EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

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ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF INCREASES IN SAME-YEAR RERUN PROGRAMMING AND RELATED ISSUES IN PRIME-TIME NETWORK TELEVISION

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Analysis of the Causes and Effects of Increases In Same-Year Rerun Programming and Related Issues In Prime-Time Network Television

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INTRODUCTION

This study is directed primarily to the problem of networks beginning to repeat their prime-time television shows earlier and earlier each year. The viewing public sees more and more hours of rerun programs, and the program production industry has less and less business. It does not concern the syndication of programs several years after they have gone off network prime-time.

In order to put this problem in perspective, it was necessary to consider broader issues affecting the networks and the television program production industry. These broader issues include an analysis of network behavior generally, the FCC's prime-time access rule, conditions in the film industry, and related problems. But the study was not intended to be a thorough analysis of all factors affecting employment in the Hollywood film industry.

This analysis is designed to aid in the formation of policy recommendations, but does not itself contain any such recommendations. The data, upon which the analysis is based, are being refined further and some new data are being collected.

The study is based on data supplied by the three television networks, the Screen Actors' Guild (SAG), the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC), the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Association of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP), and other sources. Some of the analysis is based on confidential data.

I. Extent of Reruns and the Decline of Original Production.

In this report the word "rerun" means programming previously shown on network television. When the phrase "increase in reruns" is used, it means generally a higher percent of repeats of episodes in a series during a single broadcast year. "Original programming" means programming shown for the first time on network television. Movies made for television are always considered original programming in their first television run; movies made for theatrical exhibition are considered original programming in their first television run except when the contrary is explicitly indicated.

There is no question that reruns have increased over the past decade. The 1968 <u>Land Report</u> states that "at one time" a series comprised of 39 original and 13 rerun episodes was the pattern for series shows, but that the pattern is "now" (1968) 26 - 24 (p. 89). Data made available by SAG indicate that there were some series with 39 episodes as late as 1959.


The pattern of increasing rerun programming, network by network, in prime-time within each broadcast year, can be seen in the following table and in Figure 1.


NETWORK	PERCENT RERUN PROGRAMMING		
	1962/63*	1971/72	
ABC	31	35	
CBS	29	44	
NBC	29	41	

Although total expenditures for programming in prime time increased 80% for all three networks in the last decade, their expenditures for original programs (excluding theatrical movies) fell by 15%. (See Figures 1 and 2.) In 1962/63, NBC bought an average of 32 episodes of series programs, while in 1971/72 this number had declined to 24. This trend has taken place more or less gradually over the past decade and has now reached the point where virtually every series program is repeated at least once in the year it first appears. Because of the declining number of original episodes ordered, program producers generally attempt to ensure that it is their programming, and not some other, which is rerun. Thus, their desire to compete in a rerun market created by the networks cannot be considered as studio-generated pressure for more reruns.

Original production for network prime time has declined more than the above figures suggest. Increased reruns over the past decade accounted for a decline of 343 hours per year of original prime time programming on all three networks combined. (In 1962/63 there were about 3,750 hours of primetime programming on all three networks combined.) The FCC's

* 1961/62 for NBC





prime-time access rule resulted in a further decrease of 319 hours per year, starting with the 1971/72 season.

II. Causes of Increased Reruns--Possible Explanations.

For CBS--the only network providing this type of data-increases in reruns of movies made for TV and of non-movie programs have accounted for 31% of the decline in original programming over the decade. This compares with 35% to the prime-time access rule. What has caused this increase in reruns? In seeking answers to this question, three alternative hypotheses to explain network behavior were considered. Competition Hypothesis:

If network television is highly competitive in the economist's sense (i.e., a large number of independent, profit-maximizing firms) no single network could individually affect the price of programming or advertising. In such a market, new original programming of varied audience appeal would compete with older programming (reruns) of varied drawing power.

It seems reasonable to suppose that a rerun must be of higher appeal than an original program to draw the same audience. In this context, initial drawing power is tied to program production costs, since those factors of production capable of drawing larger audiences will have their prices bid up. In such an environment, one would expect to find a wide variety of new and old programming of various production costs selling at varying prices which reflect their audience

drawing power and the demographic attractiveness to advertisers of the audience drawn by the programs. In any case, rerun programming is always a possible substitute for new programming of the same original production cost. Its popularity is lower, but so is its price, since license fees for reruns are only about a quarter of the cost of original episodes.

In these circumstances, one would expect an increase in the percentage of reruns (or in the use of older programming) whenever the cost of new programming rose, other things being equal. If audience size, in the aggregate, were to rise, or if the demand by advertisers for audiences were to shift upward, then one would expect a decrease in rerun programming, other things being equal.

If the data turn out to show that the per-episode programming costs for original episodes have risen faster in the past decade than the rise in advertiser demand and the rise in TV set usage, then this could explain the increase in reruns on network television, under the assumptions of the pure competition hypothesis. A similar effect would take place if there has been a relative decline in the cost of rerun programming due to decreases in talent residuals or other payments. Rivalry Hypothesis:

Since the networks are not many in number, as "pure" competition would require, but are few, it is naive to think that they do not each have significant influence on the cost

of programs and the price of advertising time. This suggested that a rivalry model might offer a more plausible explanation of network behavior. Consider that the networks, as rivals, vie for ratings by varying the type and audience appeal of programs at the beginning of each season. Each is aware of and can affect the actions of the others, both in selling advertising time and buying programming. This results in cost increases as each network, either directly or indirectly, raises the bidding for more popular actors, more successful writers and producers, better sets, location shooting, and the like.

There also is an effect on viewers' expectations. Many older programs are likely to be less appealing to audiences than newer fare, since they are outdated or are otherwise no longer topical. In addition, original programs produced for the summer cost less than fall original programs and usually will draw smaller audiences than reruns of fall programs. If advertising demand and audience size do not rise as fast as program costs, then new original programming will decline and reruns of recent programs will increase. The quantity of original programming tends to be curtailed when total program costs outstrip advertising revenues. To remain profitable, the networks increase the percentage of recent reruns, usually from earlier in the same broadcast year.

The networks do business in at least three markets, and it is important to distinguish among them: (1) In advertising

markets, the networks are the suppliers of an almost unique product--very large audiences--and deal with a large number of buyers of advertising time, but they must compete with other media (radio, newspapers, and magazines) and with the national spot television market; (2) By contrast, in the market in which TV programs are bought and sold, the three networks are virtually the only buyers of programming, and they deal with a fairly large number of actual and potential program suppliers; (3) Finally, the networks are the major suppliers of prime-time entertainment programming to the public--the viewer, though, is not a "customer," in the usual sense, as he pays nothing for this service. Thus, there are two markets in which the three networks collectively have a virtual monopoly--the purchase of programming from program suppliers, and the provision of programming to the public.

The behavior of the three networks in advertising markets is more circumscribed than their behavior in programming markets because advertisers have more alternatives than program producers. While the networks, individually and collectively, clearly can influence the prices advertisers pay for network commercials by changing the number of commercial minutes offered for sale, their ability to charge very high prices is presumably limited by the existence of the national television spot market and the non-broadcast media as alternatives for the advertiser.

Actually, it appears that the demand for national TV advertising time is rather less elastic (i.e., less sensitive to price) than one might expect, given the existence of competing media. Network revenues appear to have dropped about 10% when cigarette advertising was abolished, which is just about the proportion of cigarette advertising in total minutes before abolition. The prime-time access rule eliminated about 8% of the available prime-time advertising minutes, but revenues stayed about the same, or even increased as a result.

For many years the number of commercial minutes sold per hour has been constant, which may indicate the presence of conscious parallelism as a sign of rivalry in network behavior. Advertisers, of course, are interested only in audiences delivered, and this fact underlies the whole structure of network television. Advertisers have been spending more and more on the <u>production</u> of commercials (see Table 16), but advertisers' expenditures bear little relation to the value viewers place on television program choices.

The essence of the rivalry hypothesis is that the networks, aware of their interdependence, each attempt to maximize their ratings by increasing program drawing power, while perhaps paying less attention to vigorous price competition in advertising markets. As the drawing-power of programs is increased, so are costs. To maintain profits, the number of reruns is increased. This proceeds in a dynamic pattern over

time in such a manner that profit levels are maintained while reruns constantly increase over the years. Truly competitive networks would tend to resist this trend, because it would be to any one network's advantage to put original programs opposite the other networks' reruns in the Spring. But the networks, realizing that this would lead to retaliation and lower profits for everyone, have incentives to limit their rivalry to variations in the production factors that entrance the audience drawing power of the program.

This hypothesis also depends on the apparently valid assumption that, while program drawing power or age affects the audience for any given program, the overall size of the TV audience is more or less fixed on any given day of the year by factors not under control of the networks.

There is a superficial conflict between the rivalry hypothesis and earlier institutional analyses of network behavior, which placed great emphasis on the power of the networks to dominate the market for programs--to exercise, in other words, monopsony or oligopsony power over the terms and conditions of program sales. The two hypotheses are not inconsistent.

In the rivalry hypothesis, the networks choose programs of steadily higher "quality." In other words, the networks buy, over time, different kinds of programs, and in particular programs which cost more to produce. A monopsony or oligopsony model would have the networks buying programs, of <u>whatever</u>

quality, at terms and conditions more disadvantageous to their producers than the terms and conditions which might exist in a more competitive market. These two conditions can co-exist independently of each other. A given level of monopsony power might be reflected in program prices (paid by the networks to the program production industry) which were lower than they might otherwise be. But these prices may still rise over time without any reduction in the degree of monopsony power simply because different kinds of programs are called for, programs whose costs of production are higher than before.

In general, a monopsonist buys less of a product at a lower price than true competitors would buy. A hypothesis such as this could explain increased reruns by itself only if the degree of monopsony power increased over time. The existence of three buyers instead of one complicates the argument, but does not change its fundamental nature.

The fact that some of the producers of television programs are also the talent in those programs is entirely irrelevant to the principles under discussion here, although that fact would doubtless complicate any attempt to quantify the magnitude of the various effects. It remains true, of course, that the rivalry behavior, among other things, bids up the prices and incomes of more popular talent, while reducing the demand for and incomes of less popular talent. It is also true that uniquely popular talent may have just as much "monopoly" power

as the networks have "monopsony" power, and may for that reason fare much better than the factors of program production with more and closer substitutes. But there is a great deal more to the program production industry than a handful of top stars.

In any case, increased audience appeal for original programming takes the form of color and location production, more elaborate sets, longer shooting schedules, and higher and higher salaries to very popular actors, writers, directors and producers--<u>but</u> not necessarily higher payments to the program production industry as a whole. In fact, the increase in reruns probably means that uniquely popular talent is better off, while other talent, craft unions, and extras suffer. The inflation produced by this rivalry behavior would take the form of "demand-pull" program cost inflation by the networks, not "cost-push" inflation from television program production industry unions.

Cartel Hypothesis:

The final hypothesis that might explain network behavior is one in which the networks are assumed to function as a cartel. In such a hypothesis, reruns might increase (as in the competitive model) because of "cost-push" program cost increases. On the other hand, a cartel would have no particular incentive to increase program drawing power over time, absent systematic exogenous changes in public taste. If "cost-push" inflation of program costs did not occur, one might explain increased reruns

as being a result of increasing perfection in the degree of cooperation of the members of the cartel, but this seems rather farfetched.

Cartel behavior of the kind hypothesized would almost certainly require explicit collusion by the networks. This in itself would be unlikely. But if cartel-like behavior were characteristic of the industry, then one would expect to find little evidence of "demand-pull" program cost inflation, and much evidence of "cost-push" inflation, in order to explain the evident increase in rerun programming.

Which Explanation Fits?

Between 1962 and 1971 original episode program payments by the networks rose about 89% (see Tables 22, 34) in prime time, while total network program expenditures rose 88% (see Table 30). Whether the networks are "pure" competitors, rivals, or cartel members, reruns and increased costs of programs go hand in hand. The important question is why these costs rose. If the increase were found to result from cost-push inflation by the program production industry unions, then, to some extent the networks had little choice but to increase reruns to some extent. If, however, the inflation cannot be attributed to union-caused cost increases, then the rivalry hypothesis is a more plausible explanation of increased reruns.

Cost-push inflation by the unions could take two forms. First, if all wages and salaries went up X%, then the cost of an unchanged program would rise by no more than X%. Secondly, if restrictive work rules which decrease productivity (or more colorfully, "featherbedding") on the part of some unions increased, then an unchanged program would cost more because of wages paid to inefficiently used labor. Note that for cost push inflation it is not the <u>level</u> of featherbedding, that is important but effective <u>increases</u> in that level. In the absence of change in wages and prices of other inputs, cost-push inflation results <u>if and only if</u> featherbedding becomes more extensive.

Neither of these appears to be the explanation. First, craft union wages increased about 42% from 1962 to 1971, compared to a rise in the consumer price level of 33%. Actors' minimum wage rates rose 38% over the same period. Second, according to our unavoidably rough estimates (Appendix Tables 19 and 20 which unfortunately include theatrical motion picture production) man-hours of labor per unit of output have actually been declining in recent years. The change to color programming and the apparent increase in on-location production probably have tended to increase man-hours of labor per program hour, and these effects alone could account for an increase of about 20% in the labor/output ratio. While there are many colorful stories about union work rules which lower productivity, and

while we have no doubt that such practices exist, there is no evidence available which would suggest significant <u>increases</u> in these practices. Thus, there does not appear to be very much evidence in favor of increased featherbedding as an explanation of the increase in cost given the effects of rivalry on such elements of quality as color and location shooting.

Nor can much of the cost increase be explained by increases in program packager's profits in excess of a normal rate of return on investment, since the industry supplying programs is very competitive, market shares are low and volatile, and entry by new competitors appears to be relatively easy, subject to whatever monopsony power the networks possess. (See A.D. Little Report 1968 and 1969.)

An alternative explanation is "demand-pull" inflation, interpreted in terms of the rivalry hypothesis set forth above. If rivalry exists, the incomes of popular actors, writers, and producers would be expected to rise faster than craft incomes. Unlike increases in union scales, the networks would be able to exercise more choice in deciding whether to increase expenditures in these categories (popular writers', directors, and actors' salaries). This implies that above-the-line talent wages increase faster than below-the-line wages. However, increases in the <u>amount</u> of labor required per episode can also increase the total below-the-line costs. Between

1962/63 and 1971/72, for the NBC-produced program "Bonanza," above-the-line costs per episode 53% and total cost per episode 94%. Thus, above-the-line costs rose more than 4.5 times faster than SAG minimum scale. Unfortunately, "Bonanza" is not a typical network program because of its long run on NBC, but it is the only example we have that is not based on confidential data.

Indeed, as a general matter, there are little reliable data on production costs, and there is much disagreement among studio executives as to the source of cost increases over the last decade. The basic hypothesis of the present analysis is that network-generated "demand-pull" resulted in much of the cost increase. This sort of cost increase would turn up in higher above-the-line talent costs and also in higher below-the-line talent costs due to color production, location shooting, more elaborate sets, and the like. If below-the-line labor is hired at the average wage rates shown in Table 19, and if the number of days required to shoot an episode has increased by about 20%, then below-the-line labor costs would have increased by about 68% over the decade.

Confidential data obtained from one studio indicate a 290% increase in <u>total</u> below-the-line costs, while similar data from a second studio indicate a 66% increase in these costs. A third studio reports a 130% increase in

below-the-line costs. One studio estimates that fringe benefits and other non-wage labor costs account for about 9.3% of total production cost today, while another studio reports that these indirect costs rose from 20% of direct labor costs to 30% over the decade. In any event, it is difficult to imagine that increases in fringe benefits over the decade could account for a substantial proportion of the total cost escalation. One realistic explanation seems to be increased labor input per unit of production as a result of changes in the nature of the programming produced.

One studio reports a 116% increase in above-the-line costs, while another reports a 160% increase for selected series episodes. Since SAG minimum scale has increased only 40%, this suggests that actors are being employed above scale more frequently nowadays, or that they are working many more days per episode, or that very top talent is much better paid than in the past. But none of the available data provided by the program producers are directly relevant because of the manner in which the samples are selected.

Above and beyond the conclusions one can draw from analysis of cost data, the increasing use of movies in prime-time network television also indicates rivalry for ratings. Assuming that a higher-cost program generally delivers a larger audience, then a movie that originally

cost perhaps \$4 million should deliver a larger audience than the combined shorter series episodes (costing about \$400,000 total) that it replaces. Yet the network rents the movie for two showings (or more) at much less than its original cost. Since 1962, hours of prime-time movies have risen from 4 hours per week to 12 hours per week.

In addition to production costs and the increasing use of theatrical movies, the third indicator of interest here is network profits. Network profit on networking plus the income from the networks' 15 owned and operated stations varied from \$87 million in 1961 to \$226.1 million in 1969 to \$144.9 million in 1971 (see Table 30). It is difficult to rely on the data showing network profits from networking alone because of the necessarily arbitrary transfer prices to owned and operated stations--e.g., both costs and revenues are shared by the two operations.

The variability of network profits results mainly from the variability of revenues. Revenues depend on the following factors:

(1) Price to advertisers--over which the networks, collectively, have some control. It moved from \$1.94 per thousand in 1967 to \$2.09 per thousand in 1971 on NBC.

(2) Number of TV households -- this is subject to fairly stable demographic growth since about 95% of house-holds have television sets.

(3) Hours per day of viewing--which have gradually increased from five to more than six hours over the last
10 years, mostly outside prime time. (See Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29).

(4) Advertising budgets--which depend on the level of economic activity (more gross national product implies bigger ad budgets) and the level of slack in the economy (when there is a recession people are not buying and an ad dollar has less effect).

The business cycle had apparently caused much of the recent variability in network revenues. Actions by the government have also had an impact. The elimination of cigarette advertising in early 1971 cut revenues. Also, the prime-time access rule affected revenues, although it also reduced costs, and had little if any effect on network profits.

There is room for argument as to whether the present and historic levels of network profits are "excessive" by some criterion, however, they are measured. In any event, profits vary from network to network, and it is no secret that the network (ABC) with the least increase in reruns is also the network with the lowest profits.

What conclusion can be drawn from all of this? The hypothesis which best fits the facts of the situation (the dominant fact being, of course, "threeness," which makes the pure competition hypothesis unhelpful) is that the networks individually and collectively possess great economic power. The result of this power is that there has come to be a cycle of rivalry behavior, which has the effect of driving down the quantity of original programming and maintaining the profit levels of the networks. That this is not exactly the same result which would arise from the cartel hypothesis makes it no less good evidence of the existence and use of economic power by the networks. There are some circumstances, of which this may conceivably be one example, in which rivalry among a few oligopolists may be even less desirable for related industries for the public than outright monopoly. A similar degree of collective economic power is present, but it is exercised more wastefully. Moreover, that the networks "feel" as though they have little power is not relevant, since they presumably use up that power in rivalry for ratings and profits rather than hoarding it.

III. Effects of the Increase on Rerun Programming on the Viewing Public.

It is not clear <u>what</u> original programming viewers are deprived of by a given percentage of reruns within each broadcast year. If, for instance, they are deprived of original programming which <u>costs</u> the same as reruns do,

then they may be getting higher production cost reruns in exchange for lower production cost original programming. It is not clear which alternative most viewers would prefer--<u>if</u> they had any realistic choice in the matter.

It has been suggested that the general public does not suffer much from the increased level of reruns because 87% of the U.S. population over 12 years of age misses any given program the first time it is shown. It is generally recognized that there exists a group of people who watch a great deal of television. Of the homes with television, 60 to 64% are watching in the average prime-time minute. Eighteen to 19% are watching the average network program. That is, each network averages 31% of the tuned-in homes.

When reruns start, the 31% who watched a CBS program initially will have to choose between a rerun of the CBS show they just saw a few months earlier and the offerings of ABC and NBC, which they chose not to see the first time it was offered. Because of reruns this 31% have to view again the show they originally preferred or take their second choice. This pattern is repeated on the other two networks. Consequently, as many as 93% of the original viewers may be worse off because they have to make a choice between a rerun of a program they have recently seen and a second choice program.

The value of this loss cannot be measured because consumers do not pay directly for television programs and because most viewers would rather watch a second choice than no television at all. Of course, some viewers miss the original showing of their preferred program in the fall. Nevertheless, with a large proportion of avid viewers, reruns may cause a majority of viewers to be less satisfied than they would be with more original episodes of the same programs. The data supplied by CBS (Table 12) show the pattern of programs repeated. Entertainment programs and especially movies are repeated most often, while news, sports, and public affairs specials are hardly repeated at all.

Repeats of specials are different from repeats of series. One would not expect as great an audience loss from some special repeats. This is especially true of specials shown only once a year and catering to children as a unique audience. Their continued popularity reflects these two special characteristics--not the fact that X% of the American people missed them the first time they were shown.

In addition, there is a potential for increased consumer loss resulting from multi-set homes, which now constitute 43% of all TV homes. In a multi-set home, more individuals will have viewed their first choice during the original season than in a one-set home. Consequently, more people

than in a one-set home must accept a repeat or second choice program the second time around. The number of multi-set homes has, of course, been increasing rapidly.

Finally, it is relevant to any discussion of the viewers' interest in the rerun question to note that the viewers are the "products" that are sold by the networks to advertisers. As with any "product" in a commercial process, they do not have much of a role in the decisionmaking that affects them. It is the audiences' <u>character-</u> istics that are important, not their <u>tastes</u> or <u>desires</u>.

In this context, it does not assist analysis to maintain that reruns serve the viewers' desires or that changes in viewer tastes have led to a demand for more expensive programming. The "demand" for such programming is probably due more to the tendency of two networks to "follow the leader," when one network is successful with a particular program type or format, than to changes in public taste independent of the networks' programming decisions.

IV. Effects of the Decrease in Original Programming on Employment.

Below-the-line union members employed in Hollywood by AMPTP member companies have faced declining employment and only modest wage rate increases. Wage rates

increased 42% between 1962 and 1971, compared with a 33% increase in the consumer price index. Annual hours of employment increased from 35 million in 1962 to 42 million in 1968, but have since declined to 32 million. Total income of these employees was \$127 million in 1962, \$203 million in 1969, and \$163 million in 1971. Average craft union incomes fell from \$7,530 in 1969 to \$7,405 in 1971 <u>despite</u> an hourly wage rate increase from \$4.92 to \$5.17 per hour. If corrections for inflation were made, the drop in income would be larger.

Earnings of actors from SAG jurisdictions show a similar pattern. (Here, as elsewhere, it should be noted that many SAG members have earnings from work after AFTRA and other jurisdictions which is not reflected in the SAG data.) In 1965, SAG earnings from television amounted to \$33.9 million; by 1971, this figure was only \$34.0 million, having first increased and then declined in the interim. (SAG income data exclude the earnings of those actors making more than \$100,000 per year beyond their first \$100,000.)* SAG earnings from movies declined from

* SAG officials claim that the aggregate of this income in excess of \$100,000 has declined in recent years, but no detailed information is available. Results elsewhere in this report would suggest that this income should be declining, if at all, much less rapidly than the income of lower paid actors.

\$25.7 million in 1965 to \$20.6 million in 1971. On the other hand, SAG earnings from TV commercials increased in this period from \$38.6 million to \$59.2 million. Overall, SAG earnings were \$97.8 million in 1965 and \$114.2 million in 1971. In 1971, 51% of SAG members had less than \$1,000 of SAG earnings, and 75% had less than \$3,500 in SAG earnings. Only 12.4% had SAG earnings in excess of \$7,500. Film industry employment and earnings outside Hollywood are less heavily dependent on prime-time network entertainment programming trends.

Not only has total employment fallen off, but unemployment has continued to be high. Movie and television film work is casual work. Many jobs are one-shot affairs for one movie, a series episode, or a special. Television program production has a marked seasonal nature because network schedules have an original and rerun season. (See Table 3).

	Unemplo								
Los	Angel	es	-	LO	ng	B	ea	ch	SMSA

Year	SIC 78 Insu April*	red Employees October*	U.S. Civilian Labor Force**
1963	16.9	8.4	5.7
1964	15.1	6.0	5.2
1965	17.0	5.2	4.5
1966	11.1	7.0	3.8
1967	13.5	7.4	3.8
1968	15.0	6.2	3.6
1969	11.0	8.3	3.5
1970	18.4	9.8	4.9
1971	19.3	7.8	5.9
1972	16.2	N.A.	N.A.

Source: California Department of Human Resources
 ** Economic Report of the President-January 1972, p. 223

The unions claim higher unemployment rates than those above partially because they count union members employed outside of the film industry as unemployed. Thus, SAG claimed an 85% unemployment level for the week of November 6, 1972. The other major actors' union is AFTRA, whose members are generally engaged in the production of live and taped shows. These shows (daytime serials, news programs, and specials) are generally not the kinds of programs which are rerun. This phenomenon may have been due at least in part to AFTRA's contracts with the networks, which specified higher residual payments (now 75% of minimum scale) for reruns than SAG contracts (now 50% of minimum scale).* AFTRA members earnings' from TV work of all kinds increased from \$36 million in 1961 to \$69 million in 1971. This may be due in part to a trend toward increased tape programming.

V. Other Factors Affecting Employment.

A. Decline of the Movie Industry:

The impact of decreased original network programming on the program production unions needs to be interpreted in the light of what has happened in Hollywood over the last two decades.

It is clear that there has been a long term decline in the film industry. Theater admission revenues, for instance, declined from \$1.4 billion in 1950 to \$1.1 billion in 1969, while admission prices more than tripled in the same period. Television was a particularly important factor in this decline, since television was largely responsible for the drop in movie theater attendance in the 1950's. Beginning about 1959, however, television's vast appetite for programming put to work some of the

* For many years, AFTRA residuals exceeded SAG residuals. Recently, however, this gap may have been closed. While the SAG residual percentage is lower, its scale is higher.

factors of production which the decline of the theatrical industry had left unemployed, as the networks moved from kinescope to film production. In the early sixties, these two effects began to offset each other. SAG income from television, for instance, is now \$34 million, compared to \$21 million from movies and \$59 million from commercials (see Table 16). In fact, this one time jump in film employment resulted in the attraction to the industry of an excess supply of additional labor. The glamour of Hollywood and the absence of union membership criteria may be the cause of this excess supply creation, which is still being worked off.

Thus, the public's preference for television in the 1950's contributed to a decline in the film industry which was offset later by television's own vast appetite for programming. This appetite has now grown to the point where at least a majority of the industry's output is for television, including both original television production, commercials, and sales to television of theatrical motion pictures. In a sense, television "saved" the film industry from the adverse effects which television had itself "caused." But as output for television occupied a greater and greater proportion of the industry's total production, the industry became more and more sensitive to variations in television's own demand for programming.

Recently several factors have combined to reduce the output level of original television production. These are: (1) reruns, (2) longer programs, (3) more theatrical motion pictures shown on television, (4) the prime-time access rule, and (5) runaway production. In sum, the program production industry's fate is now firmly tied to television and in particular (until the development of cable) to advertiser-supported network television. This empirical fact does not by itself imply any necessary responsibility on the part of the television networks for the economic viability of the program industry.

B. Runaway Production:

What remains of theatrical motion picture production appears to be deserting Hollywood for foreign and other domestic locations. To the extent that this occurs within the U.S., the problem is not one for national policy concern. <u>Variety</u>, MPAA and <u>Film Daily Yearbook</u> suggest that the number of films from all domestic sources is increasing. The data are poor, but there is little evidence of an increasing <u>proportion</u> of foreign production, although the <u>level</u> of foreign production has indeed been high for some years (see Table 15). No doubt runaway production has contributed to unemployment in the U.S. motion picture industry, and

especially to unemployment in Hollywood. But we have not been able to measure the magnitude of this effect, or to compare it with the effect of decreased original programming.

C. Program Length:

The length of programs probably has some effect on the number of people employed in producing film for television, although it is not clear that this effect is significant in either direction. Longer programs may employ fewer people, but many employ those people longer--even proportionately longer. There has been a trend toward longer programs. In 1962, 30% of all network program hours (in prime time) were devoted to programs of 30 minutes, 62% to 60 minute programs, and 8% to longer programs. In 1972, prime-time hours were allocated 17% to 30 minute programs, 52% to 60 minute programs, and 31% to longer programs. The trend toward longer programs can be explained in part by a change in the types of programming--away from comedy and game shows and toward drama and adventure.

D. Feature Length Movies and Sports:

The use of theatrical motion pictures in prime time has grown significantly in the past decade (see Table 5). While treated as "original" programming in its first network

run for most purposes of this analysis, such programming does replace the original series-type programming that was a staple of Hollywood production for the networks. In the 1962/63 season, there were about 4 hours per week devoted to movies on all three networks combined. By 1971/72, this number had increased to 14 hours per week, or 22% of the total schedule. Of this latter figure, some part was made-for-TV movies and pilots that represented original production. Nevertheless, a decline in original programming can be explained in part by a 16 percentage point increase in the use of feature length movies in prime-time network schedules. There may be a similar trend in the use of sports programming, but we have insufficient data on this point at present.

E. Prime-Time Access Rule:

In the past year, the prime-time access rule has had a significant impact on the quantity of original TV program production. In the 1971/72 season, the time in question was devoted almost entirely to non-original programming, replacing original and rerun network programming. Whether this would continue to be the case in the future is less clear, but it does seem likely that access time will probably be devoted to programs of lower cost and lower employment than network programming.

F. Summary of Effects:

Taking the information from the networks we can partially determine the extent of these effects. From 1962/63 to 1971/72, there was a decrease of 662 hours of original (movie and non-movie) programming, (on an original base of about 3,750 prime-time hours per year for all three networks).

	1962/		
Network	Rerun Hours	Prime-Time Access	Total
ABC	42	78	120
CBS	171	130	301
NBC**	130	111	241
Total	343	319	662
% Total	51.8%	48.28	100%

Decline in Original Network Hours*

 Feature films are considered original production here.

** NBC data are for 1961/62, which is the only year available.

In the case of CBS, more data are available. For CBS, there was a decline of 389 non-movie and made-for-TV movies original hours.

This can be allocated as follows:

CBS: Decline in Specified Original Production*

Source of Decline	Hours	<u></u>
Due to increase in theatrical movies	137.9	35.4
Due to Prime-Time Access Rule	129.9	33.4
Due to increase in reruns	121.3	31.1
Total Decline	389.1	99.98

* Made-for-TV movies and non-movie programs

On the surface, it appears that half the decline in original network hours is due to reruns of programs. Only CBS provided a detailed breakdown of originals vs. reruns for theatrical and made-for-TV movies. Those data suggest that the introduction of theatrical movies, which were <u>not</u> considered original programs for this purpose, and of the prime-time access rule each accounted for a third of the CBS decline in original production. Non-movie reruns caused a 31% decline in CBS purchases of original non-movie programming. But there is an arbitrary element to calling first TV runs of theatrical movies non-original production, for this purpose, since some of these movies might never have been produced if network showing was not a viable possibility.

Most studio production for network television is in the form of series, and the industry's fortunes are now tied to network production. Therefore, reruns, movies, and the prime-time access rule affect industry employment considerably. Increasing use of theatrical movies cuts directly into the number of people employed as well as total production hours. It is not necessarily true that an increase in reruns reduces the number employed. What it does reduce is the period of employment of those who have jobs.

VI. Conclusions

The network practice of increasing the percentage of rerun programs in prime-time, during the same broadcast year, poses two problems. First, it diminishes the ability of the viewer to choose among a diverse range of original program offerings.

Second, it is a factor, but by no means the only factor, contributing to the decline of employment in the program production industry. The decline in employment is attributable to movies, reruns, and the prime-time access

rule, as well as runaway production and the general decline in theater admissions. As discussed above, the increasing use of movies and reruns is most plausibly the result of the networks' market and rivalry for ratings. Consequently, it is that market power and rivalry which appear to be the principal causes of the increase in unemployment; increased movies and reruns were just the mechanism.

The existence of such market power in the hands of three large companies, therefore, has a major, highly direct impact on the quantity, nature, and quality of television programming available to the viewers. Moreover, as the long-run effect of that power weakens, the domestic program production industry, the viewers and the networks will both lose a source of creative program fare.

APPENDIX

.

		(Prime Time Only) ABC CBS			NBC		
Season	Hours Orig. Prgmg	% Orig.	Hours Orig. Prgmg	% Orig.	Hours Orig. Prgmg	% Orig.	
1961/62	_	-	-	-	885	71	
1962/63	829	69	892	71	-	-	
1963/64	885	72	921	73	-	-	
1964/65	853	70	876	72	-	-	
1965/66	915	70	909	71	-	-	
1966/67	906	71	889	69	-	-	
1967/68	838	65	855	63		-	
1968/69	847	70	799	62	-	-	
1969/70	798	63	784	61		-	
1970/71	761	65	721	56		-	
1971/72	709	65	609	56	644	59	

NETWORK HOURS OF ORIGINAL PROGRAMMING BY YEAR

Note: Decreases in hours of original programming are due to causes other than just increases in reruns. Other causes include changes in the number of hours offered per season, changes in season starting dates (timing of premiere week), and the prime time access rule.

	Number of 1/2 Hours Repeated				
Week of	ABC	CBS	NBC		
1/13/63	0	1	0		
1/11/72		4	5		
1/20/63	0	1	0		
1/18/72	8	10			
2/10/63	0	1	0		
2/8/72	8	4	7		
2/17/63 2/15/72	0	1 0	0		
3/3/63 3/8/72	0 4	1 2	0		
3/10/63	0	1	0 ·		
3/15/72		13	5		
3/17/63	0	1	05		
3/22/72	2	17			
3/24/63	0 12	l	0		
3/29/72		13	14		
4/7/63	2	5	220		
4/3/72	9	15			
5/5/63	11	4	12		
5/3/72	17	18	22		

Table 2

Patterns of Reruns - 1971-72 TV Season

O = Original R = Repeat

S = Special or Preemption

Ten weeks beginning January 11, 1972 and ending May 3, 1972

ABC (sample)

Newlywed Monday Movie Mod Squad Welby Cash Bewitched Love Welk FBI Sunday Movie 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 R R 0 R 0 0 R S R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 R R R 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 R S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 R S R 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 R S R 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 R R R R 0 R R 0 0 0 S R R R

CBS (sample)

Gunsmoke	OROOORRRRR
Doris Day	OOOOORRRR
Hee Haw	OOOORRRRRR
60 Minutes	0055000000
Medical Center	OROOORRRRR
Hawaii	OROOORRRRR
Nabors	OOOOORRRR
Thursday Movie	RRROORROOO
Griffith	OOOOORRRRR
Glen Campbell	OOSOSOOORR
NIDC	

NBC (sample)

Premiere Movie	OOOSOOORRR
Knotts	OORSOOOSSR
Shiloh	OOOOOORRR
Kraft Music	OOOOSOSORS
Ironside	SOOOOSOSR
Name of the Game	OSOOOOSRRR
Strange Report	000500050
Andy Williams	OOOOOOORR
Saturday Night Movie	ROROORRRRR
Bonanza	OSOOOOORR

Tal	b1	e	4

PROGRAM LENGTH - ENTERTAINMENT SEFIES THREE NETWORK AGGREGATE

	Total Number of Program Hours	Percentage of Total Program Hours Represented by Length of Series						
Year	Supplied	15-Minutes	30-Minutaa	45-Minutes	60-Minutes	90-Minutes	120-Minutes	
1962	712	0.3%	29.5%	1.0%	61.6%	2.1%	5.5%	
1963	723	0.7	23.9	1.0	60.1	6.1	8.2	
1964	71	0.0	33.3	0.0	54.2	4.2	8.3	
1965	74	0.0	36.6	0.0	49.6	2.1	11.0	
1966	74	0.0	29.1	0.0	55.4	2.0	13.5	
1967	72 ¹ 2	0.0	22.8	0.0	56.6	4.1	16.6	
1958	732	0.0	23.3	0.0	53.4	4.1	19.2	
1969	731/2	0.0	22.5	2.1	50.3	6.1	19.0	
1970	73 ¹ 2	. 0.0	23.1	0.0	51.7	6.1	19.0	
1971	63	0.0	19.0	0.0	49.2	9.5	22.2	
1972	62	0.0%	16.9%	0.0%	51.6%-	12.1%	19.4%	
a transmission	and the second of the second se		an en an antiger particular de la compañsión de la compañsión de la compañsión de la compañsión de la compañsió		-			

Eased on the total hours of entertainment series regularly scheduled between 6-11 during the November composite week, including NFL Football on the ABC Network in 1970-72 on Monday evenings, but excluding NFL Football on Sunday late afternoons.

Source: 1962-1968: Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Television Program Production, Procurement, Distribution and Scheduling," Table 4, p. 10 (1969). 1969-1972: CBS.

T	a	b	1	e	5
-	-	~	and of	-	-

	ABC	CBS	NBC	Three Network Aggregate
1962	2	·	2	4
1963		-	4	۷.
1964	2		4	6
1965	2	2	4	8
1966	2	4	۷.	10
1967	4	• 4	4	12
1968	4	4	6	14
1969	4	4	6	14
1970	2*	4	6	12
1971	2*	4	6	12
1972	2*	4.	6	12

HOURS OF THEATRICAL FEATURE FILM PROGRAMMING PER WEEK

Notes:

- 1. Based upon three network schedule for a composite November week of each year of prime time 6-11 p.m.
- *During the 1970/71, 1971/72 and 1972/73 Seasons ABC had Monday Night Football during November of each year. During each of these seasons ABC normally inserts Feature Film Programming after the Pro-Football Season. The hours indicated do not include the planned Post-Football movie broadcast.
- 3. The above hours were normally devoted to the broadcasting of theatrical feature films. However, a made-for-television movie or pilot may have been broadcast within the two-hour theacrical feature film time period in some instances.
- Source: 1962-1968: Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Television Program Production, Procurement, Distribution and Scheduling," 1969; Table 7, p. 16. 1969-1972: CBS.

Seasonal Indexes of Advertisers' Expenditures on Network Television, Three Network Average,

Sunday thru Saturday Evening 7 P.M. - Sign-off

Year	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
1967	110.92	104.01	113.35	102.92	90.79	77.05	70.73	72.28	96.34	124.19	121.51	116.12
1968	110.76	103.89	113.12	102.81	90.82	77.34	70.86	72.45	96.58	1.23,96	121.93	116.35
1969	110,31	103.60	112.60	102.57	90.76	77.84	71.15	72.73	96.88	123.38	122.27	116.38
1970	109.94	103.51	112.05	102.42	90.93	78,57	70.99	72.86	96.97	123.16	122.78	
1971	109.70	103.35	111.57	102.28	90.96	79.05	70.90	72.94	97.01	122.83		116.42
1972	109.57	103.26	111.34	102.22	90.98	79.29						116.44
					10.10	12.29	70.86	72.98	97.03	122.67	123.09	

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Source: CBS,

Note: Average for each year equals 100. These data are seasonably adjusted.

ABC TOTAL NUMBER OF NETWORK PROGRAMMING HOURS

	Careful and the second s	Originals Hours		uns
	44	(%)	#	(%)
1962-63	829	(69)	370	(31)
1963-64	885	(72)	338	(28)
1964-65	853	(70)	365	(30)
1965-66	915	(70)	394	(30)
1966-67	906	(71)	370	(29)
1967-68	838	(65)	448	(35)
1968-69	847	. (70)	366	(30)
1969-70	798	(63)	462	• (37)
1970-71	. 761	(65)	417	(35)
1971-72	709	(65)	377	(35)
Average	834	(68)	391	(32)

Source: ABC.

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NBC TELEVISION NETWORK 1961 - 1962 EVENING PROGRAM PATTERNS

		TOTAI, ORIGINAL <u>PROGRAMS</u>	SERIES ORIGINAL	SERIES REPEAT	ORIGINAL SPECIALS	REPEAT SPECIALS
7:30- 8:30	the second second state state and an an an an an and an	29	27	23	2	
8:30- 9:00	a set of the set of th	32 .	31	12	1	- 1
	SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, 6/24-9/9	8	8	-	-	-
9:00-10:00		. 36	34	16	2	-
10:00-11:00	SHOW OF THE WEEK	41	29	11	12	,
8:00- 8:30	NATIONAL VELVET	33	31	19		
8:30- 9:00		52	50	13	2	-
9:00-10:00		33	30		2	-
10:00-11:00	THRILLER	33	30	19	3	~
		55	50	19	3	-
7:30- 8:30	LARAMIE	30	28	22	0	
8:30- 9:00	ALFRED HITCHCOCK PRESENTS	40	40	12	2	-
9:00-10:00	DICK POWELL	32	30	20	-	Ben .
10:00-11:00	CAIN'S 100	36	30		2	-
		20	30	16	6	-
7:30- 8:30	WAGON TRAIN	39	38	13		
8:30- 9:00	JOEY BISHOP	33	32	7	1	-
	THE REBEL 6/27-9/12	12	12	-	1	-
9:00-10:00	PERRY COMO	36	33	1	-	-
	MYSTERY THEATRE 6/13-9/26	16	16	-	3	-
10:00-10:30	BOB NEWHART	37	34	-	-	-
	PLAY YOUR HUNCH	15	15	-	3	-
10:30-11:00	BRINKLEY'S JOURNAL	41	36		-	-
		: -* ±	20	11 .	5	-
7:30- 8:30	THE OUTLAWS	28	26	24	2	-
8:30- 9:30	DR. KILDARE	35	33	17	2	-
9:30-10:00	HAZEL	37	36	7	2	
4	THE LIVELY ONES	8	8	-	1	-
10:00-11:00	SING ALONG WITH MITCH MILLER	31	30	21	1	
7:30- 8:30	INTERNATIONAL SHOWTIME	33	33	19	,	
8:30- 9:30	THE DETECTIVES	34	30			-
9:30-20:30	TELEFHONE HOUR	42	14	18	4	-
	DINAH SHORE (alternate)	7	14	-	28	**
10:30-11:00	HEPE AND NOW .	19	14		7	3
	Chet Huntley	EB		-	5	-
	1/12-9/7	22	33	6-00		e•
7:30- 8:30	WELLS FARGO	35	34	17	1	-
8:30- 9:00	THE TALL MAN	38	37	14	ĩ	
9:00-11:00	SATURDAY MOVIE	30	30	22	-	-
					•	

	ORIGINAL PROCRAMMING	885
HOURS OF	REPEAT PROGRAMMING	363
TOUNL P	RIME TIME	1,248
% OUTGT	NAT.	73.0

1.1.0

71%

NBC

1971-1972 EVENING PROGRAM PATTERNS

		TOTAL ORIGINAL PROGRAMS	SERIES ORIGINAL	SERIES REPEAT	ORIGINALS SPECIALS	REPEAT SPECIALS
7:30- 8:30	WONDERFUL WORLD OF DISNEY	24	20	28	4	-
8:30- 9:00	JIMMY STEWART & 2 PILOTS	28	24	24	4	-
9:00-10:00		.31	26	21	5	(enc)
10:00-11:00	BOLD ONES	25	22	27	3	
8:00- 9:00	LAUGH-IN/BASEBALL	39	24	1.3	10-5	-
7:30- 8:30						
	PONDEROSA	31	16	14	15	7
8:30- 9:30	SARGE/FUNNY SIDE SPECIALS-	20	12	10	26	4
	VACATION THEATRE	38 37	10-14	14	13	1
9:30-10:30	FUNNY SIDE/NICHOLS/SPECIALS	37	10-14	7.48	13	*
8:00- 8:30		27	24	24	3	1
8:30-10:00	MYSTERY MOVIE	28	2.2	23	6	1
10:00-11:00	NIGHT CALLERY	27	22	25	5	-
8:00- 9:00	FLIP WILSON/VACATION THEATRE	28	26	12-12	2	-
	NICHOLS/IRONSIDE	28	22	24	6	-
10:00-11:00	DEAN MARTIN/REPEAT REPL.	39	28-7	13	4	-
8:00- 8:30	THE DA SANFORD 1/14 PARTNERS 7/28	36	15-14-4	14-1	3	l
8:00- 8:30	PARTNERS					
8:30- 9:00						
	EMERGENCY 1/15					2
8:00- 9:00	VACATION THEATRE 7/15	32	15-11	11-7	6	2
9:00-11:00	MONDAY MOVIES	35	1.8	17	10-7	
8:30-10:30	FRIDAY MOVIES	32	18	19	14	l
9:00-11:00	SATURDAY MOVIES	22	17	30	5	

HOURS OF ORIGINAL PROGRAMMING	
HOURS OF REPEAT PROGRAMMING	447.5
TOTAL PRIME TIME	1,092
% ORIGINAL	59%

Source: NBC.

8

C.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ORIGINALS ON NEC TV NETWORK FOR VARIOUS SEASONS

SEASON	ORIGINALS
1961-62	32
1.962-63	32
1963-64	30
1964-65	30
1965-66	30
1966-67	30
1967-68	26
1968-69	26
1969-70	26
1970-71	26
1971-72	24
1972-73	24

Source: NBC

NBC TELEVISION NETWORK 1971-72 SEASON ORIGINAL-REPEAT BROADCAST HOURS

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	# Broadcast Hours	Original	Repeat	% Original
Normal Prime Time Schedule	1,092	644.5	447.5	59
Normal Post 11 PM Schedule (Tonight, Sat-Sun Tonight, Olympics)	468	392	76	84
Other Prime Time & Post 11 PM Special Coverages				
(includes primaries, conventions)	27	. 27	-	100
Monday-Friday 6:00-7:30 PM	132.5	132.5	***	100
Normal Monday-Friday Daytime 10-6 PM	1,560	1,525	35	98
Oth er Monday-Friday Daytime Special Coverages	9.5	. 9	. 5	95
Normal Saturday Morning Schedule	260	67.5	192.5	26
Saturday-Other News & Sports Programming to 8 PM	149.5	149.5	-	100
Sunday-Other Programming to 7:30 PM	191.5	191.5	-	100
Today-Plus runovers of 6:00 - 7:00 AM	4 521	521		100
	gualentiation, striv statisticate of the s	Becaderaria advantaria bitante-ara	Barran I	The instruments
	4,411	3,659.5	751.5	83%

Table 11

Source: NBC

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1000 11000

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CBS TELEVISION NETWORK NEW AND REPEAT PROGRAMMING DURING BROADCAST

SFASONS BY DROGRAM				BURNER DURING I
SEASONS BY PROGRAM	CATEGORY AND	PRODUCTION	SOURCE	1962/63-1971/72ª

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Program Category:			2/1963			19	63/1964													
	Hrs.	New %	Re Hrs.	peat %	Hrs.	New		lepeat	Hrs.	1964 New 7%	Re	epeat		190 New	65/1966 Re	peat			6/1967	
Situation Comedy Alventure/Drama Variety Jame Frature Films Specials News/Sports Total Production Source:	216.0 293.5 169.0 137.5 23.0 <u>53.0</u> 892.0	64.4 76.1 92.6 92.0 <u>84.1</u>	162.5 53.0 11.0 2.0 10.0	23.9 7.4 8.0	313.0	86.3 90.7 88.7 98.2	89.0 209.0 32.0 13.0 <u>3.0</u> <u>1.5</u> 347.5	33.8 40.0 13.7 9.3	242.5 259.5 194.0 119.5 21.5 <u>39.0</u> 876.0	67.8 64.2 85.8 81.6 70.5	144.5 32.0 27.0) 32.2 35.8 14.2 18.4 29.5 <u>18.7</u>	Hrs. 224.0 233.0 213.0 94.0 62.0 26.5 56.5	64.5 62.9 82.2 82.5 59.6 80.3 91.9	Hrs. 123.5 137.5 46.0 20.0 42.0 6.5 <u>5.0</u> 380.5	% 35.5 37.1 17.8 17.5 40.4 19.7 8.1	Hrs. 198.0 217.0 188.0 63.5	59.8 65.4 84.7 80.4 52.0 78.3 97.6	Hrs.	40.2 34.6 15.3 13.1 48.0 21.7 2.5
letwork independent lajor Studio dews/SportsC Total	111.0 674.0 54.0 <u>53.0</u> 892.0	62.0 72.5 70.6 <u>84.1</u> 71.4	68.0 256.0 22.5 10.0 356.5		127.0 672.5 39.5 <u>81.5</u> 920.5	62.0 74.1 54.1 98.2 72.6	78.0 234.5 33.5 <u>1.5</u> 347.5	38.0 25.9 45.9 <u>1.8</u> 27.4	97.0 703.0 37.0 <u>39.0</u> 876.0	61.2 73.8 69.2 81.3 72.2	61.5 249.5 16.5 9.0 336.5	30.8	75.0 625.5 152.0 <u>56.5</u> 909.0	64.4 72.2 61.9 91.9 70.5	41.5 240.5 93.5 <u>5.0</u> 380.5	35.6 27.8 38.1 <u>8.1</u> 29.5	31.5 554.5 220.5 82.0 888.5	60.6 72.5 56.9 97.6 69.0		43.1

							-		laure	12 (00	110 0)				1			1971	/1972	
		1967	/1968			1968	/1969			1969/	/1970			1970/	the second se		N		Rep	eat
Program Category:	Second Statement of Statement	ew	Rep.	eat %	N. Hrs.	ew 7.	Repo Hrs.	eat %	NHrs.	ew %	Hrs.	eat %	Hrs.	ew %	Hrs.	%	Hrs.	%	Hrs.	1
Situation Comedy Adventure/Drama Fariety	Hrs. 158.0 246.5 199.0	% 57.0 53.2 75.1	119.0 216.5	43.0	161.5 222.0 184.0	56.2 53.4 75.4	126.0 194.0 60.0	43.8 46.6 24.6	176.0 164.0 208.0	55.7 53.6 68.9	140.0 142.0 94.0	46.4	162.0 186.5 161.0	51.6 46.0 69.4		48,4 54.0 30.6	110.0 206.5 81.0	51.6 71.7	32.0	48.4 28.3
Tame Teature Filmsb Specials Tews/Sports	110.0 27.0 114.0		104.0 5.0 1.0	15.6	100.0 32.0 99.0	49.0 78.0 98.0	104.0 9.0 2.0	51.0 22.0 2.0	104.0 31.0 101.5		120.0 15.0 1.0	53.6 32.6 1.0	112.0 16.0 84.0	50.9 57.1 92.3	108.0 12.0 7.0		119.5 34.5 <u>57.0</u>		1.0	28.9
Total	854.5	62.6	511.5		798.5	61.7	495.0	38.3	784.5	60,5	512.0	39.5	721.5	55.9	568.5	44.1	608.5	55.7	483.5	44.3
Courses																				
Production Source: Natwork Independent Najor Studio Naws/Sportsd	62.0 538.5 140.0 114.0	64.1 49.6	66.5 302.0 142.0 1.0	50.4	32.0 480.5 187.0 99.0	61.6	25.0 300.0 166.5 2.0	38.4 47.1	190.5	60.3 51,1	28.5 300.0 182.5 1.0	39.7 48.9	38.0 400.5 199.0 <u>84.0</u>	58.1 47.0	48.5 289.0 224.0 7.0	41.9 53.0	283.0 231.0 57.0	49.1 98.3	239.5	41.5 50.9 <u>1.</u> 7
Total	854.5		511.5	37.4	798.5	61.7	495.0	38.3	784.5	60.5	512.0	39.5	721.5	55.9	568.5	44.1	608.5	55.7	483.5	44.3

Table 12 (Cont'd)

Based on network programming supplied on a regular weekly basis during specified hours multiplied by the number of weeks in the broadcast season. These hou are as follows: for the 1962/63 and 1964/65 seasons, Sunday 7:00-11:00 p.m., Tuesday 8:00-11:00 p.m. and the remainder of the week 7:30-11:00 p.m.; for the 1963/64 and 1965/66 through 1970/71 seasons, Sunday 7:00-11:00 p.m. and Monday-Saturday 7:30-11:00 p.m.; and, finally, for 1971/72, Sunday and Tuesday 7:30-10:30 p.m., and the remainder of the week 8:00-11:00 p.m.

For each season new and repeat programming totals 100.0 percent. The data excludes, however, a small portion of total available hours in which, on a nonregular basis, no network service was offered. This residual component never exceeds 3.0 percent for any given season and over the entire period averages 1.2. percent.

For the 1971/72 season, made-for-television films, limited to "feature-length, "feature-type "movies", can be separated from all feature films. During this season, made-for-television films were split evenly between first-runs and re-runs. The break for all other feature films was 43.6 percent and 54.4 percent. respectively.

G For the 1969/70-1971/72 broadcast seasons, the data reflect about six hours each season of made-for-television films produced by a division of CBS, Inc.

d Most of this programming is network produced.

Source: CBS, Business Affairs and Planning (CTN); Office of Economic Analysis (CBG).

Hours of Original and Repeat Programming __ CBS

(Prime Time only)

	Original	Rerun	Total
1962	/63		
Non-Movie *	909.6	364.4	1,274
Movie	0	0	0
TOTAL	909.6	364.4	1,274
* 0 * 1 LU			
1971	_/72		
Non-Movie	489	347	836
Movie made for TV **	31.4	31.4	31.4
Theatrical movie	88.1	105.1	193.2
Total	608.5	483.5	1,092

Source: CBS

- * 25.5 unexplained hours allocated 71.4% to original, 28.6% to rerun. This was the breakdown for explained hours.
- ** 119.5 hours original "movies" and 136.5 hours repeat allocated with the knowledge that the original/repeat mix was

	original	repeat
Made for TV	50 %	50 %
Theatrical	45,6 %	54.4 %

MOTION PICTURE ADMISSION RECEIPTS (millions of dollars)

Year		Amount
1950	Ş	1451
1960		951
1961		921
1962		903
1963		904
1964		913
1965		927
1966		964
1967		989
1968		1045
1969		1097

Source: Survey of Current Business

	TOTAL 2/		FEATURES	U.S	. PRODUC	CED		IMPORTS	an over the real of the set	U.S. PI BY MAJO	RODUCED 4/ RS ONLY 4/	U.S. BY INDI	PRODUCED
	VAR	FDY	MPAA	VAR	FDY	MPAA	VAR	FDY	MPAA	VAR	FDY	VAR	28
YEAR	ong a dia anti-	462	254		131	142		331	112		103	of our day	40
1961			3 7 4		147	87		280	87		102		4.5
1962	ay as as	427	191		121	101		299	90		86		33
1963		420	180		141	107		361	73		36	anan an	33
1964		502			153	117		299	74		98	***	33
1965		452	191		156	105		295	63	~ ~ =	93	*	0.5
1966		451	168		178	103		284	112	a 10 m	8,7		91
1967	215	462	215	100	180	90	123	274	140	90	98	19	82
1968	232	454	230	109	100	141	108		184	87	10 m 15	31	
1969	.226		325	118		212	99		219	73	a -1, e -	64	
1970	276		431	137			111		229	61	an an an	71	
1971	259		5132/	132		284			A	76		107	
1972*	286			183			103			, 0			

TABLE 15

1/Taken from three frequently relied on sources: (1) Daily Variety (VAR) Production Scoreboard from 1968 to present; (2) Film Daily Yearbook (FDY) to its last edition in 1969; and (3) MPAA Code Administration (MPAA). The discrepancy in or unavailability of figures reflect the industry's own inability to determine or assess the magnitude of the foreign vs. domestic production problem.

- 2/Of the two sources, Film Daily Yearbook (FDY) was the most comprehensive in compiling release statistics, especially in the imports category. Unfortunately, FDY is now out of business and present sources within the trade are unable to explain its former methodology or reconcile its figures with those of others, other than to say that, while in business, FDY generally provided reliable industry statistics. For purposes of assessing economic impact, statistics from Daily Variety should be preferred, even over those of MPAA. Variety's methodology consists of polling weekly each major (and major-minor) and the most significant independent producers for information on new production starts, primarily for the purpose of alerting actors and tradesmen of new job opportunities.
- 3/Features approved by the Production Code Administration (MPAA) have frequently been cited as indication of total, foreign and domestic releases for any given year, or production for the preceeding year, allowing 12 months Lag time. This source is inferior to Variety for release on production purposes for these reasons: Prior to 1967, the figures only reflect the number of features which sought and were awarded the PCA's seal of approval. Because the seal was not regarded as significantly important, it was not highly sought after. Therefore, pre-1967 figures would be on the short side. About 1967-1968 the PCA initiated its rating classification and thereafter many older features were resubmitted for an updated rating, resulting in considerable redundancy in the subsequent statistics. Also, the value of the X rating became obvious, providing an immediate incentive for foreign flicks to seek ratings which were theretofore useless.

4/Major companies (and major-minors) include: Allied, ABS, Amer. Int'l., Anglo Ermi, Avco, Cinema, Conerama, Columbia, Walt Disney, MGM, Palomar Pictures, Paramount, 20th Centry Fox, United Artists, Universal, and Warner Bros.

5/290 of the 513 identified foreign films were low budget production of \$50,000 or less.

Earnings of Actors in SAG Jurisdiction

YEAR	Number of	Number earning		Total Income from: (\$ millions)			
	Actors	> \$10,000	< \$2,500	Television	Movies	Commercials	Total
1962	14,365	1615	10,739	28.0		-	73.7
1963 1964	14,650 15,290	1650	11,354	27.4		-	76.9
1965	16,117	1790 2117	11,808	30.9	25.7	38.6	83.9
1966 1967	16,791 18,471	2291	12,899	40.5	23.7	40.6	104.7
1968	21,571	2371 2571	14,050	35.9	26.6	46.3	108.9
19 69 1 970	21,600	2500	16,618	35.9	27.6	57.1	112.8
1971	22,446 24,996	2446 2504	17,097 18,554	34.4 34.0	17.9 20.6	61.4	114.3

Source: SAG.

Note: Earnings figure include only the first \$100,000 in earnings of actors making in excess of that amount. These earnings are from sources subject to SAG jurisdiction only; some actors receive earnings from other sources, such as AFTRA jurisdiction employment.

Total earnings from movies in the 1935-1945 period averaged 35 to 45 million dollars per year.

*

*

ACTORS EARNINGS FOR DOMESTIC TELEVISION		RESIDUALS PAID ACTORS ON DOMESTIC TELEVISION RERUNS
1962	\$28,000,000.00	\$ 6,391,768.43
1963	\$27,400,000.00	\$ 7,704,107.28
1964	\$30,900,000.00	\$ 7,717,736.41
1965	\$33,900,000.00	\$ 7,257,090.24
1966	\$40,500,000.00	\$ 8,247,936.42
1967	\$35,900,000.00	\$11,132,339.35
1968	\$36,000,000.00	\$12,098,717.56
1969	\$35,900,000.00	\$10,451,896.45
1970	\$34,444,000.00	\$11,026,652.82
1971	\$33,984,000.00	\$13,549,730.53

Note: Residuals included in total earnings in first column. Source: SAG.

SCREEN ACTORS GUILD

GUILD MEMBERS BY EARNINGS' CATEGORIES - 1971

Categories	Count	% of Total
Under \$1,000	12,651	50.6
\$ 1,000 - \$ 1,999	3,681	14.7
\$ 2,000 - 3,499	2,614	10.4
\$ 3,500 - 4,999	1,447	5.7
\$ 5,000 - 7,499	1,343	5.3
\$ 7,500 - 9,999	760	3.0
\$ 10,000 - 14,999	902	3.6
\$ 15,000 - 24,999	730	2.9
\$ 25,000 - 34,999	309	1.2
\$ 35,000 - 49,999	199	.7
\$ 50,000 - 74,999	168	.6
\$ 75,000 - 99,000	75	.3
\$100,000 and over	121	. 4
	25,000	100 %

Source: SAG.

REPORT OF HOURS AND ELIGIBLES MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY PENSION PLAN Average Hourly Craft Rate and Estimated Total Earnings Years 1962 - 1971

Year	Number of Eligible Participants		Total Hours Reported	Average Weighted Hourly Rate	Total Estimated Earnings
1962	24,476		34,936,924	3.64	\$127,170,403
1963	24,252		33,837,543	4.00	135,350,172
1964	24,841	•	35,228,597	4.00	140,914,318
1965	29,841	- !	41,668,040	4.20	175,005,768
1966	30,101		43,929,368	4.20	184,503,345
1967	29,031		42,077,280	4.41	185,560,805
1968	28,853		41,875,173	4.41	184,669,513
1969	26,935		41,224,656	4.92	202,825,307
1970	24,338		34,430,904	4.92	169,400,048
1971	22,070		31,612,330	5.17	163,435,745

Source: AMPTP

*

Ta	b 1	e	20

Labor Hours (Millions)		1/2 Hrs. F: (Movies a	ilm Production and TV)	1,000 Labor Hou of Film Pro	Labor/Output Index ***		
Year	(1)	(2)*	(3)**	(1)/(2) = (4)	(1)/(3) = (5)	(6)	(7)
1964	35.2	2,282	2,561	15.4	13.7	100	100
1965	41.7	2,305	2,542	18.1	16.4	119	125
1966	43.9	1,948	2,176	22.5	20.2	147	152
1967	42.1	1,990	2,245	21.2	18.8	137	1.39
1968	41.9	1,726	2,017	24.3	20.8	155	146
1969	41.2	2,265	2,481	18.2	16.6	120	128
1970	34.4	1,708	1,909	20.1	18.0	131	112
1971	31.6	1,739	1,988	18.2	15.9	117	97

Estimates of Craft Labor/Output Ratios in Hollywood

Source: Calculated as indicated from AMPTP data.

** 1 movie = 6 half hours TV film

*** (6) Index based on average of (4) and (5) with 1964 = 100

(7) Index based on similar calculation, but with 1 movie = 12 half hours TV film

^{* 1} movie = 3 half hours TV film

WAGE RATES IN HOLLYWOOD

	Minimum S Daily	Scale Weekly	Wage rate per hour for Journeyman	Writer's Minimum Weekly
YEAR	Actors	Actors	Propmaker	Compensation
1935	\$ 15	\$ 65	\$1.28	-
1937	25	65	1.41	-
1941	25	100	1.71	
1945	35	115	1.80	125
1947	55	175	2.50	-
1952	70	250	2.75	2.50
1956	80	285	3.14	350
1960	100	350	3.37	385
1967	112	392	4.35	420
	120	420	4.89	470
1969 1971	138	483	5.11	494

Source: SAG and Writer's Guild

PROGRAM COST AND EARNINGS

(millions of dollars)

YEAR	TOTAL* Actors' Earnings (SAG only)	TOTAL HOLLYWOOD Craft Earnings (AMPTP)	TOTAL Writer's Earnings (WG)	Network Program Exp: (FCC)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971	74 77 84 98 105 109 113 121 114 114	127 135 141 175 185 186 185 203 169 163	26 27 27 32 32 34 37 42 45 39 37	449 491 516 580 652 734 799 857 930 974 925
YEAR	Program Cost (index)	Craft Wage Rate (index) (AMPTP)	Actors' Minimum Rate (index) (SAG)	Writer's Minimum Rate (index)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971	- 100 103.7 108.7 113.4 124.6 137.8 139.6 147.1 159.2 189.2	- 100 109.9 109.9 115.5 115.5 121.1 121.1 135.2 135.2 142.0	100 100 100 100 100 100 112 112 120 120	100 105 105 105 105 109 109 122 122 122 128 128

*Total is movies + commercials + TV.

(November 1972)

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY IN HOLLYWOOD*

	ACTIVE UNION	PERCENT	EMPLOYED
OCCUPATION	MEMBERSHIP	UNEMPLOYED	NOV. 1972
Electricians (IBEW)	358	17	297
Makeup	339	32	231
Property	1,884	23	1,451
Grips	700 est.	30	210
Projectionist	240	10	216
Studio Teamsters	1,087	39	663
Costume	822	10	739
Motion Picture			
Craft Services	202	10	182
Motion Picture Elec.	721	51	353
Ornamental Plasterers	200	70	60
Script Supervisors	106	31	73
S.A.G.	13,000	85	1,950
S.E.G.	2,645	75	661
Filmeditor	1,739	7	1,617
Writers	3,000	N.A.	
Composers	412	N.A.	
Musicians	16,000	N.A.	
Cameramen	950	20	760
Sound	901	10	811
Directors	1,101	N.A.	
Art Directors	138	29	98
Set Directors	<u>130</u> est.	N.A.	
	46,675	$\overline{X} = 32.65\%$	

*Source: S.A.G. November 1972

INSURED EMPLOYEES - LOS ANGELES - LONG BEACH SMSA SIC 78*

	Employed (Insured)			Unemployed (Insured)		Total Insured Labor Force		Unemployment Rate**	
	April	Oct	April	Oct	April	Oct	April	Oct	
1963	27,484	32,941	5,605	3,030	33,089	35,971	16.9%	8.4%	
1964	29,337	35,358	5,236	2,264	34,573	37,622	15.1%	6.0%	
1965	30,618	36,791	4,183	2,004	34,801	38,795	12.0%	5.2%	
1966	33,224	36,948	4,169	2,768	37,393	39,716	11.1%	7.0%	
1967	34,303	39,101	5,347	3,107	39,650	42,208	13.5%	7.4%	
1968	36,139	42,367	6,324	2,791	42,463	45,158	15.0%	6.2%	
1969	40,127	42,422	4,975	3,828	45,102	46,250	11.0%	8.3%	
1970	33,597	40,800	7,574	4,422	41,171	45,222	18.4%	9.8%	
1971	34,100	38,500	8,180	3,264	42,280	41,764	19.3%	7.8%	
1972	34,400	N.A.	6,630	N.A.	41,030	N.A.	16.2%	N.A.	

*

*Source: California Department of Human Resources

**Those collecting compensation as a percentage of total labor force.

Average Number of People on Set

	for	for 1/2 Hour or 1. Hour Show				
Actors		15	(Inclu	ding	Extras)	
Electricians	(1.B.E.W.)	2				
Property	÷	2	ø			
Grips		5				
Teamsters		5				
Costume		2				
Crafts	•	1				
Script Superv	isors	1				
Electricians	(Local 728)	4				
Editors		3				
Writers		2	4			
Musicians		14		*		
Composers		1				
Camera		4				
Sound		3				
Art Directors		1				
Set Directors		1	•			
Source: SAG.						

Average Hours of TV Usage per TV Household per Day Source: Nielsen Television Index (12-month averages)

1949-'53 DNA				
1954 4.8	1960	5.1	1966	EE
55 4.9		5.1	67	5.5
56 5.0		5.1	68	5.8
57 5.2	63	5.2	69	5.8
58 5.1	64	5.4	70	5.9
59 5.0	65	5.5	71	6.0

NIELSEN TELEVISION INDEX TV Usage and Sponsored Network Audience Estimates Prime Time Trends by Quarters Mon.-Sun. 7:30-11 PM NYT (% AVG. MIN.)

	1967	- '68	1968	-'69	1969	-170	1970	- 171	1971	- 72
Quarter	HuTV	Ntwk	HuTV	Ntwk	HuTV	Ntwk	HuTV	Ntwk	HuTV	Ntwk
OctDec.	60	18.5	60	18.5	60	18.4	61	18.4	61	19.2
JanMarch	63	19.3	62	19.1	64	19.4	64	19.3	63	20.0
April-June	54	15.8	53	15.9	53	15.5	53	15.5	54	16.0
July-Sept.	49	14.2	49	14.2	48	13.8	48	14.4	51	15.1

COMPARATIVE PRIME-TIME WINTER & SUMMER AUDIENCES

	And the second sec	60	19	65	19	66	10	70
	Jan/Feb	July/Aug	Jan/Feb	July/Aug	Jan/Feb	July/Aug	Jan/Feb	July/Aug
HUT	64	42	64	44	63	43	63	46
AVERAGE PROGRAM RATING	20	13	19	13	19	13	21	13

2 1

Source: NTI.

		HUT MONDAY-SUNDAY 8-1	<u>11 PM</u>
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972	MAR CH 61.8 60.1 61.5 63.1 63.3 63.4 62.3 63.2 60.7 61.2 60.8 60.9 63.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.8 61.2 61.3 62.2 61.3 62.2 61.3 62.2 61.3	APRIL 59.8 58.2 58.5 60.3 62.0 61.0 59.7 59.0 59.9 58.8 57.3 59.2 60.1 58.9 59.2 60.1 58.9 59.2 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.2 59.7 59.2 59.5 59.2 59.5 50.5	MAYJUNE54.645.954.746.152.249.153.647.353.147.554.449.751.946.154.850.155.049.852.648.953.548.551.748.853.449.955.349.056.249.353.550.054.749.353.750.5
1953-1 954	Index HUT <u>53-54</u> 61.0 100	HUT <u>53-54</u> 59.0 100	HUT <u>53-54</u> HUT 54.7 100 46.0
1955-1956 1957-1958 1959-1960 1961-1962 1963-1964 1965-1966 1967-1968 1969-1970 1971-1972	62.310263.410462.810361.010060.910062.210261.510161.810161.2100	59.410161.510459.410159.410158.39959.510159.510159.810158.8100	52.99748.253.89848.653.49848.153.89849.452.69648.754.49949.556.010249.453.69849.654.29949.9

Index 153-54

Source: ABC (from NTI).

Houses Using Television as a Percentage of Households with Television

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Network Financial Data 1961-1971

(Millions of dollars)

YEAR	NETWORK BROADCAST			0&0	TOTAL	Network	
TEAR	Revenue	Expense	Income	Income Inc.		Program Expense	
1961	526.5	501.8	24.7	62.3	87.0	449.2	
1962	584.7	548.0	36.7	74.7	111.4	490.8	
1963	635.8	579.4	56.4	79.8	136.2	515.9	
1964	712.5	652.3	60.2	96.3	156.5	579.8	
1965	788.6	729.2	59.4	102.2	161.6	651.8	
1966	903.9	825.2	78.7	108.1	186.8	733.9	
1967	953.3	897.5	55.8	104.3	160.1	798.9	
1968	1016.4	960.0	56.4.	122.4	178.8	857.0	
1969	1144.1	1051.4	92.7	133.4	226.1	929.7	
1970	1144.6	1094.5	50.1	117.3	167.4	973.8*	
1971	1094.1	1040.4	53.7	91.2	144.9	925.0*	

Notes:

Income is before federal income taxes. Program expense includes technical costs which were shown separately prior to 1969, and which amounted to \$40.7 million in 1968.

* Not comparable with prior years. See footnote 3 to Table 10 of 1971 report.

Source: FCC.

1000	1	7	~	-
111	ab	10	3	
- alla	an		-	ale.

Year	TV Homes (millions)	Cost per M (NBC) (dollars)	Hours of TV use per day	Television Revenues (millions)
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970	44.5 45.2 46.9 49.0 51.3 52.6 53.8 54.9 56.0 57.0 58.5 60.1	\$ 1.94 1.93 2.10 1.98	5.0 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9	\$ 1335 1456 1514 1705 1836 2068 2266 2558 2634 2916 3236 3243
1971	62.1	2.09	6.0	3097

Revenue and Expense Items of 3 National Television Networks, 1971 (In Thousands of Dollars)

SCHEDULE 1. BROADCAST REVENUES OF NETWORKS CLASS OF BROADCAST REVENUES Line AMOUNT No. 1 I. NETWORK REVENUES: (a) Revenues from sale of time when program is supplied 2 by advertiser (b) All other advertising revenues 3 47,477 (c) Revenues from stations for cooperative programs 4 440,017 (d) All other broadcast revenues 5 4,191 53,523 6 TOTAL GROSS BROADCAST REVENUES ... \$ 1,545,208 II. DEDUCT: (a) Payments to stations 7 227.003 (b) Commissions to advertising agencies, representatives, 8 brokers, and others, and cash discounts 224,075 9 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 451,078 III. NET BROADCAST REVENUES (Line 6 minus line 9) 10 \$ 1,094,130

1/ Because methods of treating technical and program expense differ among the networks, the two figures have been combined.

2/ In 1969 and 1970, part of the depreciation amount reported on line 14 was allocated to each of the four general expense categories. In 1971, all depreciation is allocated to general and administrative expense. For consistency, the data for 1969 and 1970 have been revised by allocating all depreciation to general and administrative expense. (The revision does not affect total expenses.) For 1969, the revised network figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$929,663; selling expense, \$31,255; general and administrative expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$90,423. For 1970, the revised figures (in thousands of dollars) are: technical and program expense, \$973,814; selling expense, \$32,451; general and administrative expense, \$90,257.

3/ This figure contains some of the costs already shown in lines 8 through 22 above. Costs of sports programs are not included.

Table32 (cont.)

(In Thousands of Dollars)

Line No.	(SCHEDULE 2. NETWORK BROADCAST EXPENSES) CLASS OF BROADCAST EXPENSE	AMOUNT	
ĺ	GENERAL CATEGORIES OF EXPENSES:		
2	Technical expenses	Ŝ	1/
3	Program expenses	2	
4	Selling expenses	-	925,031
5	General and administrative expenses		27,645
6	Total broadcast expenses(lines 2-5)	\$ _	87,784
7	SELECTED EXPENSE ITEMS (Subcategories of line 2-5 above):		
8	Salaries, wages and bonuses of officers and employees engaged in following categories:		
9	(a) Technical		1/
0	(b) Program		101 (0)
1	(c) Selling	-	131,680
.2	(d) General and administrative		11,990
			45,86
.3	(e) Total (all officers and employees)		189,537
4	Depreciation of tangible property		21,815
5	Amortization expense on programs obtained from others (TOTAL)		567,002
6	(a) Feature film shown or expected to be shown in U.S. theaters		113,761
7 .	(b) All other feature film		9,841
8	(c) All other programs		443,400
9 1	Records and transcriptions		2,445
	Music license fees		7,389
1 (Other performance or program rights		(a . a a !
2 (Cost of intercity and intracity program relay circuits		60,845
	fotal expense for news and public affairs		113,204

SCHEDULE 3. BROADCAST INCOME

Line No.		AM	DUNT
2	Broadcast revenues (from Schedule 1, line 12) Broadcast expenses (from Schedule 2, line 6) Broadcast operating income(or loss) (line 1 minus line 2)	1	1,094,130 1,040,460 53,670

Source: FCC.

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NETWORK PAYMENTS FOR FOOTBALL RIGHTS

YEAR	Payments (\$ mil.)
1961	12
1962	14
1963	15
1964	27
1965	35
1966	41
1967	46
1968	51
1969	49
1970	63
1971	63
1972	65

Source: Broadcasting

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CBS TELEVISION NETWORK EVENING ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAM COST INCREASES FOR ORIGINAL EPISODES, 1962-63; 1972-73 BROADCAST SEASONS

(\$ thousands)

	Average Cos	st Per Hour	Average	
		<u>1972-73 Season</u> (Color) <u>a</u>	Annual % Increase	
Regular Entertainment Series ^b	\$115.4	\$222.4 *	6.8%	
Entertainment Specials ^C	101.5	299.0	<u>11.4</u> %	
Entertainment Series and Specials Combined	\$ <u>115.1</u>	\$228.2	<u>7.1</u> %	

In the 1962-63 season, programming was in black and white, whereas in 1972-73 programming was in color.

Includes Feature Films in the 1972/75 season and New and Returning Series in both seasons. Excludes Sports, News and Advertiser Supplied Programs.

E Excludes Advertiser Supplied Programs.

* \$215.9 without movies.

Source: CBS.

COST PER THOUSAND DELIVERED

NBC TELEVISION NETWORK

FOURTH QUARTER 1967-72

	1967		\$ 1.94
	1968		1.93
	1969		2.10
	1970		1.98
	1971		2.09
1	1972	(projection)	2.10

The costs per thousand reflect the average cost of a 30-second announcement in our regular prime time schedule divided by the average number of homes the schedule delivered (in thousands).

The CPM is the standard measurement of cost efficiency utilized in network television.

Source: NBC.

Earnings and Employment of AFTRA Members

Year	Total Earnings from Television* (millions)	Paid Membership	Weekly Contract Wages of NBC Staff Announcers
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971	\$ 36.0 37.9 41.4 41.9 47.9 48.4 50.3 57.2 62.4 72.0 69.3	15,506 16,351 16,780 17,073 17,565 18,184 18,897 21,076 21,756 22,752	\$ 190 190 190 195 205 210 220 240 250 265

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Source: AFTRA

* Includes local stations.

