

Agenda

~~In team paper { delete Hartman memo.~~

~~1st wk paper / summary~~

~~Draft written stmt (JM)~~

~~" 5 min address (JM)~~

Smearing in

After RN resign

Bugs, Key Logs / San, Senate office

List for PB to call

Call Ralph, Jonathan Moore.

OMB/DC transition papers

CTW → Jerry Jones.

Should Read

May 7, dinner/PB
 June 11 3-
 June 17 3-
 July 17 3-
 set July 31 5-

transcripts released Apr 30.
 Press analysis for weeks; ^{WH} ^{initially}
 H pledges to stay (Agnew)
 weight of evidence v. conclusion or
 + willingness/engagement to believe
 reluctance/refusal.
 discussion of subpoena compliance

I. Background

- A. Couldn't say who he would turn to (Laird)
- B. Circumstances unknown (25th; resign; imp; death)
- C. Lack of precedent
- D. Need for secrecy
- E. Lack of Ford — "without my knowledge or w/o my consent"

II. Getting organized

- A. Tentativeness a difficulty; emotional commitment
- B. Talents needed } balance technocratic v.
- C. Objectives } political v. policy

III. Plans

- A. Operational v conceptual
- B. Organizational v. issues
- C. Options & considerations v. game plan; flexibility
- D. Time urgency v. substantive importance
- E. Symbols v reality

IV Agendas

- A. First Principles, themes, objectives
- B. Transition Team
- C. The "First Week"
 1. Resumption of office
 2. Message to American people
 3. Cabinet & White House staff resignations
 4. Congressional leadership meetings
 5. Cabinet, NSC, & economic policy meetings
 6. Meetings with national & foreign leaders
 7. Vice Presidential search process
 8. Personnel decision process
- D. Address to the American people (world)
- E. Reassessment of the Executive Branch
- F. Press & Congress: philosophy & tactics
- G. Policy & machinery background papers
 1. Foreign policy & national security
 2. The economy
 3. Budget
 4. Domestic Council
 5. White House mechanics
- H. Organization of the Presidency
 1. Background
 2. White House staff & reorganization
 3. ~~White House mechanics~~ Role of the Cabinet
- I. Key personnel actions
 1. Recruitment
 2. Transition of agency heads
 3. Handling of old White House staff

- has to be a govt
- confidential
- not a p.a.
- open, but not
- hand of good will
- necessary to have
- explicit role.

V. The 72 hours

A. Getting used to it being for real

B. Operations - home, back office, front office, EOB

C. Knowing we were to be the nucleus

1. Focus on operational & strategic

2. Transition team & first week.

D. Exposing the plans & getting ready

E. Burger in Amsterdam

Press secretary

Options for Transition Team members

F. Draft Ford statement for 10 PM

Decision & option memo for Fri AM

People in & out; reflecting, deciding, sharpening

Fri 9

G. The ride
The oath
The afternoon

Sat 10

etc.

~~H. Office & meetings~~

~~Transition papers~~

~~Memo for the TB~~

VI. The Transition Team

A. Charter

1. Make rec to TT & get outside advice
2. Report rec on 5 areas
 - ~~Domestic~~ Domestic policy
 - ~~DC~~ Econ. policy
 - Press office
 - ~~Supporting~~ personnel
 - ~~Legal~~ legal counsel

B. Offices & meetings; TT sched

C. Memos for the TT / transition papers

D. ~~Transition papers~~ points of contact; modus vivendi

E. Report

1. WH orgn baroque but w/in any reasonable limits, people
2. Thin WH staff & slim ch of staff for 5 tracks
(pers, admin, congr, press, legal) (speeches & ^{Domestic})
3. DC changed to Sec Lab incl new policy initiatives
 - OMB not to be policy competitor, but analytic, program
 - Cab & agency heads as spokesmen
4. Econ.
 - Sec Treas spokesman
 - CEP (Sec Treas) + CIEP (Sec Stat)
 - CEA as consultant to TT & member CEP, CIEP
 - STR/CIEP/Int Sec Stat (Econ) all in one.
5. Press
 - abolish office of comm & scale back PR
 - press sec to meet req w/TT
6. Counsel
 - rely on DoJ for routine legal
 - OMB legal shop upgraded for legal
 - WH counsel small but strong for unique WH func

10. Change is possible but hellishly difficult, awfully dangerous, maybe impossible, given our human limits.

"It" hasn't worked

- if "it" is the orig plan, the TT report
- ... yet : we don't really know what Ford has in mind.
 - & he may know only viscerally - not explicitly
- 3 days or 3 months

Why? - observations

1. Initial power vacuum : reins of power & extent WH involvement
2. Responsibility & power grabs often & easily confused (real power or personal perks) (Hairy)
3. Immediate drives out the important
Congress had to be dealt with : vetoes, signals, etc.
4. Inherited staff keeps doing what it's always done
Ford is learning functions of TT via choices/stacks they define.
5. Ford hadn't planned to be TT
 - hadn't set consistent course on issues
 - hadn't gotten to know national leaders
 - bit & weave w. exec response, consistency & leadership.
6. Lack of a Repub intellectual & philosopher base to draw on
- quality people & ideas; mediocrity is contagious.
7. National uncertainty about problems & political direction
 - discrediting of big govt pouring money after problems
 - unworkability of overblown WH built since Kennedy
 - press corps & politician 5 minutes after upon
& lack of forum for rigorous analysis of issues

~~8. Time - 3 days or 3 months~~

9. Things don't look the same there: real?
- REASONS, REASONS

{ press in left field
dep on knowing who's
being "informed" who
isn't enough

Transition Organization

- Objectives:
- (1) Serve as interim staff for the President until permanent arrangements are made
 - (2) Establish liaison with essential individuals and institutions ASAP
 - (3) Give the President time to make decisions on staffing, personnel, and policy in an orderly way.

People needed

1. Team chief/coordinator: Must be known and trusted by President; capable of access, judgment, and administration; needn't be "out front" or particularly visible, except within team.

Subordinates:

- (a) General deputy: detail man for team chief, short-term coordinator, scheduling of team.
- (b) Housekeeping/administration: payroll, living arrangements, offices, transport, Secret Service, EPS, etc.
- (c) Staff secretary: official actions (bill signing, executive orders, apportionments, etc.), President's signature, President's agenda, etc.
- (d) Liaison: With Nixon, old White House staff, old Vice President's staff.

Contact: Haig, Jones, Lawson

2. Policy and agency liaison: Preferably known and trusted by President, but at least by Team Coordinator; knowledgeable about executive branch procedures, agency's missions and roles, priority of policy issues, etc.; good feel for what is and isn't "Presidential" in significance and tone; adept at policy formulation, articulation, and followup management; liaison with NSC, Domestic Council, and CEA.

Subordinates:

- (a) Second-tier liaison: contacts with Under Secretaries or executive assistants, and Assistant Secretaries as needed; works with OMB and Team Staff Secretary to monitor paper flow for consistency.

- (b) Writer(s)
- (c) Legal counsel for President
- (d) Substantive staff officer

Contact: Cole, Scowcroft, Ash, Stein

3. Press officer: Preferably known and trusted by President; familiar with White House press corps, network news departments; good feel for how press makes assessments, responds to various explicit or implicit messages, and when to go out front or just pass information; active representation of media and press-play issues in transition planning.

Subordinates:

- (a) Writer: for press releases
- (b) Detail man: for TV appearances, press conferences, etc.

Contacts: Warren and Clawson

4. Political liaison: Known and trusted by President; handles Congress, governors, GOP, and key individual contacts; answers questions, passes problems on to other team members, follows up on items owed to outsiders; represents political considerations of transition agenda and planning; knows President's past contacts and relationships.

Subordinates: one or two with appropriate general background knowledge of Hill, governors, GOP, etc.

Contacts: Scott, Rhodes, Mansfield, Albert, Bush, Timmons

5. Personnel chief: Eminent man of national stature; knows outstanding people and how to judge their qualifications; knows something of governmental operation at Secretarial level; works largely independently of Transition Team except to get President consideration of his directions and action on his recommendations.

Subordinates: several from CSC and his own contacts.

Contacts: Hampton, Wimer, FBI

I N D E X

- ✓ 1. Introduction -- first principles, themes, and objectives.
2. The transition team.
3. The first week
 - Assumption of office, route and mechanics
 - Transition team
 - Message to the American people
 - Cabinet and White House staff resignations
 - Congressional leadership meetings
 - Cabinet, NSC, and economic policy meetings
 - Removal of old White House staff
 - Meetings with national and foreign leaders
 - Vice Presidential search process
 - Personnel decision process.
4. Immediate business.
5. Assessment of the Executive Branch.
6. Press and Congress: philosophy and tactics.
7. Background papers: policy and machinery
 - ↳ -- Foreign policy and national security
 - ↳ -- The economy
 - ↳ -- Budget
 - ↳ -- Domestic Council
 - White House mechanics
8. Organization of the Presidency
 - Background
 - White House staff role and organization
 - Role of the Cabinet
9. Key personnel actions
 - Recruitment process
 - Transition of agency heads
 - Handling of old White House staff

Introduction

I. First Principles

During his activities of the very first week there are several first principles which the new President will have in mind, put into practice, and project to others both inside and outside of the government. They should, in other words, guide him both with regard to the actions he takes and the signals he conveys, as they will limit or expand the scope of his future options. Such first principles can be set forth as follows:

1. Confidence and trust of the American people in their political leadership, institutions, and processes. This is the major principle and the others relate to it.

2. Assumption of control which is firm and efficient.

- Take charge of the executive machinery of the government.
- Set up an orderly and efficient transition system.
- Begin to make personnel changes which bring his own, able men in to replace those who are deeply involved in the previous regime.
- Start the process of education which any President must undergo to (a) bring him up to speed on the most urgent defense and foreign policy issues and (b) identify the key upcoming policy problems and get on top of them, particularly the economy.
- Avoid premature decisions and commitment on major issues.

3. National feeling of unification and reconciliation enabled by the character and style of the new President.

- Projection of basic decency and honesty; steadiness; respect rather than paranoia, defusing "enemies" mentality.

- Openness, candor in dealing with American public and basic institutions of government such as Congress, Courts, Cabinet Departments, States, Party; confidence in America's diversity and pluralism.
- Accessibility rather than isolation; consultation and delegation rather than secrecy and one-man control.

4. Continuity and stability particularly in the defense and foreign areas of U.S. policy. The new President must make the policy in all areas his own, and this will take analysis and reassessment of U.S. interests, objectives and strategy, but at the beginning there is a need for public reassurance that we are not on a course of trauma and disruption.

II. Personnel Policy

1. There is an imperative case that the new President establish his leadership in the area of important appointments early in his Administration by replacing many present incumbents with his own choices of strong, competent men. This must be done fairly, delicately and skillfully and without forgetting continuity, but he should act to separate himself from the existing policy machinery and cadre. This is because of the following factors:

-- By and large, the men filling the most important jobs immediately around the President (this applies, but to a lesser degree, in the Cabinet) have lost their capacity to hold the confidence and trust of the body politic. There are a few special exceptions, and in other cases discrediting may be undeserved and valuable service performed but the ability to win back essential support nevertheless lost. The American public does not want retribution but it does want new people.

-- There is too much of an image in the current Administration of men who played on an exclusive team, who lacked fundamental experience, who could be characterized by mediocrity rather than talent, and who put partisan and personal interest above public interest, the Constitution and the Republic. This must be turned around.

-- Men presently serving are liable to be both exhausted physically and emotionally and quite naturally preoccupied, in some instances to the point of obsession, with justifying past behavior and record and protecting personal interests and futures. It is a fact of life that they do not owe their allegiance to the new President or his purposes.

-- The intensively complex and crucial challenges to government leadership simply cannot be effectively addressed without a lot of competent and talented men of strength and stature who are first of all loyal and responsive to the new President and his Administration.

2. The kind of person the new President selects depends on the specific position and requires a great deal of work, but general criteria could include the following --

For interim transition appointments:

- Trusted by and loyal to the new President (personal acquaintanceship not needed in all instances).
- High intelligence and some substantive knowledge.
- Understanding/experience about structure and process in White House, Executive Branch and/or Washington.
- Politically savvy.
- Managerial skill (but not in all cases).
- Qualities of resourcefulness, sensitivity, and stature/"command" in working with, organizing/directing and judging people.
- "No future claim" on long-term jobs (doesn't require total exclusion from subsequent consideration).

And for high-level, long-term institutional posts; selected criteria from preceding list, plus:

- Independent public or political stature, assuring more accountability and less sycophancy.
- Highest competence in leadership and managerial qualities.
- Substantive expertise in area of responsibility so perceived and with respect in relevant community.
- Capable of grasping solutions to future problems with vision and imagination.

III. President's Major Themes

There are several major themes or points of emphasis which could be usefully employed by the new President personally and explicitly in public statements during the first few days of his Administration. Many of these are inherent in the preceding discussions, but can be usefully and quickly enumerated here.

1. In the event that the new President wants to say something appropriate but brief at his swearing-in he could include the following tonal points: simple and sober message; neither strident nor defensive; showing strength and humility; stressing unification and healing; demonstrating that he is representative of all the people.

2. For his first nationally televised message to the people, basic themes could include the following:

-- Respect for and reliance on the great institutions of the Constitutional system as mutually reinforcing participants.

-- Openness, access, candor, fairness, broad-based representative Administration (but not going overboard as RMN has done and appearing phoney).

-- Creating a system which will lead and manage the Government efficiently, effectively and responsively: transition arrangements, early identification and addressing of critical issues, quality appointments.

-- Most important issues facing the nation are credible government, national security, inflation.

-- Continuity in defense and foreign policies.

-- Adequate priority will be given to domestic problems.

-- Intention as first order of business to nominate a new Vice President.

Foreign and National Security Policy

Key agencies and functions:

Military and Foreign Policy

State and Defense have the major roles in making and executing policy.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to collect and analyze intelligence information. By law, the Director of CIA reports to the National Security Council.

The National Security Council (NSC), composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, was established by the National Security Act of 1947, amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security.

The position of executive director of the NSC and a staff are established by statute in the Executive Office of the President. However, in the Nixon Administration the NSC staff has been directed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his deputy or deputies on the White House staff.

By calling meetings of the National Security Council, the President can

- dramatize his concern and involvement in major foreign policy issues and crises
- explain his views and policies to his principal national security advisers
- afford his advisers an opportunity to explain their views to him.

In addition, President Nixon and his national security adviser created within the NSC framework an elaborate system of committees and procedures to direct and coordinate the making and execution of national security and foreign policy. It worked as follows:

- the President would direct an Agency or Task Force to study a major issue via a National Security Study Memorandum;

-- the study report would be reviewed by the NSC Review Group, chaired by his national security adviser and composed of number two men in the affected agencies;

-- an NSC meeting would be held to review the report and its recommendations;

-- if Presidential decisions were called for, the President, after the NSC meeting and following discussions with his national security adviser and others, would issue a National Security Decision Memorandum.

For some purposes, permanent committees composed of Under/Deputy Secretaries, often supported by assistant/deputy assistant secretaries level working groups, would be created to direct a continuing program of studies and investigations, from time to time reporting to the President. Such committees have included:

- a Verification Panel to deal with strategic arms control issues,
- a Vietnam Special Studies Group,
- a Defense Program Review Committee,
- a Washington Special Actions Group for crisis management,
- committees dealing with intelligence programs and operations.

Because of his active supervising and coordinating role, the national security adviser has been supported by a sizeable staff (100-150 members).

The President is advised from time to time by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, established by Executive Order 11460 of March 20, 1969. This board of nongovernmental Presidential appointees advise the President on the national intelligence effort, reviews intelligence activities of the Federal Government, and recommends actions to increase intelligence effectiveness.

International Economic Policy.

On January 19, 1971, the President created the Council on International Economic Policy (CIED), composed of 15-20 Cabinet officers and other senior officials. The Council was statutorily authorized by the International Economic Policy Act of 1972. It was created as a coordination mechanism

for the more than 60 agencies or other units of the Federal Government involved in some aspect of foreign economic affairs. An Assistant to the President is executive director of the Council and supervises its activities and a small staff.

As a practical member, the Council itself rarely meets; it is much too large to be useful. It mainly is used as a vehicle for the Council staff to direct studies, oversee agency activities and coordinate policy development.

The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations was established as an agency in the Executive Office of the President by Executive Order 11075 of January 15, 1963, as amended. The Office carries out its functions under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Executive Order 11075, as amended.

International economic policy making and execution is, however, largely fragmented, supervised on a largely ad hoc basis by senior White House staff. New machinery, or the adaptation of NSC machinery and staff, is needed because the issues are rapidly growing in importance, complexity, and political significance.

Objectives for Transition:

Maintain NSC and CIEP machinery and staff intact until a review of their roles in the new Administration is completed.

People Needed:

Decisions must be made on retention of Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Director of CIA. If they are retained, they can continue to play their roles with respect to the NSC system.

A separate issue that must be faced during the transition is whether the new President should have a White House foreign policy adviser independent of Kissinger. Since such an adviser, unless he is an "eminence gris," will have to seek staff assistance and maintain communications with NSC staff and the agencies, a sticky situation with Kissinger will arise. Answer might be for new President and Kissinger to agree to rely materially on Kissinger's deputy for general staff assistance, select him with this in mind.

A member of the transition team should be designated to maintain liaison with officials and agencies in the national economic matters until a review of personnel, institutions and procedures is completed.

Contacts:

Brent Scowcroft (NSC), Larry Eagleburger (Kissinger), Marty Hoffman (Schlesinger), ? for CIA, and Council for International Economic Policy.

Needed Actions:

1. Direct continued operation of NSC system.
2. Direct Transition Team to use NSC, CIEP staff as a resource to review policies and programs.
3. Direct a review of international economic policy development and execution by a White House special assistant brought in for this purpose, then decide on permanent arrangements.

Pitfalls to Watch For:

1. Permitting Kissinger to become even more the President for Foreign Affairs through excessive deference; unwittingly undermining the present NSC system by failing to use it.
2. Allowing international economic policies to drift through inattention to needed reforms, failure to develop mechanisms for White House.
3. Exacerbating budget problems by endorsing defense budgets without adequate review.

Additional Discussion:

The energy crisis is only the most dramatic evidence that our economic relationships with other countries are increasingly important in U.S. foreign policy. Economic issues may be becoming much more important than security issues. Such issues are not now being faced in anything like a systematic way, even though the consequences of mishandling them are serious.

Rather than rely on routine bureaucratic devices, the President may want to dramatize his concern for international economic issues by appointing a Cabinet rank Presidential assistant of considerable personal skill, intellect and reputation to fill the vacuum.

Economic Policy

Key agencies and functions:

OMB, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Treasury are the key "Troika" in formulating and executing economic policy: OMB for its expertise on Federal expenditures and programs, CEA for its expertise on the state of the economy and its key sections, Treasury for its expertise in the Federal revenue system and taxation.

The Council of Economic Advisers was established in the Executive Office of the President by the Employment Act of 1946. The Council consists of three members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President designates the Chairman.

CEA's functions are to analyze the national economy, appraise the economic policies and programs of the Federal Government, and recommend to the President policies for economic growth and stability.

The Federal Reserve System is responsible for the supply and management of money and credit in the economy. It is supervised by the Board of Governors, composed of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Members are appointed for 14 years; one term expires every two years in an effort to insulate the Board from political pressures.

In an effort to improve the coordination and execution of economic policy, the President created the Council on Economic Policy on February 2, 1973, with George Shultz as Chairman and a dozen agencies and offices as members. Counsellor Kenneth Rush recently assumed the responsibility for coordination.

Because of the complexity and political importance of economic issues, White House staff, subcabinet officers or Cabinet officers with special competence will, depending upon the circumstances, assume leadership roles. In general, personalities, the relative strengths of staffs, and the President's political instincts are significant in determining who emerges as economic policy spokesmen. Coordination is a continuing problem.

Objectives for Transition:

1. Insure early in the transition that the President, key members of his Transition Team are thoroughly and objectively briefed on status of the economy and the Federal budget.

2. Indicate the high priority achieving a sound economy will have and announce the intent to create machinery to insure timely and effective Presidential action on economic issues.

3. Begin a review of economic policy making machinery.

People Needed:

A senior Presidential assistant with competence in economic affairs should be named acting chairman of a temporarily resurrected Council on Economic Policy.

Contacts:

Actions Needed:

1. The acting chairman of the Council of Economic Policy should be directed to review the government's economic policy making machinery and make recommendations for improving its effectiveness within thirty days.

2. A select group of previous CEA chairmen and members should be requested to make independent recommendations to the President concerning improvement in economic policy making procedures in the light of past experience.

3. A new budget director should be appointed with respectable economic credentials.

Timing:

Because of the bread-and-butter importance of economic policy and the low level of confidence in Administration, the initial steps discussed above should be taken within first week.

Pitfalls to Watch For:

1. Making premature commitments on economic budgetary issues.
2. Allowing strong-minded officials to advocate their views in public before President has made up his mind.

Additional Discussion:

We tend to hold the President responsible for the state of the economy. His primary policy goals must be full employment, price stability, and equilibrium in our balance of payments, even though these goals conflict. Should there be unemployment, inflation or serious balance of payments problems, we expect the President to propose and/or take the necessary corrective steps. In ordinary times, nothing is quite so dangerous to a President's political survival than to be blamed for economic instability, uncertainty, and hardship.

But the President has a dual handicap: (1) he cannot always get clear and consistent advice on what to do, and (2) even when he knows what to do, he often (perhaps usually) does not have the power to do it: he cannot raise or lower taxes, he has only limited ability to increase or lower Federal spending, and he cannot direct the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy. He needs legislative authorization for policy innovations such as price controls. He faces political and ideological opposition no matter which way he turns.

Moreover, professional economic advice givers are currently in disarray. Inflation is the number one problem at the moment, both here and abroad, and most economists admit that we do not know much about inflation, its causes and cures. There are a growing number of voices predicting a worldwide depression, and there is evidence of mounting worry among consumers and investors. Maybe we can muddle through, but what if we can't?

In such unpleasant circumstances, the new President's objectives must be to

- devise a policy to deal with inflation that does not drive unemployment to politically dangerous and inhumane levels;
- set up machinery to insure that he receives timely information and advice on the state of the economy and objective assessments of the issues.

The Budget Process:

The President's budget proposals for each forthcoming fiscal year must be sent to the Congress within []. The Office of Management and Budget has the responsibility for coordinating agency budget proposals and putting together the final budget documents. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, together with the Director of OMB, have principal responsibility for budget matters, although the President may give his personal staff major responsibilities in this process. The budget is a major determinant of fiscal impact on the economy and of the programmatic priorities of the Federal government.

Objectives for transition:

1. Before December 1974, try to adjust major budget elements to achieve desired outlay/deficit position and to delete or restore any items of particular political impact on the new President.
2. December-January, prepare to forward budget pretty much intact with appropriate disclaimer of priorities and fiscal aspects.
3. February 1975 and after, launch intensive review of amendments to Nixon budget and establish directions for FY 77 budget to be completed in December 1975.

People needed:

New Director and Deputy Director of OMB.

Contacts:

Roy Ash, Fred Malek, Paul O'Neill, Wilf Rommel.

Mechanisms:

1. The new Director-designate of OMB should be picked early and brought in as a Special Consultant to the President until confirmed.

2. The OMB Director-designate (failing his selection, the President's senior domestic adviser) should be given principal responsibility for getting budget issues clarified.
3. The President's senior White House staff members for domestic and national security affairs should be directed to coordinate policy matters with the Director-designate.
4. The Director-designate or the Chairman of the CEA should be given responsibility for coordinating the Troika mechanism. (See paper on economic policy machinery)

Timing:

Filling the top two positions in OMB is urgent. Depending on the time of transition, it is urgent that the new President assert himself over whatever stage of the budget process he finds himself in.

Pitfalls:

1. Viewing the budget as an accounting matter.
2. Underestimating the time required to analyze and implement budget changes.

Domestic Council

Established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, with duties prescribed by Executive Order 11541.

Members:

Statutory:

President
Vice President
Attorney General
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, HUD,
Interior, Labor, Treasury
Director, OMB
Chairman, CEA

Others designated by President:

Heads of VA, EPA, CEQ
Deputy Director, OMB
Anne Armstrong
Ken Cole (Executive Director of the Council)

Duties: "Formulate and coordinate domestic policy recommendations to the President."

Budget and Staffing:

FY 75 \$1,331,000
 30 full-time staff members

Objectives for transition: Keep Council machinery and staff intact, but decoupled, until a review is made of the role of OMB and the Cabinet.

People needed:

The senior White House staff person for domestic policy should be designated Acting Executive Director of the Council.

Contact: Ken Cole, Dana Mead

Mechanisms:

1. Appoint a senior White House staff member as Acting Executive Director.
2. Use staff as resource in review of policies and programs.
3. Review need for Council in light of OMB, White House staff, and Cabinet authorities.
4. Make specific decisions about Council disposition.

Timing:

Name Acting Executive Director as soon as possible; timing of the rest can be keyed to development of Cabinet's role, etc.

Pitfalls to watch for:

1. Automatic reliance on staff judgments because they know the ropes, rather than on new agency heads.
2. Keeping Council and staff intact without specific review of need and function.

Functions:

As a practical matter, the Council itself rarely meets, serving principally as a vehicle for the Domestic Council staff which operates under White House direction. The Council was established to provide a mechanism for enlarging the staff resources of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and to establish better procedures for coordinating the many domestic policy proposals that come to the President from the heads of the departments and agencies.

The Council staff works closely with OMB to assure that budget and policy decisions are consonant and that the legislative clearance process reflects White House policy on domestic issues. The Council staff also works with the staffs of the Council members to provide communications between the White House and the member agencies.

Policy issues are staffed by memoranda circulated by the staff among the concerned agencies to assure that the President receives a relevant range of options and the views of each concerned Council member. The Council staffing process also seeks to eliminate inconsistencies between policy proposals and existing programs and to assure that sufficient information and analysis have gone into the development of the policy options.

The Council also serves as a mechanism for establishing administration committees on policy areas to develop initiatives or to recommend solutions to problems.

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

These changes
not yet made!

Domestic Council

Established by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, with duties prescribed by Executive Order 11541.

Members:

Statutory:

President
Vice President
Attorney General
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, HUD,
Interior, Labor, Treasury
Director, OMB
Chairman, CEA

Others designated by President:

Heads of VA, EPA, CEQ
Deputy Director, OMB
Anne Armstrong
Ken Cole (Executive Director of the Council)

Duties: "Formulate and coordinate domestic policy recommendations to the President."

Budget and Staffing:

FY 75 \$1,331,000
 30 full-time staff members

Objectives for transition: Keep Council machinery and staff intact, but decoupled, until a review is made of the role of OMB and the Cabinet. *the Council*

People needed:

The senior White House staff person for domestic policy should be designated Acting Executive Director of the Council.

Contact: Ken Cole, ~~Dana Mead~~ 

Mechanisms:

1. Appoint a senior, ^{member of the new} White House staff ~~member~~ as Acting Executive Director.
2. Use staff as resource in review of policies and programs.
3. Review need for Council in light of OMB, White House staff, and Cabinet authorities.
4. Make specific decisions about Council disposition.

Timing:

Name Acting Executive Director as soon as possible; timing of the rest can be keyed to development of Cabinet's role, etc.

Pitfalls to watch for:

1. ~~Automatic~~ reliance on ^{DC} staff judgments because they know the ropes, ~~rather than on new agency heads.~~
2. Keeping Council and staff intact without specific review of need and function.

Functions:

As a practical matter, the Council itself rarely meets, serving principally as a vehicle for the Domestic Council staff which operates under White House direction. The Council was established to provide a mechanism for enlarging the staff resources of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and to establish better procedures for coordinating the many domestic policy proposals that come to the President from the heads of the departments and agencies.

The Council staff works closely with OMB to assure that budget and policy decisions are consonant and that the legislative clearance process reflects White House policy on domestic issues. The Council staff also works with the staffs of the Council members to provide communications between the White House and the member agencies.

~~should (but really doesn't) work~~

is in effect w/ staff

*summary
of too strong*

Policy issues are staffed by memoranda circulated by the staff among the concerned agencies to assure that the President receives a relevant range of options and the views of each concerned Council member. The Council staffing process also seeks to eliminate inconsistencies between policy proposals and existing programs and to assure that sufficient information and analysis have gone into the development of the policy options.

The Council also serves as a mechanism for establishing administration committees on policy areas to develop initiatives or to recommend solutions to problems.

*issues/alternatives re role & jurisdiction
large staff v. deleg response to Cabinet.*

to do new II

2. The OMB Director-designate (failing his selection, ~~the President's senior domestic adviser~~) should be given principal responsibility for getting budget issues clarified.
3. The President's senior White House staff members for domestic and national security affairs should be directed to coordinate policy matters with the Director-designate.
4. The Director-designate or the Chairman of the CEA should be given responsibility for coordinating the Troika mechanism. (See paper on economic policy machinery)

Timing:

Filling the top two positions in OMB is urgent. Depending on the time of transition, it is urgent that the new President assert himself over whatever stage of the budget process he finds himself in.

Pitfalls:

- ~~1. Viewing the budget as an accounting matter.~~
2. Underestimating the time required to analyze and implement budget ~~changes~~ *decisions*
1. *Making too many ad hoc commitments on budget items, thereby ~~precluding~~ limiting overall discretion.*

4. *Soon after taking office, the Director-designate should make statement about how budget will be handled (to fend off a flood of ad hoc requests for changes).*

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

Notes for & marginal notes taken
at mtg at Bill Whyte's 8/7

The First "Week"

1. Assumption of office

Swearing-in
Initial statements
The former President

2. Transition organization

Short-term transition team, people and functions
Role of Vice Presidential staff

3. Cabinet and White House staff resignations

4. Congressional leadership meetings

5. Cabinet, NSC, and economic policy meetings

6. Meetings with key national and international leaders

7. Appointments process

8. Old White House staff

9. Vice Presidential search process

10. Address to the American people

11. Press policy

→ Established review of WH/EOA/Cab
Admin structure; intl coord org
Someone on TmTm for this?

1. Assumption of Office

(Note: Notification will come from RMN, Haig, or Secretary of State)

A. Swearing-in:

(1) Where?

Joint session: too elaborate, may take too long to set up.

Oval office: presumptuous, may take too long.

Senate office in Capitol: Small and informal.

Home (S.C.)? Too small.

(2) When?

Within hours: avoids speculation

A day or two later: can be bigger, more inclusive

(3) Press coverage:

TV pool camera

Film camera for record, still and movie (Signal)

Press pool still photographers (2)

Press pool (AP, UPI, plus two)

(4) Attendance (if quick and small)

Congressional leadership

Chief Justice

Ford family

Buchen

Hartmann?

Others?

RMN

(5) Schedule of events

The President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker preside

Remarks by Scott and Rhodes

The Chief Justice administers the oath

The President's remarks

B. Initial statements

(1) Short paragraph for immediate release

(2) Remarks at swearing-in

(3) Other?

C. The former President

- (1) Should Ford encourage dignity, grace, etc., before the resignation?
- (2) Should Ford mention RMN at swearing-in?
- (3) What temporary arrangements should be made?
- (4) Should Ford encourage pension, staff, etc.?

Black - Fletcher w/ Bush?
Woman - Marina Whitman w/ Norton?
U of Pittsburgh

2. Transition Organization

a. Short-term transition team, people, and functions

- Objectives:
- (1) Serve as interim staff for the President until permanent arrangements are made
 - (2) Establish liaison with essential individuals and institutions ASAP
 - (3) Give the President time to make decisions on staffing, personnel, and policy in an orderly way.

People needed

PB: Seidman or Day.

Schultz
Laird (OH)?
Wickham
Wickham
Horsford

1. Team chief/coordinator

trust

- (a) General coordination, scheduling, etc.
- (b) Housekeeping/administration
- (c) Staff secretary
- (d) Liaison with Nixon and old White House staff.

Norton
Moore (BG/SH no)

2. Policy and agency liaison

- (a) Agency liaison
- (b) Writing
- (c) Legal counsel for President
- (d) Substantive staff work

B.G. remove WH staff.
BG
Get someone who knows the Hill, carry etc into a Malibu.

Jack Harkin (DoJ) 66.
M. & Clough (State) career
to Harkin (B.H. temp enough?)

3. Press officer

- (a) Writing for press releases
- (b) Detail man for TV appearances, press conferences, etc.

Bush

4. Political liaison

Dan Parker at AD
Holtton

5. Personnel chief

B.G.: consider Dave in Cab. (eg Martha Griffiths)

b. The role of the Vice Presidential staff

1. Should they continue on an interim basis scheduling, correspondence, etc.?
2. Which members should be transferred immediately to the West Wing?

Arthur Fletcher - ask Bush.
w/ Bush?
best human labor?

Rumsfeld.
Holtton (liked among governors) (Personnel) (political savvy) (tougher than Parker)
Bob Dingerwall

3. Cabinet and White House Staff Resignations

A. How to elicit?

Ask for them: too blunt, recalls RMN in 1972
HAK, Weinberger, Haig by example: can we do it?

B. When to accept?

Immediately: leaves leadership gap; bad for morale
Later: keeps government going, preserves options

C. Other?

*probably automatic
Deal w/ if problem arises*

4. Congressional leadership meeting

A. When?

Immediately plus once or twice next week

B. Agenda?

- (1) Immediate plans
- (2) RMN
- (3) Other?

C. Separate meeting with Republicans.

When?

Where?

WH
Cab
Congr
Sub Cab.

Black
mtgs already planned in DC.
energy.

[Signature]

5. Cabinet, NSC, and Economic Policy Meetings

A. When?

Cabinet, followed by NSC on Monday?

Economic policy (Troika plus Burns) on Tuesday?

B. Agenda

Who should prepare? Transition team.

Briefings? or informal?

- Greenman on earlier { What does TT think of
Plan?
- Ask as symbol.
- What does TT want to do
w/ WH/EOP structure?

6. Meetings with Key Leaders

A. When should they start?

Soon and paced over 2-3 weeks

B. Who?

- (1) Religious, business, labor, publishers, Governors, academics; other?
- (2) Ambassadors of Soviet Union, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, Brazil, Mexico; other?
- (3) Other?

C. Press?

- (1) Announce, but don't ballyhoo.
- (2) President is seeking views, conveying stability

7. Appointments Process
(Cabinet, other agency heads, sub-Cabinet, etc.)

A. Who should be in charge of recruitment?

(1) Key individual who knows people, excellence

(Scranton?)

(2) Inside White House or apart?

B. How fast should this move?

C. How visible?

*Key Team personnel man
should set this up*

8. Old White House Staff

- A. How long can they stay in place? *at least a week except for a few.*
- B. Who if any should be kept? *short term all*
- C. Special status and recognition of Haig. ✓ *ex officio member Tr Team.*
- D. Office space and pay for "proper" period of time
review thereof. ← → *continue*
- E. Domestic Council, NSC staffs.

*Ash
Ziegler
Malch* } *symbols*

Haig as ex officio member Tr Team.

<i>TI - Oval</i>	<i>Take Bull's office.</i>
<i>Haig - stay</i>	<i>" press office.</i>
<i>Truman - stay</i>	<i>" others as they leave.</i>

9. Vice Presidential Search Process

A. Should someone be designated publicly?

Laird? Byrnes?

B. What should the President's role be?

C. What are the criteria?

- (1) GOP health and morale
- (2) Leadership ability (potential candidate?)
- (3) Image: age, intellect, experience, etc.

D. How soon should we aim to decide? *Soon*

*Ask leadership to get Cong views
then to WH.*

Bush asks others.

Research RN search process for VP.

*{ Ask Cong Gov etc
funnel to. functioning close to TI*

10. Address to the American People

A. When?

5-10 days after taking office?

B. What?

Tone?

Theme?

Topics?

C. Who should help?

D. Where? *Joint session?*
Prime time

11. Press Policy

A. The President personally?

- (1) Press conference? No.
- (2) Backgrounders? ~~Maybe a few~~ Don't favor a few favorites.
- (3) Statements, not so much written as drop-in's if possible.

B. Tone

- (1) How much rhetoric? minimum appropriate
- (2) Convey tone through actions
- (3) Deliberate, confident; but humble, sober

C. Pace

Carefully spread and paced:

"The President will ..."

"The President is ..."

"The President has ..."

*In the new press era, run around.
Say what is comfortable.*

First major press conf after "Assessment of the Admin"

Sunday talk show

*Gripper
Rhodes
Goldwater.*

Mr. Whitehead

August 8, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

John Byrnes, Bryce Harlow, Bob Griffin, Bill Scranton, Bill Whyte, Tom Whitehead and I have had lengthy discussions about your assumption of the Presidency and how the transition should be managed for the first few weeks. The following is a distillation of the most important items, the decisions, and the information we need from you.

I. Transition Organization

In addition to a trusted group of advisers, this group recommends strongly that you need a temporary operational group interposed between you and the old White House staff to enable you to exercise the powers of the Presidency. This transition staff would also provide liaison with key members of your Vice Presidential staff and with the old White House staff. They will also be needed to deal with the Cabinet, Governors, business, labor, etc. We recommend the following functions and candidates for this transition team, and need your judgments on both. However, there is a great deal of flexibility in tailoring jobs to fit the people.

Team Coordinator: We share your view that there should be no Chief of Staff, especially at the outset. However, there should be someone who could rapidly and efficiently organize the new staff organization, but who will not be perceived or be eager to be Chief of Staff.

Recommendation: Frank Carlucci, * Bill Clements,
Don Rumsfeld

Your choice:

Rumsfeld

Liaison with Cabinet and Agencies:

We recommend that this be someone in the Cabinet and also close to you personally.

Recommendation: Donald Rumsfeld, * Rogers Morton

Your choice: _____

Morton

Press Secretary: Jerry ter Horst

Political Liaison: Congress, Governors, business and labor groups, etc., will need to be contacted and will want a point of contact.

Recommendation: Jack Marsh*, Bob Ellsworth, ~~John~~

Your choice: _____

Personnel Chief: You will have to begin immediately reviewing resignations, considering new appointments already in process, and considering a recruitment process.

Recommendation: Bill Scranton* - John Barnum

Your choice: _____

II. The Business of Government

For public confidence, to keep the executive branch administration intact, and to assure the smoothest, most rapid assumption of the Presidential mantle, you should have a series of meetings the first few days to assert your personal direction and control over the executive branch of the government. We will see to the agendas, briefings, etc., you may need, and you will have a chance to change schedules, formats, etc., as the time approaches. However, we believe we should begin to plan for the following schemes of meetings in the following approximate order:

*W.S.
HAK doesn't want.*

Congressional leadership (Right after swearing-in)
 Key White House staff (~~Saturday morning~~)
 Cabinet, followed by NSC (Saturday morning)
 Address of Joint Session (Monday)
 Governors (Tuesday) ← *W.S.* →
~~Diplomatic Corps (Monday and Tuesday)~~

*Mayone & County off.
(G. Tordella in VP office)*

Recommendation: These be scheduled.

Your choice: _____

For the same reasons you should meet with a number of key American and foreign individuals. Moreover, you will need their support, their good will, and their expression to their peers and to the press. Still others you will want to consult for advice.

Recommendation: That this group or one of our members such as Bryce Harlow be asked to prepare a list for your review at the earliest date.

Your choice: _____

III. Old White House Staff

You must walk a delicate line between compassion and consideration for the former President's staff and the rapid assertion of your personal control over the executive branch. The old White House staff will submit their resignations, but they should be asked to stay on for a time to help with the transition. It will be clear that most of the political types will be expected to leave within a reasonable time. The one exception we recommend is Al Haig. Al has done yeoman service for his country. You should meet with him personally as soon as possible and prevail upon him to help you and your transition team, thus completing the holding-together he has done for so long. He also will be needed for liaison with Mr. Nixon and his family. However, he should not be expected, asked, or be given the option to become your Chief of Staff.

Recommendation: You give special treatment status and recognition to Haig. Assure him of your need for his unique capability at this time and of your assistance and support for the future.

OK

IV. Vice Presidential Search Process

You will be under considerable pressure to move immediately, and you should, but this cannot deter you and your transition team from the business of government. Therefore, we recommend that you follow the same procedure that Mr. Nixon did in eliciting suggestions from the Congress, the Governors, etc., regarding candidates and that these letters be requested to be in the hands of one of your personal secretaries on a date certainly a week or so hence.

Your choice: _____

Philip W. Buchen

August 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Just as President Nixon kept up the business of government so long as he was President, I know each of you has worked diligently to carry out the responsibilities you hold and to help him in his. You must have a feeling of sorrow, as I do, but you should also take pride in the many constructive accomplishments made by the Nixon Administration.

Many of you will now want to pass your responsibilities on to others. But you have a direct loyalty to the American people through the office you hold, and I too need your help. I ask each of you to continue to carry on the mission of your agency and to give me the advice I need as I take on my new responsibilities.

I have asked some friends whose counsel I respect to help me with the transition. They will form a bridge for me to my Vice Presidential staff office and to the officials of the Executive Branch until a permanent organization is established. I ask your help and cooperation for them as well as myself.

President Nixon fought long and with all his might to serve the American people well, ending his Presidency with a selfless and courageous act. You can still serve him and the Nation by helping us to carry on the essential functions of the Presidency. I will meet with the senior officials of the White House immediately after I take the oath of office to discuss transition arrangements and responsibilities.

Gerald R. Ford

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 10, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF

AUGUST 9, 1974

FROM: The Vice President

I know this has been a difficult and confusing time for each of you. You must have feelings of sorrow, as I do, but you also should be proud--proud of the President you served and of your efforts for him and the country.

Many of you will want to go on to other pursuits now that your service to him has ended. I understand and respect that, but I also need your help. I ask each of you to stay on long enough to assure a steady and informed transition of the Presidency.

I have asked some friends whose counsel I respect to help me with the transition. They will form a bridge for me to my Vice Presidential staff office and to the officials of the Executive Branch until a permanent organization is established. I ask your help and cooperation for them as well as myself.

President Nixon fought long and with all his might to serve the American people well, ending his Presidency with a selfless and courageous act. You can still serve him and the Nation by helping me to carry on the essential functions of the Presidency. I will meet with the senior officials of the White House in the Roosevelt Room soon after I take the oath of office to discuss transition arrangements and responsibilities.

#

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

RE: YOUR MEETING WITH ECONOMIC ADVISORS AT 2:00 PM IN
THE CABINET ROOM, FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1974

We suggest that this meeting be a short session covering the following subject matter generally:

- 1) A current general appraisal of the economic situation, domestic and world-wide.
- 2) Special emphasis on inflation
- 3) Energy
- 4) Interdependency of the United States' economy with the European Community and Japan.

We especially recommend that you ask the advisors if there are any "critical, immediate decisions" that they feel you should make.

And request their suggestions for the general or special role of the President right now.

D O N O T S

At this Conference we suggest you make no intimations of changes in personnel - or changes in policy - or changes in structure.

B U T

LISTEN for intimated or outright suggestions on personnel, policy, or structure.

D O

Request of Alan Greenspan that he prepare a brief analysis and any immediate recommendations for your personal use and have same ready by Sunday night.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

RE: YOUR MEETING WITH ECONOMIC ADVISORS AT 2:00 PM IN
THE CABINET ROOM, FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1974

We suggest that this meeting be a short session covering the following subject matter generally:

- 1) A current general appraisal of the economic situation, domestic and world-wide.
- 2) Special emphasis on inflation
- 3) Energy
- 4) Interdependency of the United States' economy with the European Community and Japan.

We especially recommend that you ask the advisors if there are any "critical, immediate decisions" that they feel you should make.

And request their suggestions for the general or special role of the President right now.

D O N O T S

At this Conference we suggest you make no intimations of changes in personnel - or changes in policy - or changes in structure.

B U T

LISTEN for intimated or outright suggestions on personnel, policy, or structure.

D O

Request of Alan Greenspan that he prepare a brief analysis and any immediate recommendations for your personal use and have same ready by Sunday night.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Meeting with the White House Staff
Roosevelt Room
1:00 p.m. Friday, August 9, 1974

The main purposes of this meeting are to:

- (1) Reassure the staff of your respect, your need for their help, and your regard for President Nixon.
- (2) Inform the staff of the role the Transition Team will play for the next few weeks and their relation to it.

We suggest that this be a fairly short meeting, covering the following general points:

1. The stress on the staff in these last few days and indeed the last year.
2. How important it is that they stayed in Mr. Nixon's service.
3. The special and heroic role of Al Haig.
4. Your personal need for the staff to remain intact and in place for a time to help you and the Transition Team.
5. The Team members will be in touch with them and General Haig will be actively involved in the Transition Team's efforts.

Do Nots

At this time, do not commit yourself to dealing directly with anyone but Al Haig.

Do

Ask each staff member to be alert to problems and to make suggestions to Al Haig or to Transition Team members.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Meeting with the White House Staff
Roosevelt Room

1:00 p.m. Friday, August 9, 1974

The main purposes of this meeting are to:

- (1) Reassure the staff of your respect, your need for their help, and your regard for President Nixon.
- (2) Inform the staff of the role the Transition Team will play for the next few weeks and their relation to it.

We suggest that this be a fairly short meeting, covering the following general points:

1. The stress on the staff in these last few days and indeed the last year.
2. How important it is that they stayed in Mr. Nixon's service.
3. The special and heroic role of Al Haig.
4. Your personal need for the staff to remain intact and in place for a time to help you and the Transition Team.
5. The Team members will be in touch with them and General Haig will be actively involved in the Transition Team's efforts.

Do Nots

At this time, do not commit yourself to dealing directly with anyone but Al Haig.

Do

Ask each staff member to be alert to problems and to make suggestions to Al Haig or to Transition Team members.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Friday, August 9, 1974 - page 2

5:30	Meeting with Presidential Transition Staff	Cabinet Room
	John Brynes	
	Senator Robert Griffin	
	Bryce Harlow	
	R.T. Hartmann	
	Jack Marsh ✓	
	Rogers Morton ✓	
	Donald Rumsfeld ✓	
	William Scranton ✓	
	L.W. Seidman	
	Jerry terHorst	
	Clay Whitehead	
	William Whyte	→ add Haig
6:00	Israel Ambassador	Sec's WH Office
6:30	Vietnam Ambassador	Sec's WH Office

✓ = transition team

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Saturday - August 10, 1974

8:00 AM

PERSONAL TIME

EOB Office

8:30 AM

General Haig

EOB Office

9:00 AM

General Haig (organization)

EOB Office

* 10:00 AM

Meeting with the Cabinet

The Cabinet Room

* 11:00 AM

National Security Council Meeting

The Cabinet Room

12:30 PM

Luncheon at Residence (T)

P.M.

PERSONAL TIME

Mtg w/TT 8/9 5:00

- All to continue Cab, dypts, floor
- Hatten counsellor reports enough on point some in to speak writing March also counsellor foreign policy & defense.

RM - prep work for TT

TT: avoid VP stuff moving in outside looks at WH open.

RM - what is re: WH

TT Cab to look, Haig to look, out down advisors.

March - beg off table

TT turn to RL

Mtg turned to PB.

BG: country better off.

Ray Menter: what about WH staff

Haig no syst review

BWS: design org to TT

Haig OMB too big

DC small, relies on OMB

Econ structure

But 5 - All Haig on structure Sat.

10-11 Cab USC

12:30 luncheon

8:00 TT TT w/spot

Conf Mena?

VP process

TT: decide who - 10 days.

Sunday 1 on / not yet talked to all on Sun sched.

David Sat

→ Reg M. Philos of new orgn by 10 days
Briefing on current orgn. 9-10. RLTT

"Crisp"

Remarks on TT TT & prep for J.S. remarks.

Start at 8
Reg thing at outset
e.g. CIA briefs
Bob Haig picks
Legal briefs
Press briefs
10: visits begin
listen better than read
Reading home at night
"not check volume"
dec only phil:
options & consensus
yes/no

President Ford inherited an administration complete with personnel, policies, legislative history, staff procedures, and operating style. The new President is a long-time supporter of the foreign policies and many of the domestic policies of the former administration. The political philosophy of the new President is not dramatically different from that which produced the mandate of 1972.

Yet, President Ford also inherited an administration besmirched by scandal, indictment, arrogance, hostility toward Congress, manipulation of public opinion, and, not least, a preoccupation with the power of government rather than the responsiveness of government.

The new President, then, faces a dilemma. At the outset, he must maintain continuity, retaining much of the philosophy, personnel, and staff procedures of the Nixon Administration and yet, somehow, turn it gradually into his own distinctive administration. There will be great pressure from without for him to do this too soon. There will be greater pressures from within not to do it at all. The President's principal ^{TASK} ~~problem~~, then, is to walk a steady ~~XXXXXXXX~~ path between these two courses, and the principal problem becomes: how much, how soon?

The Transition Team is at work on organizational and personnel that will provide significant and major options for the new President in designing a staff system and a reorganization of the Presidency to reduce the overblown and baroque superstructure of the Executive Office erected by the Nixon Administration. However, it is essential that the President, over the first two or three months of his presidency, establish a style and method of operation that is distinct from that of the former President. # There are three ways to do this at the outset: (1) personal style, (2) how he conducts his business, and (3) what he does on substantive issues. The first largely takes care of itself. The second has already begun in some ways -- most notably in the President's spirit of cooperation with the Congress and his

frankness in dealing with the public. However, the rhetoric will wear thin if not soon replaced by the evaluation of a Ford style with respect to what he does. Several proposals need to be developed for the President of things he can undertake to do over the next few months that ~~will~~ will convey his intentions and style. The third has not yet taken place. The OMB and Domestic Council, along with the departments and agencies, will throw up to the new President a steady stream of memoranda designed to obtain his ratification for the support or opposition of specific bills, policy proposals that will lock him into the same positions as the Nixon Administration. Since many of these positions have been arrived at in a way that has left the Congress and many groups of society hostile toward the Administration, it is important that the President deal with some of these in new and novel ways. The attached papers provide a list of actions for the President's consideration that will further the development of a "Ford imprint" on the presidency over the next few months and suggest some tentative timing to insure that these are paced over that period of time so that the press and the public will receive it as a steady development and evolution of the Ford Presidency and not as a massive public relations venture.

TRANSITION TO WHAT?

Those of us who had responsibility for planning the transition from President Nixon to President Ford ~~and-for-helping-to-get-the-new Administration-launched-on-its-own-XXXXXXXXXX~~ necessarily spent much ~~if~~ of our energies on the mechanics of assuring that there was in fact a government in place at the top of the ~~ex~~ executive branch; we also were caught up inevitably in the time-urgent details that have come to characterize the modern White House. But we also had the feeling -- indeed, the commitment -- that we were doing more than caring for the housekeeping details of a change in the occupancy of the oval office. We were working ~~for~~ to create the opportunity for a longer range transition from something profoundly bad/^{ingovernment} to something better and more suited to our/^{national} problems and our traditions. In other words, we believed strongly that the Nixon - Ford transition had to be a transition to something, but a transition to what?

During dinner at our home on the evening of May 7, 1974, Phillip Buchen, now Counsel to President Ford, my wife Margaret, ~~me~~ and I discussed the possibility of Nixon leaving office through any one of several routes and concluded that it would be very important for Ford to have available some advance thinking and planning to draw on should he become President suddenly. Vice President Ford, however was steadfastly refusing to do anything that might be interpreted as an indication that he thought President Nixon should or would have to leave office. On May 9, the Vice President stated with what seemed considerable precision that if there were any transition planning going on, it was "without my knowledge ~~me~~ and without my consent."

After considering the Vice President's difficult position on this matter, ~~ix~~ his statement sounded in translation a bit like, "I hope someone out there is doing some planning, but please don't tell me about it." In any event, we concluded that someone ought to initiate some planning that could be made available to Ford at an appropriate time, that it had to be done in absolute secrecy, and that since no one else was likely to be doing it, it was only prudent for us to do so.

From the outset, a major difficulty was the inability to discuss ~~ax~~ our efforts with Ford himself, for h had to be able to continue to state honestly that he had authorized and knew of no transition planning. Without the participation of the "possibly-future-President", we clearly could not develop useful plans for policy positions, replacements for Cabinet and senior White House staff, and the like. We focused, therefore, on developing ~~plans~~ plans of a kind that would give the new President ~~and-whomever-he-brought-in-to-help-the-flexibility~~ the flexibility to reject whatever of the Nixon Administration he chose and to initiate reviews of whatever policy areas he thought important, while still assuring that the necessary Presidential functions were continued without any serious ~~ix~~ mistakes.

To help in this endeavor, Mr. Buchen and I/^{asked}~~chose~~ three others to help in our efforts. Brian Lamb, Editor of Media Reprts, and formerly my assistant for press and Congressional liaison; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of Brookings was formerly an Assistant Secretary of Interior, Assistant Secretary of HEW, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Jonathon Moore, Director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard, was and assistant to Elliot Richardson in the State, HEW, and Justice departments.

This group of five, which my wife Margaret dubbed "The Ford Foundation", agreed to devote a substantial amount of time to the kind of advance thinking that would be useful if Ford became President on short notice. The composition of the group says a lot about the kind of effort I felt was needed. There were no professional politicians, no big businessmen, no super administrators, no Washington lawyers. Instead, the group was put together for its cumulative knowledge about how the executive branch of the government really works, particularly the White House. We all had a taste for the policy-making side of government, but were not particularly philosophers. ~~At that time~~ Most of us had been in government, but none of us saw that as our career; indeed, most of us had a considerable desire to be out of government. ~~Each of us had delved intensively into several~~ ~~key areas of public policy,~~

Some of our early work was easily chosen for us -- certain mechanical and legal matters the new President and his staff would need to know about, when would Nixon cease to be President under various ways he might leave office, status of bill signings, vetoes, continuity of military command and control, and so forth sometimes proved to be a bit complicated because so much of the widely accepted "common knowledge" about some of these matters proved not quite correct in detail. It was also not too difficult to identify clearly and operationally which parts of the executive offices and the Cabinet departments would need early direction from the new White House, which parts could be used as an information resource, and which parts could or should be ignored in the early days of the new Administration.

Knowing that there was a real possibility that our work would be needed within weeks or months, and recognizing the limits to what five individuals could do working part time, we did not even attempt to develop positions for the new President on the major public policy issues, nor did we attempt to recommend replacements for key Nixon Administration officials. Yet we knew deeply that for the sake of the country and the future of the Republican party that the Ford Administration would have to be fundamentally different than the old incumbent Nixon Administration. Our approach in planning then was to develop some major options and ideas that would insure the new President from becoming the captive of the machinery and faces of the old Administration, would get the processes of government going to identify in some detail what that new direction was to be, and buy time for that process to work by assuring that the necessary immediate problems of government would be dealt with ~~in-a-way-compatible-with-the---~~ in a way that would avoid anything being done in the new President's name unless it was specifically decided ~~by the~~ to be consonant with the aims of the new President. We knew that all bureaucracies, even the White House staff, would tend to keep doing what they had been doing, espousing the same problems and positions they had in the past. It was therefore important that, indeed central, to our thinking that a group of new faces be brought in with the new President and some of them interposed between the President and the rest of the executive branch. This "Transition Team" was in fact adopted, but by the new President's wish, it was to the side of the Nixon White House staff, in parallel so to speak, rather than having direct responsibility for the decisions of the new Administration.

The details of transition planning and execution could fill a fascinating book, but that is not the point I want to get at in this article. The key point for "this point in time" as we used to say is not what we did, but why. And the central answerer to that Why? is that there had to be a transition : first of all to a set of new faces that could focus the best ~~analytical-rigorous~~ rigorous thinking on the problems of our country that the government has responsibility for. Second, to a new organization for doing business within the executive branch and for dealing with the Congress and the press. And third, a new, more sincere, more ~~pragm~~ realistic philosophy of government

~~-----Well, President Ford didn't follow the recommendations of the "Ford Foundation"---and he didn't p~~

Well, President Ford didn't pick up many of the more decisive options developed for him by the "ford Foundation", and he hasn't yet acted on the recommendations of the Transition Team that gave their report on the operations of the executive branch to the new President on ~~September-~~ August 15. Like many I think he should have moved faster. Like not so many who have seen the "inside" of his Administration from the outset, I think he could have moved faster. It is still too soon, however, to criticize: He did take office suddenly, he inherited a White House structure geared to involvement in an incredible amount of detail; and any new President who has to travel around the world, veto bills, and write a state of the union message during his "transition period" has to be forgiven if he just doesn't get around to everything as soon as all of us think he ought.

But ... It isn't too soon to think about the character of what President Ford ought to be transitioning to. The country needs leadership. The newly constituted Democratic Congress, for all its pop reforms has no program of its own, and given the paucity of new ideas in the Democratic Party, (the intellectual bankruptcy of the Democratic Party) we cannot be looked to as a source of significant positive leadership. Rightly or wrongly, we look to the President to provide the kind of leadership needed when our nation is in trouble, and President Ford is going to have to try to provide that leadership. He ought to begin trying soon. His state of the union message later this month is his first chance and will mark the character of his leadership for the ~~year~~ coming year. Then we have the national bicentennial presidential election year, all the adjectives of which suggest more huffing and puffery than serious business in Washington and in the media. It may be unfair, but its this month or maybe never for the Ford philosophy.

And what should that philosophy set forth, explicitly or implicitly, in the President's articulation of the state of the union and his proposals for the coming year? And where does the President turn to for ideas and guidance? Does he turn to the intellectual traditions of the GOP, perhaps even more bankrupt intellectually than the Democratic Party? To his diminishing ranks of old colleagues in the Congress? To the officials and staffs of the Nixon Administration? No matter what your political persuasion or your view of the President's mental capacity for the job of being President, you have to admit the man has a powerful problem.

Fortunately for President Ford, he is ideally suited and situated for the task --veritably the right man at the right place at the right time. Both political parties are devoid of ideas for dealing with the new problems of the nation and both have contributed through their obsolete ideologies to the problems we now face. The Congress is institutionally incapable of programmatic leadership. The executive branch, along with the congressional committees is captive of assorted vested special interests they have come to serve. The White House staff is numb. The politicians and the press have spun the national daily news game out into some kind of political soap opera about as close to the deeper realities of our national life as the current "as The World Turns."
And the public knows it. The Democratic mandate of 1974 is no deeper than the Republican mandate of 1972. What the country needs, what the public seems to want, and what Jerry Ford is capable of giving is an objective, honest statement of the problems we face and how the state of the nation looks from ^{his} ~~the~~ new perspective of the White House. Thrust by circumstances into the Presidency at a time of profound national uncertainty, Jerry Ford, "one of the people," owes it to all of us other non-experts to assess carefully our national situation, to educate himself, and to share that education with us.

Oct PB + dog

Wed (?)

Press not yet onto PB - keep at bay. ^{Bygone?}

Group of 5 as strategy review board
PB to be exch organizer of Am.

Draft speech { treatment RN
single declaration + one theme

Xm team people <sup>Rose, Moore, Glass, Scalia
Pete, Hanger?, Woolley, Bygones?</sup>

CTW resign; status; (Comedy story?)

Draft msg to heads of state (adv) (RN control)

~~E to have PB in subty - of being from someone~~

Need to know:

timmy & effectiveness of RN resign

Timmy & pacing of 1st week.

5 min TV or in 24 hrs - from where?

written about for immed release.

Office space - GSA WH rep - Sampson

7th. Logarithms: offic, covin, secy

Watch excessive regionalism

Talk → talk: 1 wk.

Ed Turner

J. Moore 617-255-0785

Miss Harris C&P business office.