


OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

Log In No. _____

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

To: Tom

From: Chuck 

Brief Summary of the Material:

Subject: Latest on Paul Nitze

Why it is worthwhile to read:

Because of your expressed interest in keeping up with the status of Nitze's nomination.

Washington Post
March 27, 1974

Nitze Out As Appointee For Pentagon

Paul H. Nitze will not be nominated as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, White House counselor Bryce Harlow said last night.

Harlow said the appointment "would be extremely controversial to people extremely important to the President."

However, he said that the appointment, recommended by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and opposed by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), was not being held up because of the controversy over impeachment.

There are a number of Senate and House members "who are violently opposed" to the nomination, Harlow said.

Schlesinger was counting heavily on Nitze an experienced specialist in defense and diplomatic affairs, to help him run the security affairs office. That office is the Pentagon's mini-State Department, and Nitze was widely viewed within the Pentagon as being one of a few officials who could help relieve some of the burden on Schlesinger in terms of defense-related foreign policy matters.

Though objected to by Goldwater, it was widely held that there were enough votes on the Senate Armed Services Committee for Nitze's confirmation. Similarly, though Nitze has worked primarily for Democratic administrations, he has served the Nixon administration for five years—without congressional objection—as a key member of the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4/29/69

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January 3, 1966

Memorandum for:

Mr. David L. Solomon
Office of the Assistant to the Executive Agent
National Communications System

Subject:

White House Working Group on Communications
Satellite Service for Less-Developed Countries

Responding to our telephone conversation of December 30, I am enclosing background documents relative to the Marks Task Force Study now under way. You will note that General Harold W. Grant and Mr. John Broger are participants from the Department of Defense.

Chairman Marks has asked that all information concerning this study be limited in its distribution. The existence of the Working Group is considered White House proprietary in nature.

I will be pleased to discuss the subject with you dependent upon your needs.

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NFC Waiver
By	SO NARA, Date 4/15/10



Fred W. Morris, Jr.
Associate Director

Encls:

- White House (Cater) Memorandum dated November 29, 1965.
- White House (Marks) Minutes of First Meeting of Working Group, dated December 3, 1965, with Attachment.
- White House (O'Connell) Memorandum dated December 22, 1965 with attached Memorandum for Record without Appendices.

FW Morris:dc

DTM

Morris RF

Morris " Comsat: Informational/Educational Study Group - Marks"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

4/7/69

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✓
✓
✓

Material possibly in other files as this does not appear to be very complete.

Antitrust ?
Copyright legislation ?
Cable ?
License renewal?
?????

checked for Alaska stuff ✓

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1974

TO: Tom
FROM: Chuck
SUBJECT: Paul H. Nitze

Reference your query. Paul Nitze's present job in the Pentagon is Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT. Nitze is presently in Geneva attending the SALT Talks.

SENSITIVE

Nitze is under serious consideration for ASD International Security Affairs. He is the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and his name is presently under the clearance process. (Regarding this you can talk to Jerry Jones or Dan Todd). Nitze will be at the SALT Talks for at least three weeks. During this time opposition, if any, from the Hill will probably surface.

In addition to 10 years at State, Nitze has the following experience in the Pentagon:

ASD International Security Affairs under Kennedy
Secretary of the Navy under Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under
Johnson

I will be getting his biosketch which will provide more specific information. Nitze is 67 years old.

DoD

February 1, 1974

Mr. Thomas ^C Reed
Director
Telecommunications and Command
and Control Systems
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Tom:

In your search for some top deputies, the name of John (Jack) Torbet came to mind as a candidate you certainly ought to talk to.

Jack is presently Executive Director of the Federal Communications Commission, reporting directly to Dean Burch, and is generally responsible for management of the agency including coordinating all staff activities. He is an ex-colonel in the Air Force, well-rounded, personable, and very hardworking. Jack knows most of the members of the Armed Services Committee, and I believe he enjoys a pretty good relationship with them.

Jack is a Republican, was asked to join Dean Burch in January 1971; since Burch is now about ready to leave, he too feels he'd like to do something different. I have not talked with him recently, but I believe he would be interested in going back to Defense.

Sincerely,

/s/ Tom

Clay T. Whitehead

cc:
DO Records
DO Chron
Mr. Whitehead
Mr. Eger

Jeger/Whitehead:rah

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OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
January 30, 1974

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom

INFO: John
Bryan
Will
Charlie

FROM: Chuck 

SUBJECT: Defense Directive for the Director, Telecommunications
and Command and Control Systems (DTCCS)

I have been able to secure an informal copy of Defense's new directive on telecommunications. To provide quick reference to modifications, compared with the old ASD(T) directive, I have lined in yellow the significant changes.

It is evident that this is a much stronger directive. The responsibility for management of telecommunications and command control systems (including WWMCCS) and its applications of ADP technology rests clearly in the hands of the new Director. Under the old directive the ASD(T) acted as "coordinator in the area of telecommunications, including telecommunications for command and control." The new Director now has management responsibility for both. Operational direction remains with the JCS, the Services and Defense agencies. The scope of the Director's new responsibilities are described in much more detail than in the old directive.

Among other notable changes:

1. In addition to reviewing requirements validated by the Military Departments (MilDeps) and the JCS, it now reviews those of the JCS Chairman (for WWMCCS and NMCS).
2. The Director is assigned membership in the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB).

3. As before, the Director is a member of the Defense System Acquisition Review Council; in addition, he now co-chairs the Council when telecommunications and/or command and control systems programs are being reviewed.

4. OTP is referred to regarding the NCS and lead agencies, page 3 (B-2). There was no mention of OTP in the old directive.

I was able to get this advance copy of the directive on the assumption that it would not be reproduced and with the promise that this copy would be destroyed when official copies are available (within the next several weeks).

Atch.



January 17, 1974
NUMBER 5135.1

ASD(C)

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems

- Refs.: (a) DoD Directive 5135.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications)," January 11, 1972 (hereby cancelled)
- (b) DoD Directive 5100.30, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," December 2, 1971
- (c) DoD Directive 5105.19, "Defense Communications Agency (DCA)," September 18, 1967
- (d) DoD Directive 5100.41, "Arrangements for Discharge of Executive Agent Responsibilities for the National Communications System (NCS)," January 19, 1972

I. GENERAL

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, the position of Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, is hereby established with responsibilities, functions and authorities as prescribed herein. The purpose of this position is to help insure reliable, survivable, secure, cost-effective telecommunications and command and control systems for the Department of Defense and the National Communications System.

II. CANCELLATION

Reference (a) is hereby superseded and cancelled.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the following functional fields:

- A. Telecommunications.
- B. National Communications System.
- C. Command and Control Systems, to include the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

IV. FUNCTIONS

Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, shall perform the following functions in his assigned fields of responsibility:

A. General

1. Serve as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for telecommunications and command and control systems matters, and as a member of the WWMCCS Council.
2. Act as DoD coordinator in the areas of telecommunications and command and control systems.
3. Review telecommunications and command and control systems requirements validated by the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (for WWMCCS and NMCS) and other DoD Components to recommend, as appropriate, alternatives and priorities for their fulfillment.
4. Act as the DoD coordinator for those special telecommunications of a sensitive nature, e. g., those related to the support of intelligence functions.
5. Act as the DoD coordinator for general purpose radio navigation policy matters.

6. Monitor nontelecommunications and noncommand and control actions, with respect to their impact upon telecommunications and command and control systems plans and programs, and provide recommendations, as appropriate, to the cognizant staff assistant.
7. Serve as the DoD central point of contact on telecommunications and command and control systems matters for organizations external to DoD.
8. Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defense may assign.

B. National Communications System (NCS)

1. Serve as the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense in his role as Executive Agent, NCS.
2. Coordinate as necessary with all agencies participating in the NCS and with other lead agencies for specialized groups established by the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP).
3. Review progress in fulfilling NCS responsibilities and recommend to the Executive Agent, NCS, as appropriate, measures for improving the NCS and for securing efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.
4. Provide for the receipt and processing of requests from any agency having requirements for service from the NCS, to include determining feasibility, developing alternative methods of implementation, and recommending appropriate priorities.
5. Recommend NCS related tasks to be assigned to the Manager, NCS, or to other governmental agencies, as appropriate.

C. Policy and Planning

1. Develop, coordinate and recommend DoD telecommunications and command and control systems policy, including application of ADP technology to these areas.
2. Develop implementing directives to support approved telecommunications and command and control systems policy

Continuation of IV. C.

and to provide processes for telecommunications and/or command and control systems planning.

3. Join the Defense System Acquisition Review Council when telecommunications and/or command and control systems matters are discussed, and co-chair the Council when telecommunications and/or command and control systems programs are being reviewed.
4. Coordinate efforts within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to insure that adequate mechanisms exist for:
 - a. The development and procurement of integrated, reliable, survivable, secure and cost-effective command and control systems and means of telecommunications.
 - b. Achievement of compatibility between telecommunications systems and their related cryptomaterials.
 - c. The necessary interchange of technical information between interested agencies.
5. Serve as a central point for coordination and review of telecommunications and command and control systems plans and programs of the JCS, Military Services, and DoD Agencies, including application of ADP technology to these systems.
6. Serve as the OSD member on the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB).

D. Programming and Budgeting

1. Coordinate and provide recommendations on program/budget policies and procedures as they relate to telecommunications and/or command and control systems. This encompasses providing visibility for telecommunications and command and control systems in the planning, programming and budgeting process.
2. Coordinate and provide recommendations on telecommunications and command and control systems programs, budgets, financial plans and related financial management activity.

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Continuation of IV. D.

3. Serve as principal OSD witness before committees of the Congress on telecommunications and command and control systems programs/budgets.
4. Review NSA submissions on telecommunications security equipment and decisions with respect thereto for consistency with other telecommunications programs.

V. SCOPE

- A. The scope of telecommunications for which the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, has responsibility is delineated below:
 1. The Defense Communications System (DCS), as defined in DoD Directive 5105.19 (reference (c)), including transportable contingency assets for extension or restoral of the DCS.
 2. Camp, post, base, and station telecommunications.
 3. Fixed and/or transportable non-DCS telecommunications facilities which are not included in telecommunications equipment/systems considered to be organic to military forces/units.
 4. Telecommunications equipment/systems considered to be organic to military forces/units.
 5. DoD elements of the National Communications System (to the extent this category is not included in the DCS).
 6. Those special telecommunications of a sensitive nature, e. g., those related to the support of intelligence functions.
 7. Telecommunications security (COMSEC) equipment insofar as reviewing such matters for consistency with other telecommunications matters.
 8. Telecommunications for command and control, including directly coupled displays, consoles, processors, and other terminals whose primary function is telecommunications, and special subsystems such as Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN).

Continuation of V. A.

9. Teleprocessing equipment and procedural policy for on-line access to telecommunications systems by non-communications ADP systems within approved security policies.
 10. Areas indicated below are specifically excluded except to the extent necessary to establish radio frequency and communications security interface compatibility with other systems.
 - a. Sensors for intelligence, warning and surveillance; electronic warfare systems except for those affecting telecommunications; satellite telemetry and command systems except those affecting telecommunications vulnerability.
 - b. Telecommunications integral to weapons systems designed for and usually delivered with and as a part of the airplane, missile complex, ship, tank, etc., whose costs are normally included in the cost of the weapons system and which satisfy requirements that cannot be satisfied to the economic benefit of DoD by use of equipment developed and procured to satisfy other telecommunications requirements.
- B. The scope of command and control systems for which the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems has responsibility is delineated below:
1. Command and control systems of the WWMCCS, as defined in DoD Directive 5100.30 (reference (b)), including:
 - a. The National Military Command System (NMCS).
 - b. Command and Control Systems of the Unified and Specified Commands.
 - c. Command and Control Systems of the Headquarters of the Service Component Commands.
 - d. Command and Control Support Systems of the Department of Defense Agencies.
 2. Other command and control systems of the Military Services and Defense Agencies, except those excluded in paragraph V. B. 3 below.

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Continuation of V. B.

3. Systems indicated below are specifically excluded except to the extent necessary to satisfy requirements for telecommunications, communications security, and ADP compatibility and interoperability.
 - a. Command and control systems dedicated to the operation of surveillance, intelligence and warning systems.
 - b. Command and control systems used for the tactical control of weapons.
 - c. Command and control systems integral to weapons systems designed for and usually delivered with and as a part of the airplane, missile complex, ship, tank, etc., whose costs are normally included in the cost of the weapons system.
- C. Operational direction of telecommunications and command and control resources is not within the scope of the responsibilities of the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems.

VI. RELATIONSHIPS

- A. In the performance of his functions, the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, shall:
 1. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with DoD Components having collateral or related functions.
 2. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DoD Components rather than unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.
 3. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and advice with DoD Components, as appropriate.
- B. The heads of all Department of Defense Components and their staffs shall cooperate fully with the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems and his staff, in a continuous effort to achieve efficient administration of the DoD and to carry out effectively the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

VII. AUTHORITIES

The Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, in the course of exercising staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

- A. Issue instructions and one-time directive-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields of responsibilities. Instructions to the Military Departments will be issued through the Secretaries of the Departments or their designees.
- B. Obtain such reports, information and assistance from the Military Departments and other DoD Components as may be necessary to the performance of his assigned functions.
- C. Communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Directors of the Defense Agencies.
- D. Establish arrangements for DoD participation in those non-defense governmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.
- E. Communicate directly with all governmental agencies participating with DoD in those non-defense governmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.
- F. Establish procedural arrangements for the discharge of overall responsibilities of the Executive Agent, NCS.
- G. Request such reports, information and assistance from governmental agencies participating in the NCS as may be necessary.
- H. Communicate directly with all governmental agencies participating in the NCS and, after appropriate clearance, with representatives of other nations on NCS matters.

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VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

SIGNED

W. P. Clements, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Doc

Tuesday 8/21/73

12:00

COL. JIGGETTS:

Read your memo to Mr. Whitehead and his response was as follows:

Ask Col. Jiggetts to talk with Bryan Eagle and make sure that nothing will happen on that until we have made a recommendation -- preferably in September. But if necessary before that.

From your list of nominees, his choices would be (1) Mansur and (2) Starbird.

Judy

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 16, 1973

TO: Judy

FROM: Chuck Jiggetts

When Tom calls please pass this to him:

Names have begun to surface on Rehtin's replacement. People who appear to be in contention are:

Alfred Starbird (LtGen-retired) extensive communications background, former DCA Director and Manager, SAFEGUARD; present job, Deputy Director, DDR&E.

George Mansur

Harry Van Trees - Chief Scientist-Associate Director, DCA.

Dave Solomon

Howard Yudkin, Deputy Assistant Secretary in ASD(T).

Herb Benington, Acting Deputy Director, DDR&E.

Ben Oliver

The ones who appear to be real possibilities are Starbird, Yudkin and Mansur. At this point we do not know how much is pure speculation. I feel sure industry will make some inputs. Will continue to monitor. Do you have anyone you would like to enter for consideration?

↓
m. e. o. s. y. →
997
D. e. o. s. y.

D.C.

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 27, 1973

b

To: Tom

From: Chuck *[Signature]*

Subject: White Alice Communications

I have just been told from a reliable source that someone in Senator Gravel's office has leaked the story that OTP directed the Air Force to place the hold on RCA overbuilds of the White Alice System.

This is, of course, poppycock and I have assured RCA that it is not true. The Pentagon people and the Air Force people in Alaska know that such a story is ridiculous because they originated the hold in the first place. Nonetheless, I made personal calls to disassociate this office from the rumor. It is my understanding that Gravel plans to make some kind of public announcement this week regarding the White Alice controversy. I will follow up on this.

Attached is a draft of the answer to Governor Egan's letter from John Perry. The letter was sent on March 16th and was essentially the same. In it Perry explains in a lucid, straightforward manner why the White Alice transfer would not lead to increased rates or delay the modernization of Alaska's communications system.

Atch.

cc: Mr. Smith
Mr. Joyce
Mr. Lamb

*Eva —
Monthly Reading File*

DRAFT/Mr. Perry/SAFILT/ams/14 March 1973

Dear Governor Egan:

We in the Air Force have been studying the implications of your February 13, 1973 letter about the White Alice system with some concern. We fully understand your desire to assure that any transfer of the Department of Defense long distance communications business in Alaska, and the related communications equipment, be undertaken only if it is consistent with the best interests of the people of Alaska. Indeed, we also want very much to assure that any consolidated, commercially operated long distance communications system is as modern, efficient and economic as possible. If such a system is brought into being, the Department of Defense will be a very substantial customer of the system -- benefiting from its efficiencies, and paying for its inefficiencies.

Your letter of February 13th indicated briefly that your concern centered on two factors: (1) the possibility that a White Alice transfer would lead to increased rates; and (2) the possibility that such a transfer would delay the modernization of Alaska's communication system. We agree with

you that neither of these things should be allowed to happen, but we do not understand the concern of your advisors since the concept which we described to you in November included specific provisions to guard against either possibility.

In the first place, our concept specified that any offer to take over the White Alice system would be required to include a detailed analysis of costs and revenues, prepared by the offerors in a format to be developed by the Air Force in consultation with the APUC and other affected state offices. Our concept specified that each offeror's analysis must demonstrate that all costs of operation, including amortization of any purchased White Alice equipment, and an acceptable return on investment, would be recovered without having to increase rates. Thus, if no offeror could demonstrate that it could take over the White Alice business without having to increase rates, no offer would be responsive to the Request for Offers.

Secondly, our concept for White Alice transfer specified that the company taking over White Alice would buy only those parts of the White Alice system which it expected to keep in service

for an extended time. We specified that any White Alice equipment which the offeror wanted to use for only a short time and then replace could be leased, rather than purchased, so that the operator could decline to renew the lease, without further financial obligation, at any point in time when it was ready to install more modern equipment. Finally, our concept specified that the company taking over White Alice could reject entirely any piece of equipment which it did not need. These provisions for the purchaser to decide unilaterally which parts of the White Alice system to buy, to lease, or to reject, seem to us to be the clearest sort of provision to protect the commercial operator from being burdened with old equipment which might prevent or delay any desired modernization.

In contrast, we believe that the modernization and expansion of the Alaskan state-wide communication system would be accelerated by prompt action to include the government's business, and the useful portion of the government's communication equipment, in the commercial base, under APUC and FCC regulation. Moreover, we believe that the implementing request for offers, which we would prepare in close

consultation with appropriate state representatives if you concur with our concept, can and should be so structured as to assure the State and the Federal Government that any offer will be accompanied by supporting detailed information adequate to enable reliable evaluation of both defense and public interests before any decision is made as to acceptance or rejection of offers.

As I had told you when we met in November, very extensive work will be necessary to prepare a detailed request for offers implementing the basic concept which we presented to you. We do not feel justified in undertaking that workload until we know that we are implementing a concept acceptable to you. If you do concur in the concept, we would not only expect to work closely with State representatives in evolving and reviewing the Request for Offers, but also we would recognize that you are reserving judgment, as we ourselves are on whether any transfer should be made, until we can see and evaluate the offers submitted. When the evaluation of offers was completed, we would expect to seek your concurrence in any recommendation to the President of the United States

for transfer of the White Alice system to a specified private commercial operator.

Your letter, however, forces us to recognize the possibility that the State of Alaska may decide that it does not wish, at this time, to have the Department of Defense communications business and the public communications business consolidated into a single system responsive to the needs of both Government and private customers. In that event, we will have no real alternative but to continue operation of a White Alice system to meet military needs while the commercial system expands and modernizes separately, along such lines as may be considered appropriate to meet the growing public, non-defense needs. In describing our concept to you last November, I pointed out that, in spite of our confidence in the concept, we realized that we might not receive any offer acceptable to both the national defense and the State of Alaska, and that, therefore, we might have to continue operation of the White Alice system ourselves. We are still prepared to do that.

As I indicated when you called a few days ago when to discuss our deferral of further action to authorize overbuild

b the White Alice system, we had assumed that the commercial firm taking over the White Alice system would be the one to decide, in consultation with the APUC, how and when elements of the White Alice system should be taken out of service as modernization and expansion of the state-wide system enabled the commercial operator to meet both government and public requirements more efficiently and economically.

In contrast, if we are to continue operating the White Alice system as a separate defense system, we must make those decisions. Naturally, the commercial operator will be permitted to lease excess circuits in, and to over-build, those parts of the White Alice system which we decide to keep in operation to meet defense needs. You will recognize, however, that if the State of Alaska concludes that we should continue to operate our separate defense communications system, our obligation to minimize the cost of national defense to the taxpayers of the United States will require that we shut down any parts of the White Alice system not needed for purely defense purposes, and that we employ the components of the sites we shut down to meet defense communications needs elsewhere in the world.

To continue to authorize commercial overbuild of the White Alice system after we are aware that the State may desire us to continue separate military operation of the system, and before we have decided what segments of that system might be shut down, would be grossly inappropriate since costs incurred by the commercial operator in overbuilding any specific route, which become part of that company's rate base, would have been wasted if the Department of Defense then decided to shut down and dismantle that route.

As I told you in January we have not made any detailed analysis of total costs and total revenues for a commercially operated White Alice system because we think that the analyses received from offerors in the course of a competitive White Alice transfer effort would be much more meaningful and useful -- both to us and to the APUC. Our general review of the situation, however, disclosed that the total volume of Government and private communications through the White Alice system in 1972 would have produced revenues, at current RGA rates, only a few hundred thousand dollars below the total cost of operating and amortizing the White Alice facilities

to be continued. The foreseeable continuing growth of public communications should convert this slight deficit to a profit by July 1974 even if the purchaser is not able to operate White Alice more efficiently than we do.

In summary the Air Force believes that:

a. Both the Federal Government and the State desire a significant modernization of communications in Alaska;

b. At this time, when Government needs are stable but public requirements are growing, only the private sector can justify modernizing and expanding telecommunications in the State;

c. Substantial private improvements are unlikely as long as the Federal Government is operating its own separate system to meet Government needs;

d. Continued incremental overbuilding of the White Alice system is not a step toward modernization but rather a short term resolution of current requirements which, if anything, decreases the urgency of modernization;

e. The Federal Government should not be in the telecommunications business where private enterprise can meet the Government needs reliably and economically;

b
f. Adequate private capital will not be committed to bring about substantial State-wide modernization and expansion unless the White Alice business, and useful parts of the White Alice equipment and facilities are transferred from Federal operation to a responsible private operator;

g. Even after substantial modernization of the State-wide system, significant parts of the White Alice system will be needed to meet the requirements of the public as well as the Government; and

h. Since the White Alice system is not excess to Government needs, it can be transferred only under the Alaska Communications Disposal Act which requires that the Government be paid fair value for any property sold or leased.

The Air Force concept for obtaining offers to take over the White Alice system is consistent, we believe, with the above criteria; and contains clear and adequate safeguards: (1) against any increase in rates to the general public arising from incorporating the White Alice business in the State-wide revenue and rate bases; and (2) against any burdening of the commercial operator with property which

should be retired from service and replaced with more modern equipment in the interest of service quality and economy. Consequently, the Air Force continues to believe strongly that an early disposal of the White Alice system, in general accordance with the concept described to you last November, is in the best interests of both the Federal and the State Governments.

In view of our continuing belief that the concept for White Alice transfer which we have previously described to you will in fact fully protect the interests of the people of Alaska, I welcome your suggestion for further exploration of the concept. To this end, I would be happy to meet with you, together with the AFUC or such other state officials as you consider appropriate, either in Juneau or Anchorage at some mutually convenient time. To this end, I could be available to meet with you in Alaska at any time between the 10th and the 18th of April, or at any time after the 7th of May. Indeed, if you consider the matter sufficiently urgent, I could probably arrange a short trip to Alaska during the last week in March. Perhaps it is also appropriate to note that the AFUC is desirous of meeting with me on the overbuild

question. While I would be very reluctant to incur the time and expense for a trip to Alaska for that purpose alone, I would like very much to accommodate the APUC and would be willing to combine that meeting with a trip to Alaska to meet with you on the broader subject of White Alice transfer. If mutually satisfactory timing could be arranged, I could meet with the APUC in Anchorage (or conceivably in Juneau) either the day before, or the day after my meeting with you. In responding to the APUC, I will suggest such a combination trip and send them a copy of this letter to facilitate their consultation with your office on the question of timing.

Sincerely, yours,

Defense

March 23, 1973

Mr. Bernard Strassburg
Chief, Common Carrier Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Strassburg:

This is in response to your letter of March 13, 1973, concerning Comsat's applications for authority to construct a communications satellite system to provide communications services to the U. S. Navy and to commercial maritime interests.

You requested OTP's views on questions you asked of the Department of the Navy and the Department of State, concerning the national defense and foreign policy implications, respectively, of the Comsat applications. You also requested our views on the applications and Comsat's request for waiver of construction permit.

We have reviewed the Comsat applications, as well as the Navy and Department of State responses to your inquiries. In light of our review, OTP concurs fully in the Navy and State Department responses.

The Navy has significant need for the leased satellite service proposed by Comsat in order to continue research and development in the satellite communications field and to provide vital communications capabilities in the event of national emergency.

OTP also is in accord with the views presented by the Department of State, specifically including its request that the authorization to Comsat be explicitly

limited to the five-year design lifetime of the three-satellite system to be used to provide service in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

We note that Comsat has recognized the limited purpose nature of its current proposal. It is not expected to affect adversely the future deliberations regarding maritime satellite communications or the competitive conditions in the existing and future maritime communications industry. Indeed, Comsat has indicated a willingness to encourage the participation of other communications common carriers in the proposed service offering to commercial maritime interests.

For the foregoing reasons, we believe the interests of existing communications carriers can be adequately safeguarded and that there are compelling reasons to grant authorization to establish the Navy service and the commercial maritime satellite services proposed by Comsat.

Sincerely,

Henry Goldberg

cc: DO Records
DO Chron
Mr. Whitehead
Eva
GC Subject
GC Chron
Goldberg Chron

HGoldberg:pb:3-23773

PRESIDENT TO CUT MILITARY BUDGET FOR NEXT 5 YEARS

Seeks \$4-to-\$6-Billion Slash
for 1971 and Reduction
in Global Capabilities

'1½ WAR' PLAN BACKED

Preparations for One Minor
and Two Major Conflicts
Would Be Abandoned

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18—The Nixon Administration, after a nine-month, government-wide policy review, has decided to reduce sharply military spending over the next five years as part of a new, less ambitious global strategy.

For the defense budget currently in preparation, the Pentagon is urged to keep defense spending down to about \$71-billion to \$73-billion.

That is \$4-billion to \$6-billion below expected spending for the 1970 fiscal year, ending June 30, and substantially below the target figure the Pentagon had given the military services earlier this year as they drew up proposals for the next defense budget.

War Plans Trimmed

Projecting a more austere future defense posture, the Presidential decisions would:

¶Shift the emphasis of America's military capabilities to fight only one major war and one brush-fire war at a time, instead of following the two major and one minor war doctrine that has underlain defense planning for the last decade.

¶Recognize that the United States will run greater risks in meeting worldwide commitments with smaller forces, unless those commitments are reduced. After the Vietnam war is over, for instance, the Army is expected to drop back to substantially fewer divisions than it had before the war, or to reduce markedly the size of each division it keeps.

¶Retain sufficient strategic weapons so the nation will not only be able to retaliate and kill tens of millions of Russians if the Soviet Union initiates nuclear war, but also see that a gap does not develop in the actual amount of damage that each of the two powers is capable of inflicting on each other.

The decisions are outlined in two brief National Security Decision Memorandums. The principal one was distributed to key Government departments this week.

They are to serve as Presidential guidance on future budgets, starting with the one that goes to Congress in January.

Administration sources said the memorandums did not specify specific numbers of American troops to remain in Europe or Asia after Vietnam or the planes, ships or divisions the military might retain. Such decisions are to be made as part of the budget process itself, they said.

One senior official said the spending decision had been based more on fiscal than on strategic concerns. His opinion was shared by several planners in the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House who worked on the review.

"Underlying the thinking of many top people," this official said, "is the notion that we've become overextended. But we're not ready to really bite the bullet on reducing commitments, on deciding for instance that we can get by with fewer troops in Germany or Korea.

"We've been forced largely by the pressures of inflation plus a feeling that certain domestic programs ought to have a larger share of the budget, to make a defense choice largely based on cost. The fiscal tail is wagging the strategic dog."

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, in an impromptu news conference Thursday, hinted at the new strategic decision when he called unrealistic the notion that the United States could fight major war simultaneously in Europe and Asia and a small one somewhere else.

"We're probably in a position today," he said, "where we can handle [the] major initial impact of a war in Europe and give substantial support [to conflicts] in Southeast Asia and Korea."

Knowledgeable officials say the strategy selected this week is oriented toward fighting a war in Europe, but would train and equip the active divisions in the United States, making up the so-called strategic reserve, to be able to fight a major war in either Europe or Asia, but not both at once.

In addition, a small, fast-reaction airborne force would be maintained to move quickly to a small brush-fire war in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the world, they said.

This was one of five principal strategies the Administration considered. They covered a spectrum of average annual defense ranging from \$70-billion to over \$100-billion. The other options were:

¶The so-called Europe-only strategy, with only a tiny, token American military force retained in Asia and no major preparation of units in the United States to fight on the mainland of Asia.

¶The existing strategy of providing forces for "2½ wars." This would envision, after the Vietnam war is over, reducing the armed forces by 900,000 men to the 2.6 million man prewar level.

¶A "3½ war" strategy, having the capability of simultaneously fighting not only a big war in Europe but two in Asia—one in Korea and the other in Southeast Asia.

the bolstering of conventional war forces, particularly of troops and war supplies for the European theater, in order to reduce to a minimum the reliance on nuclear weapons in the event of war there.

Before the completion of the review, Pentagon officials said they were thinking of returning the Army to its pre-Vietnam

level of 16 divisions, from a peak strength of 19 divisions. But after that war is over, the new decision may require much deeper cuts.

A year-by-year budget projection is part of the two and a half page decision paper on general purpose forces. Two figures are given for each of the next five budget years, one based on the assumption that the United States will maintain a residual force of about 200,000 combat troops in Vietnam throughout the period, the other assuming a total withdrawal from Vietnam.

In no case does the spending figure, even though anticipating new inflationary pressures,

and a requirement to proceed with equipment modernization deferred during the Vietnam war, exceed this year's expected total of \$77-billion in expenditures.

One official said the Army may have to shrink to as low as 12 to 14 divisions. Another said the requisite savings might instead be achieved by stripping each of the surviving divisions of three battalions.

"We could still fight a division with only eight battalions," one official said. "And if the emergency was serious enough, we could quickly add three battalions from the Reserves, rather than have to call whole Reserve divisions and get them ready for combat."

Pentagon officials recall that when Robert S. McNamara came in as Defense Secretary in January, 1961, he asked what the nation's firm commitments were and how much force had been provided to meet them. He decided the forces were really not adequate and moved to bolster them.

At that time the so-called "2½-war strategy" was formalized. Three of the Army's 14 divisions were not combat ready, being used only for training recruits. They were made combat ready and other units were given the training chore. After the Berlin crisis that summer, two more combat divisions were added.

From that time on, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been instructed to submit budget proposals on the basis of being prepared to fight on two major fronts and one minor one at the same time.

100 Divisions Recalled

Military and civilian planners concede that budgetary constraints have always been a crucial factor in deciding how much defense was enough.

"After all, we had 100 divisions in Europe in World War II," one Pentagon planner said. "How could anyone say that 14 or 16 of 28 divisions would be enough in the event of another war?"

But, it was believed that nuclear weapons would make difference, first in deterring an attack, and secondly as a last resort for use if war broke out and allied forces were in danger of being overrun.

But Vietnam changed the calculations. As more and more divisions were poured into that fight it became clear that, should a war suddenly erupt in Europe, the United States would have to revert to a holding action in Vietnam and shift forces to Europe.

Thus, it was apparent the nation really did not possess the capability it thought it had.

Ranking Pentagon officials had previously been talking about reverting to the pre-Vietnam force levels, without really reordering priorities. Now the decision has been made to dip below those levels, and the orientation is now more toward European defense.

But the Administration rejected the single option that would have done away with any but a token force for Asian commitments.

Deterrent Plan Backed

In the strategic weapons field, the Administration's decision represents even less of a change than in the conventional force area.

Then new team has endorsed the previous strategy of deterrence based on the ability to cause unacceptable damage to the attacker.

But while Mr. McNamara and some of his associates believed that the ability to retaliate against a surprise attack and

kill about 20 per cent of the Soviet population — regardless of Soviet capabilities — should be enough to deter war, the Nixon Administration disagrees.

As the Russians continue to build up their arsenal of strategic missiles, the Administration has decided, as a matter of policy, not to allow them to develop a "disproportionate" strength.

Thus, if Russia achieves the ability to kill 40 per cent of the American people in a second strike, the United States would increase its capability to do the same, officials explain.

And, if an arms control agreement can be worked out, they will seek to insure that this kind of imbalance is avoided.

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dua

MAR 26 1973

Honorable Arthur F. Sampson
Acting Administrator of General Services
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405

Dear Mr. Sampson:

In reviewing the Government's use of telecommunications, I have been struck by the fact that we make relatively little use of commercial services. Most of the Government's needs are met by systems which, while leased in whole or in part from carriers, are specifically designed for use by the Government. While a few of these systems are unique, there is a degree of competition among many of these systems for similar types of traffic. These factors create a situation in which the Government's management of its own use of communications appears fragmented and ineffective.

The communications services used by the Government can be divided into two general classes. One is the class of services which are widely used and common to many agencies, where a broad community of interest exists among Government and non-Government users, or where the economic efficiency or "cost-effectiveness" of the service is a paramount consideration.

The other class of services consists of specialized networks supporting operational functions in which considerations of economy must yield to performance or security factors. These services have some characteristics in common, but often cannot be satisfied by systems designed to provide the most economical bulk services.

I believe that it should be the responsibility of the General Services Administration to assure that the Government obtains the first class of services, or "common services," in the most efficient manner, consistent with applicable laws and national policies. GSA should also identify instances in which an agency's justification for a specialized system appears to be inadequate and where a more economic alternative is available, and should notify the agency head of such situations with a copy provided to OTP.

While specialized systems have unique operational reasons for their existence, there are situations in which agencies with similar missions have separate but similar specialized systems. In each of these situations, a greater degree of coordination and joint planning for communications is desirable. To accomplish this, I plan to designate certain departments to take a leading role in coordinating specialized systems in selected mission areas.

I have discussed with Defense representatives a revision of the National Communications System so that it would serve as the coordinating organization for the National Security community. The Executive Agent, NCS, has developed a concept for doing this, and will be contacting GSA to discuss your role in that organization. During the coming weeks, we will be taking steps to define appropriate joint planning and coordination arrangements for other selected mission areas with specialized communications requirements.

In order to complete my recommendations to the President on this matter, I would like to know whether you concur in this statement of GSA's role in Federal telecommunications, whether the existing authorities of GSA are adequate for this role, and how these responsibilities would be carried out. Please let me have your views on these matters within 30 days.

Sincerely,



Clay T. Whitehead

cc: DO Records
DO Chron
GC Subject
GC Chron
Mr. Whitehead
Eva ✓

CCJoyce:DHall:CCJ:kraj:3-23-73

Cva
NCS

FEB 20 1973

Executive Agent
National Communication System
Washington, D.C. 20305

Attn: Honorable E. Rechtin

Dear Dr. Rechtin:

Over the past year, I have reviewed the history of the National Communications System, its accomplishments, its present status, and the needs for policy, planning and coordination for Federal Government communications. These matters have been discussed in the Council for Government Communications Policy and Planning. These reviews and discussions have convinced me that the proper role of the NCS needs to be more clearly defined, and that certain other planning and coordination arrangements need to be established.

The problems which resulted in the creation of the NCS arose from inadequate coordination and joint planning among the communications elements of the National Security community. The Communications Subcommittee of the National Security Council focused entirely on such problems during 1962. However, the charter for the NCS, the President's Memorandum of August 21, 1963, was not limited to National Security, but was left open-ended. This resulted in the belief that the purpose of the NCS was to bring about large scale, if not total, integration of government communications systems. This was reinforced by guidance from the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications in various correspondence from 1965 to 1969. The absence of a clear operational need or economic gain from such integration has blocked its accomplishment.

Rather than adopting total integration as the end objective, I believe it is better to divide the communications services used by the Government into two general classes. One is the class of services which are widely used and common to many agencies, where a broad community of interest exists among Government and non-Government users, or where the

economic efficiency or "cost-effectiveness" of the service is a paramount consideration. It is the responsibility of the General Services Administration to assure that the Government obtains such common services, in the most efficient manner, consistent with applicable laws and national policies.

The other class of services consists of specialized systems supporting operational functions in which considerations of economy must yield to performance or security factors. These services have some characteristics in common, but often cannot be satisfied by systems designed to provide the most economical bulk services. Many agencies of the Government use specialized services, and agencies with similar missions frequently have similar and interrelated needs. A prime example of this is the National Security community, where similar needs for security, speed and world-wide access exist. Other examples are (1) aviation and maritime agencies; (2) meteorological, geological and environmental agencies; and (3) law enforcement agencies. I feel that suitable joint planning and coordination arrangements should be established for each such common-interest mission area.

Within this context, I feel strongly that the primary purpose of the NCS should be to accomplish joint planning and coordination for National Security communications. This is the original need which sparked the establishment of the NCS. It is a clear and important objective, and covers a well-defined set of systems, with similar requirements for speed, reliability, security and interoperability. The importance of these communications to the President is another unique aspect of this group of systems.

The next step, which is needed rather quickly, is to assess the implications of this approach. What would be the mission, composition, and principal activities of an NCS directed primarily toward the purpose of joint planning and coordination of National Security communications? What revisions to the NCS charter, if any, would be required or desirable? I would appreciate receiving your views on these matters by March 7.

Sincerely,

12/

Clay T. Whitehead

cc: DO Records
DO Chron
GC Subject

GC Chron
Mr. Whitehead
Eva
Col Jizgett

CCJoyce:kaj:2-14-73

FEB 6 1973

Honorable E. Rechtin
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Eb:

Ted Trimmer sent me a copy of his letter to you of December 19, 1972, in which he discusses expansion of FTS service to military installations. I have asked him to withhold any action concerning AUTOVON/FTS interoperability pending analysis of the results of the field test which has been underway for some time.

As those results were due by 1 November 1972, I would appreciate it if you would let me know when I may expect a report on this test.

Sincerely,
signed
TOM

Clay T. Whitehead

cc: DO Records
DO Chron
GC Subject - AUTOVON/FTS
GC Chron
Mr. Whitehead
Eva
Mr. Hall

DaveHall/CCJoyce:kaj:2-5-73

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

*Automated Data and Telecommunications Service
Washington, DC 20405*



DEC 19 1972

Dr. Eberhardt Rehtin
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Office of Telecommunications
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Dr. Rehtin:

In connection with the President's determination to control the rate of Government spending, there is an increasing emphasis toward reduction of Government-wide costs for provision of communications services, particularly those which result from unnecessary duplication or less than optimum management procedures. I think our recent agreement on TELPAK automation was a good example of how we can mutually address these problems in an effective manner.

The General Services Administration and the Department of Defense have both been highly visible with respect to our operation of extensive private voice networks. The FTS intercity voice network was developed to provide a cost effective alternative to commercial services for the Federal Government. The AUTOVON, initially envisioned as a command and control network, has grown to include a large number of users whose mission relates to support activities such as administration and logistics.

The development of our respective networks has progressed largely independently. I think it is fair to say that there has been insufficient recognition of the needs to provide the most economical administrative service to the Federal Government as a whole, as well as maintaining emergency communication capabilities to insure continuity of operations even in the face of natural disaster or hostile action.

The FTS has been successful in providing cost effective services to the civil agencies. The types of services it provides would appear capable of satisfying the needs of many AUTOVON users. In many of your public statements, you have recognized the potential of removing such users from the military net leaving it to serve principally users with security and survivability requirements. Since we are all faced with increasing budgetary pressures, this may be the time to consider and plan for the inclusion of those users within the FTS.

An experiment has been underway in which a number of military bases have been provided access to the FTS for their AUTOVON off-net traffic. While the test trial is not fully complete, initial reports indicate that the use of the FTS, in contrast to the WATS or DDD commercial services, would be preferred on a cost performance basis. I would therefore respectfully suggest that significant expansion of the FTS service to military installations to handle such administrative traffic would appear to be a highly cost effective and appropriate action at this time.

The separate evolution of our networks has also created a problem with respect to the continuity of Government -- namely, that to interconnect them, even under emergency conditions, may not be possible. The use of these networks under such stress situations must be coordinated to allow effective utilization of the total Federal Government's communication assets in time of emergency. In this regard, I would suggest we mutually undertake a re-examination of the feasibility of providing the capability to interconnect current voice networks in time of emergency and to plan our future network capabilities so that natural interoperability is feasible when emergency circumstances dictate.

I believe these items regarding our mutual voice network problems are of sufficient importance as to warrant their prompt attention. My staff stands ready to meet with yours to explore the early implementation of these suggestions.

Sincerely,

(signed) Ted Trimmer

HAROLD S. TRIMMER, JR.
Acting Commissioner, ADTS

cc:

Dr. Clay T. Whitehead, OTP ✓
Mr. Paul O'Neill, OMB

Coins.

October 11, 1972

Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your letter regarding Alaskan communications. I follow with interest and concern the evolution of communications development in Alaska, and DOD maintains a dialogue with OTP on these matters since final determination of some issues could involve Presidential approval.

My recent discussions with Defense representatives have included their efforts to develop a plan for possible transfer of the White Alice communications system to a commercial operator. Defense recognizes that any transfer of the White Alice system must be oriented toward modernization and should not burden the commercial operator with unneeded facilities. It is understood that any such transfer must be accomplished under the Alaska Communications Disposal Act, Public Law 90-135, and would have to be advantageous to the Government, the people of Alaska and the commercial carrier.

It is my understanding that sometime in the near future the Defense representatives will be prepared to discuss DOD's Alaskan communications policies with the Governor, the Congressional delegation, and other Alaskan officials the Governor may designate. I have been assured that it is the intention of the Defense Department to cooperate fully. I feel sure they will be able to answer any questions you may have and provide clarifying information relative to the concerns Augie Hiebert expressed in his letter to you.

We will continue to follow the situation and stand ready to do anything we can to help -- just let me know. Best personal regards.

- cc: Dr. Rechtin, OSD/T
- John Perry, SAFIL
- Gen Paschall, AFPRC
- A. Hiebert, Anchorage, Alaska
- Mr. Smith/Mr. Joyce
- Mr. Hinchman/Mr. Doyle
- Mr. Lamb/Mr. Whitehead(2)

Sincerely,

15/ Jmw

Clay T. Whitehead

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN
JOHN D. PASTORE, R.I.
VANCE HARTKE, IND.
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
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MARLOW W. COOK, KY.
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., MD.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

FREDERICK J. LORDAN, STAFF DIRECTOR
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, CHIEF COUNSEL

September 22, 1972


Dr. Clay T. Whitehead
Director
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20504

Dear Clay:

As you know, the State of Alaska is in the critical process of formulating its satellite communications policy. Augie Hiebert, with whom you visited recently in Anchorage, asked me to make available to you correspondence about the Department of Defense's role in the emerging Alaskan communications system. Enclosed is the information. Your comments, especially regarding the Office of Telecommunications Policy's view of the situation, would be appreciated.

With best wishes,

Cordially,



TED STEVENS
United States Senator

Enclosures

Recd. 9/22



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

20 SEP 1972

Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

SEP 22 1972

Dear Senator Stevens:


This is in response to your letter of September 11, 1972 to the Secretary of Defense regarding DoD policy as it relates to satellite communications development in Alaska.

During the August 1969 Alaska Conference on Satellite Communications, a representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense presented the DoD policy on the use of commercial communications in Alaska. A copy of the information presented is enclosed. Also enclosed is a DoD petition to the Alaska Public Utilities Commission, dated August 16, 1972, pertaining to the matter addressed in your letter. The DoD would be remiss if it were to actually precommit itself to the use of proposed commercial communications facilities in light of the changing DoD national security missions and roles. For example, a situation could develop whereby DoD committed itself to the use of proposed commercial communications facilities and such commitment was made the primary basis for constructing the facilities. By the time the facilities become operational, the DoD requirements could have changed drastically and to the point of becoming nonexistent due to changes in the DoD mission. It is for this reason that the DoD should not and cannot precommit the use of proposed commercial communications facilities on a world-wide basis.

The representative in Alaska who can present DoD policy on a day-to-day working basis with State officials is Colonel John O'Dell, Director of Communications-Electronics, Alaskan Air Command.

I trust that the foregoing information is responsive to the requests in your letter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. L. Solomon".

D. L. Solomon

Deputy Assistant for Operations & Engineering

Enclosures

JOINT AIR FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTR: CJCS-1 NMCC-4 SECDEF-7 ASD/IL-4
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PRECEDENCE

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO DTG 281339Z AUG 69

FROM: SECDEF

TO: HONORABLE TED STEVENS
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA

UNCLAS DEF 7732 INFO: CINCAL
FROM OASD (I&L)

REFERENCE: DE RUEACSA #2929 2342156 AUG 69

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS ASKED ME TO RESPOND TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 23 AUGUST 1969 REGARDING THE ANSWERING OF A QUESTION AT THE ALASKA CONFERENCE ON SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, MR WILLIAM A. ELLIS, WHO IS ASSIGNED TO THE STAFF OF THE DIRECTOR FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, THIS OFFICE, WILL REPRESENT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AT YOUR CONFERENCE. HE IS PREPARED TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF ALASKA FEDERAL FIELD COMMISSION AS IT PERTAINS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ONLY SINCE WE CANNOT SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY FOR THE OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

OASD (I&L)

7732

DATE	TIME
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MONTH	YEAR
AUG	69
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SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

Glenn W. Gibson

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

Info 1

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

PRIORITY

ACTION
INFO

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION IS:
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS ALWAYS INTERESTED IN AND
SUPPORTS IMPROVED INTRA- AND INTERNATIONAL TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS IN THE INTEREST OF REDUNDANCY, FLEXIBILITY,
AND SURVIVABILITY. WE HAVE TRADITIONALLY SUPPORTED
INSTALLATION OF NEW AND/OR EXPANDED FACILITIES. WE WOULD
EXPECT TO CONVERT MANY OF OUR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
TO A COMMERCIAL CARRIER PROVIDED THAT THE COMMERCIAL
RATES ARE FAVORABLE AND THE COMMERCIAL CARRIER COMMUNI-
CATIONS ARE RESPONSIVE BOTH TECHNICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY.
HOWEVER, THERE ARE CERTAIN CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RE-
QUIREMENTS WHICH, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, MUST REMAIN UNDER
US GOVERNMENT CONTROL AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE IMMEDIATE
AVAILABILITY UNDER NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. HENCE
THE NEED FOR RETENTION OF CERTAIN MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES.
SHOULD THERE BE ANY QUESTIONS ON THE FOREGOING STATEMENT,
MR. ELLIS IS PREPARED TO ELABORATE THEREON AT YOUR
CONFERENCE.

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INITIALS

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September 11, 1972

Honorable Melvin Laird
Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mel:

I need your help in setting forth DOD policy as it relates to satellite communications development in Alaska.

The Alaska Public Utilities Commission (APUC) held hearings August 21 and 22 on RCA and Comsat applications for a satellite earth station at Adak, Alaska. The economic feasibility of any such project depends on the policies of the prime user which is DOD. DOD did not cooperate during the hearings. APUC was forced to subpoena the Commander of the 1929th Communications Group at Elmendorf AFB for testimony about DOD's plans regarding future use of our domestic satellite system in Alaska. The Commander stated he was not authorized to speak for DOD policy and testified as a "private citizen." A pertinent extract of the hearing record is enclosed.

My request to you is twofold. First, the timely and orderly development of communications systems for Alaska cannot occur without cooperation from the Department of Defense. DOD must reveal its communications systems policies to Alaskan authorities to further the broader public interest. The issues at stake in this matter will determine the mode of intra and interstate communications Alaskans will have to live with for a long time in the future. If DOD is in the midst of a reevaluation study of

Honorable Melvin Laird
September 11, 1972
Page 2

COPY

Alaskan communications policy, I urge you to appoint necessary personnel to expedite the study and catch up with civilian state authorities.

Secondly, for the period of time in which the State of Alaska is developing its satellite communications system it is imperative that your Department have a representative in Alaska who can present DOD policy on a day-to-day work basis with state officials.

Your assistance is necessary to explicate DOD satellite communications policy in Alaska and to provide policy level personnel to work with state officials. I would be deeply appreciative of your attention to these needs.


With best wishes,

Cordially,

TED STEVENS
United States Senator

Enclosure

cc: Honorable William A. Egan
Mr. A. G. Hebert
Mr. John Stern



NORTHERN TELEVISION, INC.
THE BROADCAST CENTER

P. O. BOX 2200 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99501
KTVA-TV/KBYR-AM/KNIK-FM/MUZAK
(907) 272-3456

P. O. BOX 950 FAIRBANKS, ALASKA 99701
KTVF-TV/KFRB-AM
(907) 452-5121

September 1, 1972

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senator
411 Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Ted:

On August 21 and 22, the Alaska Public Utilities Commission held a hearing in Anchorage relating to applications for a satellite earth station at Adak, which had been filed by both RCA Alascom and Comsat. Clippings are enclosed.

The Department of Defense was asked to participate and refused. The APUC subpoenaed Colonel O'Dell, Commander of the 1929th Communications Group, who appeared, but stated he could give no answers relating to DOD policy, and spoke only as a private citizen. The focal point of the questions to Colonel O'Dell had to do with what military needs on Adak were, and whether it would use satellite circuits if they were provided. O'Dell couldn't answer the questions. When asked whether the DOD policy of using civilian services rather than military services, when quality was comparable and cost was less applied in this case, he responded vaguely. Transcript of this portion of his testimony is enclosed.

As a result of the DOD refusal to cooperate, the APUC could not justify an earth station at Adak, and turned down both RCA and Comsat. As you know, the congestion at Bethel, and Alaska Peninsula waypoints is caused by insufficient circuits to allow full military and civilian use, which was the reason for the Adak earth station proposals.

The purpose of this letter is to inquire whether your office would pose the question to DOD about switching to civilian circuits, if satellite earth stations were installed at one or more points in Alaska. Obviously, the only way to make satellite communications viable in Alaska is to acquire the military business. It spends \$15 million annually to maintain the obsolete White Alice System now, and if even half of this would apply to costs of satellite circuitry, we'd have a system fast, and lots of capacity in areas which now have poor, if any service from White Alice's overloaded lines. Also, please send me a copy of the DOD policy referred to above. I've read it, but can't lay hands on it at this writing. I'm positive it applies to all 50 states.

My second reason for writing at this time relates to the above subject, and according to information I have acquired, is apparently deeply involved with it. Evidently the DOD is actively working on a scheme to sell White Alice, this proposal to surface in late September of this year. With this going on, they will make no statements of switching to another system, for fear of upsetting their plan to sell White

Senator Ted Stevens
Page Two

Alice. There is recent precedence for this action. You will recall that DOD opposed the Bartlett Earth Station at Talkeetna on the basis that it might impede the pending sale of ACS, and it took your efforts as well as others to make them back off.


You already know of my past concern that DOD would try to pan off White Alice to RCA, which would put an expensive, obsolete terrestrial communications system in the Alaska rate base, and at the same time delay or eliminate the hope of switching to a satellite system that would provide a total Alaskan telecommunications capability, which the military should support even if it had to close down most of White Alice and write it off as having accomplished its mission.

I think you should inquire of DOD what their intentions are on this subject, and see if you can't rattle the skeleton hard enough in that closet so they will quit obstructing the orderly development of communications in Alaska. Their "dog-in-the-manger" attitude placed the APUC in a very difficult position during the hearings on August 21 and 22, and I don't think DOD should be allowed to get away with it.

Because I know Dr. Clay Whitehead is also vitally interested in this subject, and may also wish to develop a dialogue with DOD, I am taking the liberty of sending him a copy of this letter, along with all the enclosures.

We have important issues at stake here, Ted, and I hope you and Tom can help Alaska solve this latest problem. Thanks in advance for trying.

Cordially yours,



A. G. Hiebert
President
Northern Television, Incorporated
Anchorage

cc: Dr. Clay T. Whitehead

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 5, 1972

To: Tom
From: Chuck
Subject: Answer to Senator Ted Stevens Letter re Alaskan
Communications

SYNOPSIS

You have been asked by Stevens for comments regarding OTP's view of Hiebert's letter to Stevens, Stevens letter to Defense and Solomon's reply (all attached). Following is a review of the situation and its protagonists:

DOD (Dept. of the Air Force as Executive Agent) wants to sell White Alice to a commercial company and let the buyer make system improvements for commercial services to include satellite earth stations. The present system is adequate for Defense requirements but not for the State's needs. Defense feels it would be up to a buyer to improve the system with private capital for commercial requirements of Alaska. I believe DOD is sympathetic to Alaskan communications needs and cooperate wherever possible, but feels as long as military needs are being met adequately, it cannot subsidize development of Alaska's commercial communications needs.

RCA hopes to be able to buy White Alice and thus become the sole franchised carrier for long lines in Alaska. They have plans to improve the system and to phase in domestic satellite earth stations. As far as I can determine RCA would not insist on system improvements by Defense before a sale is consummated.

Alaska Businessmen and APUC would like DOD to improve system now and include satellite stations before sale to commercial company. This is quickest way of getting what they want with Defense footing the bill for the public good of Alaska. Their real fear is that all of White Alice, including what they consider obsolete portions, will be incorporated in a carrier's rate base without a commitment for earth stations and other modernization.

COMSAT, it appears, is pushing satellite technology and has apparently convinced APUC and others that this will solve all their problems, if only the military would cooperate by precommitting enough circuits, which will support earth stations until adequate civilian requirements can be generated.

Alaskan Government and Congressional delegation have to respond to its constituents as best it can.

OTP maintains dialogue with Defense regarding plans or progress of White Alice sale in anticipation of required Presidential approval.

The package you have been asked to review contains many anomalies which obviously reflect internal politics, fragmentation of views and apparent conflict between the military and civilian entities on which way Alaskan communications should be developed.

2. Comments and Recommendation

One of the main contentions in Augie's letter is that the military refuses to cooperate by not precommitting itself to use satellite communications (which obviously would also be of great benefit to Alaskans). The Defense representative in Alaska, Colonel O'Dell, (you met him when we were there) refused to appear before the APUC on a discussion of an earth station at Adak and had to be subpoenaed. His answers to questions were confusing and he spoke only as a private citizen. This left doubt as to his credibility as the Defense representative in Alaska. I believe Col O'Dell's failure to appear before the APUC when asked was in accordance with instructions from Defense much as an Ambassador would be acting on instructions from State. Why this happened and why his answers were not straightforward are matters to be discussed and settled between Defense and the State of Alaska. In fact, there is not a single issue or point of confusion which cannot be handled by Defense. The two entities should be allowed to work out their problems. OTP should stay out of it at this time.

The attached letter was written with this in mind. Presumably, neither Stevens nor Hiebert know of the upcoming meeting between the Governor and Defense. We can lend moral support by informing Stevens and Hiebert and suggesting that all problems can be faced and discussed in these meetings with people qualified to speak for Defense and the State of Alaska.

Recommend you sign.

Atchs.

dod

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
September 20, 1972

To: Tom
From: Chuck
Subject: DOD Philippine-Taiwan Cable Issue

The attached memo cancels the Philippine-Taiwan cable. It is straightforward and includes lack of justification among reasons for cancellation. I have from reliable source that JCS really tried hard to sell Rehtin on going ahead with cable. Glad to see Defense settle this "in-house" and with the same logic we probably would have used.

I tried calling Chuck Horne last night but was not successful in contacting him, will keep trying. He is Executive Vice President to Ilusorio of Philippine Overseas Telecommunication Corporation which operates and manages PHILCOMSAT. As you know, a PHILCOMSAT Board of Directors supervises POTC's satellite operations. POTC is also the largest single PHILCOMSAT stockholder in the private sector.

cc: Mr. Smith
Mr. Joyce (w/Conf Atch)
Amb Washburn
Mr. Doyle

Good resolution.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

31 AUG 1972

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Defense Communications Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff (Communications-Electronics),
Department of the Army
Director, Command Support Programs, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy
Director, Command Control and Communications,
Headquarters United States Air Force

SUBJECT: Procurement of Submarine Communications Cable for the
Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa Defense Communications System
Integrated Joint Communications System - Pacific

Reference: OATSD(T) memorandum, same subject, dated April 1, 1971

The reference memorandum approved the installation of a 60-channel submarine cable between Juzon, Taiwan and San Miguel, Philippines.

Since the approval of the 60-channel cable project in April 1971, a sizeable reduction of forces has taken place in Southeast Asia. Further reductions can be anticipated in light of our national policy which prescribes that our allies should assume a larger role in providing for their internal security.

In light of the reductions that have already taken place and in anticipation of further reductions, we can no longer justify, either economically or operationally, the expenditure of \$7-9 million for the procurement and installation of the cable which may be used for only a limited period of time to satisfy diminishing requirements. Reliable commercial communications are available to satisfy DoD requirements. The commercial communications can be leased at considerably less cost than the cable, and the leasing arrangements can be rapidly adjusted upward or downward to meet any remaining DoD requirements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.4

DoD OIR 1H 5/17/2010
By wcc 1500 Date 6/11/2010

Classified by ASD(T)
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON Dec 31, 1978

Accordingly, it is requested that action be taken to cancel the 60-channel cable project at the earliest practicable date.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "E. Rechten". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

E. Rechten

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

2/24/72

To: Tom

From: Steve

FYI.

Notices

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary of Defense ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

Responsibilities, Functions, and Authorities

The Secretary of Defense approved the following on January 18, 1972:

References:

(a) DOD Directive 5100.30, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," dated December 2, 1971.

(b) DOD Directive 5105.39, "Director of Net Assessment," dated December 6, 1971.

(c) DOD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for the Management and Control of DOD Information Requirements," dated June 2, 1971.

I. General. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, one of the authorized positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense is hereby designated Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) with responsibilities, functions, and authorities as prescribed herein.

II. Responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) is the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the management of intelligence resources, programs, and activities, including those for intelligence, warning, reconnaissance, and other related areas which may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. His responsibility specifically includes equipment, systems, and activities in the above areas which are organic to military forces or units. He is also responsible for staff supervision of the intelligence aspects of command and control, as provided for in Reference (a).¹

III. Functions. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) shall perform the following functions in his assigned field of responsibility.

A. Recommend objectives, priorities, plans, and planning guidance for intelligence resources.

B. Review proposed intelligence resource programs and recommend resource allocations to those programs.

C. Monitor approved intelligence resource programs and supervise their implementation.

D. In conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), formulate budget estimates for the intelligence portion of the DOD budget.

E. Establish requirements for intelligence support of all research and de-

velopment programs of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.

F. Ensure that R&D project managers are provided intelligence information needed for effective direction of R&D programs.

G. Review the RDT&E intelligence programs of DOD; recommend funding levels and sources of funds for such programs.

H. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense RDT&E requirements and priorities for systems whose primary mission is intelligence and also for those systems for which intelligence should be a secondary mission.

I. Recommend policies for the management of intelligence operations, including operational requirements and priorities.

J. Coordinate intelligence activities within DOD and coordinate, as appropriate, intelligence programs for the DOD with other U.S. Government entities.

K. Provide for DOD representation for international and interdepartmental intelligence organizations and activities.

L. Recommend appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of intelligence functions) which will provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical management of intelligence resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and contribute to improved military preparedness. Monitor and evaluate approved actions in these areas.

M. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense requirements and priorities for net threat assessments of United States versus opposing foreign weapons systems. Provide for the development of terms of reference and the preparation of net threat assessments insuring the best available intelligence information is used by DOD Components in the process. Inform the Director of Net Assessment (Reference (b))¹ of the analyses and conclusions derived from such assessments.

N. Perform other functions as the Secretary of Defense assigns.

IV. Relationships. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) shall advise and develop recommendations for approval of the Secretary of Defense, or, as directed, act for the Secretary of Defense in the performance of the functions which are assigned herein or which may be otherwise assigned. In the performance of these functions, he shall:

A. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with DOD Components having collateral or related functions.

B. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DOD Components rather than unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.

C. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and advice with DOD Components as appropriate.

V. Authorities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), in the course of exercising staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

A. Issue instructions and one-time direction-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate for carrying out approved policies and for establishing management procedures for his assigned fields of responsibilities in accordance with DOD Directive 5025.1.¹ Instructions to the Military Departments will be issued through the Secretaries of the departments or their designees.

B. Obtain such reports, information, and assistance from the Military Departments and other DOD Components, subject to the provisions of Reference (c),¹ as may be necessary for the performance of his assigned responsibilities and functions.

C. Communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, and the Directors of Defense Agencies. Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of all communications with the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands which have strategic or military operational implications.

D. Arrange for DOD participation in those international and interdepartmental intelligence programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

E. Communicate directly with all government agencies participating with DOD in those interdepartmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

MAURICE W. ROCHE,
Director, Correspondence and
Directives Division OASD
(Comptroller).

[FR Doc.72-2485 Filed 2-17-72;8:47 am]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (TELECOMMUNICATIONS)

Responsibilities, Functions, and Authorities

The Secretary of Defense approved the following on January 11, 1972:

Reference: (a) DOD Directive 5100.30, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," December 2, 1971.

I. General. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, one of the authorized positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense is hereby designated Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) with

¹Filed as part of original. Extra copies available from the U.S. Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120, Attention: Code 300.

responsibilities, functions, and authorities as prescribed herein. The purpose of this position is to help insure reliable, survivable, secure, cost-effective telecommunications for the Department of Defense and the National Communications System.

II. Responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense on telecommunications matters. He is the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the National Communications System. He will also have primary staff responsibility in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), National Military Command System (NMCS), and WWMCCS-related systems as provided for in Reference (a),¹ including membership on the WWMCCS Council.

III. Functions. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) shall perform the following functions:

A. General. 1. Serve as principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for telecommunications matters.

2. Act as DOD coordinator in the area of telecommunications, including telecommunications for command and control.

3. Review Military Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD Component validated telecommunications requirements to affirm the need thereof, including priorities for their fulfillment. Recommend alternatives as appropriate.

4. Act as the DOD coordinator for those special telecommunications of a sensitive nature, e.g., those related to the support of intelligence functions.

5. Act as the DOD coordinator for general purpose radio navigation matters.

6. Monitor nontelecommunications actions with respect to their impact upon telecommunications plans and programs.

7. Serve as the DOD central point of contact on telecommunications matters for organizations external to DOD.

8. Perform such other functions as the Secretary of Defense may assign.

B. National Communications System (NCS). 1. Serve as the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense in his role as Executive Agent, NCS.

2. Coordinate as necessary with all agencies participating in the NCS.

3. Review progress in fulfilling NCS responsibilities and recommend to the Executive Agent for the NCS, as appropriate, measures for improving the NCS and for securing efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.

4. Provide for the receipt and processing of requests from any agency having requirements for service from the NCS to include determining feasibility, developing alternative methods of implementation, and recommending appropriate priorities.

5. Recommend NCS related tasks to be assigned to the Manager, NCS, or to other governmental agencies as appropriate.

C. Policy and planning. 1. Develop, coordinate, and recommend DOD telecommunications policy.

2. Develop implementing directives to support approved telecommunications policy and to provide processes for telecommunications planning.

3. Join the Defense System Acquisition Review Council when telecommunications matters are discussed.

4. Coordinate efforts within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to insure that adequate mechanisms exist for:

a. The development and procurement of integrated secure means of telecommunications.

b. Achievement of compatibility between telecommunications systems and their related cryptomaterials.

c. The necessary interchange of technical information between interested agencies.

5. Serve as a central point for coordination and review of telecommunications plans and programs of the NCS, Services and DOD agencies.

D. Programing and budgeting. 1. Coordinate and provide recommendations on program/budget policies and procedures as they relate to telecommunications.

2. Coordinate and provide recommendations on telecommunications programs, budgets, financial plans, and related financial management activity.

3. Serve as principal DOD witness before committees of the Congress on telecommunications programs/budgets.

4. Review NSA submissions on telecommunications security equipment and decisions with respect thereto for consistency with other telecommunications programs.

IV. Scope. The scope of telecommunications for which the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) has responsibility is delineated below:

A. Categories of telecommunications. 1. The Defense Communications System as defined in DOD Directive 5105.19 (32 F.R. 14781 and 33 F.R. 2721) including transportable contingency assets for extension or restoral of the DCS.

2. Camp, post, base, and station telecommunications.

3. Fixed and/or transportable non-DCS telecommunications facilities which are not included in telecommunications equipment/systems considered to be organic to military forces/units.

4. Telecommunications equipment/systems considered to be organic to military forces/units.

5. DOD elements of the National Communications System (to the extent this category is not included in the DCS).

6. Those special telecommunications of a sensitive nature, e.g., those related to the support of intelligence functions.

7. Telecommunications security (COM SEC) equipment insofar as reviewing such matters for consistency with other telecommunications matters.

8. Telecommunications for command and control, including directly coupled

displays, consoles, processors, and other terminals whose primary function is telecommunications, and special subsystems such as Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN).

9. Areas indicated below are specifically excluded except to the extent necessary to establish interface and radio frequency compatibility with other systems.

a. Sensors for intelligence, warning and surveillance; electronic warfare systems except for those affecting telecommunications; satellite telemetry and command systems except those affecting telecommunications vulnerability.

b. Telecommunications integral to weapons systems designed for and usually delivered with and as a part of the airplane, missile complex, ship, tank, etc., whose costs are normally included in the cost of the weapons system.

B. The responsibilities for management and operational direction of telecommunications resources will remain with the Services and the Defense Agencies.

V. Relationships. A. In the performance of his functions, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) shall:

1. Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with DOD Components having collateral or related functions.

2. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other DOD Components rather than unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.

3. Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information and advice with DOD Components as appropriate.

B. The heads of all Department of Defense Components and their staffs shall cooperate fully with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) and his staff in a continuous effort to achieve efficient administration of the DOD and to carry out effectively the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

VI. Authorities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) in the course of exercising staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to:

A. Issue instructions and one-time directive-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields of responsibilities in accordance with DOD Directive 5025.1.¹ Instructions to the Military Departments will be issued through the Secretaries of the Departments or their designees.

B. Obtain such reports, information, and assistance from the Military Departments and other DOD Components as may be necessary to the performance of his assigned functions.

C. Communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of the Defense Agencies and the Director, National Security Agency.

D. Establish arrangements for DOD participation in those nondefense governmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

¹ Filed as part of original. Extra copies available from the U.S. Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120, Attention: Code 300.

E. Communicate directly with all governmental agencies participating with DOD in those nondefense governmental programs for which he has been assigned primary staff cognizance.

F. Establish procedural arrangements for the discharge of overall responsibilities of the Executive Agent for the NCS.

G. Request such reports, information, and assistance from governmental agencies participating in the NCS as may be necessary.

H. Communicate directly with all governmental agencies participating in the NCS and, after appropriate clearance, with representatives of other nations on NCS matters.

VII. *Effective date.* This Directive is effective upon publication. In the event of conflict between this Directive and previous directives and instructions, the provisions of this Directive will govern. All DOD Components will review their existing directives, instructions, and regulations for conformance with this Directive; advise the Secretary of Defense of the results of this review within 30 days and implement any necessary changes within 90 days of publication of this Directive.

MAURICE W. ROCHE,
*Director, Correspondence and
Directives Division OASD
(Comptroller).*

[FR Doc.72-2484 Filed 2-17-72; 8:47 am]

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY

Organization, Responsibilities, and Functions

The Secretary of Defense approved the following on January 1, 1972:

I. *General.* Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) is hereby established as an Agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to DOD policies, directives and instructions.

II. *Mission and scope.* The mission of DMA is to provide support to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD Components, as appropriate, on matters concerning mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G).

III. *Organization.* A. The DMA shall consist of:

1. A Director, a Deputy Director, a headquarters establishment, and such subordinate elements and facilities as are specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Subordinate organizations as are established by the Director, DMA for the accomplishment of DMA's mission.

B. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Director, DMA.

IV. *Responsibilities and functions.* A. The Director, DMA shall:

1. Organize, direct, and manage the DMA and its field organizations.

2. Serve as Program Manager and coordinator of all DOD MC&G resources and activities. This includes review of the execution of all DOD plans, programs, and policies for MC&G activities not assigned to DMA.

3. Provide staff advice and assistance on MC&G matters to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other DOD Components, and other Government agencies as appropriate.

4. Develop a Consolidated Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Program for review by the JCS and approval by the Secretary of Defense.

5. In support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, review and validate MC&G requirements and priorities; develop a consolidated statement of MC&G requirements and priorities.

6. Insure responsive support to the MC&G requirements of the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands.

7. Establish policies and provide DOD participation in national and international MC&G activities in coordination with the ASD (International Security Affairs); execute DOD responsibilities under interagency and international MC&G agreements.

8. Establish DOD MC&G data collection requirements; collect or task other DOD Components to collect and provide necessary data.

9. Establish DOD MC&G RDT&E requirements in coordination with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; task other DOD Components or private contractors to accomplish such requirements.

10. Carry out the statutory responsibilities assigned under U.S.C. Title 10, chapter 639, sections 7391, 7392, 7393, 7394 for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data for the use of all vessels of the United States and of navigators generally.

B. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands shall:

1. Develop and submit to DMA their MC&G requirements and priorities.

2. Provide support, within their respective fields of responsibilities, to the Director, DMA, as required to carry out the assigned mission of the Agency.

3. Assess the responsiveness of the DMA to their operational needs.

C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

1. Advise the Secretary of Defense on MC&G requirements and priorities.

2. Provide guidance to the DMA and the Unified and Specified Commands which will serve as the basis for interrelationships between these organizations.

3. Obtain the advice and recommendations from the Director, DMA on matters within his areas of responsibility.

D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall provide primary staff supervision and financial management of the DOD MC&G program on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

V. *Authority.* The Director, DMA is specifically delegated authority to:

A. Command the Defense Mapping Agency.

B. Task DOD Components directly to accomplish MC&G RDT&E and data collection requirements as established by DMA.

C. Have access to direct communications with DOD Components and, after appropriate coordination, with other organizations.

D. Exercise the administrative authorities set forth below. To the extent that any law or executive order specifically limits the exercise of such authority to persons at the Secretarial level, such authority shall be exercised by the ASD (Comptroller).

VI. *Relationships.* A. In the performance of his functions, the Director, DMA shall:

1. Maintain appropriate liaison with other Components of the DOD and other agencies for the exchange of information in his field of assigned responsibilities.

2. Make use of existing DOD facilities and services wherever practicable to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

3. Ensure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and appropriate OSD staff elements are kept fully informed concerning DMA activities of substantive concern to them.

B. The Military Departments and other DOD Components shall:

1. Provide assistance within their respective fields of responsibility to the Director, DMA.

2. Coordinate with DMA all programs and activities which include or are related to MC&G.

VII. *Administration.* A. The Director, DMA will be a lieutenant general or vice admiral appointed by the Secretary of Defense, upon recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

B. The Deputy Director will be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. If military, the Deputy Director will be recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will normally be selected from a Service different from that of the Director. If civilian, the Deputy Director will be recommended by the ASD (Comptroller).

C. DMA will be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds, and other administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary.

D. The Military Departments will assign military personnel to DMA in accordance with approved Joint Manpower Program authorizations. Procedures for such assignments will be as agreed upon between the Director, DMA, and the individual Military Departments.

MAURICE W. ROCHE,
*Director, Correspondence and
Directives Division OASD
(Comptroller).*

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DMA, or in the absence of the Director, the person acting for him is hereby delegated, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Arnold

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

July 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PENN JAMES

I have three nominees to propose for the position vacated by the death of Mr. de Rosa. We have made the selection based on the assumption that the position will be elevated to an Assistant Secretary and the qualifications of the nominees are suitable for that level.

The nominees are:

Mr. D. C. Arnold, President and Chief Executive Officer
of McDonald-Douglas Electronics Company

Mr. Mark Sheppard, President of Texas Instruments, Inc.

Mr. Homer L. Marrs, Vice President and General Manager,
Communications Division, Motorola, Inc.

None have been screened for political affiliation, nor have they been contacted concerning their interest in the position.

Since OTP must work very closely with the Assistant Secretary for Telecommunications, we would like to work with you and the Department of Defense in the final selection.

George F. Mansur

George F. Mansur
Deputy

DOD

Wednesday 7/14/71

9:20 Dr. Mansur indicated you wanted me to call the White House to let them know we would be suggesting names for Lou deRosa's job at the Pentagon.

I called Mr. Flanigan's office, Malik's and Kingley's. They also suggested advising Al Kaupinen, which I have done.

Patty Presock	2231
Kaupinen	2244

JUL 7 1971

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Executive Agent
National Communications System
Washington, D. C. 20301

Attn: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) has approved for implementation the plan entitled "National Communications System Plan for Communications Support in Natural Disasters."

It is requested that you arrange for the implementation of the plan, and, as a first step, designate the appropriate agency to provide communications support in each of the eight OEP regions. The Director, OEP, should be advised of the designation to enable him to forward a Mission Assignment letter establishing proper authorities for reimbursement of funds expended in the conduct of the NCS plan.

A training program will be developed by OEP to instruct communications support personnel in disaster assistance activities. The NCS should assist OEP in the development of this training program.

Mr. James E. Nicholson, Disaster Assistance Division, Disaster Programs Office (telephone 395-5894) will be the point of contact within OEP for actions related to the implementation of the NCS plan. It is requested that this Office be kept advised as each major milestone is reached.

The staffs of the Manager, NCS, and the NCS operating agencies are to be commended for developing a plan which will result in providing much needed communications support during natural disaster operations.

Sincerely,

Clay T. Whitehead

cc: Honorable George A. Lincoln
Director, OEP

✓ Mr. Whitehead (2)
Subject File
Reading File

Dr. Mansur
Mr. Joyce

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JUN 28 1971

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Dr. Whitehead:

The Office of Emergency Preparedness accepts and approves the NCS plan entitled "National Communications System Plan for Communications Support in Natural Disasters" dated March 1971 transmitted to this office by your letter dated April 23, 1971.

The plan is well conceived and comprehensive, and should provide for adequate communications support for natural disaster assistance operations.

As a first step to the immediate implementation of this plan, please advise the Executive Agent, NCS, to designate the appropriate agency or agencies as the supporting NCS operating agency. The agency so designated should be requested to appoint the field office that will be assigned the support role in each of our eight regions. The office so designated will then meet with the appropriate OEP Regional Director to coordinate the selection of specific individual(s) who will become the Communications Coordinator. NCS is requested to provide assistance to OEP throughout this initial step.

Once an agency has been designated by NCS, the appropriate Mission Assignment Letter will be forwarded from this Office to that agency, establishing the proper authorities for reimbursement of funds expended in the conduct of the plan.

Within OEP, implementing instructions are being prepared to be sent to all Regional Office staffs. The NCS plan will be modified slightly in order to make it a part of our normal disaster assistance operating procedures. Any changes to the NCS plan will be coordinated within your Office.

Finally, a training program will be developed to instruct the Communications Coordinator on OEP disaster assistance activities as well as those disaster-related programs of other Federal agencies that he will be required to support in the field. We will require assistance from NCS in the development of this program.

I commend the many staff personnel of NCS, OTP and OEP who have been instrumental in the development of this most vital support program.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

G. A. Lincoln
Director

done


JUN 28 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

**Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary
Department of Defense**

**SUBJECT: DOD Report of Investigation of Emergency Action
Notification System and the False Alarm,
February 20, 1971**

Your detailed report on the subject has been transferred to the Office of Telecommunications Policy for review. A special study and evaluation group from government and the communications industry has been established to analyze EBS methods and procedures. This group, in which you have representation, will consider the recommendations contained in your report. We will continue to advise you of our progress in this regard.


Clay T. Whitehead

**cc: Military Assistant to the President
Mr. Whitehead
Capt. Babcock
Dr. Mansur
Mr. Joyce**

CTBABCOCK:jm 6/28/71

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

End
DIRECTOR

June 22, 1971

Major General Anthony T. Shtogren
Director for Communications-
Electronics (J6)
Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear General ~~Shtogren~~ *Tony*:

I have just read your letter to Mr. Dean of June 10, 1971, concerning support and consultative assistance for the development of an electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) analysis capability by our support organization in the Department of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications.

Since Mr. Dean is in Geneva attending the World Administrative Radio Conference on Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST), I would like to express appreciation without delay for your positive response to our request of May 27, 1971. Arrangements are being made now for Commerce representatives to meet with personnel of the ECAC to get on with our program. Also I have asked that the data you have requested with regard to FY 1972 and FY 1973 planning be assembled with the view of forwarding it to you shortly.

Thank you for making all these fine arrangements possible.

Sincerely,

Tom

Clay T. Whitehead



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

Communications-Electronics
Directorate (J-6)

J6M 425-71

10 JUN 1971

Mr. W. Dean, Jr.
Director, Frequency Management
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Dean:

This is in response to your letter, dated 27 May 1971, which requested certain support be provided your office by the Department of Defense (DOD).

I am pleased to hear of the emerging electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) analysis capability of the Department of Commerce (DOC), and look forward to the development of a government-wide addressal of the increasing problems wrought by a crowded radio frequency spectrum. We are pleased to assist in every way possible in the establishment of this capability.

In reference to the specific support requested, authorization is granted for consultation between personnel of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC), as designated by the Director, ECAC, and appropriate DOC and DOC contractor personnel, provided such consultation does not interfere with the manpower commitments of the ECAC to currently scheduled and funded projects. Available documentation on ECAC mathematical models, data bases, and procedures may be released by the Director, ECAC, as they are requested, subject to the restrictions imposed by applicable security regulations. The documents requested in subparagraph c of your letter, except for item c.iv., are being forwarded to the DOC (Office of Telecommunications) under separate cover. Item c.iv.,


the Communications-Electronics Equipment Directory, is an eight-volume compilation of data extracted from the ECAC Nominal Characteristic File and contains classified information which the military departments may not desire to release to a contractor without prior referral to them. Accordingly, provision of that document is withheld while clearance for release of the data is coordinated. I am certain that the document, or a satisfactory extract, can be released without undue delay.

With regard to the overall subject of continuing support by the DOD to the development of a government EMC analysis capability, I anticipate that more extensive support than the provision of documentation will be requested. In this likely event, ECAC resources may be overtaxed unless such support is identified early and adequately planned and programmed. At this time, ECAC resources are fully committed to the DOD-approved, customer-funded, FY 1972 program. This program will require a substantial increase in manning to the extent that present physical facilities will approach saturation. Additionally, the computer processing capability of the Center will be fully utilized in accomplishing the FY 1972 program tasks. It is essential, therefore, that any substantive support that would impact on the FY 1972 program of the Center be identified at the earliest, so that an assessment may be made of resource and funding requirements. Also, to the extent that they can be foreseen, FY 1973 requirements should be made known to permit their consideration as that program is assembled.

Another subject which should be addressed early is that of release of any classified ECAC documents or data base files/extracts which one or more of the military departments might consider proprietary. Because most data base outputs would contain information supplied by all of the military departments, formal coordination would, in most cases, be required to determine releasability. Also, in the event of a request for a complete file or files, should release of such be obtained, the feasibility of subsequent and frequent updates must be considered.

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that a statement of anticipated DOD/ECAC support desired for the next two fiscal years be provided to permit timely assessment of the level of effort and coordination required to provide such support in furtherance of the development of the government

EMC analysis capability. I believe that this mutually desirable achievement can best be attained in a timely, efficient manner by the orderly planning and programming of the experience, knowledge, and capabilities of the DOD which may be lent to the task.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "A.T. Shtogren". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

A. T. SHTOGREN
Major General, USAF
Director for
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Copy to:
DDR&E
ATSD (T)

June 11, 1971

Assignment of Military Personnel

Memorandum for Record

As was agreed in the meeting with General Hughes on June 7, I met with Captain Burt Shepherd, the Senior Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations, this date. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the assignment of Navy officers to the Office of Telecommunications Policy.

I briefed Captain Shepherd on the OTP and pointed out that Mr. Whitehead had made a lengthy study of the problem of duties assigned to military personnel detailed to the Office. I also made a point of the fact that newly assigned functions had changed the requirement for officers in the grade of O-6 only. He understands thoroughly the type of person that should be detailed to the Office, and appeared to be in sympathy with the request.

Captain Shepherd indicated he would brief Admiral Zumwalt on the problem and further indicated he would get in touch with Carl Wallace to discuss the action required by the Navy.

15/
Courtland T. Babcock
Captain, USN
Military Assistant
to the Director

cc: Mr. Whitehead ✓
Dr. Mansur

Capt Babcock/pm/June 11, 1971

dnd

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 10, 1971

Mr. David Solomon
(Acting) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. ^{Dave} Solomon:

As you know OTP recently provided to the FCC a statement of policy concerning construction of new commercial facilities for international communications. The policy is rather broad in scope in that it established guidelines applicable to any communications media currently in use or which may be developed in the future. It is perhaps unfortunate that attention has been focused on the effect of the policy on AT&T's proposal to construct a new SF cable (TAT-6) across the Atlantic since it tends to obscure the basic policy thrust which we believe is sound.

The Department of Defense letters to the Commission are at variance with the policy in that they support deployment of the proposed SF cable, and this proposal does not meet the economic and public interest criteria expressed in the policy. Certainly agency views may differ on many issues, but we both recognize the need for a unified Administration policy -- in which it may not be possible to accommodate all possible opinions.

OTP looks forward to an improved dialogue in the future and I will be happy to discuss with you ways in which this may be accomplished if you think it useful.

As Mr. deRosa's letter of 17 May requested, we are forwarding his comments to the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau.

Sincerely,

George

G. F. Mansur
Deputy



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DoD

June 8, 1971

Dear Tom:

This is in response to your letters of May 21 and June 1 concerning military staffing in your office.

We will forward the job descriptions to the Services and approve assignments of up to two members from each Military Department with the relief for Captain Babcock as senior officer coming from Air Force.

In the case of Lieutenant Colonel Lasher, I have asked Army for comment before making a final reply. The Army assigned LTC Lasher to your office with the understanding that he would be available for further transfer in October 1971, and I wish to resolve this misunderstanding prior to taking further action in his case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Carl S. Wallace".

Carl S. Wallace

The Special Assistant

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20504

74-15

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Military Personnel

A meeting was held this date to discuss the utilization of military personnel in the Office of Telecommunications Policy, and the retention of Lieutenant Colonel Lasher in this Office. Present at the meeting were Mr. Whitehead and Captain Babcock from OTP and Brigadier General Hughes and Colonel Redman from the White House staff.

Mr. Whitehead pointed out that Lasher had been assigned to this Office for less than a year and had received orders detaching him in late summer. He felt that Lasher should be retained in his present assignment for a normal tour of duty, and had written a letter to that effect to Carl Wallace, The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Both General Hughes and Colonel Redman agreed with Mr. Whitehead. It was decided that Colonel Redman would contact the appropriate person in the Army and advise him of the position taken by General Hughes and Mr. Whitehead. General Hughes indicated he should be kept advised and if problems developed he would become personally involved.

Mr. Whitehead then discussed how he might better utilize military personnel within the Office. He pointed out that it would be desirable to have one O-6 who could represent him in dealing with the DoD, industry, and members of the White House staff such as Colonel Redman. He further indicated the desirability of having several less senior officers who could perform professional duties in the Office and at the same time further their careers by acting in this high level arena. He pointed out that after discussing the proposal with Mr. Wallace he had written him a letter stating his case.

General Hughes agreed in the proposal and indicated he would add his support by calling Mr. Wallace. He further stated he would point out to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force the importance of nominating the right kind of officers. He suggested that Colonel Redman do the same with the Army and Captain Babcock with the Navy.



C. T. Babcock
Captain, USN

cc: Mr. Whitehead
Brigadier General Hughes
Colonel Redman

DOD
Military

Monday 6/7/71

6:05 At Mr. Whitehead's request (through Dr. Mansur), I have called Gen. Hughes' office and left a message for his secretary -- to be sure she understands that we are going to coordinate our military detail paperwork through Gen. Hughes and, of course, that includes both requests for personnel and efficiency reports, etc., that come to us.

cc: Timmie
Judy
Lorrains
Brenda

DOD

June 4, 1971

To: George

From: Tom

I agree that we should
let things go and not
send this letter out.

June 3, 1971

*(expressions) are for
DoD letters.*

To: Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
David Packard (DoD)

As you know OTP recently provided to the FCC the Administration's policy concerning deployment of new commercial facilities for international communications. The policy is rather broad in scope in that it established guidelines applicable to any communications media currently in use or which may be developed in the future. It is perhaps unfortunate that attention has been focused on the effect of the policy on AT&T's proposal to construct a new SF cable (TAT-6) across the Atlantic since it tends to obscure the basic policy thrust which we believe is sound.

The Department of State (Defense) letter(s) to the Commission *(is)(are)* at variance with the policy in that it supports deployment of the proposed SF cable, and this proposal does not meet the economic and public interest criteria expressed in the policy.

The result is that there are now at least two differing views from the Executive branch before the Commission. I'm sure you agree that it is essential to have a *unified* single policy which represents the Administration's views and it was this factor which led us to initiate the international facilities *policy* study.

It may be helpful to review the activities preceding our policy formulation so that we can avoid similar situations in the future. Approximately three months ago I asked my staff to develop factual data concerning Atlantic basin traffic projections for both government and private sectors, special requirements for critical national security circuits, and relative costs between satellite and cable facilities. This resulted in a staff report which provided essential basic data, ^{and was} ~~This report was~~ circulated in draft form to all interested carriers and Federal agencies for comment. ^{It} ~~and~~ was subsequently amended to incorporate factual data and substantive remarks received from government and industry. In my letter of 5 May, I requested the Department of State (Defense) and other agencies to meet with the Deputy Director of OTP to review the staff study and to formulate conclusions and policy recommendations. The Department of State (Defense) did not provide a representative (although written comments were provided after the policy statement was completed).

Consequently we now find the Executive Branch, and possibly the President, in the awkward position of expressing two conflicting views to the Federal Communications Commission. Certainly agency views may differ on many issues, but we both recognize the need for a single ^{unified} Administration policy -- in which it may not be possible to accommodate all conflicting opinions.

I believe that this letter may be helpful to you as background in assessing what has become a somewhat ^{controversial} emotional subject. My office and staff look forward to an improved dialogue in the future and I will be happy to discuss with you ways in which this may be accomplished if you think it useful.

Sincerely,

Tom

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1971

Carl-

The attached policy paper which was forwarded to the FCC is virtually identical to the draft which we discussed last Friday. You will note that it does not oppose cables in a broad sense and, in fact, encourages development of both cable and satellite technologies. We believe this is in consonance with the spirit of Secretary Laird's recommendation to the Commission.

There is also evidence which cannot yet be made public that substantial and immediate rate reductions will be made by COMSAT in trans-Atlantic rates, if a new trans-Atlantic cable is not constructed at this time, so that existing facilities can be filled at a faster rate and thereby increase the utilization efficiency.

We are sure we have the same objectives in mind -- those objectives being the best service and reliability at lowest cost, both to DoD and to the general public, and believe that our views can converge with respect to the broad public policy issues.

Sincerely,

George F. Mansur

G. F. Mansur

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
... OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

DIRECTOR

May 25, 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

As discussed in Mr. Whitehead's memorandum of 5 May, the Office of Telecommunications Policy has conducted a review of the policy issues connected with planning, construction, and operation of commercial international communications facilities. This review is now complete and the resulting conclusions and recommendations have been provided to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. A copy of the correspondence is attached.

The fundamental premise of the Administration's policy is that the public interest is best served by permitting both cable and satellite technologies to evolve competitively in response to operational needs and economic considerations. We believe that adoption of this policy framework will provide industry, both domestic and foreign, with the guidance it needs to more effectively plan for new facilities.

We wish to express our thanks to the Department of Defense for their constructive advice and assistance during the course of the policy review.



G. F. Mansur
Acting

Atch.

CTW

DOD

MAY 21 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

General James D. Hughes
The White House

I spoke with Carl Wallace last week about the military personnel detailed to my Office. In reviewing the precedents and the current situation, I have concluded that continuation of the arrangement would be mutually beneficial, but that the situation would be improved by making a somewhat different utilization of these personnel. This is set forth in the attached letter to Carl.

Carl indicated he saw no problems so long as we were not talking about an increase in the number of details. He did ask, however, that in the future the coordination of selection and assignment be done through his office rather than through the Assistant to the Secretary (Telecommunications). This is certainly acceptable to me. He also requested that I forward the attached letter through you, not for your approval but to help assure that you were fully informed of our military details within the Executive Office. I am happy to do so, and would appreciate your forwarding the attached letter. I will make it a point to keep you informed on other matters pertaining to military details as they arise.

As you know, my responsibilities involve me rather heavily in national security communications, and the Director, Defense Communications Agency, is also the Manager of the National Communications System, for which I have policy responsibility. As a result, there is considerable need for me and the military details assigned to my Office to have contact with the Defense Department and with WHCA. If you think it would be useful, I would like to bring Captain Court Babcock, who is my senior military officer, over to talk with you some time about how we could make the most effective use of my military assistant in coordinating with you and DOD.

- cc: Mr. Whitehead (3)
- Dr. Mansur
- Capt. Babcock (2)
- Subject--
- Reading--

Clay T. Whitehead
Clay T. Whitehead 5/21/71

Attachment

CTBabcock/bas 4/20/71. GFMansur /ed

DOD

MAY 21 1971

Mr. Carl S. Wallace
The Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
Room 3E941
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Carl:

As we discussed earlier, I have conducted a review of the role of military personnel assigned to this new Office. As a result, I am now able to advise you how military personnel can most effectively be utilized in carrying out the functions assigned to me by the President.

Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1970 established this Office in the Executive Office of the President. By the Reorganization Plan and Executive Order 11556 functions previously assigned to the Director of Telecommunications Management, including those assigned by Presidential Memorandum of August 21, 1963, establishing the National Communications System, were reassigned to this Office. In addition, however, new functions and responsibilities were added which broadened the mission significantly from that of the old Office of Telecommunications Management (OTM).

Historically, the OTM, and more recently this Office, has been assigned approximately five members of the military. Each of the services has shared the detailing on approximately an equal basis. These officers have all been in the grades of O-5 and O-6, and during the period of reorganization I found their experience and advice invaluable. However, I now feel that to properly utilize military personnel and to make their assignment to this Office more beneficial in a military career pattern, it would be desirable to have personnel of varied experience levels. I believe, therefore, it would be preferable to have one officer in the grade of O-6 and five less senior officers assigned to this Office.

A review of currently assigned personnel follows: the senior officer presently on board is Captain C. T. Babcock, USN. He has approximately two years of commissioned service remaining before retirement, and

will have completed two years in this Office in August 1971. I understand it would be to his advantage to be made available for reassignment this summer. The next senior officer is Colonel W. T. Olsson, USAF, who will retire on July 1, 1971. Two Army officers, Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Enslow, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel S. A. Lasher, have been recently assigned and are not due for rotation.

With the above assignments in mind, I would like to propose for your consideration the following: assignment of one officer in the grade of O-6 who meets the qualifications stated in Attachment 1; retention of Lieutenant Colonels Enslow and Lasher until their normal tours have been completed; assignment of three more junior officers who meet the qualifications stated in Attachment 2.

If the assignment of personnel can be accomplished as outlined above, I feel that the mission of this Office will be accomplished more effectively, and the careers of the officers in question greatly enhanced.

Sincerely,



Clay T. Whitehead

Attachments (2)

cc: Mr. Whitehead (2) ✓ Dr. Mansur
Subject File ---
Reading File

CTBabcock/bss 4/28/71; GFMansur/ed 5/21/71

ATTACHMENT 1

Military Assistant to the Director

The incumbent in this position should be in the grade of 0-6, and may be from any of the armed services. His military career should reflect considerable experience in command and management positions and it is preferred that he has had command experience in the grade of 0-6. He should have some familiarity with communications. His educational background should be equivalent to that required by other employees of this Office, i. e., B. A. as a minimum.

The incumbent will report directly to the Director. He will act as the Director's personal representative in effecting liaison with the Executive Agent, National Communications System, the Department of Defense, the Military Assistant to the President, members of Congress, other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, and the communications industry.

The incumbent's experience in the management of resources will be utilized in the definition of programs and preparation and review of budgets, including the preparation of recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget.

In addition the incumbent will provide advice and assistance to the program managers in policy decisions concerning the Department of Defense and the National Communications System.

ATTACHMENT 2

Staff Assistant (Military)

The incumbent in this position should be in the grade of 0-3, 0-4, or 0-5 and may be from any of the armed services.

The incumbent will report to Senior Program Managers (GS-16 or above). He will coordinate actions with senior staff members of the Executive Agent, National Communications System, the Department of Defense, other Federal departments and agencies, staffs of Congressional committees, and representatives of industry.

The incumbent should have as a minimum a Master's degree or equivalent experience in one or more of the following fields of study: mathematics, economics, operations research/systems analysis, business administration, engineering or science. He must be capable of independent research, proposing and analyzing options to complex multi-disciplinary problems. He need not be technically qualified in communications but some experience in the communications field is desired.

An assignment to this Office could be considered as qualifying in a utilization tour for advanced civil schooling.



HALL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DoD

17 MAY 1971

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
1800 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Whitehead:

Our letter of May 7, 1971 states that our views on your detailed study and conclusions regarding policy issues concerned with future international communications facilities, including TAT-6, would be forwarded to you in the near future.


Your study and conclusions have been reviewed. It is disturbing to note that the Department of Defense (DoD) comments as well as those of others submitted in response to your March 5, 1971 draft study have been largely ignored in the latest study and conclusions. Notwithstanding this, we are enclosing the DoD comments on the conclusions since we believe that you will find them most relevant in the development of your views on these important issues.

Your study and conclusions, which are satellite oriented, strongly endorse additional satellite facilities and, in effect, deny further installation of submarine cables, particularly in the Atlantic basin, through 1977. This policy could result in eliminating a U.S. capability to construct and install such cables prior to and beyond the 1977 time frame. The DoD is neither willing, nor can it afford, to place an increasing and predominant reliance on satellites. There must continue to be a judicious mix of both government-owned and commercial media to satisfy national security requirements. The lack of future U.S. cable construction and installation capabilities would have a serious impact on the ability of DoD to maintain the required degree of responsive, alternate, redundant and diverse routings for U.S. national security requirements.

The Department of Defense views on the future licensing of international communications facilities and the early installation of TAT-6 have been

made known to the FCC and to you. There has been no change in these views. Therefore, it is requested that our enclosed views and comments on the OTP conclusions be provided to the FCC at such time as your views are forwarded to the Commission.


Sincerely,



Louis A. deRosa

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)

Enclosure



DoD Comments on OTP Conclusions dated May 7, 1971. The comments respond to the corresponding OTP numbered paragraphs.

1. The DoD cannot agree that the demand for both TV and data services is sufficiently small in relation to existing cable and satellite capacity. On the contrary the use of data communications is expanding rapidly. There are also increasing demands for TV transmissions. There is no evidence that this trend will be reversed. Therefore, the DoD cannot categorically conclude that no additional transatlantic communications facilities will be required prior to 1977 to meet these and other ever-increasing demands for communications.
2. The DoD is unaware of any action which will provide for automatic circuit restoration in the near future. Your statement "...it will continue to be appropriate to use only a single communications mode..." would deny TV transmissions if only cable is available and would deny data transmissions in many cases, if only satellites are available. Furthermore, a judicious mix of satellites and cables provides improved diverse routings. This would include tail segment routings due to satellite earth station/cable head termination locations.
3. The less than 6 percent spare capacity which is projected for transatlantic cable and satellite facilities through 1977 is, in the opinion of the DoD, extremely limited and could easily prove grossly inadequate in the event of the loss of a cable and/or satellite either temporarily or on a permanent basis. Furthermore, the DoD is convinced that industry projections for TAT-6, as in the past, are underestimated and that actual demands for communications will increase as TAT-6 becomes available. There are too many examples of poor planning on the part of the communications industry which have resulted in inadequate availability of responsive communications in a timely manner.
4. The authorization and construction of new facilities to meet unexpected increases in demand would not only be costly but is questioned when considering that such authorization and construction always involves one or more foreign countries in addition to the United States. There is absolutely no guarantee that foreign countries will agree to construct new facilities on a crash basis, particularly when they fully support the construction of TAT-6 now. Reliance on a projected CANTAT-2 (British-Canadian) cable scheduled for service in 1974 would have a greater impact on gold-flow than construction of TAT-6. Furthermore, service in CANTAT-2 will be considerably more expensive than TAT-6 due to the extension of long tail segments to U. S. locations.
5. The DoD agrees that national security communication needs can continue to be met by existing facilities provided that appropriate

priority allocation and restoration procedures will continue to be honored by the foreign correspondents, and provided that all existing transmission media remain operational. However, there is no guarantee that such transmission media will be available at all times. Previous satellite failures alone negate this guarantee. There also is no guarantee that foreign correspondents would honor the restoration of national security communications circuits should there be a significant reduction in available media, either temporarily or on a permanent basis, particularly if foreign public message service would have to be denied in order to restore such national security requirements.

6. Basically agree. However, there are no indications that action is in progress to provide for automatic circuit restoration in the near future.

7. Basically agree with the philosophy in the statement -- "Those facilities which have lower total cost for a given circuit capacity will result in lower overall cost of services to the public." However, while the detailed OTP Economic Study states that satellite communications are cheaper, COMSAT has not reduced its rates for satellite circuits since their first availability in 1965. The cost of new facilities does not necessarily predict the cost for service via that facility. The installation of TAT-6 could allow for the cost of service in this cable to be averaged with such costs for TATs 1 through 5, thereby almost guaranteeing the arrival at a TATs 1 through 6 common rate.

8. The statement that satellite costs are lower than SF cable technology should be confirmed or denied by cable-oriented activities.

9. Basically agree.

10. It is the understanding of DoD that the selection of circuit routes for public message traffic is generally left to the discretion of the communication carriers involved. Furthermore, circuits are ordered on an end-to-end basis - not on a half circuit basis. Therefore, this conclusion does not appear proper or relevant.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 1 8 1970

Honorable Dean Burch
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
1919 "M" Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Several weeks ago my Assistant for Telecommunications, Mr. Louis A. deRosa, wrote to the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy with respect to your "inquiry into policy to be followed in future licensings of facilities for overseas communications." Our views were that as a matter of policy we supported actions on the part of the FCC which stimulate and encourage the growth and expansion of telecommunications throughout the world.

This DoD position is based in a large measure on the reliance which we must place on the common carriers for supplying international commercial communications. Our experience as a user supports the concept that high capacity submarine cable systems and satellite systems provide the best mix of complementary rather than competitive systems for meeting the compelling needs of national security and defense communications.

We further advised that we would respond to the Commission within the framework of these general policy views, with regard to specific applications by carriers. In this connection we have been studying the applications of the AT&T Company and other participating U.S. international common carriers to construct a new transatlantic cable (TAT-6) linking the U.S. with France, and extending a number of cable circuits from the French landing point directly to the Federal Republic of Germany as well as providing access into the domestic facilities in France. We note in the application for TAT-6 that the existing transatlantic communications facilities will soon be fully utilized and that additional circuits will be sorely needed within the next two or three years. Our review of previous transoceanic cable and satellite system applications tends to bear out the fact that justifications presented for additional facilities have been understated.

8 MAY 1971

Honorable Dean Burch
Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission
1919 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On December 18, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird sent to you a letter outlining the Department of Defense views and support of actions which stimulate and encourage the growth and expansion of telecommunications throughout the world. He strongly supported the construction of a new transatlantic cable (TAT-6) linking the United States with France, and extending a number of cable circuits from the French landing point directly to the Federal Republic of Germany.

This letter is to ensure that no misunderstanding exists regarding our continuing strong support of the TAT-6 applications for the reasons stated in Mr. Laird's letter. Favorable action thereon by the Commission would lead to an early service availability using SF cable technology.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Louis A. deRosa
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)

In addition to supporting the growth of international commercial communications facilities from which the DoD can selectively fulfill its needs, we are, of course, also interested in the substantial contributions that these additional facilities provide in the trend toward reducing costs through rate reductions.

Since the AT&T Company and other participating carriers wish to construct another high quality communications path across the Atlantic without obligating the Department of Defense, we strongly support the TAT-6 applications and a favorable response thereon by the Commission.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D. S. S.", written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized and somewhat cursive.

5 MAY 1971

lod

CWHITEHEAD/HINCHMAN:dc

Mr. Whitehead -2 ✓

Dr. Mansur

Mr. Hinchman

Mr. Owen

Same ltr to Attny. Gen. John N. Mitchell
Richard Hlems, DIA


MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

My Office has been reviewing policy issues connected with the planning, construction, and operation of international communication facilities, working with staff from your Department and other agencies. These issues are of immediate concern to the Federal Communications Commission in its consideration of Docket 18875, which addresses the general policy to be followed. It also relates directly to action on the AT&T proposal for a new trans-Atlantic cable (TAT-6).

I have asked George Mansur, my Deputy Director, to coordinate the views of interested Executive Branch agencies in arriving at Administration recommendations to the FCC. I would like to invite you to designate a representative who can speak for your Department, to meet with Dr. Mansur and other agency representatives. I am enclosing the Executive Summary of our study of economic and technical considerations which I believe forms a useful framework for these deliberations.

The Department of State advises that for reasons of foreign policy an early action is desirable. The FCC and industry are also anxious to resolve this matter. Therefore, we would like to schedule a first coordination meeting for Friday, May 7, at 2:00 P.M., and complete the preparation of Administration recommendations by Friday, May 14.



Clay T. Whitehead

Encl.


5 MAY 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Attached for your information is a draft summary of an OTP study concerning regulation of international communication facilities. This issue is currently under consideration by the Federal Communications Commission; it is of considerable interest to Federal agencies, the U.S. international communications industry, and certain European nations. Of immediate concern is a pending proposal by AT&T to lay a sixth trans-Atlantic cable (TAT-6).

The Secretary of Defense, in a letter to the FCC, has expressed "strong support" for the TAT-6 application. However, DOD has agreed that "existing facilities appear to be sufficient to satisfy existing and projected NCS priority circuits.... Therefore, the need for expansion of trans-Atlantic facilities must not be predicated on U.S. Government needs alone." The DOD has supplied no other justification for its support of the TAT-6 proposal. Also, while certain European nations have a special interest in seeing additional cable facilities established, these foreign relations implications do not seem of sufficient concern to dominate what is essentially a commercial regulatory matter.

We are soliciting the views of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other interested agencies, in order to submit an Administration recommendation to the FCC shortly. I doubt this matter is of significant concern to you; but if you would like to be involved, you may want to have someone from your staff contact Walter Hinchman (x-5190), Assistant Director, OTP, who is handling this project.



Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc:

Mr. Whitehead ✓

Dr. Mansur

Mr. Hinchman

Mr. Owen

WHinchman/CTWhitehead:sbw 5/4/71

5 MAY 1971

CWHITEHEAD/HINCHMAN;dc

Mr. Whitehead -2✓

Dr. Mansur

Mr. Hinchman

Mr. Owen

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

My Office has been reviewing policy issues connected with the planning, construction, and operation of international communication facilities, working with staff from your Department and other agencies. These issues are of immediate concern to the Federal Communications Commission in its consideration of Docket 18875, which addresses the general policy to be followed. It also relates directly to action on the AT&T proposal for a new trans-Atlantic cable (TAT 6).

I have asked George Mansur, my Deputy Director, to coordinate the views of interested Executive Branch agencies in arriving at Administration recommendations to the FCC. I would like to invite you to designate a representative who can speak for your Department, to meet with Dr. Mansur and other agency representatives. I am enclosing the Executive Summary of our study of economic and technical considerations which I believe forms a useful framework for these deliberations.

We have been advised that your Department considers early action to be desirable for foreign policy reasons. The FCC and industry are also anxious to resolve this matter. Therefore, we would like to schedule a first coordination meeting for Friday, May 7, at 2:00 P. M., and complete the preparation of Administration recommendations by Friday, May 14.



Clay T. Whitehead

Encl.

DOD

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

April 26, 1971

Mr. Louis A. deRosa
Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Telecommunications)
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. deRosa:


The Chairman-Designate of the U. S. Delegation to the forthcoming World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST), Mr. Robert Tyson, has indicated his desire to visit the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) at Green Bank, West Virginia. The only time he has available for this visit is May 21, 1971.

In view of the substantial Department of Defense interest in both the outcome of the WARC-ST and in spectrum provisions for radio astronomy, the travel to Green Bank and return for Mr. Tyson and his party by military aircraft appears appropriate and justified. It is expected that Mr. Tyson will be accompanied by Dr. G. Mansur, Deputy Director of this Office, Dr. M. Ehrlich, and Mr. W. Dean, Jr. of my staff. You are invited to name a senior DoD representative to be a member of Mr. Tyson's party during the visit.

Arrangements for air travel from DoD resources as outlined above are requested. If this can be done, specific departure times on May 21st and other details can be worked out with Mr. Dean (phone 395-5623), my point of contact for arranging this trip.

Any assistance you can provide to make Mr. Tyson's visit to Green Bank a success would be very much appreciated.

Sincerely,


G. F. Mansur
Deputy

April 23, 1971

Handwritten initials

Honorable George A. Lincoln
Director
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear General Lincoln:

Last October you indicated that a final natural disaster communications support plan should be developed to replace the interim plan for employment of National Communications System (NCS) communications teams. In November I asked the Executive Agent, NCS, to develop such a plan and forward it to me for review.

The attached plan was developed by the Manager, NCS, assisted by those NCS Operating Agencies having the principal responsibility for communications support during natural disaster operations. In addition the plan was reviewed by both your staff and mine prior to its being submitted for my approval.

The plan entitled "National Communications System Plan for Communications Support in Natural Disasters" dated March 1971 is approved. Prior to its implementation your Office will want to instruct the OEP Regional Offices in its implementation. When this action is completed I will be pleased to advise the Executive Agent, NCS, to assist you in implementing the plan.

Sincerely,

/s/

Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: Executive Agent, NCS
✓ Mr. Whitehead (2)

CTBabcock/bss/4-23-71



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 APR 1971

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Whitehead:

Please refer to your letter of November 18, 1970 regarding the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) requirement that a natural disaster communications support plan be developed by the Manager, NCS.

Enclosure 1 is the proposed plan which was prepared by the Manager, NCS in coordination with pertinent NCS Operating Agencies. Enclosure 2 is the Department of Defense (DoD) plan to provide emergency communications support to the Director, OEP Region Three during natural disasters. DoD is being tasked to develop a plan to provide similar support to the other OEP Regional Directors. A copy of the plan will be forwarded to you as soon as it is available.

Prior to your approval and submission of enclosure 1 to the Director, OEP for implementation, it is recommended that the following change be made to paragraph 4b (page 5) in order to further emphasize the responsibilities of the NCS Operating Agencies.

- b. Maintain staff supervision over and provide assistance to its designated Communications Coordinator in the fulfillment of the specific mission.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. deRosa", is written over a faint circular stamp.

Louis A. deRosa
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)

Enclosures 2

November 18, 1970

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Executive Agent
National Communications System
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

By his letter of October 27, 1970, General Lincoln approved an interim plan for NCS support of OEP during communications emergencies resulting from natural disasters. A copy of General Lincoln's letter is forwarded for your information.

General Lincoln has indicated a desire that his staff continue to work with the NCS staff to develop the final natural disaster communications support plan. I agree that such a plan should be developed utilizing appropriate portions of the nation's telecommunications resources. During the development I would appreciate the opportunity to make inputs to the plan. When the plan is completed it should be forwarded to me for review and forwarding to General Lincoln for his subsequent implementation during natural disaster situations.

I am pleased that General Lincoln is looking to the NCS for support in emergency situations, and I'm certain that the NCS will respond accordingly.

Sincerely,



Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: Director, OEP
Mr. Whitehead (2)
✓ Subject File -- Natural Disasters
Reading File

CT Babcock/bss/5170/11-18-70

COPY

October 27, 1970

Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, USAF
Manager
National Communications System
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20305

Dear General Klocko:

Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1970, transmitting to us the interim plan for employment of NCS communications field teams in support of the President's disaster assistance program.

The plan has been reviewed within OEP and a number of minor word changes have been suggested. These have been discussed informally with NCS staff personnel and they foresee no difficulties making these minor adjustments. The OEP suggested changes are attached.

I approve your suggested interim plan and am anxious to proceed with its implementation. The support of NCS communications personnel was valuable during the Corpus Christi hurricane disaster and proved the desirability of a joint effort to meet the needs of the disaster assistance program.

I have instructed my staff to continue to work with NCS personnel in developing the final natural disaster communications support plan.

Sincerely,

(Signed)
G. A. Lincoln
Director

Attachment

cc: Director, OTP

dod

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM WHITHEAD

FROM: GEORGE CRAWFORD *gc*
SUBJECT: MARITIME COORDINATION

I would be very interested in getting your thoughts on this before sending it to Peter.

*George -
It's not clear to me that you can focus this only on the N. Atlantic (or meant to).
If you can, you certainly should. Either way, I think it's a good idea.
Also a good memo.*

Tom

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: GEORGE CRAWFORD

SUBJECT: MARITIME COORDINATION

As you know, there are several agencies with responsibility for maritime problems, and coordination among them is something of a problem, often requiring White House leadership. Such leadership may be required with respect to the general problem of North Atlantic commercial shipping. As a result of American technical innovation in the form of containerized shipping, American share of this trade increased from 30% to 70%, but it has since dropped to 50%. The industry needs a unified government policy to plan its activities and compete effectively against foreign shipping. Also, if this shipping cannot be made sufficiently profitable to attract capital, the President's ship building program will be drawn in jeopardy.

The following issues are components of the problem, and there is inter-agency disagreement about them.

-- Consortia and mergers. The industry would like to engage in mergers or to form operating and pooling agreements in order to cope more effectively with foreign competitors who can do this with government approval. The Federal Maritime Commission and Federal Maritime Administration are generally receptive to this; the Antitrust Department is opposed; and the issue is now being thrashed out in the courts rather than determined as administration policy.

-- Bilaterals. The Maritime Commission and Maritime Administration are receptive to industry initiatives for inter-governmental or inter-company agreements to divide up shipping lines and thereby make business more predictable; the State Department and Antitrust Division are opposed.

-- Compensatory Defense Department rates. The Maritime Administration and Maritime Commission argue that the Defense Department should not be allowed to procure shipping services at rates below the standard commercial rates; the Defense Department disagrees. Ship owners may be willing to carry Defense Department cargos at rates which do not cover average costs, but which are nevertheless above marginal cost, but if this in fact is the case and the practice continues, capital will flee the industry. The issue of merger between the MSC and MTMTS appears to be tied in with this question.

-- Labor. The intractable problem of moderating longshoreman demands, and making them more receptive to technological change must be solved in order to get the maximum advantage from containerized shipping. There is no immediately apparent way to do this, however, and there is some expectation of a general longshoreman strike this fall.

Formulation of a unified governmental policy on these questions would not only improve the health of the industry, and hopefully restore some of the lost ground in North Atlantic shipping, but should also aid in fulfilling the President's ship building program, and will have repercussions for international trade and the balance of payments.

If you agree that this problem calls for formulation of a unified governmental policy, I would suggest formation of a Task Force chaired from the White House and including Helen Bentley, Charles Baker, Bert Rein, Andrew Gibson, Richard McLaren and Barry Shillitoe. As past coordinator of our maritime policy, you would be the logical chairman, although other demands on your time might lead you to conclude that the full problem should be referred to the Peterson office.

March 23, 1971

dad

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Executive Agent
National Communications System
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

By my letter of March 5 to Mr. deRosa I forwarded a copy of the revised "Statement of White House Requirements for Presidential Communications with the General Public During Periods of National Emergency," and advised him of my intention to initiate a review of the entire Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

A group of technically qualified personnel is required as a nucleus to conduct this review. The people assigned to this group, augmented as required from other agencies and industry, will work within the attached terms of reference to recommend measures to improve the operation of the existing EBS, and to provide options for improvement which can be made in the next one to three years.

I would appreciate your requesting the Manager, National Communications System, to provide two persons as participants in this nucleus group.

I am certain that you share my concern with past failures of the EBS, and I am sure that with the cooperation of all

interested parties steps can be taken to insure a more responsive system in the very near future.

Sincerely,

/signed/

Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: General George A. Lincoln, OEP
Commissioner Robert G. Wells, FCC
Governor John E. Davis, OCD
Dr. Robert M. White, NOAA
Lt. General Richard P. Klocko, DCA
Mr. Louis A. deRosa, DoD
✓Mr. Whitehead (2)

CTBabcock/bss/3-23/71

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR REVIEW OF THE
EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM

A group of technically qualified personnel will be formed to conduct a review of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). This group will be headed by a member of the staff of OTP, and will be made up of two members provided by NCS and one person provided by the FCC. The group will be augmented as required by persons from the communications industry and other Federal agencies.

The EBS Review Group will accomplish the following:

a. Determine what caused the inadvertent activation of the EBS on February 20, not as a "finger-pointing" exercise but to insure that the group has complete knowledge of the incident. The Department of Defense investigation and the FCC investigation will be made available to assist in this effort.

b. Recommend measures required to correct any deficiencies in the existing EBS. Include incorporation of new and revised requirements as stated in the "Statement of White House Requirements for Presidential Communications with the General Public During Periods of National Emergency" dated February 26, 1971, and the additional requirements forwarded to OTP by General Hughes in his memorandum for Clay T. Whitehead, dated March 4, 1971.

c. When the recommendations to correct deficiencies are approved, rewrite the EBS plan to reflect required changes.

d. Provide options for near-term improvement of the EBS in order to increase its reliability, responsiveness, coverage, etc.

Chron
✓ FTS
Autovon
AT&T

MAR 28 1971

Mr. Benjamin H. Oliver
Vice President for Government
Communications
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
2055 L Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Ben:

We are working with the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration to determine the best course of action with respect to the future of the AUTOVON and FTS telephone networks. We plan to complete this within the next few months.

I understand that you have given some consideration to the possibility of providing the capabilities inherent in AUTOVON and FTS in the form of a service offering by the company. We would like to evaluate such a possibility in conjunction with the other options which are available at the present time. It would be most helpful if you could provide specific information on the costs of such a service, on interconnection privileges, and on the division of management, engineering and other responsibilities and prerogatives between the government and the telephone industry under such an arrangement.

Sincerely,

Clay T. Whitehead

CCJoyce:hmy

3-19-71

cc: Subj File

Chron File

Mr. Whitehead - 2 ✓

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Date: March 18, 1971

Subject: Letter to Ben Oliver, AT&T

To: Mr. Whitehead

From: Charles Joyce *CJ (Lenny)*

Recommend that you sign the attached letter to Ben Oliver.

The purpose of the letter is to get the AT&T top management to focus on the question of providing a government communications network as a service offering, and to see if they will commit themselves to a price level. To date, all discussion of such an offering has been informal and non-committal. AT&T has not sorted it out internally.

The major hooker I see in the service offering thus far is interconnection rights. If AT&T engineers the network and offers it as a service, they are in a stronger position to say that it is "incompatible" with terminal equipment or other facilities we may want to interconnect with. We will be watching this aspect closely.

Attachment

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

ROUTE SLIPTO C. T. Whitehead____________________

ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
Concurrence	<input type="checkbox"/>
Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>
Comments	<input type="checkbox"/>
For reply	<input type="checkbox"/>
Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
Per conversation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Discuss with me	<input type="checkbox"/>

FROM W. DeanDATE 3/11/71

REMARKS

1. Sent this, and one like it to Asst. Sec. Cannon of DOT, to get Radio-navigation allocations into clearer focus.
2. Coordinated with Dave Salmon in advance. Ditto DOT staff members. Will

~~Am. Plan~~
Defense

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 10, 1971

Mr. Louis A. deRosa
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Telecommunications)
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. deRosa:

The reports on Phases I, II, and III of the JCS Navigation Study forwarded with your letter to Mr. Whitehead of September 2, 1970, have been studied with interest. It is noted that these reports will serve as a basis for the preparation and publication of a NCS Master Navigation Plan. We are looking forward to receiving a copy of this Plan upon its availability.

By separate action, the Department of Transportation has announced its intention to conduct an annual review of its "National Plan for Navigation" which, it is understood, will include the JCS Plan by association.

This Office evaluates on a continuing basis the use being made of the radio frequency spectrum resource to ensure that the allocation structure is responsive to overall U.S. needs. In this regard, it is necessary to treat questions such as "Why are so many radionavigation aids required?" and, in the interest of spectrum conservation as well as cost reduction, "Can there be a programmed reduction in the number of such aids over the next few years?" These questions are applicable to long and short range radionavigation aids and to radio positioning devices as well.


Attached hereto is a recap of the spectrum allocated for radionavigation purposes as reflected by the U.S. National Table of Frequency Allocations. To this could be added a number of frequencies being used for positioning systems such as RAYDIST, LORAC, and SHORAN.

2.

Answers to the foregoing questions are needed in the near future for consideration as a part of the continuing evaluation mentioned above.

In view of the vital interest of the DOD in this matter, your views would be appreciated. A similar letter is being forwarded to the Department of Transportation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "W. Dean, Jr.", written in dark ink.

W. Dean, Jr.
Director
Frequency Management

Enclosure

RECAP OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATED FOR RADIONAVIGATION AIDS

10-14 kHz	- Omega
70.8375	- Decca
84.945	"
85.005	"
85.065	"
113.340	"
116.1735	"
127.5075	"
90-110	- Loran-C
200-285	- Aero Nav Aids (beacons)
285-325	- Maritime Radiobeacons/Shared with aero
325-405	- Aero Nav Aids (beacons)
405-415	- Maritime R D/F / Shared with aero
510-535	- Aero Nav Aids
1605-1800	- Aero Nav Aids
1800-2000	- Loran-A
74.60-75.40 MHz	- Aero Nav Aids (Marker Beacons)
108-117.975 MHz	- Aero Nav Aids VOR/ILS localizer
149.4-150.05	- Transit
328.6-335.4 MHz	- Aero Nav Aids (ILS Glideslope)
399.9-400.05	- Transit
420-460	- Altimeters (Until 1973)
960-1215	- TACAN//IFF//Air Traffic Control Secondary Beacons
1300-1350	- Aero Nav Aids (Long range surveillance radars)

Enclosure

RECAP OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATED FOR RADIONAVIGATION AIDS (Cont)

- | | |
|-----------------|--|
| 1557.5-1637.5 | - Aero Nav Aids (no systems yet) |
| 1592.5-1662.5 | - Aero Nav Aids (Collision Avoidance system) |
| 1600-1660 | - Aero Nav Aids (Altimeters) |
| 2700-2900 | - Aero Nav Aids (Terminal ATC/GCA) |
| 4200-4400 | - Aero Nav Aids (Altimeters) |
| 5000-5250 | - Aero Nav Aids (New ILS planned) |
| 5350-5460 | - Aero Nav Aids (Airborne radars & associated beacons) |
| 5460-5470 | - Nav Aids (Airborne radars & associated beacons plus ship borne radars) |
| 5470-5650 | - Maritime Nav Aids (Ship borne radars) |
| 9000-9200 | - Aero Nav Aids (Precision Approach/GCA final) |
| 9300-9500 | - Nav Aids (Airborne radars & associated beacons/ship borne radars) |
| 13.25-13.4 GHz | - Aero Nav Aids (Doppler) |
| 14.0-14.3 GHz | - Nav Aids (Aero & Maritime - planned) |
| 14.3-14.4 GHz | - Navigation Satellite |
| 15.4-15.7 GHz | - Aero Nav Aids (ILS planned) |
| 24.25-25.25 GHz | - Nav Aids (Airport surveillance radars & maritime planned) |
| 31.8-33.4 GHz | - Nav Aids (Airport surveillance radars & maritime planned) |

dod

March 10, 1971


MEMO FOR THE RECORD

Subject: DOD/DCA Reconfiguration of Circuits in the Western Pacific

The purpose of this memo is to report on the resolution of the problem with regard to the ITT complaint to the Office on the reconfiguration of the DCA circuits in the Western Pacific area.

Informal and low-key discussions were held over the past few weeks with representatives of DOD, DCA, DOS, and the FCC to define the basic problem and to determine what could be done to resolve it. The basic problem, from the carrier's viewpoint, was one of not being informed rather than a specific procurement action by DOD/DCA. This informal investigation showed that no basic policy issues were prevalent, and as such no formal activity by OTP should be considered, since it would appear only as intervention in a procurement dispute.

It now appears that the basic problem has been resolved by DOD and DCA consenting to a briefing of the international carriers and the Japanese KDD on the unclassified plans of DOD and DCA in the Western Pacific. This briefing will most likely be held the week of March 15. No further activity on this problem is anticipated.


J. Thornell

- cc:
- Mr. Whitehead ←
- Dr. Mansur
- Mr. Joyce
- Mr. Doyle

March 9, 1971

Chron
✓ DOD
NCS
EBS
OTP - Studies
OEF
OTP - Rprsntatvs

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Executive Agent
National Communications System
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), pursuant to PL 91-606, is making a study to determine what improvements should be made to prevent or minimize the loss of life and property due to major disasters. A report to the Congress is required by the end of this year. This Office has been asked to participate in the study.

In November 1970 you tasked the manager, National Communications System (NCS), at my request, to undertake the development of a natural disaster communications support plan. I understand that plan will be submitted to this Office within the next thirty days. Because of their expertise, it is requested that the NCS staff participate in the preparation of the communications input to the OEP study.

A copy of the guidelines for the PL 91-606 Disaster Study is attached. Because of the short time frame proposed for the study, it is requested that an NCS staff member contact my representative, Captain C. T. Babcock, at the earliest practicable date.

Sincerely,

(s)

Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: ✓ Mr. Whitehead (2)

CTBabcock/bss/5170/3-9-71

dod

The following letters have been filed in the Emergency Broadcast Systems file -----

3/5/71 To Louis A. deRosa, Asst. to the Secretary of Defense (Communications) re "Statements of White House Requirements for Presidential Communications with the General Public During Periods of National Emergency". (dated 2/26/71)

3/5/71 - to Defense Commissioner Robert G. Wells, FCC, re above.

3/5/71 - to Senator Pastore

3/5/71 - to General Lincoln, ODP

¹⁰
3/5/71 - to Commerce

clod

March 5, 1971

Mr. Louis A. deRosa
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)
Room 3E160
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. deRosa:

The Military Assistant to the President has forwarded to me the revised "Statement of White House Requirements for Presidential Communications with the General Public During Periods of National Emergency" dated February 26, 1971. It is the responsibility of this Office to develop, with the cooperation of appropriate departments and agencies, the full potential of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and assure its reliable performance.

I intend to initiate a thorough review of the entire EBS program with the ultimate aim of satisfying the requirements of the President and of Federal departments and agencies. Because of the prior involvement of the Director of Civil Defense, the Director, Defense Communications Agency, and the Manager, National Communications System, I consider their advice and assistance essential in this important undertaking.

For your information a copy of the revised Statement of White House Requirements is attached. I would appreciate your informing the Manager, NCS, and appropriate components of the Department of Defense of my intentions.

Sincerely,

Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: ✓ Mr. Whitehead (2)

CTBabcock/bss/5170/3-5-71

26 February 1971

Presidential Communications
with the General Public
During Periods of National Emergency

STATEMENT OF WHITE HOUSE REQUIREMENTS

Basic Requirement:

During periods of national emergency, reliable communications are required to enable the President to reassure and give direction to the populace regarding survival and recovery of the nation.

Assumptions:

a. The nongovernment communications industry will, in view of their expressed and demonstrated willingness to assist the Federal Government in the establishment of an Emergency Broadcast System*, unreservedly make their facilities available for emergency use, and provide personnel to assist in the formulation of emergency communications plans. The industry can also be expected to bear a portion of the cost of any special arrangements required, particularly in those instances in which such arrangements may find gainful application in the normal commercial enterprises of the industry.

b. Existing facilities of the nongovernment communications industry will, if utilized to the maximum advantage, prove adequate for emergency Presidential use. Because of the substantial number of facilities available, by-pass and backup arrangements can be provided in such depth as to assure a high probability of survival despite the infliction of severe damage to the system as a whole.

* The Emergency Broadcast System is considered to comprise all nongovernment communications facilities designated and authorized by the FCC to operate during periods of national emergency for the purpose of meeting the basic requirement.

Guiding Principles:

a. In view of the fact appreciable costs would accrue to the Federal Government for the construction of special radio and television stations designed for use on nongovernment frequencies, and because of problems inherent in the operation of such stations and the limited day-to-day application of such facilities, it is desirable that existing privately owned facilities be utilized by the President in communicating with the populace.

b. Emergency communications facilities provided for the President's use in communicating with the populace must be configured and arranged in such a manner so as to provide a capability under the most severe circumstances.

Operational Requirements:

a. The President requires a capability to address the nation both orally (AM/FM radio/TV audio) and visually (TV) on short notice regardless of his whereabouts. To this end, the following specific operational features must be provided:

(1) Radio and Television Audio - From a "cold" start, automatic or "seize-key" availability is desirable. It is recognized, however, that the technical arrangements inherent in the provision of such a capability are prohibitively expensive. Current commercial radio and television network procedures suggest that an availability within five (5) minutes following notification is a realistic capability. Accordingly, these procedures are acceptable for the present, however, improved procedures should be exploited where possible.

(2) Live Television Video and Sound - A reaction time of three (3) hours following notification is acceptable for the provision of a live television transmitting capability. Necessary technical arrangements and constraints listed in paragraph 2. of the Guiding Principles dictate that the President will proceed to, and speak from, locations where adequate commercial video transmitting facilities already exist. No expenditures by the nongovernment communications industry for special equipment or facilities to

support this requirement, other than special arrangements referred to in paragraph a. of the Assumptions are requested or required.

b. All Presidential broadcasts during periods of national emergency will be "live". Such prerecordings as may be required to provide continuity of program service for the Emergency Broadcast System will be prepared as directed by the Department of Defense.

c. Once constituted, the Emergency Broadcast System must remain available as a network until its participating facilities are specifically released by Presidential authority and directed to shift to some other mode of operation. The White House, however, interposes no objection to the planned emergency utilization by other departments and agencies of facilities designated for Presidential use provided:

(1) The facilities have been activated by Presidential direction.

(2) The President is not actually speaking to the nation over the facilities.

In all such instances, however, Presidential priority must be preserved by a "seize-key" control feature which would enable the system to revert to Presidential use.

d. The White House encourages day-to-day use of emergency facilities for such purposes as may be authorized, provided that such use (1) provides realistic training in emergency operating modes, (2) contributes to or enhances the development of desired optimum emergency systems, (3) will not delay the establishment of the Emergency Broadcast System in the event of an actual emergency, and (4) provides at all times for the exercise of Presidential priority as set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Reliability/Survivability:

a. Communications facilities through which the President will communicate with the populace under emergency conditions will be configured and arranged in such a manner so as to provide

a high degree of assurance that a portion of the total system capability, sufficient for the satisfaction of the basic requirement, would be available to the President under the most adverse conditions.

b. During emergencies short of an attack on the United States, adequate intercity private line communications circuits should be available to support the basic requirement. However, during an attack or heavy destruction resulting from an attack, sufficient circuit facilities may not be available in some areas to support this basic requirement as well as other critical Presidential, command and control, and intelligence circuits pertaining to the attack. In such cases, the established priority of restoration of circuits will be changed only at the direction of the President.

DOD

Thursday 3/4/71

10:10 Charlie McWhorter called to ask if you were meeting with Dave Solomon tomorrow on Tat-6. Apparently Ben Cliver thought you were. If so, Ben would like to brief you for 5 minutes today (won't be available tomorrow). Charlie thought it would be helpful to you -- in case you are meeting with Solomon.

(STEVE-----Checked with Tom; he is not aware of any meeting with Solomon. Have you heard of anything?)

Doyle

25 JAN 1971

Mr. Fred J. Ruge
2420 First Avenue
Box 517
Seattle, Washington 98121

Dear Mr. Ruge:

The President has asked me to reply to your telegram of January 9 concerning transfer of the Alaska Communications System to RCA Alaska Communications, Incorporated.

As you are no doubt aware, the Alaska Communications Disposal Act, 81 Stat. 441 (1967), provided for transfer of the System by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. The President gave his requisite approval to the transfer on June 25, 1970, after thorough consideration of all factors involved. Subsequently, approval was also obtained from the Alaska Public Utilities Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.

Since the long-pending transfer has now been completed in accordance with applicable laws, we think no further action on our part can be taken.

Sincerely,

Signed

Clay T. Whitehead

cc: Mr. Whitehead ←
Mr. Doyle

SEDoyle/ec/21Jan71

Scalia

The White House
Washington

WHA334 1030P EST JAN 9 71 (49)CTA367
PRA356 PR SEC192 LB PDC SEATTLE WASH 9 459P PST 1971 JAN 9 PM 10 31
PRESIDENT RICHARD M NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 ~~PAV~~^{PENN} AVE NORTHWEST WASHDC 20500

IT IS PUBLICLY REPORTED THAT ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
IS TO BE TRANSFERRED ON 10 JAN 1971 TO RCA ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS,
INC THE PROCESSING OF ALL BIDS FOR ACS, INCLUDING ROA'S BID,
VIOLATED 40 U.S.C. SEC. 484 (E) - (2) (B)
, AND OUR GROUPS HIGH BID FOR ACS HAS STILL NOT BEEN CONSIDERED
BY THE GOVERNMENT. UNTIL NEW AND LEGAL BIDDING ON ACS TAKES PLACE,
ALL PERSONS FACILITATING ANY TRANSFER OF ANY PART OF ACS WILL
BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR UNLAWFUL TRANSFER OF FEDERAL PROPERTY.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES A NEW CALL FOR BIDS, AND COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAW FOR DISPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM

FRED J RUGE 2420 FIRST AVE BOX 517 SEATTLE WASH 98121

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

To: Director
Office of Telecommunications Policy

Date: January 11, 1971

ACTION REQUESTED

- Draft reply for:
 - President's signature.
 - Undersigned's signature.
- Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
- Direct reply.
 - Furnish information copy.
- Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
 - Furnish copy of reply, if any.
- For your information.
- For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:


Letter: Telegram: Other:

To: The President

From: Fred J. Ruge, 2420 First Avenue, Box 517, Seattle, Washington

Date: 1/9/71

Subject: Says the public interest requires a new call for bids in the case of Alaska Communications System to be transferred on Jan 10 to RCA Alaska Communications, Inc.



By direction of the President:

[Handwritten signature]

Noble M. Melencamp
Staff Assistant
to the President


rah

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Doyle

DATE: 13 January 1971

FROM :  Kenneth Robinson

SUBJECT: Telegram from Fred J. Ruge complaining that the sale of the Alaska Communications System to RCAC was unlawful.

I have checked with these persons so far:

(a) Justice- the "approving" agency there was Mr. Joseph Saunders, Chief, Public Counsel Section, Antitrust Division [(187)2515]; by delegation the Antitrust Division passes on these surplus property sales. Mr. Saunders has not returned the call. However, I doubt whether the Antitrust Division ever considered something as basically mechanistic as evaluating the steps of the bidding process.

(b) FCC- The Commission's General Counsel's Office has no knowledge about the matter apparently; they had no idea who passed on the matter, or when. I was referred to a Mr. Bill Jensen, Chief of their Enforcement Bureau. He knew nothing but promised to return the call with the necessary information.

(c) Air Force - The Air Force handled the sale of the system under a delegation from GSA, which normally handles these things. I talked with Mr. Richard Bonney in their General Counsel's Office [(11) 75608]. He supplied the following chronology:

- (1) the original request for offers was sent to 33 interested parties, including Mr. Ruge on 28 October 68. It set March 1, 1969 as the due date for offers.
- (2) on January 1, 1969, the terms of the original request for offers was slightly amended; these changes were mailed to all parties, including Mr. Ruge on 17 January. The change order stated that the original due date was still 1 March.
- (3) on February 28, 1969 letters were sent to all parties, including Mr. Ruge stating that the due date was still 1 March.



(4) on 1 March six offers for the system were submitted; Mr. Ruge did not submit a bid.

(5) on 3 March the Air Force received a letter from Mr. Ruge complaining about the bids in some nondescript fashion, the putative upshot of the letter being that he claimed that when the request for offers was amended back in January, the due date for offers should have been extended beyond March 1. The Air Force wrote back asking him to be more specific about the matter. He has not responded so far.

(6) Of the six offers, one was rejected as nonresponsive; one of the offers was for only one of the exchanges in the system [by the Matanuska Cooperative Teleph. Co.]. Four of the bids were for the entire system. RCAC was awarded the system. On 25 June the President signed the necessary authorizations. On July 1 the award was made formal.

(7) Secretary Laird's Office received a telegram similar to the one the White House received on January 9.

The law

Mr. Ruge's telegram states that the sale is in contravention of 40 U.S.C. Sec. 484 (e) (2) (B), a provision in the act governing disposal of surplus property by the Administrator of GSA. It should be noted that GSA delegated their interest in the whole ACS sale to the Air Force.

Sec. 484(e)(2)(B) requires that when surplusage is disposed of by the Administrator, and the sale is of a type that requires "public advertising for bids," then "all bids shall be publicly disclosed at the time and place stated in the advertisement."

Sec. 484(e)(3), however, exempts from the routine mechanics -- advertising, opening, and the like -- disposals of a variety of public-interest types, including disposals

" otherwise authorized by this Act or other law."
Sec. 484(e)(3)(I)

It is my understanding that the ACS sale was pursuant to a specific act [our library does not have a copy]. Hence from a strictly legal standpoint, the Air Force has done far more than they would have had to do otherwise; if they had wanted to insist on the law, they apparently could have negotiated the sale privately, and not violated Sec. 484(e) at all.

I believe that the appropriate thing to do in this instance would be to adapt Mr. Hall's proposed letter, and send it. I would recommend against setting forth in a letter any variety of legal argument or defense, for not only is it technically unlawful for a federal lawyer to do so vis a vis a private citizen -- a convenience the Justice Department utilizes frequently-- but if we were to get specific, we could prejudice or unduly stricture the Government should this fellow decide to exercise his rights in a court.

Defense

December 24, 1970

Mr. Arthur B. Focke
General Counsel
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Mr. Focke:

This is in response to your letter of December 21, 1970, requesting my views in regard to a Draft Executive Order entitled "Providing for the Administration of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970."

I am concerned that language in Section 1(c) of the Draft Order could be construed to exempt emergency communications system planning and construction from any further review by the Executive Office of the President. This appears to be different from other civil defense function delegations, which are "subject to the direction and control of the President." See Executive Order No. 10952, "Assigning Civil Defense Responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and Others," Section 1(a), line 7.

If it is felt that this provision is required to ensure necessary operational flexibility in an emergency situation, then I would find this provision acceptable if it were revised so as to read:

- (c) The Secretary of Defense is designated and empowered to exercise in an emergency, without the approval, ratification, or other action by the President, all of the authority vested in the President by Section 210 of the Act concerning the utilization of the civil defense communications system for the purpose of disaster warnings.

Sincerely,

Clay T. Whitehead

CCJoyce/KGRobinson:hmy
12/24/70
cc: DTP - 2 ✓
Chron File
Subj File

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Mr. White
~~FYI~~
Defense

December 3, 1970

Mr. David L. Solomon
Office of the Secretary of Defense
ATSD (Telecommunications)
Washington, D.C. 20301


Dear Dave:

Attached is a copy of correspondence received from the FCC pertaining to the proposed use of a TV translator channel to alert personnel of the Dugway Proving Ground of local day-to-day emergency situations.

Current FCC Rules do not permit the type of locally originated programming proposed by the Commanding Officer, Dugway Proving Ground. If their Rules were to be amended, and Dugway proposals approved, there is concern on the part of the Commission's staff that a precedent would be established to relax present restrictions on locally originated translator programming.

While sympathetic with the purposes of the Dugway proposal, comments on behalf of the Department of Defense are requested prior to further action.

Sincerely,


W. Dean, Jr.
Director
Frequency Management

Enclosure

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

November 24, 1970

IN REPLY REFER TO:

6300

Mr. Wilfrid Dean, Jr.
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504


Dear Mr. Dean:

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter dated November 2, 1970, which the Commission received from Headquarters, Deseret Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, proposing the use of one of its existing military TV translator channels to alert the Proving Ground population of local day-to-day emergency situations. It is understood that the FCC licensee of the educational TV station which supplies programs over this translator channel is agreeable to this proposed local origination of emergency announcements by Dugway Proving Ground military personnel through a tie-in at their translator station.

Because this is the first proposal of this type which the Commission has received, we would appreciate receiving the views of your Office prior to taking further action in this matter. More specifically, we would appreciate your comments as to whether this proposal is consistent with existing policies of your Office and the military or whether it is your opinion that the proposal, if implemented, would be the most desirable means of adequately meeting this alerting requirement, as stated. It appears possible that other military installations having TV translators may advance similar proposals in the future.

As you may recall, the Commission has, in the past, agreed to the use of a number of military broadcasting stations outside the conterminous United States to provide under specified conditions an emergency alert capability, as well as regular AFRTS programming. However, we have not previously considered the local origination of program material at Government TV translator stations.

Sincerely yours,


Raymond E. Spence
Acting Chief Engineer

Attachment

HEADQUARTERS
DESERET TEST CENTER
Dugway Proving Ground
Dugway, Utah 84022



2 November 1970

STEPD-DP-CO(D)

SUBJECT: Authorization for Local Origin of Emergency Procedures on Existing Educational TV Translator at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

Mr. Ben F. Waple
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street
Washington, DC 20554

BROADCAST FACILITIES
DIVISION

NOV 19 1970

ATTENTION: MR. K. G. OPPENHEIMER

1. Background: Dugway Proving Ground is an isolated Department of the Army installation (under US Army Test and Evaluation Command) located on the edge of the Great Salt Lake Desert approximately 75 miles southwest of Salt Lake City. The daily population of the post is approximately 2700. The nearest town, Tooele, Utah, is located approximately 45 miles away on the other side of the 11,000 foot Stansbury Mountains. There are a few ranches in the area, the closest being approximately 15 miles away.

2. Statement of Problem:

a. To alert and differentiate between day-to-day emergencies posing a threat to the safety of life and property to the population of Dugway Proving Ground. These day-to-day emergency situations in the public interest include: tornado warnings or tornado sightings; toxic gases threatening the community; flash floods; widespread fire threatening the community; earthquakes; electric power failures; large scale explosions; civil disorders; heavy rains; icing conditions developing dangerous road hazards; heavy snows developing blizzard conditions; appeals for medical assistance (blood donors, etc); appeals for emergency food and housing; call back of off-duty police, fire, utilities or military personnel; alleviate fear or panic in the populous; inform population of impending or possible epidemic, drought, water or food contamination. The above includes both situations where the time element is short and those which develop slowly.

b. At the present time, Dugway Proving Ground has four methods of alerting the population to any of the situations noted in paragraph 2a above.

SUBJECT: Authorization for Local Origin of Emergency Procedures on Existing Educational TV Translator at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

(1) Civil Defense Siren. This signal is deemed adequate to warn the post population of an ATTACK WARNING and also provide the post with the ATTENTION or ALERT signal; however, there is no adequate means of informing the population of what type of emergency is transpiring when the ATTENTION or ALERT signal is sounded.

(2) Sound Vehicles. This type of notification is considered inadequate due to the limited coverage available and number of trucks equipped. The sound vehicles that are in being at the present time are security vehicles and it is possible these could be in use with security/police matters and not available on a 24-hour basis. Another problem that exists is not being able to maintain continuous liaison with the total population at all times. The vehicles would have to be on a roving patrol and would thus be able to disseminate only a limited amount of information.

(3) Telephone. This type of communication is deemed slightly adequate for a one-time notification through a paramid alert response, but deemed inadequate for disseminating any quantity of information with much degree of accuracy. By the time the last person(s) was notified, the initial information could be vastly distorted from what was originally transmitted. Aside from this, there is the time element involved with disseminating any large amount of information over the telephone. The use of recordings is also limited by the number of calls that can be handled plus the possibility of the telephone lines being down due to some form of disaster.

(4) Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). This system is deemed adequate for emergencies of a wide general nature covering county, state or national situations. There may be occasions when information is only desired to be disseminated to the residents of Dugway Proving Ground, who number approximately 2700. The use of the Utah State EBS for problems peculiar to Dugway Proving Ground could cause undue anxiety or panic to the general population prior to general release of public information of the situation.

3. Discussion.

a. The logical means of passing emergency information to the population would be through a media which is common to a great majority of the people. Television and radio fall within this spectrum.

b. A study was made to test the feasibility of using the commercial power system (120 volt) on the post as an antenna for broadcast of emergency information.

2 November 1970

SUBJECT: Authorization for Local Origin of Emergency Procedures on Existing Educational TV Translator at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

This proved impossible due to the fact that the buildings suitable for use of this system had been made "communications secure" (shielded to prevent eavesdropping). It was also determined that transmissions using the power lines would not bypass the numerous transformers on the post.

c. Dugway Proving Ground has its own TV translator for retransmitting commercial TV programs from Salt Lake City. One of these TV stations is an educational channel from the University of Utah.

4. Proposal. That the Commanding Officer of Dugway Proving Ground be authorized to originate emergency audio information using the educational TV channel presently existing on the post. A tie-in to the present translator could be built-up from existing resources and no additional expense would be involved. Any locally originated emergency program would be used only in a local emergency and, of course, would not be used if the state or national EBS system were activated.



CHARLES M. SHADLE

Colonel, CM
Commanding

Office of Telecommunications Policy
Route Slip

4 DEC 1970

To

~~Clay T. Whitehead~~

~~FYL~~

~~George F. Mansur~~ ✓

William Plummer

Wilfrid Dean

~~Steve Doyle~~ ✓

Walt Hinchman

~~Charles Joyce~~ ✓

William Lyons

Eva Daughtrey

Timmie White

Judy Morton

J. L.

REMARKS



dod

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE AGENT, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DEC 3 1970

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Whitehead:

On May 21, 1970, the Secretary of Defense established the position of Assistant to The Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) to serve as his principal staff assistant on telecommunications matters, and as his principal assistant in his role as Executive Agent of the National Communications System.

I was appointed to this position on August 11, 1970, and the NCS responsibilities and functions formerly assigned to Mr. Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), have been transferred to my office. For your information, there is enclosed an outline of the NCS functions which I have now assumed.

In view of the above, correspondence for the Executive Agent, NCS, should be addressed as follows:

Executive Agent, National Communications System
Attention: Mr. Louis A. deRosa, ATSD(T)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

I look forward to the continuation of our good relations in this important endeavor.

Sincerely,

LOUIS A. deROSA

Assistant to The Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)

Enclosure

U.S. AIR FORCE

Honorable Clay T. Whitcomb
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504

Dear Mr. Whitcomb:

On May 21, 1970, the Secretary of Defense established the position of
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) to serve
as his principal staff assistant on telecommunication matters, and
his principal assistant in his role as Executive Agent of the National
Communications System.

I was appointed to this position on August 11, 1970, and have since respon-
sibilities and functions formerly assigned to Mr. Robert E. Broeze,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), have been transferred
to my office. For your information, there is a close relation of the
functions which I have now assumed.

In view of the above, correspondence for the Executive Agent, NCS,
should be addressed as follows:

Executive Agent, National Communications System
Attention: Mr. Louis A. DeRose, AT&T
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20304

I look forward to the continuation of our good relations in the important
endeavor.

[Handwritten Signature]
LOUIS A. DEROSE
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)



Enclosure

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (TELECOMMUNICATIONS)
National Communications System (NCS) Functions

Serve as the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense in his role as Executive Agent, NCS.

Coordinate as necessary with all agencies participating in the NCS

Review progress in fulfilling NCS responsibilities and recommend to the Executive Agent for the NCS, as appropriate, measures for improving the NCS and for securing efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.

Provide for the receipt and processing of requests from any agency having requirements for service from the NCS to include determining feasibility, developing alternative methods of implementation, and recommending appropriate priorities.

Recommend NCS related tasks to be assigned to the Manager, NCS, or to other governmental agencies as appropriate.

Office of Telecommunications Policy
Route Slip

22 DEC 1970

To

Defer

_____	Clay T. Whitehead	_____
_____	George F. Mansur	_____
_____	William Plummer	_____
_____	Wilfrid Dean	_____
_____	Steve Doyle	_____
_____	Walt Hinchman	_____
_____	Charles Joyce	_____
_____	William Lyons	_____
_____		_____
_____		_____

_____	Eva Daughtrey	_____
_____	Timmie White	_____
_____	Judy Morton	_____

REMARKS

Copy to Mansur & Seatis.

*Notes:
I generally agree with
Charlie's suggestions.
The GSA General Council
called with apologies
& an offer to help on the
broader coordination problem,
& I think we should
probably include him.*

T

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Date: December 21, 1970

Subject: Discussion with Dave Solomon

To: Mr. Whitehead

*Charlie
Generally agree,
but let's not let
this drag on.
T.*

At lunch today, Dave Solomon and I discussed the problem of coordination between the OTP, Defense and GSA on filings with the FCC. Solomon points out that GSA has the responsibility under the Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to file with the FCC on behalf of all the Executive agencies of the government. GSA can also delegate this authority, and frequently does so, to Defense. In Defense these filings are handled by the Department of Army. Solomon says there are about 4,000 filings made annually of which about 600 are with the FCC. Most of these are obviously minor.

Solomon says that if we want to get in on these, we should either indicate some criteria by which Defense and GSA can determine which cases we are interested in, or else set up some apparatus within our offices for handling the workload. He also raises the more fundamental question of whether it is our intention to try to tell Defense or GSA whether they may file or not, what position to take, or how to back it up. He says that Defense and GSA lawyers are very sensitive on this point and will resist any efforts to tell them what to do. He admitted, on the other hand, that the Army lawyers come to his office to get "policy guidance". I couldn't pin him down on what constituted policy guidance or on how it affected the filings.


We also discussed the possibility of a Defense filing on TAT 6. Solomon fully understands our interest in this one, particularly in view of the Pausch letter. However, he points out that from the view point of Defense, our office operates very slowly and at an abstract policy level. Defense feels a need to protect its interests and is reluctant to wait around to see if our office is going to do anything. He indicated, for example, that Defense provided our office with comments on Docket 18875 with the expectation that we would soon write to the FCC. They are disappointed by our inaction. (Of course, they would be even more disappointed if we had said what we thought.) Solomon's point is that if Defense has something to say, and particularly if there are pressures from Congress and other Defense constituencies, they will be reluctant to wait indefinitely for their


views to be incorporated in an OTP policy statement. I pointed out that there were similar problems with respect to issues being handled through the NSC process.

I am not sure what concessions, if any, we might want to make to the need (desire?) of Defense and others to act quickly in these regulatory cases. However, I think it is very important that we get a better feel soon for how much pressure we can try to exert on GSA and Defense with respect to a particular filing. I suggest that Nino Scalia and I discuss this with the appropriate GSA people and with the Army. Then Nino should dig into the legal background and find out what authority we have in this area, if any. I feel that we should postpone putting out any memorandum to the departments and agencies on this subject until we have looked into it a bit more.

In the meantime, Dave Solomon has promised to call us when one of these is coming up and I will ask O'Mahoney to do the same.

I am sending you separately memoranda for your signature to Defense, State and CIA on TAT 6 and the Pausch letter.


Charles C. Joyce



Office of Telecommunications Policy
Route Slip

3 DEC 1970

To

~~Clay T. Whitehead~~ ✓

~~George E. Mansur~~ ✓

William Plummer

Wilfrid Dean

~~Steve Doyle~~ ✓

Walt Hinchman

~~Charles Joyce~~ ✓

William Lyons

Eva Daughtrey

Timmie White

Judy Morton

REMARKS



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DOD

1 DEC 1970

The Honorable Robert Wells
Defense Commissioner
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Commissioner Wells:

Please refer to your letter of November 24, 1970 regarding the appointment of a drafting group to prepare a revision of the Federal Communications Commission Order, FCC 70-291, March 20, 1970 "In the Matter of a Priority System for the Use and Restoration of Leased Intercity Private Line Services."

I appreciate your invitation to nominate one representative of my organization to participate with the industry drafting group in its meetings. I understand that a representative of the Director of Telecommunications Policy, (DTP), Executive Office of the President will participate with the industry drafting group. Therefore, my representative will assist the DTP representative as required in lieu of participating directly with the industry drafting group.


Sincerely,

(signed) D. L. SOLOMON
for

LOUIS A. deROSA
Assistant to The Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)

cc: Director, Telecommunications Policy





Wednesday 11/18/70

DOD

MEETING
11/23/70
10:00

1:00

We have scheduled a meeting for Mr. Whitehead with Dr. Charyk and Mr. Acheson of Comsat to discuss the GAO report on the use of Cape Kennedy Facilities at 10:00 on Monday (11/23). (Steve is getting a copy of the report from GAO.)

Do you want anyone to sit in on the meeting?

Who knows anything about it?

Probably Steve

*We have a copy —
copy given to Bruce Owen*

Report filed in "Comsat" with note of meeting of 11/23/70.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Date: November 20, 1970

Subject: GAO Study of Comsat Launch Bills

To: Mr. Whitehead

The "Draft Report"* which GAO did at the request of Senator Gravel deals with the manner in which the Air Force charges NASA for Comsat launches. NASA passes these costs along to Comsat under various launch contracts. GAO did not investigate aspects of the NASA-Comsat relationship other than these Air Force charges.


The GAO investigation revealed that Comsat has been undercharged about \$3 million for pre-F.Y.'69 flights of Intelsat I and II. However, GAO feels that these undercharges are not legally collectible from Comsat.

Similar undercharges of at least \$3.7 million were found for the first four flights of Intelsat III. GAO believes that these costs should be paid by Comsat, and that future launches should bear similar costs. If depreciation costs are added to the undercharges which GAO identifies, the underpayment during F.Y. 1969 may range up to \$4.5 million.

The principal basis for GAO's argument is that overhead expenses of the launch facilities were not apportioned correctly (or, in some cases, at all) to Comsat launches. The Air Force has not yet replied to this charge, and there is a possibility that a legitimate question about proper accounting procedure is present. There is, however, little doubt that some undercharge was made.

On the basis of our in-house analysis of Comsat's financial structure, it is unlikely that full payment by Comsat of the amounts involved now and in the future would significantly affect their overall cost and revenue requirement position. The order of magnitude of the impact would be between 2% and 5% of cost per circuit. This is well within the range of uncertainty of our estimates of costs.

The principal import of the issue would thus appear to be in the area of international politics.


Bruce M. Owen

* "Draft Report to the Congress...Review of Launch Charges for Launch Support Services Provided to the Communications Satellite Corporation..."
November, 1970.

DRAFT

FS-92

**DRAFT OF REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES**

**REVIEW OF CHARGES FOR LAUNCH
SUPPORT SERVICES PROVIDED TO THE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AND
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION**

NOTICE — THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE

This document is a *draft* of a proposed report of the General Accounting Office. It is subject to revision and is being made available solely to those having responsibilities concerning the subjects discussed for their review and comment to the General Accounting Office.

Recipients of this draft must not show or release its contents for purposes other than official review and comment under any circumstances. At all times it must be safeguarded to prevent premature publication or similar improper disclosure of the information contained therein.

**BY
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

NOVEMBER 1970

DRAFT

Defense

Monday 11/23/70

MEETING
11/25/70

Ham

11:00 The briefing on Project Sanguine which will be held at 11 a. m. on Wednesday (11/25) will be attended by:

Commander Wunderlich

Capt. F. L. Brand

Commander Keith Hartell

Mr. Ron Enticknap (Group leader - Navy programs -
Lincoln Laboratories)

Harry B. ...

We have invited Charlie Joyce, Dr. Mansur, and Col. Enslow.

(We understand Charlie Joyce will be in a meeting from 9:30 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. that day; but his secretary will advise him.)

(Dr. Mansur is scheduled for a briefing at AT&T at 11:00 a. m.)

Thursday 11/19/70

MEETING

11:10 Commander Wunderlich called with reference to the attached letter concerning the briefing on Project SANGUINE, which you had requested.

Ox. 7-1219

He is available any time within the next several weeks.

cc: Col. Enslow

Set for Wk. of 11/23
Set for Wk. of 11/30 _____
Set for wk. of 12/7 _____

Office of Telecommunications Policy
Route Slip

To

- Clay T. Whitehead _____
- _____ George F. Mansur _____
- _____ William Plummer _____
- _____ Wilfrid Dean _____
- _____ Steve Doyle _____
- _____ Walt Hinchman _____
- _____ Charles Joyce _____
- _____ William Lyons _____
- _____ _____
- _____ _____

cy: Steve Enslow

- _____ Eva Daughtrey _____
- _____ Timmie White _____
- _____ Judy Morton _____

REMARKS _____

*Cy of Nov. 2
memo attached*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT)
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350


Ser 15679
17 NOV 1970

Dear Mr. Whitehead:

Your memorandum of November 2 to Secretary Laird requesting a briefing on Project SANGUINE, has been forwarded to me for reply.

A comprehensive briefing will be scheduled at your convenience. Commander R. WUNDERLICH of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications and Cryptology will contact your office in order to make the necessary arrangements.

Sincerely yours,


ROBERT A. FROSCH

Mr. Clay T. Whitehead
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504

2 NOV 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

Subject: Project SANGUINE

Project SANGUINE is of interest to me because of the electromagnetic environmental implications, the spectrum usage, and the question of national priorities. I am informed that there are research programs in progress to address some of these areas, and would appreciate a briefing on the project in general, the actions presently underway, and the results obtained thus far. I would also appreciate an arrangement for my office to be advised on future results and decision points as we approach them.

Clay T. Whitehead

PHEnslow:avr:30Oct70
Revised: CTWhitehead:avr:30Oct70
bcc: Dir. OTP (2) ✓
PHE Reading
Subject File

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

dad

Date: November 16, 1970

Subject: NCS Support in Natural Disasters


To: Mr. Clay T. Whitehead

Attached is a letter tasking the NCS with providing the telecommunications support required by OEP in natural disaster planning.


The letter establishes your role in NCS planning, and gives the Manager, NCS, the tool he needs to obtain the cooperation of the NCS Operating Agencies.


By sending a copy to OEP your role in this particular problem becomes evident and gives your staff the support they need to resolve any problems with NCS and OEP.

The attached has been coordinated with the Deputy Manager, NCS, and the staff of OEP.


C. T. Babcock

Coordinated with:


Mr. David Hall


Mr. Charles C. Joyce

November 18, 1970

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Executive Agent
National Communications System
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

By his letter of October 27, 1970, General Lincoln approved an interim plan for NCS support of OEP during communications emergencies resulting from natural disasters. A copy of General Lincoln's letter is forwarded for your information.

General Lincoln has indicated a desire that his staff continue to work with the NCS staff to develop the final natural disaster communications support plan. I agree that such a plan should be developed utilizing appropriate portions of the nation's telecommunications resources. During the development I would appreciate the opportunity to make inputs to the plan. When the plan is completed it should be forwarded to me for review and forwarding to General Lincoln for his subsequent implementation during natural disaster situations.

I am pleased that General Lincoln is looking to the NCS for support in emergency situations, and I'm certain that the NCS will respond accordingly.

Sincerely,



Clay T. Whitehead

Attachment

cc: Director, OEP
✓ Mr. Whitehead (2)

CTBabcock/bss/5170/11-18-70

*See
Emergency
Prepared*

Tuesday 11/3/70

Defense

MEETING
11/3/70
10:30 a. m.

10:30 Col. Lasher is meeting with Mr. Whitehead at 10:30 this morning to discuss the meeting at the Pentagon with Fred Buzhardt (General Counsel of DOD) re the Blue Ribbon Panel letter that was given to the President.

Monday 11/2/70

MEETING

5:10 Col. Lasher asked if we could schedule a time for you to go over to the Pentagon and meet with Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of DOD, concerning a Blue Ribbon panel letter that was given to the President (classified). Said it wouldn't take more than half an hour and he thought you probably intended that he and Charles Joyce should accompany you.

Shall we set it up soon? _____

You want Lasher? _____

You want Joyce? _____

dad
2 NOV 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

**Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense**

Subject: Project SANGUINE

Project SANGUINE is of interest to me because of the electro-magnetic environmental implications, the spectrum usage, and the question of national priorities. I am informed that there are research programs in progress to address some of these areas, and would appreciate a briefing on the project in general, the actions presently underway, and the results obtained thus far. I would also appreciate an arrangement for my office to be advised on future results and decision points as we approach them.

Clay T. Whitehead

PHEnslow:avr:30Oct70
Revised: CTWhitehead:avr:30Oct70
bcc: Dir. OTP (2) ✓
PHE Reading
Subject File

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

ROUTE SLIP

TO Mr. Whitehead

ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>
Concurrence	<input type="checkbox"/>
Signature	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Comments	<input type="checkbox"/>
For reply	<input type="checkbox"/>
Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
Per conversation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Discuss with me	<input type="checkbox"/>

FROM Lt. Col. P. H. Enslow Jr. DATE 10/30/70

REMARKS

1. Per your request.
2. Coordinated with Charlie Joyce.
3. Coordinated with Dave Solomon in DOD.
4. Recommend signature.

Phil

SAME LETTER SENT TO:

Dr. Willis Shapley, Associate Deputy Admin., NASA
Mr. Richard Beam, Director, Office of Tel., DOT
Mr. Raymond A. Gilber, Deputy, NASC
Mr. David Solomon, Deputy Assistant to the Secty. of Defense (Telecommunications)
Ambassador Washburn, U.S. Delegation, INTELSAT Conf.

Comsat
dob

Mr. William K. Miller
Director
Office of Telecommunications
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

26 OCT 1970

Dear Mr. Miller:

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 requires that the President transmit a report to Congress in January of each year regarding significant developments and activities during the previous calendar year. The report includes an evaluation of those developments and accomplishments in terms of attaining the objectives of the Act, as well as recommendations for additional legislation or other Congressional action.

In order to afford the opportunity for careful preparation and review of the report, we are requesting that the Executive Departments and Agencies having responsibilities which may bear on commercial satellite communications submit their suggestions for material to be included in the report by November 20.

After submission of the information we contemplate preparing a draft report for comment by affected Departments and Agencies about December 10.

Sincerely,

JECOLE:dc
Mr. Doyle-2
Subj.
RE *[initials]*

Stephen E. Doyle
Special Assistant to the Director

Defense
8315

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
October 21, 1970

DIRECTOR

Honorable Dean Burch
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense has a requirement for two FM Broadcast frequencies for use by official Armed Forces Radio Television Service (AFRTS) stations located at Shemya Air Force Station, Alaska and on Johnston Atoll. Pertinent technical information is summarized as follows:

Shemya Air Force Station - Bandwidth/emission is 189F3; antenna 250 H Gates FMA-1A Ring; antenna site Shemya AFS, Alaska; Antenna coordinates 52 43N 174 07E; power 250 watts (225 watts ERP).


Johnston Atoll - Bandwidth/emission is 256F9; antenna single bay circularly polarized; antenna site Johnston Atoll; antenna coordinates 16 44N 169 31 W; power 50 watts.

Both stations will be operated by the Department of the Air Force to disseminate information, provide entertainment, and promote education for military personnel. Due to remoteness there are no commercial radio or television stations located in the areas of either of these military installations.

As regards the Shemya Air Force Station, the Department of Defense proposes the frequency 101.1 MHz. No frequency is proposed for use at Johnston Atoll but the Department of Defense requests that one be nominated from the 88.1 - 107.9 MHz broadcast band.

I would appreciate having the views of the Commission on these two broadcast operations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Clay T. Whitehead". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping initial "C" and "T".

Clay T. Whitehead



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 OCT 1970

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504


Dear Mr. Whitehead:

The Department of Defense has a requirement for a radio frequency to be used by the Department of the Air Force for an official Armed Forces Radio Television Service (AFRTS) FM/Stereo broadcast outlet on Johnston Atoll. This station will disseminate information, provide entertainment, and promote education for military personnel stationed at this isolated location. Because of the remoteness and limited off-duty recreational facilities, there is a need to supplement AFRTS radio and television services.

It is recommended that the Federal Communications Commission be asked to concur in the use of and nominate one of the FM Broadcast Channels 201-300 (88.1-107.9 MHz).

The following technical data is submitted: Bandwidth/Emission 256F9; Antenna Single bay circularly polarized; Antenna Site Johnston Atoll; Antenna Coordinates 1644N16931W; Power 50 watts.

Sincerely,


for LOUIS A. deROSA
Assistant to The Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 OCT 1970

Honorable Clay T. Whitehead
Director of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20504


Dear Mr. Whitehead:

The Department of Defense has a requirement for use of radio frequency 101.1 MHz for an official Armed Forces Radio Service FM broadcast outlet at the Shemya Air Force Station, Alaska. This Department of the Air Force operated outlet will disseminate information, provide entertainment, and promote education for military personnel stationed at this isolated location.

Shemya AFS is a remote installation on the Alaskan peninsula. No commercial radio or television stations are located in this area.

It is recommended that the Federal Communications Commission be asked to concur in the Department of the Air Force requirement for authority to assign frequency 101.1 MHz for use at Shemya.

The following technical data is submitted: Bandwidth/Emission 189F3; Antenna 250H Gates FMA-1A Ring; Antenna Site Shemya AFS, Alaska; Antenna Coordinates 5243N17407E; Power 250 watts (225 watts ERP).


LOUIS A. deROSA
Assistant to The Secretary of Defense
(Telecommunications)