

By MW, NARA, Date 11/29/12

- 7/19/71 - Memo from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Whitehead advising that the President had asked him to send the attached
- 7/16/71 - Background briefing on Dr. Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking 7/9-11/71, and the President's proposed trip to visit the People's Republic of China.
- 10/16/71 - Memo for Dr. Henry Kissinger re communication services and the trip to Peking; at a later date when the President visits Peking he might consider the following initiatives:

(1) encouraging China to seek membership in the International Telecommunications Union and in the International Satellite Communications Organization;

(2) creating conditions necessary for U.S. private companies to seek to sell U.S. communications eqpt. in China;

Will have a paper upon his return; will also want to consult re appropriate timing of Mr. Whitehead's planned visit to several Pacific countries to discuss communications issues; WHCA and Press Secretary have information on readiness of several U.S. firms to use the Intelsat system by setting up temporary air transportable earth stations in or near China, which could demonstrate that adequate communications services can be easily established, economically and expeditiously, by using existing satellite capacity, and possibly leaving the temporary station in China at no cost to the Chinese after the President leaves -- and even to permit their initial use of the Intelsat system before joining the UN.

- 10/25/71 - Memo from Alexander Haig acknowledging Mr. Whitehead's thoughtful memo of 10/16/71 to Dr. Kissinger re the President's Peking trip; will look forward to receiving further paper.

- 11/3/71 - Memo for Peter Flanigan attaching an 11/2 memo from Arthur C. Becker revaluation of the yen in Japan.

- 12/9/71 - Memo for Dr. Henry Kissinger attaching a paper on current telecommunications issues with France for the President's briefing book for his meeting with President Pompidou; recommending the President avoid firm commitments on both the cable landing and proposed Aerosat program by offering to send the Director of Telecommunications Policy to France for substantive discussions.

- 12/16/71 - Memo from Mr. Flanigan advising that with regard to cancelling the grand tour, the President's previous statement had been taken into effect; it was decided that some of the planet probes can be taken care of by more modest initiatives than the grand tour.

- 12/23/71 - Memo for Dr. Henry Kissinger re U.S. telecommunications relations with the Federal Republic of Germany for use in preparing the President's briefing material for discussion with Chancellor Brandt; recommending the President should avoid any firm commitments concerning either the Symphonie Program or the Aerosat proposal until details and implications of both plans are further clarified by both governments.
- 12/23^{/71} - Memo for General Haig attaching a memo of 12/23/71 to Dr. Kissinger re recommended communications initiatives toward Mainland China: Services and Markets, in connection with the President's forthcoming visit to Peking.
(Further paper prepared re the October 16 memo to Dr. Kissinger and 10/25/71 memo from Alexander Haig)
- 1/28/72 - Memo for Dr. Kissinger re NATO Secretary General's visit to the White House on 1/31/72, attaching a paper describing the new NATO Integrated Communications System which consists of two segments -- a satellite network providing coverage to the European Continent and the Atlantic Ocean, and a terrestrial network which relies heavily on European commercial communications systems for transmission with special and dedicated equipment for switching and local distribution.
- 2/24/72 - Memo from Bromley Smith re Chinese Communications Officials involved in the President's visit to Peking.
- 4/18/72 - Memo from Steve Doyle for the file re report of the AT&T advance man for arrangements in connection with the President's trip and future US/USSR telephone ~~any~~ services.
- 5/4/72 - Memo for Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Flanigan attaching an information memorandum summarizing our relations with the USSR in the field of electronic communications -- for use in preparation of a briefing book for the President's forthcoming trip to Moscow.
- 5/18/72 - Memorandum from Mr. Flanigan thanking him for his 5/4/72 memo summarizing relations with USSR in electronic communications; will include it in briefing book for the Moscow summit
- 5/18/72 - Memo for Mr. Flanigan wanted to get four points to him before he leaves for Russia: (1) EIA and Commerce Dept. indicate they may jointly ask that Mr. Whitehead head a U.S. trade mission to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in mid-September discussing the sale of U.S. electronic and communications equipment; (2) Hughes awaiting guidance re the sale of a U.S.-launched domestic communication satellite system for the PRC; (3) Have been trying to find a negotiating plan for Aerosat acceptable to DOT and have delayed too long in getting back to the Europeans but felt the benefits of getting DOT agreement were worth the delay; if that is not possible, will have to proceed much on the course laid out in last memo to Flanigan and Kissinger; (4) Cabinet Cmte. on cable has suspended work for three months to avoid even a minute risk of unsettling the compromise agreement; now that the rules are firmly in effect and the copyright issue settled, the work of the committee will proceed but will be rather time-consuming and deliberate giving ample opportunity to review the timing of the report vis-a-vis the election.

PUBLIC BROADCASTING

NETWORKS 2/17/73 - 1/31/74

Chron List Typed _____

Copies xeroxed for CTW _____

File in safe

Copies need to be xeroxed
Check for W.H.

NETWORKS

Sensitive memo.

2/17/73 - Memo for the President re the FCC inquiry into networks' dominance of programming; ~~memo~~ ^{memo} of the same date on the rerun problem and FCC's prime-time rules does not cover the FCC inquiry into the network domination of the TV programming, which the President earlier agreed we should seek at the same time we urge rescission of the prime-time rule; following approval, have already privately urged this inquiry upon FCC; John Ehrlichman and Ron Ziegler are concerned that we weigh carefully the benefits of such an inquiry and the press attention it is bound to generate; given this concern and given the fact that the FCC must somehow address the problems of network dominance of prime-time which the rule was intended to deal with, we should consider the following options: (1) take no public position on the inquiry, and leave the FCC to its own devices, as to the matters to be investigated and the future course of the proceeding; (2) take a low-key public position on the need for the inquiry, if asked, but make no attempt to shape its direction; (3) same public posture as Option 2, but actively work with the FCC to shape the direction of the inquiry; (4) take a strong public position pushing for a vigorous inquiry, and actively work with the FCC on its direction. Mr. Whitehead recommends that effective and vigorous pursuit of the inquiry on network dominance is a prerequisite to any lasting change in TV networking, at least until cable arrives. Even if we begin now, it will take the better part of your second term to achieve such change. Moving forward with the inquiry preserves our options for future action and keeps heat on the networks at a critical time, but does not commit us to any immediate action. On balance, urges that we follow Option 3. Prior to initiation of FCC action, we should take no position on the need for such an inquiry in order to minimize any appearance that we are behind it. After the FCC announces the inquiry, our position should be that we support the inquiry as an appropriate means of reducing network dominance of programming, and providing more competition in nationwide TV programming. (Channeled through Bruce Kehrli; copies to Ziegler and Tod Hullin)

*note -
with Bureau
see memo
6/7/73*

3/27/73 - Memo for the Record from Mr. Whitehead advising that the White House says the President still sees serious dangers in the existence of a Federally funded broadcasting network; he is strongly opposed to control of the interconnect and its scheduling anywhere other than with CPB since that is the entity responsible to the Congress by law for the use of Federal funds; the effort Mr. Curtis is making to seek more involvement by the boards of local public broadcast stations and a more active partnership with them in funding programs has much good in it. But the President would have to oppose that

plan and Mr. Curtis personally, both strongly and openly, unless the principles of board responsibility and of safeguarding against excessive control by private organizations are clearly incorporated.

6/7/73 - Memo for the Record from Mr. Whitehead advising that he has withdrawn in its entirety the memo to the President of 2/17/73 re FCC inquiry into networks' dominance of programming.

1/31/74 - Testimony of The Network Project on the matter of Domestic communications satellites before the Cmte. on Government Operations of the House of Representatives.

Ehrlichman
memo for

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

Attached is a somewhat long discussion of the PSAC nominees problem and the more fundamental underlying issues.

The short-run situation is that we have pushed DuBridge about as far as we can go on including "our kind" of people in science positions over the nominees of the long-established community of scientists in and about government. If we decide to push further, we should recognize that we may be provoking a showdown with DuBridge. In any event, I doubt we will now want to refuse the five names because of the political backlash that could result.

Recommendation

That you and Pete Flanigan (a) discuss this issue with the President and (b) send DuBridge a memorandum requesting a review of PSAC and National Science Board membership criteria to be carried out jointly by DuBridge and Flanigan. If you agree, I will draft such a memo for your signature.

Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant

Attachment

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files

CTWhitehead:jm

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

February 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

Regarding the President's Science Advisory Committee names:

How we got here:

1. DuBridge consulted with the well-established science policy groups to get suggested names in accord with long-established traditions; these groups have been somewhat self-perpetuating on government science boards, of which PSAC is the pinnacle.
2. I pressured DuBridge to (a) reduce the dominance of academic physicists on PSAC in the direction of environmental and domestic policy related sciences and (b) favor those scientists who would be more compatible with the thinking of this Administration, recognizing that these would not necessarily all be Republicans given the nature of the science world.
3. DuBridge resisted vigorously, defending his choices, and we compromised.
4. Given Flemming's clearance and DuBridge's attitude, I recommended to Flanigan we not push DuBridge further unless we wanted to risk pushing him over the brink. (PSAC is the keystone of his world and is really more his committee than the President's.)
5. Flanigan agreed and I sent you my judgment that we should approve the names, but that we could only certify that they would not embarrass the President politically.
6. DuBridge, claiming to go on past precedent, had the nominees attend the February PSAC meeting even though his office knew we were awaiting the President's final approval via your office.

The underlying problem

In all fairness to DuBridge, he has his problems:

1. There is something of a Washington science club that has evolved out of the wartime MIT-Caltech axis. It is as much a lobby for academic science research funding as a conduit for science advice to the Government.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. I would not want to guess what the Republican/Democrat ratio is among scientists, but there is a clear liberal orientation among academic scientists. They are somewhat schizophrenic in that they reject any partisan political "contamination" of the science ideal, but then use their forum of expertise to further basically liberal ideals. Like it or not, the best scientists are found in academia and academia is heavily liberal in its orientation; this causes us problems the Democrats don't have.

3. DuBridge has spent his life in that community. Loyal as he may want to be to the President, his current position requires him to go against many of the slogans and coalitions he has been a part of creating; on the whole, he has not been too successful in making the transition.

4. A strict partisan test for professional science positions is inappropriate, but a test for loyalty and general compatibility is equally clearly appropriate at the PSAC/National Science Board level. The problem is to find the rather fine line between the two without causing the kind of political reaction we had in the Long incident.

5. On the whole, the Flemming-style check will not achieve this since the distinctions are relatively subtle, and the scientists are relatively inactive in partisan politics. (Flemming's check on the PSAC names was apparently quite cursory because he believed, drawing on the Long incident, that we only wanted to screen the "rock-throwers" in science slots.)

6. Any Science Adviser will have to make the judgments implied by the above considerations necessary to get the best possible mix for the President of professional quality and loyalty/compatibility with the Administration. I clearly feel the criteria are currently too biased toward not offending the academic science community rather than toward attracting good scientists more willing to work with us than against us.

Short-run solutions

1. We have "been had" but we can live with the five nominees. However, make sure DuBridge knows how we feel, and let the President know the situations.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

2. Ask DuBridge for a one-month analysis of PSAC membership, activities, and plans; advise him we think he should be more hard-nosed in looking out for the President's interests.

3. In a month or two add a few scientists to PSAC of our choice without prior clearance with the "club."

4. Insist on a thorough review of nominees to the National Science Board with Flanigan-Dubridge.

Longer-run solutions

1. Find a new Science Adviser who is not so much a part of the "club." I would stress independence from the pure science academic world as strongly as political compatibility and loyalty.

2. Consider a reorganization of the Science Adviser/OST activities as we are now discussing with the Ash Council.

Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead

CTWhitehead:jm

*Science Adv.
activities*

February 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR ROY ASH

I have reviewed your report to the President on Selected Activities in the Executive Office of the President. With regard to the Science Advisory activities, I would like to suggest a further discussion before we propose this to the President.

I am in general agreement with your analysis on the role of science advisory activities and the changed needs of the President, White House staff, and EOB. However, I feel that a somewhat more fundamental reorganization along the following lines may be in order:

1. Shift the responsibilities of OST and ECST staff support to the Office of Executive Management.

2. Retain the position of Science Adviser to the President as a top staff position on the White House staff with two or three staff assistants.

3. Retain the President's Science Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of the Science Adviser, but do not retain the large staff of people now devoted to providing PSAC staff work.

This suggestion is designed to meet the following objectives:

1. Separation of the functions of advocacy for academic science and access to academic science experts (Science Advisers) from the functions of operational coordinating Federal science programs and providing objective program analysis for the OMB and White House staff.

2. Reducing the frequency of activities initiated independently by PSAC and restricting them to activities requested by White House staff and the President. (Not all PSAC activities are necessarily desirable from the President's viewpoint.)

I recognize that the Science Adviser will argue that the separation of these functions decreases his effectiveness. This is in part true, but desirable. The major problems are twofold:

1. Separation of the two functions will change the role of Science Adviser and may make it difficult to attract an individual of top quality. Offsetting this would be a somewhat higher status for the Science Adviser, more flexibility in his use of time, presumably greater access to the President and the White House staff, and the increased prestige of a direct White House staff appointment.

2. It may be claimed that this is a downgrading of science in the Federal Government. However, with appropriate thought and attention, we can make this appear to be a strengthening of the Government's ability to deal with the problems of academic science, as well as being more effective in bringing science to bear on national problems.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue with you or the Council at your earliest convenience.

Peter Flanigan
Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead
Mr. Kriegsman
Central Files

CTWhitehead:jm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FEBRUARY 23, 1970

FOR TOM WHITEHEAD

I have Dr. DuBridge's five nominees to the President's Science Advisory Committee.

I'd like to give you my ideas on criteria.


This Committee, as I understand it, is designed to give scientific advice to the President. As in so many of these things, the President should be entitled to assume that the advice that he is getting is based upon established loyalty. Obviously, an advisor to the President holds a unique, fiduciary relationship that other scientists of various kinds might not hold with the President.

Accordingly, I think we have a right to require that each of these people be established as complete, 100% loyalists.

In looking at the clearance sheets I find political affiliation to be unknown in virtually all cases.

I don't think this is enough of a showing on the question of loyalty.

Accordingly, I would not be willing to recommend these names on the basis now provided.



John D. Ehrlichman

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

2/13/73

To: Chuck Colson

From: Tom Whitehead

As requested.

DRAFT
CTWhitehead:jm
2/12/73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, February 5, 1973,
H. R. Haldeman, Charles Colson, Clay T. Whitehead

The President opened the meeting by saying how much he admired and appreciated the way Mr. Whitehead had been handling his job, particularly with respect to the problem of the networks and broadcasting. He indicated that this was a most serious problem that had to be pursued vigorously, but one in which we were up against formidable adversaries. He stated that some in the White House did not share his view of the priority of this problem and that he wanted a clear staffing pattern established, so that once decisions were made everyone in the Administration would be on board. He did not want conflicting public statements because we could not afford to appear indecisive to the outside world.

The President requested Mr. Haldeman to hold an immediate meeting with Messrs. Colson, Shultz, Ehrlichman, and Whitehead to agree on coordination arrangements, to be followed by a meeting including Messrs. Klein, Ziegler, Buchanan, Moore, and Garment to discuss the directions being taken and make sure everyone was on board.

The OTP broadcasting license renewal bill was discussed, and the President indicated he favored that general approach to deal with problems with the current licensing scheme. He agreed with Mr. Whitehead's strategy that we should insist on broadcast industry support in improving network news in return for our vigorous pursuit of this bill. He also expressed agreement with the strategy of both seeking and professing First Amendment goals in broadcasting, while at the same time working vigorously in private to get more exercise of local broadcast responsibility and a wider range of points of view of TV news.

Cable television was discussed as the most likely long-run solution to many of the problems brought about by the current network dominance of broadcasting. Messrs. Whitehead, Colson, and Haldeman all felt this should be encouraged by Federal policies and should come as soon as possible. The President generally agreed. He asked that the report of the Cabinet committee on cable television be forwarded as soon as possible.

The prime-time rule was discussed briefly, along with the reasons behind the President's recent approval that we seek repeal of the rule.

The President reaffirmed his view on public television and that we should oppose the funding of controversial public affairs programming

with tax dollars. Mr. Whitehead expressed concern that the various parts of the public television field were feuding over future directions and Federal dollars. He feels that the strong proclivity of public TV to produce one-sided political affairs programming as an instrument of social change and the danger of CPB becoming a mouthpiece for a future, less restrained Administration may make it necessary in the future to eliminate the use of Federal tax monies to fund public television. The President recognized that such steps might become necessary.

The meeting closed with the President reaffirming his concern that the Administration speak with one voice in these areas and stressing the need to establish a coordination mechanism to make sure that everyone in the White House "got the word" on broadcasting matters and to assure that all of OTP's communications program proposals received prompt White House staffing.

Shelichman

May 8, 1972

To: Tom
From: Eva

Checked with Ed Harper's
office.

FYI -

William Baroody, Sr., is
the top man at the American
Enterprise Institute locally.

Phone number 296-5616

*5/5/72 Mr. Whitehead
talked with Paul Feldman*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM WHITEHEAD

FROM:

ED HARPER 

SUBJECT:

Proposal on Program Evaluation and Reform

John Ehrlichman has asked me to reply to your memorandum to him of April 26th which transmitted a proposal from the Public Research Institute Division of the Center for Naval Analysis.

The goals of Mr. Feldman's proposals--finding better ways to evaluate and reform Federal programs--are as you know wholly in concert with the goals of this Administration.

Although we have had some modest successes in reforming and restructuring programs, there is still much to be done.

Although I personally know of no immediate funding sources which could be used to assist the Public Research Institute to achieve these goals, I have brought Mr. Feldman's proposal to the attention of Larry Lynn, Cap Weinberger, and Bill Baroody. Bill said that he would like very much for Mr. Feldman to give him a call.

If you feel it is appropriate, would you please ask Mr. Feldman to call Mr. Baroody so that they can explore their mutual interests?

I will keep you apprised of any subsequent developments.

Thank you for sending us a copy of Mr. Feldman's proposal.

ELH:ppd

4/25/72

Ehrlichman
Paul Feldman

To: Ed Harper

From: Tom Whitehead

I suppose this will very likely be bounced to you. If John has not focused on this problem, I really think he ought to.

Attachment -- Memo to Ehrlichman re Paul Feldman letter

cc; Mr. Whitehead
Eva✓

CT Whitehead:jm 4/25/72

APR 26 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Ehrlichman
The White House

I attach a letter from a friend that may interest you because it illustrates a very important problem.

Here is someone very much dedicated to most of the principles of this Administration, trying to do some innovative but practical analyses in the area of public policy. His premise is that it is relatively easy to identify Government programs that are too large, outmoded, or just plain bad--but very difficult to find responsible and politically acceptable ways of altering those programs. Since the thrust of his efforts are devoted to cutting back and restructuring Government programs, he finds no support from foundations or Government bureaucracies who tend to be liberal and more interested in expanding than contracting

If we are serious about our philosophies, we really ought to be encouraging support for those who want to do this type of research. If we do not encourage this kind of thinking and have it available to us, it seems to me we are always going to be behind and responding to Democratic initiatives and philosophies.

I thought you ought to be aware of the despondency that is not uncommon among public policy researchers of our political persuasion. If you have any interest in encouraging this specific proposal or if you would like to discuss the broader problem it illustrates, I would be pleased to help.

Clay T. Whitehead

cc: Ed Harper
Mr. Whitehead
✓ Eva

CTWhitehead:slr:4/25/72

Tom

Here it comes again -

Do you know any foundation people - that you wouldn't be afraid to introduce me to - to whom I can send this?

I feel that I ought to try a broader audience than the Ford Foundation, but I still find it emotionally difficult to send this out as junk mail - besides which, it might come back in some way and hurt CNA. Think on that for a bit -

Paul

**The Public
Research
Institute**

1401 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, Virginia 22209

703/524-9400

A Division of CNA,
an affiliate of the
University of Rochester

3 March 1972

Mr. C. T. Whitehead
Office of Telecommunications Policy
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Tom,

I'm sure that you are too busy these days to worry about the pathology of government, but I thought that you might be interested to see that I'm still trying to find support for research that can help make desired policy changes politically acceptable.

That prior administrations had no enthusiasm for change was no surprise to me; their own original lack of judgment was at issue. It is really discouraging, however, to find old errors being perpetuated. Only a president with a fresh approach can hope to undo the tangle of controls and subsidies built up over the past 40 years. Yet, if the administration has recognized that their problem is to disengage honorably from the commitments embodied in old programs, they seem unwilling or unable to do anything about it.

The enclosed note is our latest (and last) attempt to find a sponsor for this kind of work. Although the NSF has made a great to-do about focusing its efforts on policy research, they are under the thumbs of both government and science bureaucracies and won't touch anything that even faintly smacks of policy. The Ford Foundation politely suggested that we "try again in September." The universities are altogether other-worldly.

In short, budgeting is going on as usual; everyone, including the administration acts as if the anachronistic old programs are perfectly normal, apparently in the vain hope that problems will go away. They won't go away, though, unless someone does the necessary work, and the prospects for that don't look good.

If you can suggest anything we should do to make this proposal more convincing to sponsors, please let me know. I'd like to be sure that if our last attempt fails, it is because people aren't interested, not because we haven't presented the case properly.

Sincerely,

Paul

PAUL FELDMAN

*The Public
Research
Institute*

1401 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, Virginia 22209

703/524-9400

*A Division of CNA,
an affiliate of the
University of Rochester*

Dear

The Public Research Institute of the Center for Naval Analyses is seeking financial support for a new type of research into matters of public policy. Our objectives are to identify impediments preventing government from changing programs that are widely recognized to be inefficient or outdated, and to show how these impediments can be overcome.

Agreement cannot always be reached about whether particular programs are good, despite general acceptance that desirable policies should

- increase competition in the economy
- increase reliance on individual rather than collective choice in production and consumption
- allow price mechanisms to ration use of government facilities and services
- place reliance on local governments to deal with local problems
- substitute cash transfers of income for transfers of particular goods and services.

But people are quick to agree that some programs are bad. Neither an expert nor a study is required to reveal their undesirability. Despite this, however, recognition and even proof that

these programs are undesirable has not served to change them. In the face of clear evidence that better alternatives are available, programs persist that are inefficient, perverse, and even pernicious.

For good reasons, government programs should not be changed whenever an improvement can be made. Once the private sector has adjusted to a program, any "change in the rules" will be detrimental to those affected, and even where improvements are much desired, the political process must take these detrimental effects into consideration. Where a program can be changed, however, and the private sector protected, it should be easier to introduce changes than it is now. The research we propose can help to soften the impact of change and make policy more flexible. By finding ways to mitigate the problems associated with "changing the rules," policies that now appear politically impossible can be made politically possible. To our knowledge, this kind of research has not been done before and is not now underway anywhere.

Policy Analysis

Most research on government policy seeks to answer the familiar questions, "what new programs should we undertake" and "what changes should we make to increase the efficiency of existing programs?" For policy makers, however, the more important question is not "what" but "how": How can we change our programs without hurting people? The difficulty in making changes often is that some group in society has come to rely on government programs; they have based personal and business decisions on an expectation that the programs will be continued.

As with a drug addict whose maintenance dose, though expensive, produces no sense of exhilaration, the maintenance of a government expenditure program may be expensive without producing significant

benefits for the addicted group. Yet while the maintenance of the program may produce little benefit, its termination would cause socially disruptive and politically painful withdrawal problems. This point can best be explained with a concrete example.

Agricultural price supports are costly. Direct government outlays on the program are hard to pin down, because of accounting difficulties, but they are in the neighborhood of \$5 billion per year. The additional burden of higher prices borne by consumers has been estimated at \$7 billion.

Aside from the financial burden they impose, price support operations create severe social strains. The cotton support program initiated in 1966 was responsible for displacing as many as 200,000 Southern agricultural workers from cotton production, literally forcing them to migrate north. By so doing, the support program probably made a significant contribution to the riots in northern cities in the late 1960's. Foreign relations, too, have suffered; our surplus disposal operations abroad have interfered with the agricultural sectors of developing countries.

Moreover, agricultural price supports per se do not help our farmers. Each increase in support level is matched by stricter controls on the acreage devoted to production. On land that remains in production, the greater return is reflected by an increase in land value, which in turn is used as collateral for increased borrowing by farmers. Once farmers have gone into debt on the basis of the higher land value, the higher price support has been converted into an interest cost, and the farmer is left in essentially the same net income position as before the increase in the support level.

Administrations of both parties have for years been advised to phase out price supports. Outright termination, however, would be unfair to farmers, many of whom have never really benefited from the program. As price supports are reduced, both the cash returns to farming and land prices will fall. Farmers will be unable to make payments on their debts, and banks will have to foreclose. At lower land prices, foreclosure sales will probably not cover the loan principal, and some banks will fail. In other words, the withdrawal symptoms associated with removing agricultural price supports would consist of a crisis in agriculture and in the banking industry.

To predict such a result is to identify real problems that prevent a desirable policy from being undertaken. It also identifies an opportunity for analysis to be useful, for if we identify the groups that would be hurt, estimate the losses they would incur, and devise a way of compensating them, it may be possible to strike a bargain between farmers and taxpayers that would leave both groups better off than they are at present.

That is the farm problem. It is not a matter of prices and quantities, it is a problem of government rigidity, and it promises to get worse in the near future. Legislative action limiting the size of support payments and recent pressure on prices in world markets arising from the development of highly productive varieties of wheat and rice should be read as warning signs. The legislative requirement for a new farm bill in 1973 may well prove an embarrassment to both major parties, for it promises a major conflict in which either farmers or urban dwellers, or both, will be seriously hurt. The conflict may be unavoidable, but the hurt can be made tolerable if the dimensions of the problem are spelled out beforehand. At the very least, the legislative and executive branches can be given the information they need to measure the effects of the alternative policies they will consider.

The farm price support program is by no means the only one that both parties would like to change if they could manage it. Many government activities have generated conditions of economic addiction with a maintenance cost that exceeds the benefits they generate. Government has grown, not only because it must perform necessary functions, but also because it is locked into increasingly costly mistakes of the past. It would be irrational to wait for those mistakes to accumulate until crisis conditions force action, for actions taken in a crisis frequently lead to further crises. Realistic research, designed to identify impediments to change, could make it a great deal easier to recover from past mistakes and to avoid crises in the future.

Our Proposal

We propose to assemble a research group that will concentrate on policy problems such as those discussed above. PRI, in association with the University of Rochester, has the nucleus of a technical staff capable of handling most studies such as those outlined above. To perform this work, it will be necessary to expand our staff by hiring policy-oriented professionals with practical experience in the legislative and executive branches of government. As the occasion warrants, we will also need to call upon outside consultants experienced in the substantive areas of our research.

The research involved would not require development of new theory or new methodology. History, political science, economics, sociology, law, and other academic disciplines have, for a long time, dealt with these problems. Individuals who have worked in policy positions in the executive and legislative branches have performed their own informal analyses in the past and continue to do so as part of the everyday business of government. What is lacking is a focused research effort that can provide a better basis for policy decisions than the informal estimates we rely on at present.

We are seeking support to organize such an effort. If your organization is interested in participating in support of our proposed program, we will be pleased to meet with you to discuss it further and prepare a detailed proposal outlining a set of studies. Inquiries should be directed to:

PAUL FELDMAN, Acting Director
Public Research Institute
Center for Naval Analyses
1401 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Ehrlichman

Copies filed in:

Budget Memos folder
NSSM-3

Some materials filed
in Memos for Ehrlichman
Some in Memos for
Flanigan

December 22, 1970

To: Jon Rose
From: Tom Whitehead

**The budget materials which I promised
to send.**

Attachments:

Booklet: Presidential Control of the Budget

August 7, 1969 Memo to Mr. Flanigan

**October 23, 1969 Memo for Mr. Ehrlichman
attaching**

**October 24, 1969 Memo to Mayo/McCracken/Harlow/Flanigan/
Haldeman/Kissinger**

June 4, 1970 Memo for Mr. Ehrlichman attaching another

June 4, 1970 Memo for Mr. Ehrlichman

Ehrlichman

June 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

Since George Shultz is to be the head of OMB, I have somewhat different feelings about the memo I wrote you last week on policy analysis. George is outstandingly capable of getting for you and the President what I was talking about. It is possible that he will get hold of the old BOB machinery fast enough to be useful in the next few months; he certainly should be urged to do so. There is a real danger, however, that this kind of analysis will continue to fall between the cracks between the concerned offices: OMB, CEA, NSC, and the Domestic Council staff.

In view of this, you may wish to have Shultz undertake the direct responsibility for this kind of analysis. However, I think you would find it useful to have someone on your personal staff following that activity and keeping you apprised so that it would be directly responsive to your needs. Alternatively, you could still have prime responsibility in a small staff component of the Domestic Council staff.

In any event, most of the basic analysis will have to be done in OMB and CEA since that is where the data and technical expertise is. (In my proposal to undertake that function with 4-6 professionals, I clearly anticipated most of the work being done in those offices.) The Domestic Council staff should be concerned primarily with the kinds of information to be generated and the most useful format for policy decisions.

I mentioned this problem to Paul McCracken recently, and he agreed that there was a large and urgent need to do better in this area. He suggests you convene a meeting of yourself, McCracken, Shultz, and Kissinger in the very near future to discuss the possibilities and problems.

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Cole
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files

Clay T. Whitehead
Special Assistant to the President

Ehrlichman

April 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FLANIGAN

Here is a memorandum for the files I dictated as you and I discussed. I have also attached a letter McElroy sent at my request.

Also attached is a memorandum you indicated you wanted to send John Ehrlichman. It has attached a copy of my memorandum for the files.

Clay T. Whitehead
Special Assistant to the President

Attachments

cc: Mr. Whitehead
Central Files

CTWhitehead:ed

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES


In conversations with Bill McElroy and Lee DuBridge yesterday, the following points came out:

1. I informed DuBridge that Peter Flanigan and I had concerns about the appointment of George Hammond to Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation. (I had previously mentioned this to Frank Pagnotta.) I indicated that it was our feeling that it was not particularly desirable to have two Democrats in the top two jobs at NSF, and that, while we recognized that NSF was not a partisan organization, certain criteria of philosophical compatibility and loyalty to the Administration criteria should be applied in selecting people for any Presidential appointment. I suggested that DuBridge, Flanigan, McElroy, and myself might discuss this matter. DuBridge indicated that he resented having to discuss such things with Flanigan; that the President had informed him last year that appointments to science-related agencies would be made on a nonpartisan basis and that partisan politics would not be a consideration; that, if this issue were raised, he would want to talk to the President about it and ascertain that the President wanted to go back on his word. He also indicated that it would cause a major flap if Hammond were not appointed in view of the widespread knowledge that Hammond had been nominated by McElroy and the National Science Board. I indicated that I thought political loyalty and compatibility with the Administration were important criteria along with the ability of Hammond to assist McElroy where he needed it the most; and that, while McElroy would have to be the primary judge of the latter, we should be concerned with the former here. DuBridge indicated that it would still be very unfortunate to block the Hammond appointment. I indicated that I would talk to Flanigan and discuss how we might proceed.

2. I informed McElroy that we had problems with Dr. Hammond, and he felt that to not send the appointment forward would cause a major flap comparable to the Long incident. He attested that Hammond was outstandingly qualified for the job, was in no sense partisan, would be compatible with the kinds of directions we would generally like to see the Foundation go, and was fully cognizant of the need for loyalty to the Administration.

3. Dr. McElroy and I had a frank discussion about the problems of dealing with Dr. DuBridge. We discussed the desirability of getting political and philosophical criteria for Presidential appointment selections into the process earlier. McElroy indicated his belief that OST was the major source of leaks in the science appointment area, citing an incident wherein he received a call about the selections from a scientist outside the Government only one hour after he had communicated to Dr. DuBridge the names he was to recommend for Assistant Directors of the National Science Foundation.

4. McElroy and I discussed the need for better analysis to support science policy formulation and the problems of trying to do this with DuBridge so unresponsive and so difficult to work with. We agreed that he and I would keep in closer touch, and that he would begin to think about organizing analytical efforts in this area without unduly offending DuBridge's prerogatives. He and I also agreed to work more closely together in the future on the appointments before they are formally recommended to the White House.



Clay T. Whitehead
Special Assistant to the President

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20550

April 22, 1970

Dr. Clay T. Whitehead
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Room 110
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20250

Dear Dr. Whitehead:

I write this letter to indicate my complete support for George S. Hammond as Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation and to indicate strong reasons why his nomination would be a major asset to the Nation and Administration. Professor Hammond is a first-class scientist, well-known and respected for the quality of his ideas and his experimental results. He is, in fact, one of the better known American chemists abroad. Professor Hammond's interests and notable contributions to the field of chemistry education, and science education in general, have earned him a broad reputation in this aspect of higher education.

Hammond's basic strength is the quality of his ideas. He is not a conventional thinker. He has not left unchallenged the conventional wisdoms of scientific research or scientific education. He is simply one of the scientific community's most original thinkers.

It is this capacity for generating ideas, for critically examining the old ideas from a fresh point of view, that will make Hammond invaluable in the process of changing the direction of the National Science Foundation. As I have said before, without the infusion of

new concepts and new programs, we cannot achieve Administration and Foundation goals - and I would regard George S. Hammond as the Foundation's critical leader in this transition. Few talents in the scientific community are similar to his, and in my judgment his particular combination of abilities will be of particular assistance in evolving the Foundation's future programs.

There is no question in my mind that Professor Hammond will be loyal to the Administration. He well understands the distinction between desirable science policy and national policy. I have personally talked to Dr. Hammond on this subject, explaining the prevailing rules of the Washington arena as well as aspects of attitude and identification with the Administration. Professor Hammond understands, agrees and will abide by the letter and the spirit of the Administration's science policy determinations. He is not unsophisticated in this area.


As you know, news of the submission of Dr. Hammond has already reached the press - through sources other than the Science Foundation I might add. Dr. Hammond's reputation is such that White House negation may create an incident within the academic community analogous to that of Professor Long. In the case of Hammond, it would seem to me that the Administration's position is much less tenable for Hammond (to the best of my knowledge) has no record of public statements antithetical to the Administration's policies. It is clear that Hammond has unconventional views on science, but it is for this very reason that he will bring particular strength to the Foundation.

I know Hammond is a registered Democrat, but apolitical on non-scientific matters. I know, too, that the quality of his ideas is vital to the future of the Foundation, and I believe this should be the crucial point. If a man like Hammond is declined for appointment to the Science Foundation, it will not be possible to recruit first-rate people for these appointments. As you know, we have already experienced considerable difficulty in this respect.

3.

I urge you to throw your full weight behind the nomination of George S. Hammond. If there is anything I can do to assure this, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "W D McElroy". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

W. D. McElroy
Director

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

Bob Haldeman agrees that we cannot let the fact that Dr. George Hammond is a Democrat be the sole criterion for refusing his appointment as Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation. Tom Whitehead is convinced that Hammond would be a good Deputy Director and that the question of loyalty has been thoroughly covered with him and is thoroughly understood by both Hammond and Dr. McElroy, who is the Director of NSF. Tom feels, as do I, that Hammond would not be our first choice, but that we should not block the appointment in view of the wide dissemination in the scientific community that he has been recommended.

I enclose a copy of a memorandum for the files prepared by Tom Whitehead that covers some of his recent discussions with DuBridge and McElroy. I believe you will find it of interest.

Peter Flanigan
Assistant to the President

Attachment

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files

CTWhitehead:ed

Memorandum
1/1/79

- 1. **AEC**
- 2. **NASA**
- 3. **NSA/CSS**
- 4. **Department of Defense**
- 5. **Department of State**
- 6. **Department of Justice**
- 7. **Department of Energy**
- 8. **Department of Health, Education & Welfare**
- 9. **Department of Agriculture**
- 10. **Department of Transportation**
- 11. **Department of the Interior**
- 12. **Department of the Environment**
- 13. **Department of Labor**
- 14. **Department of Social Services**
- 15. **Department of Housing & Urban Development**
- 16. **Department of Veterans Affairs**
- 17. **Department of the Navy**
- 18. **Department of the Air Force**
- 19. **Department of the Army**
- 20. **Department of the Marine Corps**
- 21. **Department of the Coast Guard**
- 22. **Department of the Federal Reserve**
- 23. **Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York**
- 24. **Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco**
- 25. **Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago**
- 26. **Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland**
- 27. **Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City**
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- 1. **Department of Defense** 1/1/79
through December
- 2. **STU & TX 7/1/79**
through December
- 3. **through December/January**
- 4. **Indefinite**
- 5. **Indefinite**
- 6. **through June**
through Aug./Sept. if projects strong
operation launch rate
through mid Spring if approved
- 7. **through December**
- 8. **heavy through Oct./Nov. (as through May)**
- 9. **Indefinite**
- 10. **Indefinite**
- 11. **through Oct./Nov. or through Sept.**

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- 2. **Department of Defense**
- 3. **Department of State**
- 4. **Department of Justice**
- 5. **Department of Energy**
- 6. **Department of Health, Education & Welfare**
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- **Domestic satellite**
- **Intelligence**
- **CIA**
- **INTELSTAT**
- **Regulatory agency review**
- **AEC**
- **NASA**
- **Communications organization**
- **NSA**
- **Regulatory agencies**
- **International satellite projects**

May 20, 1969

ACTIVE PROJECTS -- CTW

Cape Keraudren

Proposal dropped by private interests and therefore by
AEC and Australia

\$ $\frac{1}{2}$ million in FY 70 budget to study similar ventures in Australia
Summary memorandum received from BOB on economic/technical
aspects and forwarded to NSC; will be relevant if a new
proposal is received

Uranium enrichment

Seven-agency task force underway; NSSM issued; AD Little
report received 5/21

Joint Committee nervous, but hopefully appeased by being
more closely informed

Jack Rosen of AEC detailed to McCracken for one month on 5/21

Maritime policy

WH working group (Navy, OSD, Mar. Ad., Labor, NSC, State,
BOB, Treasury, OEP) stalemated pending Mar. Ad. proposal;
narrative sections of report proceeding

Industry/unions/Congress waiting for WH initiative

Plan for memo to President in June or July

Short-term staff on loan from DOD and Mar. Ad.

Watching maritime labor problem (strike date June 15)

Oceanography

Monitoring Wenk (Marine Sciences Council staff director),
who is looking at specific proposals

Reply sent to VP; meeting with VP soon

INTELSAT

Scranton doing very well, working closely with me to hold
delegation in line (COMSAT, State, DTM, FCC are principals)

Questionable aspects of old U.S. position about rectified
Planning strategy/positions/fallbacks for June 13 meeting of
Conference planning group

Scranton on first of two trips to Europe

Domestic Situation

FCC unlikely to act this year (letter has been before them since 1968) and unlikely to be able to act decisively -- no sense of direction and inability to formulate policy issues on their merits

All parts of industry getting removed; COMSAT pushing hard for satellite initiative (satellite should have recommendations by June 1) -- will need to get Secretariat work done before will have to let him know of Administration interest

National Communications System

Antennas and security systems brought together as a result of Carter's policy (Secretary Sec. Def. is "Executive Agent" with responsibilities delegated to ASD (Arms))

Director of program on authority of Chief of President

Can report "Security Council" -- to be referred to them looking for what can be done should have specific initiative by June 1. It is going to be going to Congressional leaders looking for the replacement of O'Connell

Secret will suggest removal of O'Connell later on annual report

Security Report

Released 1/80 by letter to Congressmen James Dwyer with no further action

Communications for Communications

What Government has something might to be done, especially in regard to FCC, spectrum allocation, and regulatory policy

Now fragmented and confused

Subject of unclassified ROE report

Looking into what can be done related to FCC issues above and some time frame

Future of the System

Following House Task Group (VP, DeBriens, Seawards, Faine) work through DeBriens and Vice President

Will present about completeness and budget implications; still going to deliver some clarity but haven't had time to do so. Report Aug. September 1.

International science projects

Several big money possibilities still in process between State, OST, and BOB; little interest now for AEC or NASA to push.

Possible major initiative for Administration.

Still looking into what can be done; Western countries increasingly showing interest in issues for FY 71 budget process (September deadline).

Talked to BOB and will see OST and State; insufficient time to do.

Canadian commercial satellite launch

President and Trudeau discussed.

DTM and COMSAT disagreed with State recommendation that we provide bilateral launch services, but FCC and Justice support, DTM overriding.

President approved bilateral launch via either NASA or COMSAT.

GII import study

Beginning to work in order to study gate widening.
Will monitor substance; report due in October.

Public Broadcasting

Senate hearings April 19; Corporation (CPB) authorization of \$20 million by Senate.

BOB recommending \$10 million; one-year authorization and moving CPB from HEW budget to independent status.

Long-term financing is big issue; working with BOB and industry to get some decent ideas. Hard to do.

National Science Foundation

Long history of weak leadership and lack of clear goals.

New statutory positions under and upgrading of Director to level III; also new general authorization hearings will focus attention on how agency is run.

Being nothing.

ABC - International Edition

Walter Packer Report leaves open possibility of that
stimulated earthquake

Howard Hughes reported donating some cash and possibly
the support pressure on WII prior to next big test in June

Working with ABC and CBS and will have TV response
ready when and if trouble arises -- probably early June

COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

- 11/13/72 - Memo for Guyford Stever, Director, NSF, thanking him for his note 11/7 concerning the Important Notice in the communications area; will bring this program to the attention of the other government agencies ~~in~~/ concerned; support of these agencies will be essential if these communications research capabilities are to achieve their full potential contribution to policy-making.
- 11/13/72 - Letters to FCC, HUD, Commerce, HEW, Defense, advising that the National Science Foundation has announced competition for grants to establish several new centers ~~oriented~~ oriented toward policy-relevant research in the communications area; requests them to designate someone to be in touch with Dr. Harvey Averch of the Natinal Science Foundation Staff regarding the progress of the program.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM RE: Post-Election Activities

All Presidential appointees are expected to submit a pro forma letter of resignation to become effective at the pleasure of the President. Please include with your resignation letter the attached confidential memorandum indicating your personal plans and preferences. These should be submitted to the White House Personnel office by November 10.

The purpose of the resignations is to give the President a free hand to strengthen the structure of the government as he begins his second term.

While it is recognized that this period will necessarily be a time of some uncertainty, this will be dispelled as quickly as possible. At present, it is anticipated that virtually all major actions on personnel will be completed by December 15. Prior to that time there will be an opportunity to discuss your own plans and preferences.

Between now and December 15, please plan on remaining on the job, finishing first-term work, collecting and depositing Presidential papers, and making plans for next term. This is not a vacation period.

Regardless of whether you expect to remain in your present position or not, you should put together a basic book about

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

your current assignment. It should be divided into four sections as follows:

- A. How you define your current assignment. What is its objective?
- B. What is its current status? Where does it stand?
- C. Where should it go? What are the opportunities for improvement in accomplishing the objectives of your assignment?
- D. How should it get there? What are the steps to fulfilling the objectives?

This should be as comprehensive as possible -- and should cover the full range of your responsibilities. This project should be completed by December 15.

Attachment

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Disposition of Personal Papers

No matter what your plans, the President is most concerned that a very valuable record of the Presidency is likely to be dispersed and destroyed. For those of you expecting to depart the Administration, he requests you to give your personal papers to the United States Government for eventual deposit in the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. Those of you planning to remain are likewise requested to give those personal papers of the first Administration to the Government which you no longer need in your work. The papers will be held in your name in courtesy storage in the National Archives or in an archival depository within the federal records system until such time as the Library is ready to receive them.

Section 2108 of the Federal Records Act, Title 44 of the United States Code, authorizes the Administrator of GSA to accept for deposit in the National Archives and Records Service or in Presidential archival depositories, papers, documents, or other historical materials of the President's associates and contemporaries. It further states that materials so deposited "are subject to restrictions as to their availability and use stated in writing by the donors or depositors, including the restriction that they shall be kept in a Presidential archival depository. The restrictions shall be respected for the period stated, or until revoked or terminated by the donors or depositors or by persons legally qualified to act on their behalf." You may be sure, therefore, that any restrictions you may wish to place on the use of your personal papers will be carefully observed by the professional staff of the National Archives and Records Service who will be responsible for them. You may also be assured that you will have ready access to your papers should you ever so desire.

By depositing your papers in the Library, you can ensure that your contributions to the Administration will be properly recognized and that the record of your service will be conveniently available to scholars. You will also greatly enrich the research value of the President's Library, its stature as a scholarly institution, and its efforts to increase the public knowledge and appreciation of the work of the President.

Mr. John R. Nesbitt, Supervisory Archivist, White House Office of Presidential Papers and Archives (456-2545), will be contacting you to make arrangements for picking up your papers and delivering them to the National Archives for storage and safekeeping.

ADMINISTRATIVELY
(CONFIDENTIAL)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

(Name)

(Position)

(Department)

November 10, 1972

My personal plans for the next term are indicated below (check appropriate box):

☐

If the President wishes, I would like to stay on in the Administration.

☐

in my present position

☐

in another position (Please indicate preference(s) below. Be specific).

☐

I would be willing to stay in the Administration but only under certain circumstances. (Please state those circumstances below. Be specific as to particular job, salary, title, location; what you are definitely not interested in, etc.)

☐

I have decided to leave the Administration, and if possible, request that my resignation be accepted effective _____.
(Date)

Comments:

PMF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1972 MAY 22 PM 4 10

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
CIEP

Tom
Whithead
FYI

Ehrlichman
memo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

To: White House Staff

From: John Ehrlichman

--The attached is for your information
and use.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 92^d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 118

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MAY 1, 1972

No. 69

THE NEW JOURNALISM

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, last weekend the Public Affairs Conference Center at Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio, was the scene of a 4-day conference on "The Mass Media and Modern Democracy."

Among the important papers delivered at this conference was Mr. Robert D. Novak's "The New Journalism."

It is Mr. Novak's contention that in recent years "a rigid conformity has emerged among the Washington press corps." This conformity has encompassed a constantly shifting but always definable catechism of liberal doctrines. This catechism has been inflicted on the public with all the considerable energy at the command of those who favor "advocacy journalism." This is the journalism of those who think that the journalist's job is not to understand the world but rather to change the world.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Novak's essay be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the essay was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NEW JOURNALISM

(By Robert D. Novak)

On July 14, 1964, at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco, General

Dwight D. Eisenhower roused the drowsy delegates when he read this line from the speech written for him: "Let us . . . scorn the divisive efforts of those outside our family, including sensation-seeking columnists and commentators, who couldn't care less about the good of our party." Neither General Eisenhower nor the thousands of journalists covering the convention were quite prepared for the reaction. Delegates rose in their seats with an angry roar, shaking their fists at the glass-enclosed booths containing Huntley and Brinkley, Walter Cronkite and the other famous television journalists. In the tumult, it seemed as though the delegates, who a few nights later would nominate Barry Goldwater for President, were about to storm the broadcast booths.

The incident revealed dramatically an animosity toward journalism by conservatives that had been building for years. In that 1964 campaign and in the years to come, press buses following candidates would encounter jeers and shaking fists time and again. The most intense reaction came from active conservative political workers but was by no means limited to them. Across the land, the journalist, and particularly the television journalist, was distrusted and disliked by the ordinary citizen, who may or may not have considered himself a conservative but surely did not embrace the programs and policies of the liberal establishment.

This deepening change in mass attitudes toward the communications media, in turn, reflected a gradual transformation in the media through the 1960s and into the 1970s. The change was not dramatic transformation but an acceleration of trends begun some twenty-five years earlier. It consisted basically of two developments. First, the journalist working for the television networks, the big news magazines and the important metropolitan press had now become part of the liberal establishment, both in his manner of living and in his ideological commitment. Second, in a later and less fully developed trend, these journalists were increasingly advocating causes of the moment rather than functioning as neutral observers. Taken together, the developments widened the gap between the mass media and the great mass of citizens, a gap that can only result in diminished credibility by the media and, therefore, the inadequate fulfillment of the necessary function by the press in a democratic society.

II

In *Commentary* of March, 1971, Daniel F. Moynihan wrote:

"One's impression is that twenty years and more ago, the preponderance of the 'working press' (as it liked to call itself) was surprisingly close in origins and attitudes to working people generally. They were not Ivy Leaguers. They now are or soon will be. Journalism has become, if not an elite profession, a profession attractive to elites. This is noticeably so in Washington where the upper reaches of journalism constitute one of the most important enduring social elites of the city, with all the accoutrements one associates with a leisured class. (The Washington press corps is not leisured at all, but the style is that of men and women who choose to work.)"

Moynihan's article generated a storm of angry rebuttal from Washington journalists. In fact, Moynihan had missed the mark in the details of his formulation. As Martin F. Nolan pointed out in the *Boston Globe*, the press corps contained more alumni of Boston College and the University of Illinois than of Harvard and Yale. Only a tiny fraction of them move easily in the upper social circles of Washington. Even a tinier fraction possess independent financial means. They work because they must, not because they choose to.

But having pointed out these misperceptions, it must be said that Moynihan is ba-

usually on the track. The Washington press corps had changed. The employees of the network, news magazines and important daily newspapers did now have a more prestigious position in the society, higher than that of their counterparts in any other Western capital. After years of shamefully poor pay scales, they are now receiving salaries at least commensurate with those paid by the Federal Government.

Partly because of this and partly separate from it, the press corps has been ideologized and is a part of the liberal establishment. More and more, the members of the Washington press share in total the world view dictated by the dominant liberals who control the Democratic Party. More and more, they share axioms that profoundly influence their coverage of day-to-day events in the worlds of politics and government.

What follows is a list, by no means complete, of axioms shared by the Washington press corps of 1972:

Axiom No. 1: The Vietnam war has been a shameful, immoral episode in American history, which blackens the good name of this Republic. Consequently, the anti-communism which as a policy led to involvement in Vietnam should be subdued and, ultimately, abandoned.

Axiom No. 2: The military-industrial complex is a sinister conspiracy, robbing the nation of its wealth and imperiling its future. To cut defense spending, therefore, is a laudable goal no matter what the international consequences.

Axiom No. 3: Severe measures must be taken to prevent the despoiling of the nation's natural resources by pollution, industrialization and otherwise. If these stentorian measures result in unemployment, that will be unfortunate; but protection of the environment must take precedence.

Axiom No. 4: White racism, as defined by the Kerner Commission report in 1968, is a crime that must be removed from the American body. That goal must take precedence over any personal inconveniences caused by services as forced busing for the racial integration of schools.

Axiom No. 5: The forces of repression in America threaten our liberties, a racist danger becoming a sinister reality under President Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell.

Axiom No. 6: A reordering of priorities is essential and past due so that great quantities of Federal funds can be funneled into cities for social rebuilding purposes. That substantial increase in Government spending must result in at least some improvement, scarcely debatable.

Axiom No. 7: A redistribution of wealth in this country is similarly overdue through a reformation of the tax system and a general shift in fiscal policy.

Most of axioms is feasible. A year earlier, they would have included a belief in the abundant wisdom of youth, now undermined by the present acquiescence on the part of the older generation. Whatever the list contains, it is a considerable amount of ideological baggage that the journalist is carrying. In short, he is preaching the political and governmental developments he is covering with a set of axiomatic beliefs identical to those of some political figures and wholly alien to others.

These axioms exert a pervasive influence on journalistic coverage. Senator Henry M. Jackson violates so many axioms—the Vietnam war, the military-industrial complex, racism, the ecology—that no matter his competence or his own professions of liberalism, he can scarcely be taken seriously. Mayor John V. Lindsay, on the other hand, is so closely in conformity with these axioms that he must be taken seriously, notwithstanding suspicions about his depth or administrative efficiency.

On a broader basis, issues are viewed by the

press corps in relation to these axioms. Inasmuch as President Nixon did not write off the Vietnam war as shameful and immoral, his Vietnamization policy is indefensible. In any controversy between environmentalists and industrialists, the environmentalists must be given every benefit of the doubt. The specter of white racism casts its shadow on a vast number of public questions, granting the indisputable benefit of any doubt in behalf of spending programs for the cities or any scheme of racial integration.

To be sure, there are many journalists on the Washington scene who do not share these axiomatic beliefs. But increasingly, a rigid conformity has emerged among the Washington press corps. That reflects in part the conformity in the colleges producing the new journalists. But beyond this, the young journalist who violates these axioms can scarcely expect a rapid rise up the ladder of advancement. A young television network correspondent who reporting reveals a lack of sympathy for environmental protection or racial integration or a reordering of priorities will soon find himself in some professional difficulty with his superiors.

Moreover, the Washington press corps exerts peer group pressure as will any other group. When Washington journalists gather among themselves socially as often they do, there is a startling consensus on the basic perceptions. There may be a difference of opinion on the relative merits of politicians or programs but seldom is there debate about guiding principles.

The result is a gap of widening proportions between the national journalist and the mass of Americans, paralleling a gap between liberal politicians and the masses, specifically the white workingman. Whereas the national journalist feels Vietnam is immoral and shameful, the white workingman is angered by the failure to win it. Whereas the national journalist condemns President Nixon's efforts to restrict school busing as demagogic, the white workingman feels a sense of outrage and futility over the whole busing process. Whereas the national journalist is basically convinced that the solution of our national problems lies in the area of governmental spending, the white workingman is disillusioned with the effectiveness of government.

There is, further, a vast difference in the instinctive reaction of the journalists and the white workingman. An example: On March 14, 1972, badly beaten by Governor George Wallace in the Florida Presidential Primary, Senator Edmund Muskie went on national television to denounce Wallace and those who had voted for him. Walter Cronkite, on CBS, immediately commented on the courage and eloquence of Muskie's statement. But polling data shows that a vast majority felt Muskie's statement was graceless and ill-tempered, an attack on the wisdom of the voters of Florida.

The gap between the national journalists and the mass of voters is so basic in its reaction toward life that it can scarcely be bridged. Furthermore, it transcends questions of the journalist's individual background. It really makes no difference whether his school is Ivy League or land grant college, whether his family background is first family or immigrant, whether he comes from Manhattan or Main Street. The national media is a melting pot where the journalists, regardless of background, are welded into a homogeneous ideological mold joined to the liberal establishment and alienated from the masses of the country.

III

Advocacy is by no means a new element in American journalism. The early 19th Century newspapers were open advocates of a political party with no pretense of objectivity. The muckrakers of the Progressive Era were practitioners of advocacy journalism. Until recently, the great conservative

dailies of the Midwest followed the example of the *Chicago Tribune* in brazenly espousing, in news columns and editorial columns alike, an undiluted prairie conservatism.

But until the early 1960s, objectivity was at least the goal, though not always achieved, of journalism and journalists. The concept of the journalist openly advocating one point of view or another was abhorrent, at least in theory, throughout the profession. Even today, many journalists who fully subscribe to the axioms outlined above at least give lip service to the concept that these beliefs should not intrude upon the way they report on the news.

The new advocacy journalism became evident in the early 1960s and has been rising steeply since 1970. It is centered among a new generation of journalists who view objectivity in a wholly different light than their senior colleagues and are themselves a reflection of the turbulent 1960s on the college campus.

Sharing the campus consensus, they see the American system as basically corrupt, in need of drastic and immediate revision. It must be changed root and branch; simple reform alone will not do at all. To accomplish this, the young graduate has several options to follow. He may seek a post somewhere in government. He may seek to enter directly into the political process, as a campaign worker. He may join one of the new activist organizations, such as Common Cause or Nader's Raiders. He may join a public interest law firm or a law firm that permits its employees to take time off for public interest work. If wholly despairing of the system, he may seek to promote the revolution as a demonstrator or through an underground organization, though these courses have now become less fashionable.

Or, he may become a journalist. The rise in social status and remuneration of journalism described earlier makes this a more attractive option than would have been the case even a decade ago. But the young activist fresh from the campus enters journalism not solely to seek fame, fortune and adventure as did his predecessors, but to redress the ills of the Republic.

The journalist as advocate makes no pretense at objectivity. He is the avowed enemy of the industrial polluters, and his writing is intended to flay them, not to merely describe and analyze. In any coverage of the Nixon Administration's prosecution and persecution of dissenters, the journalist advocate intends to actively help the cause of the dissenter and stay the repressive hand of the Administration. An advocate-correspondent covering the Pentagon must as his first priority seek out the waste and inefficiency that will discredit the military-industrial complex.

The middle-aged news executives encountering these advocates are appalled by their unconcern with objectivity and resist it. But they may well be fighting a losing battle. In the nationally important media of communications, the shared axioms between the executives and the new advocate journalists make the argument strictly one of objectivity or non-objectivity. Furthermore, the new journalist is fresh from the turmoil of the campus, knowledgeable in skills of organization for dissent. In the news rooms of the great metropolitan newspapers, the executives are encountering young journalists organizing and mobilizing to influence the editorial policies of the newspaper. Far less certain of themselves, the executives can scarcely resist the temptation to retreat.

The full impact of the new generation of journalists is yet to be experienced. But even now, advocacy journalism can be detected in newspapers of national importance. For example, thorough coverage by the Washington Post of the hunger controversy in 1969-70 did not disguise the reporter's obvious belief that Senator McGovern was correct and his opponents incorrect in their assessment of

the seriousness of the problem. The Post's accounts left no doubt as to its sympathies in the question; in the news stories, it was implicitly advocating greater expenditures for food distribution to the poor. Again, the accounts of both the Washington Post and New York Times of the recurrent difficulties of the Nixon Administration in dealing with school desegregation in the South have made no pretense at neutrality. Advocacy for vigorous school desegregation and against any compromise is undisguised.

Advocacy journalism also has accelerated in the abbreviated news reports of network television, reaching an audience so much larger than that of the newspapers and news magazines. The coverage by CBS of social welfare legislation during the Nixon Administration, reflecting superb reportage, is unmistakably on the side of vigorous racial integration in the schools, a considerably larger Federal stipend to welfare recipients and a substantial Federal role generally in the solution of social problems. The widely supposed fear cast in the hearts of the network executives by Vice-President Agnew's invective had no apparent effect on this brand of advocacy journalism.

All three networks in their reporting of the school busing controversy have played the role of advocate. By implication, busing is defended as necessary, however unpleasant it might be, whereas the foes of busing are interested wholly in political advantage and catering to popular passions.

After President Nixon addressed the nation with new anti-busing proposals, the immediate analysis over CBS was revealing. One correspondent, not a lawyer and with no access to expert legal opinion at that moment, asserted flatly that the President's proposal was unconstitutional by resorting to the old separate but equal doctrine declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1954. Disapproval of what Nixon had done was imprinted in his and his colleagues' brief remarks.

All these examples of advocacy journalism, implicit and indirect, involve mature journalists raised in a tradition of objectivity and balance. Their advocacy quite probably is not a conscious design but rather an intrusion on their intentions of objectivity caused by the depth of their adherence to the axioms listed earlier. The sea change in journalism will come if and when the new generation of avowed advocates is ascendant, unencumbered by any obsolete notions of objectivity and balance.

Why not? That is the question posed by the young journalists. Why should a strait-jacket hinder their ability to right the wrongs of a corrupt and failed society? And in such a society, what is wrong with advocacy? Indeed, is it not the older generation of journalists who failed to condemn the evils in our land who should be condemned?

Certainly, there is no dishonor to the advocate. He is welcomed in many fields: politics, government, the law, social work, education. Advocacy is an integral part of journalism as well. The editorial writer, the columnist, the writer for journals of opinion all must be advocates by definition.

It is the reporter of news, either in the electronic or printed media, who is subject to heated controversy over advocacy journalism. It is in the news columns and on the news broadcasts that the new journalists want to carry on their advocacy.

But to do so subverts the function of the press in informing the citizenry of a Democratic Society. If the evening news telecast and the morning newspaper are advocating positions and policies, how can they be relied upon to report accurately on the news? The problem is aggravated significantly if the advocacy is based on axiomatic beliefs foreign to the mass of citizens. If the vast majority of citizens are clearly opposed to school busing and the national communications media

are advocates of school busing, the credibility of the media on this and other questions is eroded and with it the media's ability to fulfill its vital function.

IV

On March 31, 1972, regular North Vietnamese divisions poured across the Demilitarized Zone into South Vietnam to begin three years of relative quiescence in the endless Indochinese War. The reaction by the most prestigious national communications media was remarkable, in keeping with the coverage of the war that had developed over the years.

On April 4, the banner headline of the New York Times declared: "U.S. Says Hanoi Open." The quotations around "invaded" derived from the lead paragraph of a Washington dispatch: "The United States accused Hanoi today of launching an 'invasion' of South Vietnam and said Washington was leaving open all retaliatory options—including renewed American bombing of North Vietnam." Implicitly, the "invasion" was a figment of the imagination of the U.S. Government, not the natural description of massive artillery bombardment preceding columns of armor and infantry pouring down across the border.

That same morning, in the Washington Post, a dispatch from Danang began: "Hanoi's offensive in the northernmost section of South Vietnam means that the Saigon government's stumbling pacification program in that bloody battleground has taken a bad fall." Pacification in Vietnam generally understood in terms of government control in heavily populated areas, and the North Vietnamese offensive by April 3 had occupied mostly wilderness with a relatively small outflow of refugees. On the basis of that small amount of evidence, the dispatch implied a major defeat in the critical struggle for the countryside. The headline: "A Setback for the Pacification Program."

That evening on the three national television networks, a picture of impending doom in the northern provinces of South Vietnam was painted, the South Vietnamese Army in full retreat as it ran from the enemy legions. Flashed on the screen were pictures of hapless South Vietnamese soldiers, who having lost or thrown away their weapons, joined the stream of refugees fleeing from the front line. The televised reports gave the unmistakable impression that the end was near, military collapse at hand. From watching them, no television viewer could have guessed that in a few more days the northern front would be stabilized at a point not much further south than the line of April 4.

These accounts of the early days of the 1972 Communist offensive reflect dominant themes in coverage of the war by the national media that first appeared years before: A disinclination to put the North Vietnamese in the clear aggressor's role (as in the use of quotation marks around "invaded"); a quick trigger in proclaiming the failure of American-managed programs in Vietnam, such as pacification; an inclination to assume the worst in any military confrontation between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese.

These dominant themes are part of a general pattern of reportage on Vietnam by the national media, encapsulating more than any single other issue the trends discussed earlier in this paper. The view of the Vietnam war given the American public by the national media is shaped by the axiom on Vietnam commonly held by the vast majority of the news correspondents who cover or have covered the scene.

There are practical reasons for much of this. The young journalists who won a name for themselves by critical reporting of the Vietnam war a decade ago—David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan and Malcolm Browne—pointed the way to the young men subsequently assigned there; surely, the Pulitzer

Prize does not await he who is positive in reporting the war.

Beyond the practical lies the ideological. Both the correspondents in Saigon and their editors back in Washington and New York share, in overwhelming numbers, axiomatic beliefs about the war. The correspondent, consciously or not, tends to look at the worst side of things. The editor, consciously or not, tends to select news that is negative.

An example occurred last autumn when a CBS correspondent, an excellent reporter with previous Vietnamese experience, visited Binh Dinh Province, the worst hotbed of Communist insurgency in South Vietnam. In absolute terms, the situation in Binh Dinh was dreadful; in relative terms, however, it was much better than it had been only six months past, thanks to an accelerated pacification campaign. The treatment given by the CBS correspondent was that, despite the new campaign, pacification was far off in Binh Dinh. He described the glass of water as half empty rather than half full. Furthermore, the introduction to his account by the network anchorman was to the effect that nothing ever changes for the better in Vietnam.

Both the correspondent and the anchorman in question are known critics of the present war policy, a view which may well have cast a long shadow on their treatment of the Binh Dinh story. But there is another dimension to the problem. Assume the correspondent, inhibiting his own beliefs, approached the story from the standpoint of limited progress being made in Binh Dinh. There is serious doubt that this would have made the evening network news, ostensibly on grounds that the story lacked bite and viewer interest. Here too, however, the beliefs of the editors come into play, though perhaps subconsciously.

The problem can be framed in this pattern, which fits the experience of several young correspondents assigned to Vietnam. Arriving from the United States, the neophyte is prejudiced against the war and looking for the worst. But as he digs into the problem, he discovers new elements of hope and accomplishment that surprise him and, he believes, deserve being reported. The dispatches he writes on these subjects are then relegated to the back pages of a back section of his newspaper. It is the stories of despair and failure that receive front page treatment. This is in the ancient journalistic tradition that man-bites-dog is news whereas dog-bites-man is not. But it also conforms to deeply felt beliefs about Vietnam within the media. The fact that the negative stories also conform to the correspondent's personal beliefs about the war makes it easier for him to write the negative stories that please his superiors and win him advancement.

All of the above concerns, more or less, subconscious tailoring of Vietnamese reportage to anti-war beliefs. There is, in addition, conscious emphasis on the negative by correspondents in Vietnam who believe in advocacy journalism and practice it, either clandestinely or openly. Most of these are free-lancers, but some correspondents for national media view their mission as one of undermining U.S. policy in Indochina.

To them, this is the highest form of patriotism. Many are not many years away from the college campus, where U.S. intervention in the Vietnam war was universally perceived as an abominable moral outrage. To be assigned to Vietnam is for them to be given a rare opportunity at advocacy. This is the highest form of patriotism; to retreat to obsolete standards of objectivity would be unthinkable.

The most famous of the journalist-advocates in Vietnam has been Seymour Hersh, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his exposure of the My Lai massacre. In interviews, Hersh has made no secret of the fact that his

May 1, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

avowed purpose in Vietnam is to discredit the U.S. effort there. Obviously, to balance the atrocity at My Lai against Communist atrocities at Hue and elsewhere in the 1968 Tet offensive would not be to his purpose.

Just how many correspondents in Vietnam share Hersh's goals but are less candid about it is impossible to say.

On the surface, it would seem that the new journalism has profoundly affected public opinion on Vietnam. Widespread support for the war in 1965 has gradually changed to widespread opposition. Seldom has the public change in viewpoint been so complete on a major issue in so short a period of time. It would seem that, on this issue at least, the mass media and the masses are together.

But how much the media really converted the masses on Vietnam is debatable. The national media's opposition to U.S. policy, mirroring the attitudes of the peace movement, is that it is ineffective, unwise and immoral; the masses have accepted only that it is ineffective. The national journalists have argued it was indecent of the U.S. to have been in Vietnam; the masses have come to the conclusion that our one and only sin was not winning. The gap between the masses and the media over the underlying moral clash of Vietnam persists.

It may be said that the media played a major role in pushing the masses to the conclusion that the war was unwinnable. That judgment was surely formed by years of televised news from Vietnam putting the military situation in the blackest of terms. Certainly, the great turning point in American public opinion on the war was the great Communist Tet offensive of 1968, where the national media failed badly in reporting the magnitude of the Communist military defeat.

At this writing, a national inquest into who is to blame for Vietnam seems unlikely. But in any such inquest, the media would be sharply attacked for its role and a demagogic politician, following Vice-President Agnew's success, might well whip up a torrent of public hysteria. The potential exists because of the gap between the masses and the media on Vietnam and the lack of restraint by the masses in either consciously or subconsciously shaping the news of the war to fit its own axioms.

On most controversial events of the last decade, the gap between mass media and the masses has been even more obvious than in the case of Vietnam. On no point was the gap more noticeable than in the coverage of the disturbances at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago by the national journalists, particularly the television networks.

The televised accounts gave the unmistakable picture of a police riot against unresisting young protesters. But polling data shows a wholly different picture perceived by the masses, who felt the networks were distorting an anti-police provocation by organized radicals. So intense was the disbelief by the masses that even indisputable excesses by the police visually portrayed on television were doubted by viewers.

Though the truth of the situation rested somewhere between the version of the media and the perception of the masses and probably closer to the media version, the consensus of disbelief showed a rugged resistance by the television viewer against being forced into new patterns of belief.

On a less violent level is the gap on the school busing question. Television coverage that tends to defend busing has had no effect whatever in diminishing mass abhorrence against the practice. The public believes that busing is irrational, ineffective and against its interests. Television commentators cannot convince it otherwise.

But even if the impact of the national me-

dia is limited in transforming public opinion, the effort is not without significance. As the gap widens between the public and the media, so does the media's credibility decline. The media must play a role as watchdog critic in a free society but scarcely can do it effectively if it lacks credibility. If separated from the masses and disbelieved by them, the media is vulnerable constantly to political attack, which could ultimately result in a shrinking of freedom.

An easy corrective is not at hand. Any governmental or quasi-governmental agency to police the press is unconstitutional and unthinkable, the corrective being worse than the malady. Self policing by press boards probably would reflect existing views of the media, which constitute the heart of the problem. Informal watchdogs over the press, such as the journalism reviews around the country, are so dominated by advocates of advocacy journalism that they denigrate examples of objectivity and balance.

The return of the media to a goal of objectivity, balance and nonadvocacy, though difficult to blueprint, is nevertheless essential. Without progress toward this end, the communications media cannot be free from growing fears and dangers in the years to come.

*Memo
for Ehrlichman*

November 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

Peter Flanigan has referred to me your memorandum of October 13 regarding the possibility of including a woman in the field of environment who could participate in formulating our program and possibly be a member of a future council of environmental advisors.

I have the following two suggestions:

(1) Dr. Marguerite Fisher who is at the Maxwell School of Public Administration at the University of Syracuse. She has been active in environmental problems from a management point of view and holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She is a Republican and a county committee worker in the 16th Ward, Syracuse.

(2) Dr. Corine Gilb who is a professor of humanities at San Francisco State and a research scientist in political science at Berkeley. She holds both a law degree and a Ph.D. in political science. Her interest in environment is primarily in the design of incentive structures for pollution abatement to avoid the need for large government expenditures and to encourage local initiatives. The Republican National Committee is unable to provide any information on her political affiliations.

Both of these women would provide a useful management/public administration viewpoint toward pollution and the environment, a point of view that I think should definitely be represented to avoid an excessive scientific bias which might otherwise occur on this sort of thing. Both have been recommended to me as sensible and responsible. Both are in their early forties. I can check further if you wish.

cc: Mr. Whitaker
Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Krlegsman
Mr. Whitehead ✓
Central Files

Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant

Republican National Committee has no info
on Dr. Corine Gilb.

Marguerite Fisher is a Republican (16th Ward,
County Committee worker, Syracuse).

Contact at National Committee: Mr. Richards,
Political Division.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dr. Corwin Gill - early 40's
Prof. Harn SF State
Res Pol Sci, Berkeley

BA
LLB
PhD. - politics

into in ant.
incentive structures.

Marguerite F. Fisher - early 40's
Marguerite School Pol Admin

Supervisor
Exec/ Mgt of projects
PhD Columbia Pol Sci.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 13, 1969

TO: BUD KROGH
JOHN WHITAKER
PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

In developing our environmental program, it would seem to be a natural to include a woman spokesman.

Perhaps some effort should be made to establish the identity of several prominent women in this field right at this time so that if, as and when we get a Council of Environmental Advisors one of them can be such a woman.

P.S. May I have your suggestions?

Mr. Whitehead
Tom -
Can you think of
any Republican
Women who have
the credentials
(maybe a
botanist) to
fill this job.
Pete.

Mrs Charles Lundberg
Lady Bird Johnson
A female Republican botanist, indeed!

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GEORGE BUSH
EARL L. BUTZ
JAMES HODGSON
DAVID KENNEDY
RICHARD KLEINDIENST
MELVIN LAIRD
ROGERS MORTON
PETER PETERSON
ELLIOT RICHARDSON
WILLIAM ROGERS
GEORGE ROMNEY
GEORGE SHULTZ
JOHN VOLPE
CASPAR WEINBERGER

WILLIAM ANDERS
JOSEPH BLATCHFORD
WILLIAM BROWN, III
JOHN A. BUGGS
RICHARD BURRESS
CURTIS COUNTS
WILLIAM EBERLE
JAMES C. FLETCHER
ROBERT E. HAMPTON
JOHN A. HANNAH
JEROME JAFFE
DONALD E. JOHNSON
HENRY KEARNS
THOMAS S. KLEPPE
GEORGE A. LINCOLN
BRADFORD MILLS
HERMAN NICKERSON
BYRON V. PEPITONE
HENRY M. RAMIREZ
WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS
ARTHUR SAMPSON
PHILLIP V. SANCHEZ
FRANK SHAKESPEARE
RUSSELL TRAIN
CLAY WHITEHEAD ✓

FROM:

FREDERIC V. MALEK *FVM*

SUBJECT:

Resignations

RECEIVED

Nov 13 5 20 PM '72

OFFICE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY

Some confusion seems to have arisen regarding whose resignations are expected, and where the resignations should be directed. The purpose of this memorandum is to help clarify the situation.

1. Presidential Appointees. All full-time, non-term Presidential appointees in your department should have sent a pro-forma letter of resignation to the President by c. o. b. November 10. Any who have not sent such a letter should do so immediately. If the packet you received at the meeting on November 8 did not include an envelope for all such appointees in your department, please call my office and we will provide you with the necessary materials.

2. Non-Career Executive Assignments (NEA's). All NEA's in your department should submit their resignations to you. You should hold these resignations, and notify us when you have collected them all.

3. Schedule C's. Schedule C resignations should also be obtained and held by you. However, we would suggest that you exercise judgment at this level. The vast majority of Schedule C's are closely tied to an individual Presidential appointee or NEA, and therefore would automatically leave or be reassigned if their superior resigned. These persons (e. g., secretaries, special assistants, chauffeurs, etc.) need not resign, unless you want such resignations.

* * * * *

The instructions with regard to NEA's and Schedule C's apply to equivalent positions in those departments with different classification systems.

If you have any questions, please call me.

THE WHITE HOUSE

The Honorable Clay Whitehead
Director
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Room 770
1800 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

25885

VIA MESSENGER

Dick Smith
Ehrlichman
Memo for

February 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: Peter Flanigan

**SUBJECT: Agenda and brief for President's
meeting with the FCC on Tuesday,
February 3, at 3:30 p.m.**

Attached is an agenda and brief for the President's
meeting with the FCC.

We are hopeful that the President will continue these
meetings with the regulatory agency Commissioners.

Attachments

**cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead ✓
Central Files**

CTWhitehead:ed

February 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

Meeting with the Commissioners of the
Federal Communications Commission
February 3, 1970 (30 minutes)
3:30 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this meeting with the seven Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission is to encourage greater identification of the Commissioners with the Administration and to provide the opportunity for the President to discuss with them matters of mutual interest.

II. BACKGROUND

There is no set agenda for this meeting in order to encourage free discussion. This is one of a series of meetings which we hope to arrange for each of the regulatory agencies. You have previously met with members of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

III. POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- A. Domestic satellite policy: On January 23, we released a memorandum to the FCC setting forth the Administration's recommendations regarding policies for the commercial use of satellites for domestic telecommunications (Tab A). The policy calls for relatively more reliance on competition than past FCC policies. The initial response has been favorable, although COMSAT stock fell sharply after the release.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you urge prompt FCC adoption of this policy.

- B. Pastore Bill: Recent FCC decisions on broadcast station license renewals have caused considerable apprehension by broadcasters that the franchise value of their investments is in jeopardy. Senator Pastore proposed a bill that would make license challenges almost impossible, but the recent FCC policy statement engineered by Dean Burch is more moderate and appears to placate most of the interests involved.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you voice approval of this new policy statement.

- C. Obscenity: There is a growing awareness that obscenity considerations for radio and television broadcasting are qualitatively different than for the press and motion pictures. This will become even more important as recent motion pictures with explicit sex scenes and obscene language become available for television showing. Dean Burch has spoken out publicly about the need for serious consideration of this problem, although an exact course of action is not yet clear.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you emphasize the need for the Commission to focus on this problem.

- D. INTELSAT: International satellite communications are carried through the INTELSAT Consortium in which COMSAT is the U. S. representative and system manager. The Conference on permanent arrangements for INTELSAT has been in recess since last March and will resume later this month. The major issue is the continuation of COMSAT as technical manager for the next few years -- with the major opposition coming from the Europeans.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest that you emphasize the Administration's commitment to stand firm on this issue.

- E. Other points that might be raised are: Cable TV policies and protection of local broadcast stations; rules restricting newspaper ownership of broadcast stations and concentration of ownership in TV and radio; reduced or free rates for public television; and reduced or free rates for political candidates.

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you take no firm positions on any of these matters.

IV. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Two of the four Democratic Commissioners hold extremely liberal political views: Nicholas Johnson and Kenneth Cox. Both have actively promoted citizenry challenges to broadcast license renewals and have been sharply criticized by FCC policies in this matter. Cox has specialized also in common carrier issues and is widely respected for his responsible approach in that area; Johnson has been radical almost to the point of irresponsibility. Cox's term expires in June, giving us control; Johnson's term expires in 1973. You may not be able to trust fully the confidence of these two Commissioners with respect to your remarks in the meeting.

John D. Ehrlichman

Attachment

cc: Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead ✓
Central Files

CTWhitehead:cd