alk

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: His Excellency Rudolph Hartmann, Federal Political Department, Bern (Switzerland)
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Timing of Introduction of American Draft Agreement; Swiss Support for an International Secretariat; and the "Care and Feeding" of Dr. Steiner

Mr. Hartmann suggested that introduction of the U.S. draft this week might be taken by other delegations as an indication of U.S. desire to impose its position. He added it might be more appropriate to wait until the early part of next week when other delegations would have had the opportunity to begin putting forward their views.

Mr. Hartmann indicated that the Swiss will shortly introduce discussion of an international secretariat; they will not, however, press this formally at this time. They plan to wait until their proposal can be introduced as a compromise of other eventual proposals on this issue.

Mr. Hartmann voiced discomfort over the unfavorable impression Dr. Steiner of the Swiss Delegation had been causing. He said that Steiner would be calling on General McCormack and others to assure them of his desire to be cooperative.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador A.F.K. Hartogh (Netherlands),
Vice Chairman, INTELSAT Conference
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

Ambassador Hartogh told me this morning that there had been some discussion within the Credentials Committee as to the Chairmanship. Ambassador Fay of Ireland had been suggested but there is some question as to whether or not he will be available. Hartogh asked my reaction to the selection of Turkey for the Chairmanship. I told Hartogh that certainly from our viewpoint either Ireland or Turkey was acceptable. I did take the liberty of pointing out however that there were certain advantages to Turkey's assumption of the Chairmanship. Hartogh then said he would speak to Turkey as well as to Ireland.

Subsequently, he told me he had discussed the matter with Turkey and that he had been informed there would be talks within the Turkish Delegation on this subject.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Samba N'Diaye (Delegation of Senegal)
Mr. H. A. Bingham (Comsat)

I discussed the following subjects with Mr. N'Diaye this afternoon: (a) voting in the Governing Body of the definitive INTELSAT organization; (b) regional satellite systems.

Concerning the voting power of member nations, Mr. N'Diaye stated that the African countries would have a great deal of difficulty accepting a voting system which gave them individually a "meaningless" voice in INTELSAT. I explained to Mr. N'Diaye that the organization would under the United States proposal have a varying vote from year to year for each country depending on each country's use of the system and that the votes of the developing countries could only go up in future years while the votes of developed countries would necessarily decline in relative weight. I also explained that the U.S. position was that no government should have over 50 per cent in weighted voting power.

On second subject above, Mr. N'Diaye said that he had discussed this subject with the French Delegation at lunch and that he felt that it was desirable to join a regional system if the charges for satellite circuits were lower than those of the global system. It was his understanding that the charges in the French-German system would be much lower since the cost of the system would be lower. I pointed out that the French-German system would only provide circuits to other countries within that system and that 67 countries were already joint owners of

INTELSAT and would obviously use INTELSAT. Therefore, Senegal would have direct access to far more countries in the global system than in the regional system. Moreover, I pointed out that the charges in INTELSAT per circuit would decline rapidly as the larger satellites increased the traffic and revenues of the system and that the charges for circuits in the system were moderate already.

Mr. N'Diaye asked the value of having an efficient world-wide system with maximum participation which spreads out the cost of the system among many nations. He seemed particularly impressed by the argument that the participation in INTELSAT by so many countries at present assured maximum direct access through the INTELSAT system and that there could be a competitive effect from regional systems which would reduce the efficiency of satellite communications.

Although he had not been well acquainted with the INTELSAT organization on Monday, Mr. N'Diaye had definitely been hearing the French arguments against Senegalese participation in the last two days. He frankly volunteered that he had lunch with part of the French delegation.

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HABingham:bsl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Chemali, Delegation of Lebanon

Ambassador Marks, Delegation of U.S.
Mr. Battle, Delegation of U.S.

The head of the Lebanese Delegation, Mr. Chemali, called on Ambassador Marks at the request of the latter for a discussion of problems before the INTELSAT Conference. Ambassador Marks asked whether there were any difficulties which the Lebanese Delegation faced which could usefully be discussed with Ambassador Marks. Mr. Chemali said that since the Conference was only at its beginning he had no problems he wished to discuss at this particular time but would be grateful for an opportunity for further discussion should the need arise. Ambassador Marks urged that Mr. Chemali call on him at any time such a meeting would facilitate the work of the Conference.

Ambassador Marks then emphasized the great need for the Conference to proceed as rapidly as possible. He said that the work of Committees II, III, and IV should be able to be completed within perhaps two weeks. The work of Committee I would obviously take a longer period but every effort must be made for the Committees to meet promptly and to proceed with their work as rapidly as possible.

Mr. Chemali said that some delegations believed that the work of Committees II, III, and IV must await completion of the work of Committee I. Ambassador Marks agreed that some aspects of the work of Committees II, III, and IV were dependent upon decisions taken by Committee I, but that the major portion of the work of Committees II, III, and IV could be completed within a shorter time frame.

Ambassador Marks also touched upon the draft agreement which was prepared for the United States Delegation. Ambassador Marks asked Mr. Chemali his opinion on the distribution of the draft agreement by the United States. In particular, Ambassador Marks stressed that he did not want the distribution of the draft to be interpreted by other delegations as an attempt by the U.S. to impose its views on the Conference without any discussion of the issues involved. Ambassador Marks stated that the U.S. only wished to facilitate the discussions. Mr. Chemali stated that he did not believe that the motives of the U.S. would be misinterpreted, particularly in light of the distribution of a draft agreement by the Swedish Delegation, and he agreed with Ambassador Marks that submission of the draft agreement could enable the Conference to complete its work on schedule.

Mr. Chemali stated that he believed the Conference could complete its work on schedule, but he noted with regret that differences of opinion between Delegations of the United States and France had been apparent in the discussions of this morning in Committee I.

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US DEL:LBattle:bl

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. L. C. Jain, Delegation of India

Ambassador Marks, Delegation of U.S.
Mr. Battle, Delegation of U.S.

Mr. Jain called on Ambassador Marks at the latter's request for a general review of INTELSAT Conference business. Mr. Jain said that he was most eager to know the news of Eastern European countries and believed that many countries would want to know their intentions before moving too rapidly or too finally on decisions in which Eastern attitudes might be of great importance. Mr. Jain said that he had urged in a Committee meeting today that the Eastern European countries be requested to submit papers containing their views.

According to Mr. Jain, India wants a global system and not a series of regional systems. It does, however, hope for a specialized service (aeronautical, for example) in the years ahead in which there might be sufficient capacity for domestic services and even for service to nearby neighbors such as Burma and Nepal. Their primary purpose, however, in such a satellite would be for the specialized service and not for the regional or domestic arrangements even though these could flow from such an arrangement.

There were brief discussions of the legal problems, the organizational problems, and the voting arrangement during which the Indian Delegate referred favorable to a Canadian proposal for weighted voting.

Ambassador Marks, in response to Mr. Jain, said that he was concerned over the implication that the Conference

should await the Russian and Eastern European proposals before getting on with work essential for a successful meeting. While we would welcome Russian views, Ambassador Marks does not believe we should be deterred from moving ahead because we have not received them. The work of the next days is most important. Committee III should be able to complete its work in a couple of weeks and Committee IV in one week. Everything possible must be done to speed up Committees I and II.

Mr. Jain suggested that one-half day be set aside for Committee I which badly needs to get on with its work the most complex before any Committee. Ambassador Marks emphasized the need for punctuality in the beginning of meetings and said that he would speak to the Secretary General to be sure that meetings begin as scheduled.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:LBattle:bl

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Joao Aristides Wiltgen, Under Secretary for Communications, National Council for Telecommunications, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Ambassador Leonard Marks, Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Ward P. Allen, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Work of Conference: Brazilian Positions

1. Work of Conference. Mr. Wiltgen agreed completely with Ambassador Marks' assessment of the work of the conference and the vital importance of eliminating idle talk, political and other extraneous considerations, getting down to business. He readily agreed to persuade other delegations to this view and offered complete cooperation in expediting the conference.

2. Regional Systems. Mr. Wiltgen was firm in his opposition to the French position favoring regional systems. He puzzled at French motives. The idea that it might be for a French regional network with their former colonies or to permit the Soviets to have a regional system struck him as possible reasons.

3. Structure of Organization. Brazil is completely in accord with the three tiered structure with the Assembly in the role of an annual shareholders meeting and the Board of Governors having the same functions as the ICSC. However, the respective functions were not discussed in detail.

4. U.S. Draft. Mr. Wiltgen's reaction to Ambassador Marks' question as to whether the U.S. should table a complete draft was negative. He felt it would be preferable for

three or four delegations who agreed with us to present a draft rather than to have the U.S. do it alone.

5. Brazilian Communications Problems. Mr. Wiltgen outlined in detail Brazil's plans and programs for expansion, indicating they expect to put in some 800,000 telephone terminals in major cities within the next three years and to construct some 18,000 miles of lines within the next 24 months.

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Jose Soriano, Ministry of Communications, Caracas (Venezuela)
Ambassador Leonard Marks, Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Ward P. Allen, U.S. Delegation WPA

Subject: Work of Conference

In a short meeting in which Mr. Soriano indicated Venezuela had no substantive problems he wished to discuss, he responded to Ambassador Marks' question on Saturday meetings by suggesting it should be left up to each committee. Delegations will, of course, want time to meet within and among themselves and work out positions, but he thought perhaps Committe 1, which has the heaviest agenda, might preferably meet on Saturday and the other committees not.

As to the advisability of the U.S. tabling a complete draft on which Ambassador Marks sought his advice, Mr. Soriano was favorably disposed. He felt that if the U.S. Delegation explained to all the others they were doing this not in an effort to dominate the conference but in an effort to focus it, such a move should not be misunderstood. He suggested we point out that there has been no general debate and thus no opportunity for the conference to get a grasp of the whole complex of issues and that one other delegation (the Swedish) has already tabled a comprehensive draft. Thus, the U.S. would table its own simply as a "working paper" (implying it represented not the final U.S. views).

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Mr. O'Connell

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Augustin Jordan, Minister Plenipotentiary, Chief of Service for General Affairs, Foreign Ministry, Paris (FRANCE)
Ambassador Leonard Marks, Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

Subject: France

Mr. Jordan opened the meeting by stating that it was the French desire to see the INTELSAT Conference come to a successful conclusion. He wished Ambassador Marks to understand that France did not intend to delay proceedings but that there were certain objectives which France wished to secure. Mr. Jordan then stated there were certain areas in which France was in agreement with its European counterparts and certain other areas in which the French position was not similar to that of such counterparts.

The French are particularly anxious to secure some arrangement at this conference under which (a) the European space satellite industry can be developed, (b) the Europeans can have some experience in space communication technology, and (c) gain experience in the operation of their own satellite.

In this connection, Mr. Jordan states categorically that the French wish to proceed with the "Symphonie" project and that it is France's intention "one way or another" thus to come into the space field and to gain operating experience in a space satellite system.

The French are particularly anxious to establish some kind of satellite system under which an European satellite would be available to France for communication

with Quebec and the French speaking African countries. This position, Mr. Jordan indicated, was a French position and did not necessarily reflect an unified European position. One of the additional reasons which Mr. Jordan advances for the desirability of such a system is the relatively less expensive cost to the Africans in building an earth station in this system as compared to the cost of building those which would tie in to the current Intelsat system. He states that the present cost to an African country as part of tying into the world system is about two million dollars per earth station, whereas a station which becomes part of a regional system is "considerably less".

Ambassador Marks then enquired which are European positions with which France agreed. Mr. Jordan observed that these are in the area of "the international organization".

Returning to his discussion of a regional system which would encompass Europe, Quebec and the African countries, Mr. Jordan observed that, if necessary, the French would agree that traffic between Quebec and Europe would not be "commercial" but would be confined rather to a cultural television exchange.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:JSHayes/bk 2-27-69

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: His Excellency Rudolph Hartmann, Federal Political Department, Bern (Switzerland)
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

Subject: Timing of Introduction of American Draft Agreement; Swiss Support for an International Secretariat; and the "Care and Feeding" of Dr. Steiner

Mr. Hartmann suggested that introduction of the U.S. draft this week might be taken by other delegations as an indication of U.S. desire to impose its position. He added it might be more appropriate to wait until the early part of next week when other delegations would have had the opportunity to begin putting forward their views.

Mr. Hartmann indicated that the Swiss will shortly introduce discussion of an international secretariat; they will not, however, press this formally at this time. They plan to wait until their proposal can be introduced as a compromise of other eventual proposals on this issue.

Mr. Hartmann voiced discomfort over the unfavorable impression Dr. Steiner of the Swiss Delegation had been causing. He said that Steiner would be calling on General McCormack and others to assure them of his desire to be cooperative.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE February 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador A.F.K. Hartogh (Netherlands),
Vice Chairman, INTELSAT Conference
Ambassador John S. Hayes, U.S. Delegation

Ambassador Hartogh told me this morning that there had been some discussion within the Credentials Committee as to the Chairmanship. Ambassador Fay of Ireland had been suggested but there is some question as to whether or not he will be available. Hartogh asked my reaction to the selection of Turkey for the Chairmanship. I told Hartogh that certainly from our viewpoint either Ireland or Turkey was acceptable. I did take the liberty of pointing out however that there were certain advantages to Turkey's assumption of the Chairmanship. Hartogh then said he would speak to Turkey as well as to Ireland.

Subsequently, he told me he had discussed the matter with Turkey and that he had been informed there would be talks within the Turkish Delegation on this subject.

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Mr. O'Connell

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969
Time: 3:45 PM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ghulam Abbas (Pakistan Delegation)
Mr. Abdur R. Bashir (Pakistan Delegation)
Mr. A. Bruce Matthews (U.S. Delegation
Mr. Carl Reber (U.S. Delegation)

SUBJECT: Pakistan

The Pakistan Delegation had previously raised questions with Ambassador Marks concerning the investment/use concept. Ambassador Marks referred them to me.

Their specific questions were:

(a) How would Pakistan's cash payments under an investment/use mechanism with no utilization charge differ from investment/use with a utilization charge. They indicated that the idea of no utilization charge appealed to them because it avoided monthly payments and provided for just one large payment at the time of the annual adjustment.

(b) Would base share owners receive interest on their investment.

On the latter point, I indicated that we propose that base share owners receive interest on their investment.

On the first point, I indicated that the subject could be discussed more easily if we assembled a few numbers to stimulate the payments under both circumstances. It was agreed that such figures should be prepared using the year 1970 as an example, assuming earth station operation July 1, 1970, with 80 circuits between East and West Pakistan and

35 circuits to other countries. I indicated that we will prepare the figures and be ready to discuss them by Friday, February 28. They agreed that this would be helpful.

A. Bruce Matthews

cc: Ambassador Marks
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BMatthews:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969
Time: 10:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

At the request of Ambassador Roca (and since I was unable to find Ambassador Hayes), I spoke with the British Delegate of the Vice Chairmanship of Committee I. The Europeans will back Mohammad (Pakistan) and the United Kingdom will place the name in nomination (Commonwealth and all that).

Lucius D. Battle
Adviser, U.S. Delegation

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969

Time: 9:55 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Mr. O. H. Mohammad (Pakistan) has just informed me that he will accept the Vice Chairmanship of Committee I, if elected.

LB by mel

Lucius D. Battle
Adviser, U.S. Delegation

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969
Time: 9:45 AM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Marks (U.S. Delegation)
Mr. Abdelladim Essakalli (Morocco Delegation)

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Conference in Morocco

Ambassador Marks received Mr. Essakalli to discuss the Moroccan request for assistance in arranging a "seminar" conference in Morocco in October to take place in conjunction with the inauguration of Moroccan earth station. I participated as interpreter.

Mr. Essakalli requested a list of names of participants and advice on the arrangements for the conference. Ambassador Marks questioned Mr. Essakalli concerning the purpose of the conference and was told that it would deal with the advantages and art of satellite communications generally. Ambassador Marks recommended that the conference should include the following three topics: (a) INTELSAT and its organization; (b) earth station technology and operation; and (c) the benefits of satellite communications.

Moreover, Ambassador Marks said that he would definitely provide a list of suggested names of U.S. Government, COMSAT and other American individuals who might participate. This list would be given to the Moroccan delegation prior to the end of the INTELSAT Conference. Mr. Essakalli has been informed that COMSAT would definitely participate in the conference and/or inauguration ceremonies although the individuals who would participate from COMSAT have not been selected.

Mr. Essakalli seemed pleased with the discussion and said he would relay the conversation to his Government.

It appears that the Moroccans envisioned inviting ministers from African and other countries, at the suggestion of Ambassador Marks, although the main audience for the conference and ceremonies will be Moroccan.

Mr. Essakalli was not in a position to say to what extent the Moroccan Government would pay the expenses of foreign participants.

H. A. Bingham

cc: Amb. Marks
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HABingham:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 26, 1969
Time: 9:45 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador Roca of Argentina (Chairman of Committee I) has spoken with Mr. Mohammad (Pakistan) about the possibility of the latter serving as Vice Chairman of Committee I. Mr. Mohammad said he would have to consult with the leader of his delegation (presumably the Ambassador) before he could accept. He has been asked by the Ambassador to sit for Pakistan in Committee I and Mr. Mohammad fears that this might be an awkward arrangement for him if he accepts the Vice Chairmanship. He will call the Ambassador immediately and report back to Ambassador Roca.

LB

Lucius D. Battle
Adviser, U.S. Delegation

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Battle

SUBJECT: Conversation with Nigerian Representative

At 1:45 today, Tuesday, February 25, I was informed by Mr. Bodede of Nigeria that:

1. Ethiopia had been offered support by the African Group for Vice Chairman of a Committee in addition to support for Nigeria and Kuwait, but Ethiopia indicated no interest in a Vice Chairmanship and the support was withdrawn.

2. The Syrians have stated they will not accept a position on the Credentials Committee.

3. Ethiopia will probably be supported for the Editorial Committee.

H. A. Bingham

cc: Amb. Marks
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HABingham:bl

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By ISCAP, NARA, Date 11/13/14

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Delegation: Mr. Minoshin
Mr. Aldoshin

U.S. Delegation: Ambassador Marks
Mr. Thacher

TIME: February 25, 1969, 11:00 a.m.

Minoshin called on Ambassador Marks and said he shared Marks' hope that the Conference would produce fruitful results.

In response to Minoshin's inquiry as to the status of the Soviet observer delegation, Marks said it was his earnest hope and desire that the Soviet Delegation would have full opportunity both to meet informally with all delegations and to place their views formally before the committees and plenary of the Conference.

Stressing the importance of maintaining open lines of communication, Marks said he was hopeful that the Soviet Union will find much in this Conference to interest it.

Minoshin responded generally by laying emphasis on international cooperation as forming the basis for communications systems between developing "entities" (as interpreted by Aldoshin). In the Soviet view it is important to maintain the right for existence of regional systems in addition to a system of global scope. At a later point in the conversation, Minoshin affirmed Soviet support for the concept of a single global system, but he urged that the conditions of the global system not be such as to make it impossible or difficult to develop communications between systems (which presumably would be less than global).

Minoshin repeatedly stressed the need to maintain equality between states. (It became clear he did not mean equality of access or use of the system.) Asked by Marks if the Soviet Union favored the principle of one nation-one vote, Minoshin responded by noting that in the INTELSAT system the manager is COMSAT which has more than a 50 percent vote in decisions. He

accepted Marks' point that the Intersputnik proposal includes the principle that each nation shares investment according to its use of the system. Minoshin also acknowledged the accuracy of Marks' observation that the U.S. uses the INTELSAT system 53 percent and therefore should have a corresponding share of investment. But he maintained that the profit, which he later corrected to mean share in management, should be based on the principle of equality among States.

Responding to the criticism of U.S. domination, Marks pointed out that on the 18-member Board the U.S. must obtain at a minimum the additional support of 12.5 percent of the ownership for decisions taken. He asked if the Soviet Union seriously contemplated unweighted voting whereby a State without technical competence or financial contribution would have an equal voice in management decisions.

Minoshin responded that Intersputnik starts on the basis of the principle of equality between States, the system of management can evolve with experience.

Marks commented that if the Soviet Union were to join INTELSAT, it would undoubtedly have a seat on the Board which would give it full opportunity to participate in the planning and policy decisions of the system. He again asked if the Soviets would want equal rights for lesser members. Minoshin agreed these were complex matters which should be handled by qualified experts but one must start, he asserted, on the basis of equality between States.

As time was running out, Ambassador Marks briefly outlined the U.S. proposal for an Assembly. Minoshin agreed with the point that a group of this size would not be good for taking management decisions.

Minoshin expressed his appreciation for what he considered to be a very useful preliminary exchange of views. At no time did he express any lack of satisfaction either as regards the treatment of his delegation at the Conference, or of the manner in which the Conference was proceeding. He was friendly throughout. (Aldoshin later commented that the chief of the Soviet Delegation, Talyzin, had been delayed for several days because of illness.)

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Battle, Adviser, U.S. Delegation
Kuwaiti Delegation

I talked with the Kuwaiti Delegation this morning and brought up their interest in having Syria on the Credentials and/or Editorial Committee. I told them that we had had difficulty in getting delegations to serve in these two committees which could be onerous. I asked whether there was any background to the request which I had heard was made to the Chairman. The Kuwaiti Delegation said that there was nothing to this except a simple desire to have their area represented as widely as possible and that nothing else prompted this initiative.

Mr. Bingham reports that the Nigerian representative stated on the same subject that the choice of the Syrian on the Credentials Committee was simply a matter of increasing area participation and that there was no intention to select a Syrian as such. (He added that there was little interest in membership in this Committee on the part of most delegations and therefore it was passed off to the first taker.)

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:LBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Participants: Mr. Battle, Adviser, U.S. Delegation
Morocco Delegation

The two representatives of the Delegation of Morocco asked to see Ambassador Marks urgently. Since he was not available, they asked to see me.

The King of Morocco has expressed an interest in holding a seminar in Morocco between October 14 and October 24, 1969 to coincide with their inauguration of an Earth Station. The Delegation would like to know as soon as possible whether we see any problem in connection with this suggestion.

I told the Delegation that we welcome the interest of His Majesty the King in communications and satellites programs and that off-hand I could see no problem but would like to have an opportunity to check the schedule for international meetings to be sure there was no conflict and that I would do so urgently and be back in touch with them.

They asked also for guidance on steps they should take in the event there were no conflicts with other international meetings.

I agreed to talk with them again, perhaps tomorrow.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:LBattle:bl

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Mr. O'Connell

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Member of Moroccan Delegation

The following information was provided me by Mr. Abdelladim Essakalli concerning the wishes of the King of Morocco to host a conference on satellite communications in Morocco next October 14-24:

The conference would run for 10 days but would include three free days for sightseeing. The present thinking is to have speeches on satellite communications and operations matters by visiting experts, including COMSAT participation. The conference would not be in the form of a seminar and therefore would not require a team of experts to give courses or lectures. Rather, it would include participants from administrations with experience in satellite communications and would be attended by participants interested in earth station administration, operational, financial and related questions.

Mr. Abdelladim Essakalli also stated that his government was solely interested in obtaining a firm commitment from the United States, including COMSAT to participate in the conference by giving one or more speeches.

H. A. Bingham

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

HABingham:bl

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INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador Fay, who heads the Irish Delegation, said we should not think that the CETS position is as firm and united as it might appear.

cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:JSHayes/bk

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Battle, Adviser, U.S. Delegation
Kuwaiti Delegation

The Kuwaiti Delegation informs me that they would like to be Vice Chairman of Committee III and that Nigeria would like to be Vice Chairman of Committee IV. They consider this important in order that the Middle East-African area be fully represented in the hierachy of the Conference.

cc: Amb. Marks
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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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cc: Amb. Marks
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US DEL:LBattle:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

February 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Augustin Jordan, Head of French Delegation
Frank E. Loy, Chairman, US Delegation

At the request of M. Jordan, we had lunch at the French Embassy (my devotion to duty knows no bounds). In a far reaching discussion of issues, M. Jordan stressed repeatedly that of all the issues they felt strongly about, the one he wished to emphasize was the need to provide a place for regional satellites, but particularly Project Symphony. At one point he indicated that while he had been unable to see President De Gaulle, he had talked to Couve du Muirville, who had personally stressed this matter. I suggested that we might feel quite different about a truly European satellite, but he stuck to his guns, France wanted a place for Project Symphony. (I leave out all the argumentation on each side).

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (For Distribution)

INTELSAT: FELoy: fbp

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Battle, Adviser, U.S. Delegation
Indian Delegation

I met with several members of the Indian Delegation and asked them whether the Asian Group has caucused and who the candidate of that Group will be for Vice Chairman. The Indian Delegation said they were the choice and that Mr. L. K. Jain will serve since he is Chairman of their Delegation. They will take care of arrangements for a nominating speech.

cc: Mr. Marks
SEC DEL (for distribution)

U.S.
~~INTELSAT~~ Del:LBattle:bl

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

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February 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: M. L. Gribble

SUBJECT: Committee Chairmenships

According to Bill Miller, the Australians (White) have decided to shoot for the Chairmanship of Committee III. The Europeans (candidate unnamed) intend to go after Chairmanship of Committee I.

cc: US DEL - Amb. Marks
US SEC DEL (For Distribution)

US DEL:MLGribble:bl

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTELSAT CONFERENCE

February 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Battle, Adviser, U.S. Delegation
Philippine Delegation

I asked the Delegation again whether the Philippines would serve on the Credentials Committee. On the understanding that it will take very little time, the Philippines have agreed.

cc: Amb. Marks
SEC DEL (for distribution)

U.S. Rel

INTELSAT DEL:LBattle:bl

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 22, 1969

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Vasco Vieira Garin — Portuguese Delegation
Jose Teixeira de Miranda
Fernando Franco Feijo

Frank E. Loy, Vice Chairman INTELSAT

The Ambassador asked me to consider the problem Portugal had arising out of the concept of the principle that the main objective of the definitive arrangements is to provide coverage for International communication services (ICSC report paragraphs 166 and 195). See also Article I of the Interim Arrangements and XIII(a) of our draft intergovernmental agreement.

Portugal is worried that it might wish at some time to establish or increase circuits between Portugal and its overseas provinces, principally Angola, and will then find that there is no capacity, because that will be considered as domestic traffic and all the capacity is taken up by international use.

It would be helpful to Portugal if "domestic" were defined not as in paragraph 161 of the ICSC report but as is described in footnotes (b) and (a) (in that order) to paragraph 161.

An alternate suggestion made by the Portuguese was that overseas territories should be permitted to become members of INTELSAT just as they have been permitted to become members of the ITU. (The overseas territories of the US, of the UK and France all have membership in the ITU. The Soviet Union is represented in the ITU by three States including Byelorussia and the Ukraine).

I told the Ambassador I had not considered this matter before but the US Delegation would consider it and get in touch with them.

INTELSAT:FELoy:fbp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

FORM 2-65 DS-1254

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IO:WPAllen:mlp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 21, 1969

SUBJECT: Conference Officers: Attitudes Toward US

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alberto E. Ham, Argentine Delegation
Mr. Ward P. Allen
Ambassador De la Colina, Mexico

COPIES TO:

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1. Roca as Chairman. Ham reports it has not yet been possible to consult widely enough so that Roca candidacy can be announced at the Heads of Delegation meeting Saturday. The LAs are thinking of having a caucus either late Saturday or Sunday afternoon at which time theyhope to work it out.

2. LA Vice-Chairman. Ham reports that Venezuela has announced its candidacy and its support by Colombia and Chile. When I informed de la Colina, he indicated that he had not yet done much campaigning but did not want to make a fight within the LA group and would be prepared to accept Venezuela if they were the majority preference.

3. US Chairmanship. Ham reported at length his conversation with Alegrett of Venezuela and an official of the Brazilian Embassy. They could not believe that the US would seek a chairmanship and Alegrett stated that if the US should do so they would "bring them down". Since the US is chairman of the conference it "cannot have" a committee chairmanship. They would go for a European chairmanship. When Ham insisted that it should not be a European, Alegrett indicated they would accept Bowie of Canada. They would not like White of Australia

but it would be more difficult for Europe to resist him than to resist the US. When Ham asked Alegrett why he did not seek a Committee Chairmanship, Alegrett replied that he did not want to be so tied down since he intends to "raise hell" and could not do it as a chairman.

4. According to Ham "nobody" believes that COMSAT will not be the power behind the US Delegation. The Europeans are spreading the word that COMSAT "is using" the State Department as its "front". Our Latin American trip is additional proof of this. The Europeans (unidentified) contacted Ham about the Latin American trip in December and requested that the Argentine government decline to receive us. Ham said he told them in effect to go jump in the lake.

5. Other Committee Chairmanships. Ham agrees the Europeans should not have either 1 or 1A. The Europeans would object to Japan for 1B and they feel Japan does not represent Asia. Ham feels that Laurson (Denmark) would be satisfactory. He also mentioned a Belgian as acceptable. He understands that Steiner (Switzerland) will seek the chairmanship of 1B.

Gen. O'Connell

IO:WPAllen:jag
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 20, 1969

SUBJECT: Organization of INTELSAT Conference

PARTICIPANTS: (2 separate conversations)
1. Amb. Eduardo Roca (Argentina)
Mr. Alberto Ham (Argentine Embassy)

2. Amb. Rafael De La Colina (Mexico)

Mr. Ward P. Allen
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (IO)

COPIES TO:

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1. Chairmanship of Committee I - Ambassador Roca, pleased that we want him for the post, is lobbying to obtain support and feels reasonably confident he can obtain it. He will ask for our help if he needs it. We agreed that to avoid the appearance of his being a U.S. stooge, we should not actively campaign for him.

2. Latin American Vice Chairmanship - De La Colina is working to obtain Latin American agreement to Mexico. Similarly, we will lie low until he requests our help. He too is hopeful. Brazil may be a problem.

3. Chairmanship of Subcommittee 1(a) - Each Ambassador indicated he would be happy to vote for the U.S. for this position. Each indicated, however, that it might be a difficult fight. Ambassador Roca and Mr. Ham are certain that some of the European countries will try to get the Chairmanship of either Committee 1 or Subcommittee 1(a). We agreed it was important to deny them either post and also important to avoid an incompetent Chairman. They promised to take discreet soundings to ascertain reactions to a U.S. Chairman of Subcommittee 1(a).

Each felt (De La Colina was more explicit) that unless we could be sure in advance of victory for the U.S. candidate it might

be wiser to back a representative from some non-European, like-minded country and each suggested Australia. (I suspect they may have discussed the matter between themselves.) De La Colina felt that launching a U.S. candidacy which would precipitate a fight with uncertain results would make it more difficult to rally support for a third candidate. He made the additional suggestion that the U.S. might seek the Vice Chairmanship of 1(a) since this would assure adequate Chairmanship in the absence of the Chairman and put the U.S. in a position at the Chairman's side to follow, guide and counsel him.

As one tactical possibility Roca suggested that Ambassador Marks could offer a complete suggested slade of Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen if it included Australia for 1(a) and this might be railroaded through. If, however, the U.S. were a candidate he felt it would be inappropriate for Ambassador Marks to propose a full slate.

4. General Debate - Both Ambassadors agreed that it is to be avoided if possible; each doubted that we could and felt that once a few insisted on speaking there would be a snowball effect which could only be arrested by the Thursday noon recess. De La Colina suggested as an alternative Ambassador Marks might propose that general debate statements be submitted in writing to be circulated as official conference documents.

5. Composition of 1(a) - Both Ambassadors stated that the Subcommittees should be open to all voting participants. De La Colina suggested, however, that for purposes of quorum and voting a time limit be set by the Chairman of Committee 1 within which each delegation would indicate whether or not it would participate in each Subcommittee.

IO:WPAllen:jag