

Future directions of the government's communications policy

The general counsel for the embattled technocrats of President Nixon's Office of Telecommunications Policy spells out (again) the OTP mission

Henry Goldberg

THE WORDS "future," "policy," and "communications," included in the title above, to me define the territory that the Congress and the President staked out as the "turf" of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP). These words and their relationship to OTP are my theme here.

In recent months, some scholars have given us a glimpse of the future as they see it. For example, Daniel Bell, the Harvard sociologist, in his new book, "The Coming of Post-Industrial Society," pictures an America transformed by powerful new technological, economic and social forces.

We started as a manufacturing or industrial society that put a premium on individual entrepreneurship and practical inventiveness. The entrepreneurs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries used their specialists—their engineers and lawyers and the like—in supporting roles. There was no question who constituted the hired help.

Enter the technocrat

But the industrial economy evolved into a service economy, and modern industry itself, whether electronics, chemicals,

HENRY GOLDBERG is general counsel of the White House's Office of Telecommunications Policy. This article is adapted from an address given at a joint meeting of the Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers and the Assn. of Federal Communication Consulting Engineers.

computers or communications, became very complex, because they depend upon a high degree of technological knowledge. Indeed, Professor Bell calls the post-industrial society a knowledge society, in which specialized and theoretical knowledge provide a new basis of power and status.

The fear is that the former hired hands—the engineers, scientists, technicians, lawyers, academics and others comfortable with theories and concepts that underlie the new technology—will take over the reins of our economy, whether they operate in the private or public sectors. J. K. Galbraith, for example, refers to a "technostructure" of specialists who manage the government and the giant corporations according to their personal interests and not according to the "public interest" or the impersonal forces of the marketplace.

In short, the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat have given way, in both commerce and government, to the technocrat. The term "technocrat" has all sorts of bad connotations, but these are in the eyes of the beholder. One man's technocrat is another man's skilled professional. But in any event, let's use the term—"technocrat"—whatever its limitations, because it is, at least, commonly accepted.

The technocrat deals with a mysterious body of knowledge and, therefore, he seems to be the

fearful minion of a new order. Even worse, the technocrat engages in an activity that is virtually un-American—he plans. The technology that is grist for the technocrat's intellectual mill lends itself to forecasting and measuring its impact and thus to planning its directions. More importantly, given the economic and social implications of the development of new technologies, he knows that the alternative to intelligent planning is chaos.

The beasts that roam

I can think of few industries in which technology is as essential to growth and innovation as the electronic communications industries. As the beasts that roam the world of communications, we—I literally mean you and me—are technocrats; and we are distrusted. The view seems to be that communications is much too important to be left to the specialists, so we must be kept in our place, that is, in a supporting role. There's no point in overstating this desire to put limits on the technocrat's sphere. But, I can't help thinking that at least some of OTP's present difficulties stem from a lack of understanding of what that sphere should be.

First, last and, perhaps, always, OTP practically reeks of "technostructure," and its present and future status have to be viewed against the biases that this raises.

A look at the pre-history of

P will help to define the technology structure clearly. The effort to add a technocratic dimension to the government's frequency assignment functions began in 1951 with a recommendation from President Truman's Communications Policy Board to create the position of Telecommunications Advisor to the President. The first advisor was Haraden Pratt, incidentally a communications consultant. The Office of Telecommunications Advisor did not last long, having met its demise in 1953.

From 1953 to 1970, the duties of the former Telecommunications Advisor were performed by various Executive Office entities concerned primarily with civil defense and emergency preparedness. However, beginning in 1964, various proposals were made by congressional committees, by executive branch study groups and by groups outside the government to create a separate office for telecommunications research, policy planning and formulation, and for coordination of government's own communications activities. The Rostow Task Force in 1968 referred to the need for a "communications promoter" for the executive branch. Some of the language of the recommendations is interesting in light of subsequent developments:

"The overall need, then, is for a long-range planning, policy-formulating and coordinating, and mission-support capability which can serve to integrate the various roles in which the Executive Branch is presently engaged.

To its tasks, the proposed entity would bring the skills of engineers and scientists capable of analyzing the applicability of technological developments in terms of both component performance and system design; and of lawyers, economists and statisticians capable of engaging in, in cooperation with technical personnel, long-range technological, cost and demand forecasting. As these programs began to be implemented, one

'The job of coordinating the communications activities and policies of other government agencies has proven to be more difficult than originally anticipated. Furthermore, our research and analysis do not always overwhelm everyone.'

could expect a constant flow of such personnel to other communications-related government activities, including the FCC."

Clearly, the Rostow group wanted the technocrats to bring their skills to bear on communications issues and even foresaw some of the player trades that have taken place between OTP and the FCC.

A new decade, a new group

In February, 1970, President Nixon proposed and the Congress supported the Reorganization Plan which created OTP. The functions assigned the new office were essentially those recommended by the Rostow Task Force. The Office was deliberately kept small, with most research and analysis to be performed by OTP support groups in the Department of Commerce's Office of Telecommunications. The President's message to the Congress outlined three essential roles for OTP:

1. To be principal advisor to the President on telecommunications policy to "enable the President and all government officials to share more fully in the experience, the insights, and the forecasts of government and non-government experts." (Our old friends the technocrats coming to the fore again.)

2. To formulate policies and coordinate operations in the realm of the government's own use of communications.

3. To enable the Executive Branch "to speak with a clearer voice and to act as a more effective partner in discussion of communications policy with both the Congress and the Federal Communications Commission."

Clay Whitehead was nominated and confirmed as director of OTP and today marks the third year of his tenure in that position.

In technocratic terms, Dr. Whitehead was a natural to head the Office: he's an MIT graduate, a Rand Corporation "think tank" occupant, and a former member of IEEE.

A kindly axe for OTP?

But what in the world happened to OTP? If you read the trade press, you are expected to believe that the bright promise of OTP has tarnished, that OTP is battered, and that Whitehead is beleaguered. I get the image of Dr. Whitehead sitting in a decaying and crumbling office, deprived of belt and shoelaces by a kindly retainer who does not want to see him do anything drastic, and waiting for a merciful Congress to put him out of his misery.

You shouldn't believe this image; just as you had no reason to believe the articles of a year ago that pictured Whitehead as a young czar of the communications world, riding the crest of power, and stuffing his policies down the throats of un-

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ing FCC commissioners and members of Congress.

I'm not, however, going to tell you that OTP doesn't have some new difficulties. When Congress gives every indication of lopping off half of OTP's 1974 budget request, which totalled only \$3.2 million to begin with, we're not exactly flying high. We lose some issues at the FCC; we lose some in the Congress; and we even lose some at the White House. The job of coordinating the communications activities and policies of other government agencies has proven to be more diffi-

and complex interrelationships that abound in telecommunications.

Hamstrung by Congress?

It would be useless, and even risky, to attempt to confine an entity such as OTP to narrow considerations of technical matters. If this is the intent of the Congress in slashing the OTP budget, they are going about it in the wrong way. The budget cuts will hurt the very aspect of OTP activities that everyone finds least offensive, that is, the solid technical and economic research that must be done and that OTP

broadcast industry arises from its multi-channel capacity. Cable offers an abundance of channels in place of TV broadcasting's scarcity.

Cable's channels could be used to increase the variety and diversity of entertainment, information, and opinion available to the viewer, if the policy-makers can devise ways to increase access to those channels free of regulatory bottlenecks and excessive private monopoly controls.

But that's a big "if" and development of broadband technology itself will not dictate the adoption of a policy that takes full advantage of the opportunities presented by cable.

Look what has happened in television broadcasting. There is no engineering reason why it has to be as scarce a medium as it now is.

If policy-makers were to change a few non-technical, but socially and politically critical assumptions, we could have many more TV channels and stations; both the low-power kind and the wide-area service VHF kind. It's not technology that has dictated the choice to keep TV broadcast channels a scarce resource. But I'm not criticizing this choice.

My point is that the same thing could happen to cable technology, if care isn't exercised. If we do not tailor a new public policy for cable, it is likely that cable will continue to develop and be regulated in the policy mold created for broadcasting by the 1927 Radio Act. This could result in the creation of an artificial scarcity of channels. Cable could be seen simply as an extension of and a supplement to the TV broadcast industry. It could be treated as a secondary service that could engulf the primary broadcast service if cable's many channels are used to their full capacity. This perception of cable's channel abundance as a threat could retard cable growth and even limit full use and expansion.

'... what is needed from OTP is not only specialized expertise. We also need the ability to take a broader view, a broader perspective on the close and complex interrelationships that abound in telecommunications.'

cult than originally anticipated. Furthermore, our research and analysis do not always overwhelm everyone. And, with our record out there in full view for anyone to see, I can't claim that we haven't made mistakes.

But we are doing what we are supposed to do, even though we could do it better. OTP has been brought up short, however, when it has spoken out forthrightly on the broad issues that affect the electronic mass media and its relation to the government through the regulatory process. In effect, OTP's critics are saying "technocrat stick to your last"; don't get involved in these broader questions that needn't concern you. But what is needed from OTP is not only specialized expertise. We also need the ability to take a broader view, a broader perspective on the close


is well-qualified to do.

Right now, the Congress quite properly provides the broader perspective that is and will continue to be needed in communications policy-making. But this shouldn't be a closed shop. The FCC should perform a broader policy-making function too, and so should OTP. You can't be principal advisor to the President on telecommunications issues or an effective partner in the policy dialog if you've suffered a pre-frontal lobotomy. We should be able to think about and state opinions on the social, philosophical and even political issues and considerations that, as technocrats, we know must ultimately control in the future of communications policy-making.

For example, the principal challenge of cable television to public policy and to the existing

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of its channel capacity. It is OTP's responsibility to anticipate these kinds of risks and, as experts acting with other experts in and out of government, make the policy choices and their consequences explicit. But we must take into account a full range of considerations, not simply the technical considerations, and we must be free to speak out on these issues.

The real role of OTP

OTP doesn't want, and must not have, primacy in communications policy-making. But we do want to be the effective partner of entities that perhaps do not want partners. The policy-making process, however, must of necessity include the executive branch, whether or not there is an OTP. What president could or should ignore the issues posed by the rapid and varied development of communications technology and its impact upon the fabric of our society?

The question answers itself. Without an OTP, this president and every future president would still have a responsibility to deal with these issues; but the technocrats, skilled professionals, or what have you, would be driven underground or scattered among other departments and agencies. They would be effectively cut off from the President and he would find it difficult to have the benefit of a full-range of their insights and perspectives.

The communications industries are too technologically advanced and growing too rapidly to accept this return to a fragmentation in policy planning and a hidden agenda in policy formulation. This points up the need for an OTP that is out in the open and visible to the public, to the Congress and to the FCC; an OTP that is accountable to the President, the Congress and the courts for the conduct of its activities.


Being visible and accountable, we should be challenged, disputed

ed, debated and even, from time to time, denounced; just as OTP should be allowed the same freedom to inquire, question and challenge others in the field. But we should and must continue to forge ahead and percolate with new ideas, new concepts, and different perspectives, if policy-making in the vital communications area is to be a dynamic process from which all can benefit.

Despite ruffled feathers, does anyone think that the Congress will not benefit in its deliberations of a renewal bill from the clash of FCC and OTP views on the issue of program percentages in the license renewal process? Who doesn't believe that the public broadcast system will not be a healthier one for all the debate regarding its fundamental goals and objectives; or that commercial broadcasting cannot withstand careful analysis of its economic imperatives and their regulatory consequences? Are the Congress and the FCC the only ones to be allowed to judge the future policies for cable development or the roles of competition and monopoly in the telephone industry? Are the only advocates to be the industry interests and an *ad hoc* assortment of consumer or viewer groups? I certainly hope not.

There is no place for the closed shop or the closed mind in communications policy-making. OTP should not be confined to the role of technocratic waterboy while the other players are on the field. I don't think that professional communications engineers would want to be confined to that kind of a role either. There's more at stake than requiring one FCC commissioner to be an engineer or appointing someone with an engineering background to head OTP; all such professionals should be participating in the policy process on a much wider scale and to a much greater degree. The public will be short-changed if the professionals settle

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Nixon Aides Discuss Rerun Limit

TV Officials Pressured

By ALBIN KREBS

(of N.Y. Times News Service)

Clay T. Whitehead, director of the White House office of Telecommunications Policy, together with his top legal aide have quietly been calling on officials of the three television networks to get them to limit voluntarily the number of reruns on TV.

All of the network calls were made Nov. 22, the day before Thanksgiving. Network officials involved refused yesterday to reveal exactly what was said at the meetings.

One official, however, who asked that his name be withheld, said that Mr. Whitehead and his acting special counsel,

Henry Goldberg, visited the networks to "indulge in some gentle jawboning at the urging of President Nixon."

THE VISITS were in keeping with Mr. Nixon's promise to the Screen Actors Guild and other West Coast entertainment-industry unions to take an active part in a campaign to cut the number of TV reruns. Such a cut, Mr. Nixon has said, would create more original programs and thus more jobs for the union members.

Mr. Nixon in a letter to the Screen Actors Guild on Oct. 14, suggested that unless the networks voluntarily reduced the number of reruns in evening prime viewing time, "we will explore whatever regulatory recommendations are in order."

The President delegated Mr. Whitehead to work with the networks to "find a voluntary solution." Since then, according to Mr. Goldberg, "we have made a two-month investigation of the problem."

A spokesman for Mr. Whitehead said yesterday, "we did not want to make public the fact that we have reached the

stage of actually calling on the networks about a voluntary solution."

IT WAS LEARNED however, that the calls were made, and that the Columbia Broadcasting System Official reached was John A. Schneider, president of the C.B.S. broadcast group.

A spokesman for the National Broadcasting Company said that Don Durgin, president of the N.B.C. television network, received Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Goldberg "to talk about reruns," but that the and details could not be revealed.

A spokesman for the American Broadcasting Company said that officials at that network were in Puerto Rico for a station affiliates meeting, and there would be no comment.

The network official who characterized the meetings with Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Goldberg as "jawboning" in behalf of the President, expressed resentment that "Nixon feels he has a right to step in and tell us how to run our businesses."

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

October 29, 1971

INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND REGULATION

Intermediate (2-5 years)

- (1) Allow importation of distant signals under FCC proposed formulas, with compulsory licensing.
- (2) Allow cable operators to provide additional programming at their discretion.
- (3) Require that cable operators lease excess channels to other program suppliers without discrimination.
- (4) Relieve cable operators of all uneconomic burdens (free channels, excess capacity, two-way capability, etc.)

Permanent

*Stans
objections*

- (1) Require that broadband system operators lease all channels to other program suppliers without discrimination, and increase capacity on reasonable demand.
- (2) Require that broadband operators connect all who wish to subscribe within their franchise area, at nondiscriminatory rates.
- (3) Impose full copyright liability on all channel lessees ~~concept~~
~~as provided under grandfathered FCC package~~.

*Klein
Problems*

- (4) Impose no content regulation on channel lessees, and enforce existing obscenity, libel, slander laws through the courts.
- (5) Impose no regulation of rates charged by program suppliers or other channel lessees to their customers.
- (6) Leave to the States the right to regulate franchise terms, basic subscriber fees, and channel access fees.
- (7) Provide broadcast stations and newspapers the option within their market area of:
 - (a) owning broadband systems subject to the programming restrictions and other obligations noted above; or
 - (b) programming any number of channels leased from a nonaffiliated broadband operator.
- (8) Encourage the ~~continued~~ ^{service to} availability of ~~existing levels of~~ rural and low-income ~~service via one or both of the following means:~~ ^{people by}
 - (a) ~~require broadband operators to continue existing service levels within the area affected by their operators, via whatever means they choose;~~
 - ~~provide~~ ^{ing} Federal subsidies for rural and low-income viewers, as for telephone service.

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October 29, 1971

FEDERAL INITIATIVES

- (1) Establish cooperative government/industry broadband demonstration programs in several urban and rural areas.
- (2) Expand HEW activities in software development for education and health services.
- (3) Disseminate information and assistance on broadband services through the SBA and National League of Cities.
- (4) Encourage NBS to mount a cooperative program to establish technical standards for broadband systems.
- (5) Establish a rural broadband development program under DOA.
- (6) Underwrite some R&D costs for private sector development of terminal devices, and other peripheral equipment, as part of demonstration programs.

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON

To: WAIT
STAN
HANK ✓

For review, comment,
suggestions, additions.

Bruce

B. M. Owen
July 28, 1971

LONG TERM CABLE TELEVISION POLICY
PRELIMINARY LIST OF POLICY OPTIONS

1. Industry Structure
 - a. Complete vertical disintegration (common carrier)
 - b. Partial integration (operator controls some channels)
 - c. Full integration (operator controls access to all channels)
 - d. Full or partial government control of access (licensing of program suppliers)

2. Protection for Broadcasting
 - a.. Free reign to cable development
 - b. Accelerated cable development through government promotion, subsidization
 - c. Partial restrictions on rate of growth of cable to protect broadcasting
 - d. Complete "freeze" on cable to protect broadcasting
 - e. Subsidies (direct or indirect) to broadcasters hurt by cable
 - f. Arrangements to allow broadcasters to participate in cable
 - g. Concessions to broadcasters in other areas (e. g., license renewals)
 - h. Purchase by government of broadcast licenses (at "market values"); replace broadcasting with wire gradually

3. Rural and Low Income Viewers

- a. Do nothing
- b. Establish subsidy programs (like REA) for rural areas
- c. Require cable operators to run translators
- d. Encourage satellite development, other technological solutions
- e. Subsidize low income viewers directly or indirect (e. g., through model cities)

4. Pay Television

- a. Extend present highly restrictive rules to cable
- b. Allow unrestricted pay-TV on cable
- c. Allow pay-TV on cable with mild restrictions, such as minimum quantities of accompanying free service
- d. Leave this issue to FCC or Congress or States

5. Ownership

- a. Leave it all to antitrust authorities
- b. Prohibit or limit broadcast/newspaper ownership of cable
- c. No restrictions on cross-ownership
- d. Restrictions on multiple system ownership
- e. Restrictions on network ownership

6. Regulatory Authority

- a. Leave industry unregulated
- b. Leave content unregulated, but regulate transmission
- c. Give FCC full regulatory authority
- d. Give full authority to States/cities
- e. Make legislative guidelines, leave rest to courts
- f. Split authority between FCC and States

7. Copyright

- a.. Propose special institutional arrangements for payments (like ASCAP, BMI)
- b. Do nothing
- c. Suggest legislation defining methods, amounts of payment

8. Public, Social, Educational, Government Uses

- a. Suggest establishment of large scale experimental programs
- b. Suggest Federal funding of some social uses
- c. Do nothing
- d. Suggest further study

9. Kinds of regulation

- a. Full licensing of cable systems (transmission) in the traditional common carrier mold
- b. Regulation of content (fairness, licenses) as in broadcasting
- c. Partial regulation in each of above areas through legislative guidelines enforced by courts
- d. No regulation in either area

10. Telephone Service

- a. Prohibit telephone companies from getting involved
- b. Allow full telephone company participation, but not on an exclusive basis
- c. Define services, functions which telephone company can/cannot perform
- d. Encourage direct competition between telephone and cable

Alternative Approaches

1. Do nothing
2. Propose major legislation
3. Suggest need for legislation, but propose none
4. State policy in letter to Congress/FCC, but do not propose legislation
5. Announce further study/task force

Major Substantive Alternatives

1. Take a major initiative in favor of cable/wired nation, pull out all stops, make this an issue of "progress versus vested interests"
2. Put full freeze on further cable development, either outright or through continued delay; come down squarely on side of broadcasters
3. Come out with a compromise solution, a "balanced" policy, allowing some cable growth, while providing some broadcast protection.

DAMATA, JASON

From: DAMATA, JASON
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2005 9:10 AM
To: 'tom@cw.com'
Cc: DAMATA, JASON
Subject: Sifting Through History--Box #3

Importance: High

Some of this stuff is fascinating! You are missing out on a good time!
Here is what I sorted through so far

Pre-OTP

1. Executive Branch and Spectrum Management

Materials dating back to the Eisenhower administration on the establishment of an Advisory Board.

2. Comsat

There are documented squabbles over

- Legislation Amending the 1962 Satellite Act.
- Ownership/oversight of the executive board,
- Industry structure and reach
- Oversight jurisdictions
- Domsat issues
- Government Use Issues
- AT&T and the fight over satellite entry into long distance telephony
- Talk of eliminating common carrier ownership of Comsat stock
- DOJ's anti-trust division had taken an interest
-

The players so far are

OTP--CTW, Goldberg

Don Baker-DOJ

Joe Charyk--President of Comsat

John Martin--VP of Comsat

Dean Burch and Bernie Strassburg-FCC

Henry Cartucci--Western Union

Howard White--ITT

Howard Hawkins--RCA

Battle, Ashern, Crosland--AT&T

Sen. Gravel

The most interesting thing to me is

There was a movement to force AT&T to sell its stock and relinquish its stake in Comsat. Meanwhile there is media hype about Comsat becoming a competitor in the long distance market (since the MCI decision). The executive branch appointed 3 seats on the Board of Directors in perpetuity.

OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 15, 1971

DIRECTOR

Honorable John O. Pastore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Pastore:

You have asked me to provide you with the Administration's views on the FCC's cable television proposals, as well as Administration recommendations resulting from the work of the special Cabinet Committee on broadband cable. Since the Committee will not address specifically the FCC's proposed conditions of distant-signal carriage, and since it will in any event not complete its work for several more weeks, I am replying separately to your first request.

The Administration's views on the FCC proposals can be summarized as follows:

- (1) It is highly desirable that the "freeze" on cable development in the major markets be eliminated, and that the new medium be permitted to proceed with its growth as soon as possible in an atmosphere conducive to stability and cooperation among the various interests involved in providing program services to the public.
- (2) Those matters pertaining to cable retransmission of broadcast television signals which the FCC has addressed (i.e., permissible distant signals, definition of local signals and "anti-leapfrogging") involve the type of substantive determination which, within broad limits, is best resolved by an administrative agency. Those proposals should be supplemented, however, with provisions applicable to radio signals and with restrictions upon importation of copyrighted programming.
- (3) The balance of the proposals, including the division of federal-state authority over broadband cable services are predicated on unclear authority and address issues of major national concern which will ultimately determine the form and structure of the new industry. Implementation of these proposals should not be allowed to preclude thorough Congressional review of the fundamental policy questions which the Cabinet Committee is considering.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the FCC's authority to impose those regulatory requirements on cable television that are "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." The FCC's proposals dealing with carriage of television broadcast signals clearly fall within this authority. Accordingly, there is no question of the FCC's power to resolve such issues as the definition of "local" signals, the appropriate number of distant signals to be carried by cable systems, and restrictions on the points of origin of distant signals (i.e., "anti-leapfrogging").

We have no substantive comments on these aspects of the proposed rules. These provisions are intended to provide cable with an opportunity for immediate growth, while protecting the economic viability of our "over-the-air" television broadcast system. They involve judgmental determinations of the type which, within broad limits, Congress must of necessity leave to the discretion of its regulatory agencies. What is essential, as far as the broadcast-carriage proposals are concerned, is that there be prompt adoption of a regulatory approach which will receive general acceptance, thereby enabling the sound growth of the industry to proceed.

There are, however, several problems which these broadcast-related proposals leave unresolved: first, there is the problem of the importation of distant radio signals, and second, the problem of exclusivity protection for copyrighted television programming.


Leaders of the affected industries have recently reached an agreement regarding provisions that deal with these concerns and also involve minor modifications of some broadcast-related items already included in the Commission's proposals. If reflected in the Commission's final rules, this agreement would fully meet our concerns regarding radio and copyright. Absent this accord on the final rules, there is serious risk that an end to the freeze will be delayed by challenges in the courts and Congressional hearings on these matters. We believe the public interest would not be served by such developments.

Turning now to those aspects of the proposals which go beyond the conditions of cable retransmission of over-the-air signals, relating to broadband cable as a communications medium in its own right: These aspects of the proposed rules (together with existing rules and further contemplated rulemakings) involve such matters as Federal preemption of state and local control, the extent of FCC supervision of programming, limitations on numbers of channels, flexibility with respect to new services, and prescribed channel usage. These and other matters of like

importance will shape the economic structure, and indeed the character, of the new medium. They are the subject of the Cabinet Committee's work and will ultimately require careful Congressional consideration. The Commission itself has noted that the recent Midwest Video case casts doubt upon the legality of this type of regulation, and it has requested Congressional clarification. Similarly, we believe the 1934 Communications Act provides inadequate guidance for the regulation of broadband cable communications. Therefore, while we favor immediate implementation of the proposed rules in order to permit the growth of cable television, our recommendation is based upon the hope and expectation that Congress will address these fundamental aspects of broadband cable policy at an appropriate time, before the economics of the industry and the character of the medium have become irreversibly set in the mold contemplated by the Commission.

As you have stated, cable television involves many fundamental and complex policy matters of national importance. Until they can be resolved by due Congressional deliberation, we believe the public interest will best be served by ending the cable "freeze" through adoption of the FCC proposals. This course of action will enable the Congress to give its full attention at a later time to the major issues involved in the future of broadband communications services without further delaying the expansion of cable television service for the American people.

Sincerely,



Clay T. Whitehead

REMARKS OF

Clay T. Whitehead, Director

**Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President**

at the

**Regional Conference of
The National Association of Broadcasters**

**Dallas, Texas
November 17, 1971**

Last Wednesday the Boards of both the cable television association and the NAB compromised many of their differences and agreed to support significant modifications in the FCC's proposals for ending the distant signal freeze. On Thursday, the MST Board voted to go along and we learned that the major program production companies had also agreed. As news, this is pretty stale, as history it's very current, and it could be a most significant milestone for the electronic media. Today I'd like to tell you why I think this assessment is not extravagant.

First, how was it accomplished? Let's face it--broadcasters and copyright owners were ready for a settlement once it became apparent that cable's star at the FCC was on the ascendancy. Cable operators chose certainty and a quick end to the freeze rather than endless challenges to their right to exist. This is not to say, however, that the outcome of the settlement discussions was a certainty. There were some very doubtful moments. Obtaining agreement on the details of the compromise among the disparate factions in each industry was a difficult and, some thought impossible, task. It was accomplished by extraordinary leadership on the part of industry representatives. I can't give them enough credit. We in government, especially Chairman Burch and his staff, worked with the industry leaders, but it was truly an industry effort in which government cooperated.

The substantive details of the settlement dealt with the bread and butter issues of the number of distant signals, the definition of a local signal under the significant viewing standard, and leapfrogging restrictions. These types of determinations are best resolved by the affected industries and the FCC. OTP did not impose its judgment on how these matters should be decided. We simply felt they should be decided without a free-for-all in the Congress and the courts. We felt that the public had a substantial interest in having the industry representatives agree on provisions that would permit cable to expand its program services to many new areas, while preserving the continued availability of programming offered by local television broadcast stations. This goal has been achieved.

The settlement also achieves other important public interest goals. It deals for the first time with the problems of radio distant signal importation and provides exclusivity protection for copyrighted television programs. The settlement assures the economic viability of the existing television program production companies and encourages new ones to enter the field by enabling them to collect copyright fees from cable operators and to sell adequate exclusivity protection to broadcasters. The public has a substantial interest in fostering a diversity of program supply sources in this manner.

Copyright and programming were central to the compromise. This reflects the view that government policy must treat the electronic media from the public's viewpoint. We do this when we focus on the program services offered and not the means of transmission.

But where's the programming going to come from? What incentives are we going to use to encourage new program sources? Will the availability of many channels simply illuminate the scarcity of attractive programs or will it spur the development of programs of a kind not feasible today? These are the appropriate questions government can ask about programs--not how can we manipulate each station's or cable system's programming, but how can we encourage program diversity and choice so we won't have to manipulate content.

The compromise gets cable growth underway and enables us to turn our attention to this type of very basic, longer range problem. To get back to my opening point, I see this as the real significance of the settlement. With the skirmishing on distant signals, footnote 69, and leapfrogging out of the way, we can concentrate on how broadband cable can become an integral part of our communications media.

This basic issue is being actively considered by the Administration. I recently wrote to Senator Pastore, Representative Staggers and other Congressional leaders giving

them our views on the FCC proposals. Let me summarize them briefly for you:

- (1) We said the "freeze" on cable development should be eliminated and cable should be allowed to grow in an atmosphere conducive to stability and cooperation among the various interests providing program services to the public.
- (2) We also supported modification of the proposals regarding cable retransmission of broadcast signals, as agreed upon in the settlement reached by the parties.
- (3) We ended by sounding a note of caution concerning the balance of the FCC proposals--the ones that don't relate to the requirements for cable carriage of broadcast signals, but aim to mold cable as a new communications medium in its own right. While we favor immediate implementation of the FCC proposals, we recommended that the Congress carefully review these broadband policy issues before the economic structure and the character of the new medium becomes irreversibly shaped by the FCC's proposals.

This means that cable should get going immediately to offer distant signals, build new markets and attract the investment capital it will need for its growth. We have not

yet stated our views on the desirability of the direction for that growth chosen by the Commission. We think that the issues posed by broadband cable must be resolved by the Congress, since there is no statutory guidance for the FCC on how to deal with these issues. While this should not delay implementation of the cable rules, in our view, the Congress will have to give its full attention at a not too distant time to the fundamental and complex policy issues involved in the future of broadband communications.

Broadcasters have an important role to play in the future--and not as cable's adversaries. Broadcasters, cable operators and program production companies are parts of one industry--an industry that provides programming to the public. That's how the public views you. That's how government policy should treat you. If we fail to establish such a policy, broadcasters and cable owners will be pitted against each other and each compromise will be harder to get. It will become a matter of economic survival and then compromise will be impossible. More importantly, we can't predicate media development on a series of short-range compromises. We need a policy and we need Congressional assistance in creating one. This should be our mutual goal.

DEC 8 1969

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1969


MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. John Ehrlichman

Attached are:

- (1) A discussion of the executive branch organization for telecommunications and a recommended reorganization.
- (2) A description of the responsibilities of a new
× Office of Telecommunications Policy.

Both the Bureau of the Budget and the staff of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization have assisted in the preparation of this recommendation. We would like to have your comments before submitting a final recommendation to the President. I would appreciate having your comments by December 13.


Peter Flanigan
Assistant to the President

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	E.O. 12958
By	ATARA Date 11/16/04

EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATION FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS

In spite of the rapidly growing importance of telecommunications to the Nation and for the government's own missions, there is no effective policy-making capability for telecommunications in the executive branch. The Administration is therefore largely unable to exert leadership or take initiatives in spite of vulnerability to criticism for FCC policies. Government-wide coordination of its own telecommunications activities has not been adequate. These problems have been manifested in several ways:

1. There is a serious lack of effective machinery for dealing expeditiously with domestic telecommunications issues. The government has been grappling for several years, with only limited success, with such issues as "foreign attachments" to the public telephone network, cable TV and pay TV, the possible uses and industry structure for a domestic satellite communications system, and policies for computer communications. There is a current tendency to resolve such issues by past precedents and by compromises between the FCC and various agencies in the executive branch, but the increasingly rapid rate of technological change and introduction of new services makes policy-by-precedent increasingly less relevant, more restrictive, or counterproductive. Neither the FCC nor the executive branch has a significant capability for systematic economic and technical analysis.
2. Efforts to coordinate the procurement and use of telecommunications facilities and services by the Federal government have had limited success. The current coordination arrangements, embodied in the National Communications System (NCS) structure, have achieved certain desirable interconnections and operating procedures, but have not produced the desired assurances that the government is procuring the services needed in an efficient manner. Although present policies call for a "unified" NCS, there is little agreement on what further unification is needed, or what it would cost or accomplish.
3. The current procedures for spectrum allocation are highly inflexible and are increasingly creating a spectrum shortage crisis. The shortage is especially severe in the land mobile radio allocations, which are becoming increasingly important to local police and fire protection services, among many other claimants.

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Authority	<u>EO 12958</u>
By	<u>ATARA</u> Date <u>11/16/04</u>

Current organization for communications policy-making and coordination


The Director of Telecommunications Management (DTM) in the Office of Emergency Preparedness is now charged by Executive Order and Presidential memorandum with the responsibility for coordinating telecommunications activities in the executive branch. The DTM also is designated Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications. However, the history of the organization reveals that attempts by the DTM to exercise leadership in communications policy have been largely ineffectual. The responsibilities and authority of the DTM are questioned by agencies with operating responsibilities. This situation results from a number of factors including organizational location, inadequate staff, and lack of clear authority.

There is now no office in the executive branch with the responsibility or the capability to review the whole range of national telecommunications policies as expressed in legislation and in FCC policies. The Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice has occasionally filed briefs on the competitive aspects of decisions before the FCC, but these derive largely from antitrust considerations rather than from familiarity with communications issues. The Department of Commerce has a telecommunications research capability, but no responsibility or familiarity with communications policy. Neither the Council of Economic Advisers nor the Office of Science and Technology are equipped to address the fundamental economic and institutional problems of the communications industry and its regulation by the FCC, or the problems of the government's own telecommunications.

Studies of Federal organization

Since World War II, there have been a number of studies of Federal communications organization and a number of reorganizations and shifts of responsibilities within the executive branch. None has proved particularly satisfactory, and, indeed, there is no ideal solution. This is due in part to the quasi-independence of the FCC from the executive branch and in part to the conflicting individual agency mission responsibilities within the executive branch.

The study of the Federal government communications organization completed in December 1968 by the Bureau of the Budget provides




a good statement of the shortcomings of our current organization. The Bureau of the Budget reported a need for:

- (1) a strengthened organization for policy planning, formulation and direction of Federal communications activities.
- (2) a reorganized and strengthened National Communications System (NCS) within the Department of Defense.
- (3) an improved procurement and technical assistance effort in communications on behalf of those Federal agencies which do not now have adequate resources in this field.
- (4) a unified frequency spectrum management process.
- (5) a coordinated technical assistance program for State and local government in this area.

The recently released report of the Government Accounting Office focused on the government's communications and evaluated the progress toward establishment of a unified National Communications System as directed by the President in 1963. The GAO found a need for stronger coordination of government telecommunications planning, and recommended a single entity be responsible for policy direction and control of the Government's telecommunications systems. The GAO also recommended clarification of what a "unified" NCS is intended to be.

Reorganization issues

The Budget Bureau study of Federal communications organization made a number of major recommendations and was recently distributed to the departments concerned. Agency views on this study have the common themes (1) that stronger coordination from the top is required in establishing Government policy for its own telecommunications requirements, and (2) that the Federal government should take a stronger role in the evolution of national telecommunications to deal with the increasingly rapid rate of technological change and industry growth. There is also agreement that a much stronger analytic capability within the executive branch is needed to achieve these goals.




There are a variety of possible ways in which telecommunications responsibilities could be reshuffled or strengthened. As a starting point, there is widespread agreement that a single office should bear ultimate responsibility for:

- (1) analyses and formulation of overall telecommunications policy for the executive branch.
- (2) policy-level coordination of Federal government procurement and use of telecommunications services and equipment.
- (3) allocation and assignment of spectrum resources to government users.

There are several further issues.

The first is where such a single office should be located. There are two competing sets of considerations. Further expansion of telecommunications activities within the Executive Office of the President would force undesirable growth in the size of the Executive Office of the President, while telecommunications does not require the frequent direct Presidential attention implied by a location within the Executive Office. On the other hand, placing the central office within an executive department (e. g., Commerce or Transportation) raises serious questions about the impartiality of frequency allocation and assignment among government users and assurance of vital national security interests. Both sides of this issue have considerable merit, but from the standpoint of practicality and the need to minimize even temporary disruptions of our policy machinery, the policy functions should for the time being remain in the Executive Office. However, as much of the operational and research responsibilities as possible should be carried out in the departments and agencies.

Another issue is whether the authority to allocate and assign frequency spectrum to nongovernment uses, now vested in the FCC, should be transferred to the central, executive branch policy office.



Consolidation of spectrum allocation authority would permit greater flexibility in assignment policies and eventually, even more efficient spectrum use. However, such a move requires legislation, it raises concerns about political interference in the assignment of frequencies, and it would inundate the new office with a highly routine workload. (The FCC now processes 800,000 applications yearly, compared to 37,000 now handled by the DTM.) For these reasons, immediate consolidation of these responsibilities is not recommended, but planning for eventual consolidation should be started.

A third issue concerns organizational arrangements for management of Federal communications networks to implement policy guidance. This is currently done through the National Communications System (NCS) structure. Both the BOB and GAO studies concluded that changes should be made in the NCS arrangements. However, the issues involved are too detailed and too complex to be settled in the context of reorganization of policy machinery. Therefore, the NCS arrangements should not be changed at this time, but should be studied as a priority matter by the new central policy office as soon as it is established. The study would review the objectives, system concepts, organizational arrangements, and effectiveness of the NCS structure, and should include a thorough examination by the National Security Council of national security objectives for telecommunications. Recommendations should be developed for the President regarding the best objectives and management arrangements for overall coordination of Federal telecommunications activities.

Recommendation


An Office of Telecommunications Policy should be established as an independent entity in the Executive Office of the President. The Director of this office, appointed by the President, would have primary executive branch responsibility for both national telecommunications policies and Federal administrative telecommunication operations. The responsibilities of the Office of Telecommunications Policy would include:

- economic, technical and systems analysis of telecommunications policies and opportunities in support of national policy formulation and U. S. participation in international telecommunications activities.
- developing executive branch policy on telecommunications matters including, but not limited to, industry organization and practices, regulatory policies, and the allocation and use of the electromagnetic spectrum for both government and nongovernment use.

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By	ATARA Date 11/16/04

- advocating executive branch policies to the FCC, and through the President to the Congress; and representing the executive branch in FCC proceedings.
- exercising final authority for the assignment of the spectrum to government users, and developing with the FCC a long-range plan for improved management of the total radio spectrum.
- reviewing and evaluating the research and development for, and planning, operation, testing, procurement, and use of all telecommunication systems and services by the Federal government; developing appropriate policies and standards for such systems; and making recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget and responsible departmental officials concerning the scope and funding of competing, overlapping, or inefficient programs.
- exercising the functions conferred on the President by the Communications Satellite Act.
- under the policy guidance of the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, coordinating plans and programs for testing of and preparing to the use of telecommunications resources in a state of national emergency.
- test, review, and report to the President, through the National Security Council, on the ability of national communications resources to meet established national security requirements efficiently and responsively.
- coordinating Federal assistance to state and local governments in the telecommunications field.

In performing these functions, the Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy, will be assisted by a small staff, augmented as required by: (1) ad hoc, interagency and nongovernment task groups, (2) independent consultants, (3) contract studies, (4) a new Telecommunications Research and Analysis Center, (5) the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, and (6) a new Telecommunications Advisory Committee composed of experts from outside of the government. So long as the NCS structure is retained, he will also be assisted by the Executive Agent of the NCS.



-7-

A Telecommunications Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) should be established in the Department of Commerce, reporting to the Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology. The TRAC would provide a centralized research, engineering, and analysis capability in support of spectrum management and such other areas as may be required. Specific functions of the TRAC would be to:

- conduct research and analysis in the general field of telecommunication sciences in support of other government agencies or in response to specific directives from the Office of Telecommunications Policy, with particular emphasis on radio propagation, radio systems characteristics, and operating techniques leading to improved utilization of the radio resource.
- develop and operate a national electromagnetic compatibility analysis facility under the general policy guidance of the Director, OTP.
- provide the administrative and technical support required by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee. This support will operate in accordance with policies and criteria laid down by the OTP, and will be responsive to OTP requests for information and special frequency assignment actions.

The Office of Telecommunications Policy should be established with an initial strength of up to 30 professionals, including up to 15 at super-grade levels. The position of Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy should be established at executive pay level III. Provision should be made within the budget of the office for adequate consulting fees and contractual support; and for administrative support to, and space for, task groups and personnel on short-term detail.

The Office of Telecommunications Management in the OEP should be abolished. All policy functions of that office not directly related to emergency preparedness should be transferred to the Office of Telecommunications Policy, along with appropriate emergency planning functions, final spectrum management authority, and NCS responsibilities. The major portion of the Frequency Management Directorate of the OTM should be transferred to the Department of Commerce to provide the technical and clerical support functions described above. The position of Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications should be abolished.

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The Office of Telecommunications Policy will exercise the policy functions of the Executive Office of the President with respect to the planning, integration, and emergency use of the telecommunications systems of the executive branch, subject to general policy guidance on appropriate matters from the National Security Council and the Director, OEP. This function will continue to be exercised through the mechanism of the National Communications System (NCS), until such time as changes in that mechanism are suggested by the policy review recommended above and approved by the President.

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By ATARA Date 11/16/04

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

The Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy develops the executive branch position on national telecommunications policy, coordinates the planning and operation of the telecommunications systems of the Federal government, discharges responsibilities assigned to the President in the areas of spectrum management and satellite communications, and performs emergency planning and control functions for telecommunications.


The Director serves as the President's principal advisor on telecommunications policy, including:

- (1) The organization, practices, and regulation of the U. S. domestic and international communications industry.
- (2) The allocation, use, and management of the radio spectrum resource for government use, and preparation of recommendations to the FCC on spectrum allocation for civilian use.
- (3) The preparation of U. S. positions for international communication conferences, conventions, and organizations.
- (4) Federal research and development programs in support of the above.

The Director assures that the executive branch position on telecommunication policy issues is effectively presented to the Congress and to the Federal Communications Commission in the form of legislative proposals, recommendations, and testimony as required.

The Director's responsibilities for the planning and operation of Federal government telecommunications systems include:

- (1) Development of government-wide standards for equipment and procedures, as required in the interest of economy or effectiveness.



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
- (2) Evaluation of the ability of national communications resources adequately and efficiently to meet established national security and emergency communications requirements.
- (3) Recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget concerning the funding of communications systems and research and development programs.
- (4) Preparation of guidelines for the most economical procurement of Federal telecommunications services.

The Director exercises the authority, delegated by the President, to assign radio frequencies for use by the government. He is assisted in this responsibility by the Telecommunications Research and Analysis Center to be established in the Department of Commerce and the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee. He carries out the responsibilities conferred on the President by the Communications Satellite Act. The Director coordinates the development of plans and programs for the mobilization and use of telecommunications resources in an emergency, and prepares to administer national telecommunications resources in the event of war under the overall policy guidance of the Director, OEP.

The Director coordinates assistance in telecommunications matters provided by the Federal government to State and local governments. He appoints scientists, engineers, and economists from outside government to advise on telecommunications matters.

To carry out these responsibilities, the Director must have the following qualifications:

- (1) A thorough grasp of the social, economic, engineering, and national security factors which must be considered in formulating telecommunications policies and standards.
- (2) Familiarity with telecommunications needs and opportunities of government, industry, and the public, and with the structure of private and governmental telecommunications institutions, both national and international.



- (3) The ability to initiate and coordinate telecommunications policy matters on an interdepartmental basis in cooperation with industry and public interest groups, and to define and analyze those key policy issues requiring Presidential involvement.
- (4) The ability to direct studies utilizing systems analysis, systems engineering, and economics needed for the systematic analysis of telecommunications policies and opportunities, their impact, their effectiveness, and their costs.

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By AT NARA Date 11/16/04

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June 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL O'CONNELL

NF.
Thank you for your memorandum of June 16th regarding correspondence between your office and NASA on the procurement of communications satellite service to support the Apollo program.

Your position seems eminently reasonable with regard to the timing of a conference with the terrestrial carriers. However, I still have reservations about the authorized user question and the question of certification of national interest. I would like to discuss this with you before a final decision is reached in this matter.

Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files

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CENTRAL FILES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN 

Attached is a thoughtful memorandum which I asked Tom Whitehead to prepare on NASA. One obvious use of this memorandum is to give it to the new Administrator when he comes on board (I am expecting that Jim Fletcher will take the job in about four weeks). x

You will particularly note the discussion starting in the middle of page two regarding international cooperation in space. I suggest that either you or I, or both of us, talk to the President about this before we get ourselves too deeply committed. If the President is not, as I suspect, committed to the current sharing program, then I think I should immediately get George Low in and discuss with him the kind of international cooperation that is desired.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 6, 1971

DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER FLANIGAN

This Administration has never really faced up to where we are going in Space. NASA, with some help from the Vice President, made a try in 1969 to get the President committed to an "ever-onward-and-upward" post-Apollo program with continued budget growth into the \$6-10 billion range. We were successful in holding that off at least temporarily, but we have not developed any theme or consistency in policy. As a result, NASA is both drifting and lobbying for bigger things -- without being forced to focus realistically on what it ought to be doing. They are playing the President's vaguely defined desire for international cooperation for all it's worth, and no one is effectively forcing them to put their cooperative schemes in any perspective of whether they are good or not so good, what are their side effects, and are they worth the candle. For the last two years, we have cut the NASA budget, but they manage each year to get a "compromise" of a few hundred million on their shuttle and space station plans. Is the President really going to ignore a billion or so of sunk costs and industry expectations when he gets hit for the really big money in a year or two?

I will try to be constructive by sketching out a few thoughts on the subject that might suggest what we should do about all this.

NASA is -- or should be -- making a transition from rapid razzle-dazzle growth and glamor to organizational maturity and more stable operations for the long term. Such a transition requires wise and agile management at the top if it is to be achieved successfully. NASA has not had that. (Tom Paine may have had the ability, but he lacked the inclination -- preferring to aim for continued growth.) They have a tremendous overhead structure, far too large for any reasonable size space program, that will have to be reduced. There will be internal morale problems of obvious kinds. The bright young experts attracted by the Apollo adventure are leaving or becoming middle-aged bureaucrats with vested interests and narrow perspectives. (Remember when atomic power was a young glamor technology? Look at AEC now and you see what NASA could easily become.)

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There needs to be a sense of direction, both publicly and within NASA. The President's statement on the seventies in space laid the groundwork, but no one is following up. What do we expect of a space program? We need to define a balance of science, technology development, applications, defense, international prestige and the like; but someone will have to do that in a way that really controls the program rather than vice-versa. In particular, we need a new balance of manned and unmanned space activity, for that one dimension has big implications for everything else. We need a more sensible balance of overhead expenditures and money for actual hardware and operations; the aerospace industry could be getting a lot more business than they are, I suspect, with the same overall NASA budget if we could get into all that overhead.

NASA is aggressively pursuing European funding for their post-Apollo program. It superficially sounds like the "cooperation" the President wants, but is this what the President would really want if we really thought it through? We have not yet decided what we want our post-Apollo program to be or how fast it will go, but if NASA successfully gets a European commitment of \$1 billion, the President and the Congress will have been locked into NASA's grand plans because the political cost of reneging would be too high. I assume the President wants space cooperation as a way of building good will and reducing international tensions. But it does not follow that all joint ventures will have that effect. INTELSAT, for example, is a fully cooperative space venture and less political than the post-Apollo effort now envisaged would be, but most would agree it has been more of a headache than a joy and has created new tensions and contentions rather than good will and constructive working relationships. Finally, the U.S. trade advantage in the future will increasingly depend on our technological know-how. The kind of cooperation now being talked up will have the effect of giving away our space launch, space operations, and related know-how at 10 cents on the dollar. It does seem to me that taking space operations out of the political realm and putting it more nearly in the commercial area would diminish international bickering and give U.S. high technology industries the advantages and opportunities they deserve; this may or may not prove fully feasible, but the point is, no one in this Administration is seriously trying to find out.

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The key thing missing, I think, is management attention to these issues. We need a new Administrator who will turn down NASA's empire-building fervor and turn his attention to (1) sensible straightening away of internal management and (2) working with OMB and White House to show us what broad but concrete alternatives the President has that meet all his various objectives. In short, we need someone who will work with us rather than against us, and will seek progress toward the President's stated goals, and will shape the program to reflect credit on the President rather than embarrassment. We need a generalist who can understand dedicated technical experts rather than the opposite. But we also need someone in the Executive Office who has the time, inclination, and authority to coordinate policy aspects. Separate handling of political, budget, technical, and international aspects of NASA planning here means that we have no effective control over the course of events because all these aspects are interrelated.

We really ought to decide if we mean to muddle through on space policy for the rest of the President's term in office or want to get serious about it.




Clay T. Whitehead

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1970

TO: Mr. Tom Whitehead
FROM: Willis H. Shapley

These are the changes George Low and I recommended to you on
the phone at Dr. Paine's request.



Willis H. Shapley

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Authority E.O. 12958
By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

NASA Changes on
p. 4, p. 5, p. 7, & a brief Whitehead copy
for p. 8
 (Huebner) JK


March 4, 1970

Proposed Statement on the Future Of
the U. S. Space Program

Over the last decade, the principal goal of our nation's space program has been the Moon. By the end of that decade men from our planet had traveled to the Moon on four occasions and twice they had walked on its surface. With these unforgettable experiences, we have gained a new perspective on ourselves and our world.

I believe these accomplishments should help us gain a new perspective on our space program as well. Having completed that long stride into the future which has been our objective for the past decade, we must now define new goals which make sense for the Seventies. We must build on the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements. But we must also recognize that many critical problems here on this planet make higher priority demands on our attention and our resources. By no means should we allow our space program to stagnate. But -- with the entire future and the entire universe before us -- we should not try to do everything at once. Our approach to space must continue to be bold -- but it must also be balanced.

When this Administration came into office, there were no clear, comprehensive plans for our space program after the first Apollo landing. To help remedy this situation, I established in February of 1969 a Space Task Group, headed by the Vice President, to study



-2-

possibilities for the future of that program. Their report was presented to me in September. After reviewing that report and considering our national priorities, I have reached a number of conclusions concerning the future pace and direction of the nation's space efforts. The budget recommendations which I have sent to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971 are based on these conclusions.

Three General Purposes

In my judgment, three general purposes should guide our space program.

One purpose is exploration. From time immemorial, man has insisted on venturing into the unknown despite his inability to predict precisely the value of any given exploration. He has been willing to take risks, willing to be surprised, willing to adapt to new experiences. Man has come to feel that such quests are worthwhile in and of themselves -- for they represent one way in which he expands his vision and expresses the human spirit. A great nation must always be an exploring nation if it wishes to remain great.

A second purpose of our space program is scientific knowledge -- a greater systematic understanding about ourselves and our universe. With each of our space ventures, man's total information about nature has been dramatically expanded; the human race was able

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Authority E.O. 12958By SG NARA Date 1/22/04


to learn more about the Moon and Mars in a few hours last summer than had been learned in all the centuries that had gone before. The people who perform this important work are not only those who walk in spacesuits while millions watch or those who launch powerful rockets in a burst of flame. Much of our scientific progress comes in laboratories and offices, where dedicated, inquiring men and women decipher new facts and add them to old ones in ways which reveal new truths.

The abilities of these scientists constitute one of our most valuable national resources. I believe that our space program should help these people in their work and should be attentive to their suggestions.

A third purpose of the United States space effort is that of practical application -- turning the lessons we learn in space to the early benefit of life on Earth. Examples of such lessons are manifold; they range from new medical insights to new methods of communication, from better weather forecasts to new management techniques and new ways of providing energy. But these lessons will not apply themselves; we must make a concerted effort to see that the results of our space research are used to the maximum advantage of the human community:

A Continuing Process

We must see our space effort, then, not only as an adventure



-4-

of today but also as an investment in tomorrow. We did not go to the Moon merely for the sport of it. To be sure, those undertakings have provided an exciting adventure for all mankind and we are proud that it was our nation that met this challenge. But the most important thing about man's first footsteps on the Moon is what they promise for the future.

We must realize that space activities will be a part of our lives for the rest of time. We must think of them as part of a continuing process -- one which will go on day in and day out, year in and year out -- and not as a series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration of energy and will and accomplished on a crash timetable. Our space program should not be planned in a rigid manner, decade by decade, but on a continuing flexible basis, one which takes into account our changing needs and our expanding knowledge.

We must also realize that space expenditures must take their proper place within a rigorous system of national priorities. What we do in space from here on in must become a normal and regular part of our national life and must therefore be planned in conjunction with all of the other undertakings which are also important to us. The space budget which I have sent to Congress for Fiscal Year 1971 is lower than the budget for Fiscal Year 1970, a condition which

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By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

reflects the fiscal constraints under which we presently operate and the competing demands of other programs. I am confident, however, that the funding I have proposed will allow our space program to make steady and impressive progress.

Six Specific Objectives

With these general considerations in mind, I have concluded that our space program should work toward the following specific objectives:

1. We should continue to explore the Moon. Future Apollo manned lunar landings will be spaced so as to maximize our scientific return from each mission, always providing, of course, for the safety of those who undertake these ventures. Our decisions about manned and unmanned lunar voyages beyond the Apollo program will be based on the results of these missions.
2. We should move ahead with bold exploration of the planets and the universe. In the next few years, scientific satellites of many types will be launched into Earth orbit to bring us new information about the universe, the solar system, and even our own planet. During the next decade, we will also launch unmanned spacecraft to all the planets of our solar system, including an unmanned vehicle which will be sent to land on Mars and to investigate its surface. In the late

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1970s, the "Grand Tour" missions will study the mysterious outer planets of the solar system -- Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. The positions of the planets at that time will give us a unique opportunity to launch missions which can visit several of them on a single flight of over three billion miles. Preparations for this program will begin in 1972.

There is ^{major but} one longer range goal we should keep in mind as we proceed with our exploration of the planets. As a part of this program we ^{will} eventually send men to explore the planet Mars.

3. We should work to reduce substantially the cost of space operations. Our present rocket technology will provide a reliable launch capability for some time. But as we build for the longer-range future, we must devise less costly and less complicated ways of transporting payloads into space. Such a capability -- designed so that it will be suitable for a wide range of scientific, defense and commercial uses -- can help us realize important economies in all aspects of our space program. ^{desires} [We are currently examining in greater detail the feasibility of re-usable space shuttles as one way of achieving this objective.]*

4. We should seek to extend man's capability to live and work in space. The Experimental Space Station (XSS) -- a large orbiting

* Replace with insert #1 attached

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 By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

Insert 1 to replace last sentence of par. 3 on page 6

We are currently examining the design of a reusable space shuttle that could evolve into a new space capability. With this capability, we could fully exploit and use space for the benefit of all mankind and at the same time substantially reduce the cost of space operations.

(Wording adapted from Page 99 of the FY 71 Budget.)

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Authority E.O. 12958
By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

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workshop -- will be an important part of this effort. We are now building such a station -- using systems originally developed for the Apollo program -- and plan to begin using it for operational missions in the next few years. We expect that men will be working in space for months at a time during the coming decade.

We have much to learn about what man can and cannot do in space. On the basis of our experience with the XSS, we will decide when and how to develop longer-lived space stations. Flexible, long-lived space station modules could provide a multi-purpose space platform for the longer-range future and ultimately become a building block for manned interplanetary travel.

5. We should hasten and expand the practical applications of space technology. The development of earth resources satellites -- platforms which can help in such varied tasks as surveying crops, locating mineral deposits and measuring water resources -- will enable us to assess our environment and use our resources more effectively. We should continue to pursue other applications of space-related technology in a wide variety of fields, including meteorology, communications, navigation, air traffic control, education and national defense. The very act of reaching into space can help man improve the quality of life on Earth.

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By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

6. We should encourage greater international cooperation in space. In my address to the United Nations last September, I indicated that the United States will take positive, concrete steps "toward internationalizing man's epic venture into space -- an adventure that belongs not to one nation but to all mankind." I believe that both the adventures and the applications of space missions should be shared by all peoples. Our progress will be faster and our accomplishments will be greater if nations will join together in this effort, both in contributing the resources and in enjoying the benefits. ^{insert attached} The Administrator of NASA recently met with the space authorities of Western Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia in an effort to find ways in which we can cooperate more effectively in space.

* * *

It is important, I believe, that the space program of the United States meet these six objectives. A program which achieves these goals will be a balanced space program, one which will extend our capabilities and knowledge and one which will put our new learning to work for the immediate benefit of all people.

As we enter a new decade, we are conscious of the fact that man is also entering a new historic era. For the first time, he has reached beyond his planet; for the rest of time, we will think of ourselves as

(* see change)

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INSERT ON PAGE 8

Unmanned scientific payloads from other nations already
make use of our space launch capability on a cost-shared
basis; we look forward to the day when these arrangements can
be extended to larger ^{space projects} applications satellites and astronaut crews.

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By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

March 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Thomas O. Paine
March 7, 1969

I. PURPOSE

To discuss your statement on the future of the space program prior to its release and Dr. Paine's press briefing.


II. BACKGROUND

This statement has been under discussion with NASA, OST, BOB, and the Vice President's office for the past three months. It is designed primarily to put space in perspective vis-a-vis our other priorities and to set forth a rationale for planning the future direction of the space program. The statement complements the specific program information presented in the FY 1971 budget submission. Many of NASA's suggestions have been incorporated, but not all.

III. POINTS OF DISCUSSION

There is no need for you to raise any of the following issues at this time. They are presented for your information in case Dr. Paine raises them.

- A. Dr. Paine may discuss his trips abroad to explore opportunities for more international cooperation in space. Both Mr. Flanigan and Mr. Kissinger's staffs have been working with NASA, and this area turns out to be more difficult than might be expected.



-2-

RECOMMENDATION

That you encourage Dr. Paine to continue his efforts, but stress the need for a firm economic and technical foundation to be laid before too many expectations are raised publicly.

- B. He may also raise the extent of your commitment to the future development of the re-usable space shuttle. The development cost estimates for this program are very high and quite uncertain.

RECOMMENDATION

That you stress the need to consider a full range of options and make design and development decisions only after more technological and cost unknowns are resolved.


IV. POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE

The tone of the space statement is important. While it includes a number of specific program initiatives, the thrust is more explanatory of a rationale than a listing of major initiatives.

RECOMMENDATION

That you emphasize this point to Dr. Paine and suggest he address the rationale as well as program initiatives in his press briefing.

Peter M. Flanigan





NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

File

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

December 12, 1970

Honorable Peter M. Flanigan
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Peter:

There are two important points which bear on the President's posture on the NASA program, and which I had especially hoped to discuss with you: (1) the relationship of the NASA program and budget to the problem of unemployment in aerospace and related fields, and (2) the disturbing implications of current trends in Soviet space activity compared to the U.S. that have emerged during recent months.

Unemployment and the NASA Budget

The decline in the NASA budget in the past four years has been a major cause of the current unemployment in aerospace and related fields. From 1966 to 1968 the impact was largely offset by increases in Defense-related work. Since 1968 the impact has been strongly felt and today 97% of the people affected by a NASA cut are laid off by their companies. Charts 1 and 2 show NASA contractor manpower data.

NASA work is highly labor intensive by nature. In general, each \$100 million increment in the NASA annual budget results in the direct employment of about 4,500 people. (It is also generally accepted that there is a multiplying factor of four on employment, so that a \$100 million increment indirectly affects an additional 18,000 people.)


NASA money is quick in taking effect whether up or down. Because the facilities and management structure required to carry out programs are in existence, a small increment in the NASA budget can have a prompt and substantial impact to increase employment.

Trends in Soviet Space Activities

The Soviet Luna 16 and 17 flights and recent earth orbital missions have again pointed to the strong continuing Soviet effort in space.

When viewed as isolated events, Luna 16, with its automatic sample return, and Luna 17, with its self-propelled vehicle Lunokhod, are

cc: *Wiel Kriegeman - 12/14/70*



technically impressive; but their import to science and technology is relatively minor. We demonstrated United States leadership with Apollo 11, and that lead is still ours.

However, when viewed in the context of overall trends in the Soviet space program and in ours, there is every indication that we will not maintain this lead. They have launched 81 payloads into orbit to our 32 this year (see Chart 3). Their R&D effort is increasing, while ours is decreasing. They are competing in every area of space flight in a program that is more aggressive than ours.

The Soviet space program, like our own, recognizes that manned flights offer important advantages in exploration and in other complex missions. They have a continuing manned program, appear to be increasing their manned capabilities, and are supporting a total space program containing strong manned and unmanned components. A major Soviet earth orbital manned space station during the gap in U.S. manned space flight is a real possibility.

These trends in the USSR program strongly underline the importance for the President to take a positive position in the coming year on space as recommended in my memorandum of November 30, 1970.


I am still hoping that we will be able to discuss these and other matters.

Sincerely yours,



George M. Low
Acting Administrator

Enclosures



NASA EMPLOYMENT AT SELECTED MAJOR CONTRACTORS

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 By SG NARA Date 1/22/04








CHART 2




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CHART 3

EARTH ORBITAL, LUNAR & PLANETARY PAYLOADS USA & USSR

AS OF 5 DECEMBER 1970



SOURCE: SATELLITE SITUATION REPORT

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By SA NARA Date 1/22/07

EXECUTIVE

FI4/FG164
FG164THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN KNUBEL

FROM: JON ROSE

Attached is a copy of the Fletcher package which will be coming over to HAK's office this evening. As I expressed, the key issue is as follows:

OMB analysis has indicated that the only way to reach the overall desired mark for NASA of \$3.047 billion is to cancel the Viking-Mars landing mission scheduled to arrive in 1976. NASA has, in my judgment, very constructively responded to what even OMB agrees is a stringent mark based on its guidance to them last year. It very nearly reaches the OMB mark but does so by canceling projects less related to its central mission of planetary exploration than Viking.

I think Henry's principal concern here would be that whatever our budgetary level for NASA during the current year is, it conveys a continuing sense of direction and coherence to the American presence in space. Through the results of the entire fiscal straits we face we are in severe danger of presenting a program which has no clear and defined purpose.

The attached letters I believe reflect this problem adequately. When you have had a chance to read them would you kindly let me know.

March 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN

I have prepared the attached brief for the meeting of Dr. Paine with the President in case it is decided that Paine will meet with the President prior to his press briefing on the space statement.


I think it would be desirable for the President to meet with Paine for a short time. However, I would urge that this not be an occasion for Paine to attempt to talk the President into re-interpretations of the Message, since we are not yet ready to make any further commitments on NASA programs.

Peter M. Flanigan
Assistant to the President

Attachments

cc: Mr. Flanigan ✓
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files
Mr. Kriegsman

CTWhitehead:ed



January 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PETER M. FLANIGAN
FROM: JON ROSE
SUBJECT: NASA

In line with my earlier memorandum, I believe that we should de-emphasize your personal involvement with NASA as well as mine as much as possible.

I will undertake to do this. I do not believe a monthly lunch with Fletcher is too much but anything beyond that will simply have to be handled by someone else.

For the sake of the record between you and me, I believe it appropriate to set forth my views on the general subject of NASA in order to make clear that I have not been turned into a space cadet by my contact with the aerospace industry during the California unemployment effort. Through a rather indirect process I believe we have arrived at a predictable level of \$3 billion space budget over the next few years, down from a nearly \$6 billion level during the heydays of the Johnson Administration and the Apollo program. Perhaps the amount should be less, but I think our office and particularly Tom Whitehead can take credit for getting it down this low. My suspicion is without having intensely studied the matter that we would not have a viable space program if the level were too much lower than it is now. I believe for the foreseeable future we must have an effective program if for no other reason that that the Russians are continuing to have one. You may have forgotten momentarily the great stir that was created in 1957. It is certainly conceivable that another breakthrough of that type could cause a similar stir in the 1970s. I am far from convinced that the military uses of space have been exhausted.

If we are going to have a space program, I believe that both NASA and the aerospace industry are entitled to have some notion in general of what the level of federal effort in that program will be. I believe that we have now arrived at that point. We were being severely criticized for not having a viable space program over the last 18 months.

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With regard to the shuttle, I can only say the following. Ed David and Don Rice may well have been right that there existed a different cost curve than the one NASA was able to find for a shuttle with a smaller bay and lighter payload. I am quite clear that only their pressure forced the shuttle modifications which produced the massive savings from the August shuttle to the December shuttle. They were however unable to prove their case when it came to another billion dollars of potential savings if we delayed for several months more. While NASA may not historically have effectively studied the smaller shuttle I became convinced that Jim Fletcher had in the time given to him done the best he could. In the last analysis, that is all one can ask of an honest agency head. He should not be brutalized on a continuing basis by the budget process or by the White House Staff when such pressure appears to reach the point of diminishing returns.

I used to be much more awed by the products Alain Enthoven's system analysis office when I first arrived in Washington than I am now. He produced a group of highly disciplined thinkers prepared to take the shaky assumptions of weapons happy generals. This group is highly effective and its graduates include such people as Larry Lynn, John Court, and Phil Odeen all of whom have done excellent work for Henry Kissinger. However, in the circumstances, the essence of judgment is to know when to stop. I simply think Don Rice failed us here. He viewed the political situation as well as the plight of the contractors very lightly. He was far more interested in pursuing the marginal cost savings which his staff led him to believe were possible. This in turn finally led him to some highly shoddy tactics in ex parte lobbying which led me to the simple conclusion that I could not trust what he was saying unless NASA and he were both in the same room. This is not a charge which I make lightly; I simply observe it happening.

I believe we reached the best possible result under the circumstances. In a non-election year I might have seen the equation differently and been willing to wait several extra months to see if Rice was right. But I believe you have to play the ball from where it lies, and this is after all 1972. In the last analysis I am far from clear the Rice-David hypothesis could have been proven, but in another year I might have been willing to take the chance.

The above is my NASA apologia. I hope you don't find it overly disagreeable.



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

EXECUTIVE

FB 164

dm
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

March 18, 1969

Mr. John D. Ehrlichman
Counsel to the President
The White House

Dear Mr. Ehrlichman:

This is in reply to your request of March 15, 1969, for a description of present and reasonably probable future activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in certain areas:

1. Programs Involving Legislative Enactment - We have not proposed since January 20, 1969, nor do we now contemplate programs requiring new substantive legislation. NASA's requirements for legislation at this time are limited to the annual authorization required each year for our appropriations, and, of course, the appropriation legislation itself. Our needs here are discussed under the next item.
2. Programs to be Undertaken Pursuant to Existing Legislative Authority - I have recommended to the President that the authorizing legislation and FY 1970 Budget request now before Congress be amended to meet problems and take advantage of opportunities the Administration has at this time in the field of manned space flight. Enclosed are copies of my memorandum to the President of February 26, 1969, and his reply dated March 7, 1969. In accordance with my memorandum and the President's letter, my recommendations on manned space flight are now being considered by the Task Group established by the President on February 17, 1969. This group consists of the Vice President as Chairman, Secretary Seamans, Dr. DuBridge, and myself. Chairman Seaborg of AEC, Undersecretary Alexis Johnson of State, and the Director of the Budget are participating as observers. The Task Group is now scheduled to meet Saturday, March 22, 1969, to consider its recommendations to the President. Concurrently, the Bureau of the Budget is considering our proposed amendment to the FY 1970 Budget.

It is my hope that a Nixon Administration amendment to the FY 1970 Budget will be approved in time for the House Committee on Science and Astronautics to hold hearings before they report out the NASA FY 1970 authorization. Hearings on this bill are being completed this week and we understand the present intention of the Committee is to report the bill and attempt to secure floor action prior to the Easter recess.

3. Reorganization Within the Agency - I am now considering the need for organizational changes to provide within NASA a strong focal point to plan and eventually direct our work on the manned space station project discussed in my memorandum to the President of February 26, 1969. The nature and timing of this organizational change, and the degree of its significance from the standpoint of the President, will depend in part on the decisions of the President on the matters raised in that memorandum. We will keep your office informed.

With respect to long-range programs, we are developing proposed goals, objectives, and plans for consideration by the President next fall, or earlier if he wishes. As the President requested in his memorandum of February 13, 1969, our long-range plans and proposals will be considered by the Task Group referred to above with a view to developing coordinated proposals for the President's consideration by September 1.

We will keep you informed on an "early warning" basis of programmatic and reorganizational developments in NASA.

Sincerely yours,



T. O. Paine
Acting Administrator

Enclosures (2)

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 By NARA Date 11/16/04

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Carbon memo/attach	From Whitehead to Harlow, et al. - 3 pgs.	4/1/70	D
2	Carbon/attach	From Whitehead to Lincoln - 12 pgs	4/1/70	D
3	Memo	From Whitehead to Timmons - 2 pgs	4/24/70	D

FILE GROUP TITLE

WHCF: Subject Files FG 6-14

BOX NUMBER

1

FOLDER TITLE

Exec FG 6-14 Office of Telecommunications Policy

Begin - 4/30/70

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy


- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investig enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1970

TO: Mr. Tom Whitehead
FROM: Willis H. Shapley

These are the changes George Low and I recommended to you on
the phone at Dr. Paine's request.



Willis H. Shapley

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By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

*Sah***EXECUTIVE**

76 6-14

December 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR ERIC WARD

The following people, all coincidentally from California, have been suggested for the new Telecommunications job. If you know any of them, I would appreciate hearing your opinion of their qualifications for this position.

Dr. Bernard M. ^x Oliver, Vice President, Research and Development, Hewlett-Packard, Palo Alto

Dr. Malcolm R. ^x Curry, Vice President, Director of Research, Beckman Instruments, Fullerton

Dr. Allen ^x Peterson, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant

cc: Mr. Kriegsman
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files ✓

CTWhitehead:ed

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By	ATARA Date 11/16/04

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July 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

**Dr. Willis Shapley
Associate Deputy Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration**

Attached is a rough draft of a proposed working paper to be discussed at a Thursday meeting at 2:30 in my office with other executive branch agencies and the FCC.

May I have your comments by telephone either this afternoon or early tomorrow morning -- to be sure that the role described for NASA is not totally out of line.

**Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant**

Attachment

**cc: Mr. Whitehead
Central Files**

CTWhitehead:ed

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UT 1
76 164

July 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR**Dr. Willis Shapley
Associate Deputy Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration**

Would you please arrange a 30-45 minute briefing for me on the general subject of communications satellite technology, current and projected near future. I am interested primarily in those aspects relevant to the relative capabilities of the space segment and the ground stations, tradeoffs between the two and the interaction between power, beam width, and orbital parking capacity.

Mr. Walter Hinchman has been working with me on a number of communications issues and I would appreciate it if you would have the appropriate people work with him in planning the content of the briefing. He can be reached on Code 145, Ext. 2161.

**Clay T. Whitehead
Staff Assistant****cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Hinchman
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files****CTWhitehead:ed**

EXECUTIVE

LE

FG164

August 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I concur in Dr. Faine's recommendation that the Administration concentrate its support of bills recognizing accomplishments in space to two of the proposals. Both the astronaut medal and the Commission to erect an astronaut memorial at Kennedy Space Center are appropriate at this time. Other proposals are inappropriate or would be better enacted at a later time.

Peter Flanigan
Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Whitehead
Central Files
Mr. Kriegsmann

CTWhitehead:ed

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74

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE FILE

DATE 6/25/69

EXECUTIVE

CF

FT

FE-16

LETTER, MEMO, ETC.

TO: Mr. J. Langgan
FROM: Clay G. Whithead

FG 6-11-1/9
P

SUBJECT: NASA space program

CORRESPONDENCE FILED CENTRAL FILES -- CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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EXECUTIVE

FG164
Previously filed

8-22-69
Date

NAME Memo fr. Mr. Flanigan to Mr. Tom Whitehead
ORGANIZATION _____

EXECUTIVE

FG164
New File Symbol

9-4-69
Date

FINAL ACTION memo fr. Checker Funn
to Jim Schlesinger

EXECUTIVE

FE 14-1

FG 164

August 6, 1969

TO: ED MORGAN**FROM: PETER FLANDIN**

You will note from the attached that we are about to have an action under the Freedom of Information law. This is a matter that you and the Counsel's office should be aware of. I presume you will take any action that is appropriate. When you have determined what action to take, please be sure to let Klein's office know.

c.c. to:
Tom Whitehead

August 21, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FAINE

FROM: PETER FLANNAN

Thank you for the excellent report on the NASA-Contractor Cost Reduction Program for the six months ending December 31, 1968. I understand from the Bureau of the Budget that both the contractor and internal cost reduction programs of NASA are among the best in Government and have continually achieved impressive results.

As you indicated in your memorandum of July 28, 1969, the Bureau of the Budget is now working on strengthening and broadening the present cost reduction program to include all aspects of management improvement, of which cost reduction will remain a significant element. I can assure you that the President intends to continue to emphasize the necessity for efficiency and economy in Government operations and in concerns that are doing business with the Government.



Washington, DC 20408

Date 1 September 1989 1 September 1989

Reply to

Attn of Scott E. Lewis

Subject Acquisition of Apollo 11 Press Kit

To The File

The Nixon Presidential Materials Staff has acquired a reproduction of the original Apollo XI press kit. It was re-published on July 20, 1989 in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the landing on the moon. It is stored in the NLNP vertical file under the heading "Moon Landing." To request the press kit, ask for assistance from the archivist on duty.

National Archives and Records Administration

EXECUTIVE

OS 3

FG 164

July 27, 1971

Dear Mr. Sully:

Thank you for your recent letter dealing with this nation's priorities and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Viking Program. The question of priorities is one we have had under consideration for some time and we welcome your inputs.

The level of the NASA budget and the programs which make up this budget are reviewed regularly by both the Office of Management and Budget and the President and his staff. A special study was conducted early in 1970 on the future of the space program. One conclusion reached was that we must continue our studies in space, and that the potentials of space exploration warrant the expenditures presently planned. The President's message to Congress, a copy of which is attached, summarizes the results of this study.

There have been many papers written on the question of planetary exploration, two of which I am enclosing for your information. One of the more interesting ones was prepared by Dr. Carl Sagan of Cornell University which speaks to the exact questions that you raise. While I cannot agree with all of Dr. Sagan's views (his understanding of the nature of and reasons for cost overruns in Defense seems incomplete, for example), his space research views are authoritative. The second paper by Cyril Ponnampetuma and Harold P. Klein is a more technical treatment of "The Coming Search for Life on Mars". I hope these will provide you with a better understanding of what we hope to learn from planetary exploration, and how these results may affect Mars.

The Viking Program is one of the top priority programs in NASA. The question of landing a science payload on Mars has been reviewed many times by groups both inside and out of NASA. The conclusions have consistently supported a Viking-type mission. For example, the National Academy of Sciences conducted studies on space exploration goals in 1965, 1968, and again in the summer of 1970. In each case, Viking has been strongly supported.

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mt

October 1, 1971

Inkum Reply

EXECUTIVE

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FG 416

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CLAY T. WHITEHEAD

FROM: PETER G. PETERSON
PETER G. PETERSON

You ask in your memorandum of September 24 for my views by September 29 concerning alteration of the FAA/ECRO arrangements.

As you know even better than I, the matter is extremely complex and I am unable as of today to give you a substantive reaction. I have asked my staff to look into the question and I would hope to get views to you shortly.

Director
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Executive Office of the President
Room 770
1800 G Street, N. W.

DRHinton:lmb:9/29/71

*cc: RVA
DRH
CJH
RIP*

*56 395-5800
Sent by messenger*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NASA Budget for FY 1973 and the Future Manned Space Program

Background

Commitments to be made in settling NASA's FY 1973 budget will determine the future civilian space program. Depending on FY 1973 decisions, future funding levels for NASA can vary by \$200 million in FY 1973 and more than \$1 billion in FY 1976.

These FY 1973 budget decisions involve the type of manned space flight programs to follow Apollo and Skylab. In addition, an immediate decision involved is whether to complete the last two Apollo flights. These decisions must be faced for FY 1973 because:

- The lead times are gone to decide what to do after Apollo.
- Industry wants decisions one way or another, particularly on the Space Shuttle--on which contractors have been doing design studies for the last 18 months.
- Adjusting space spending and turning NASA's capabilities to other domestic problems requires a 2-3 year phasing.

This memorandum:

- describes NASA's proposed manned space flight program;
- develops an alternative to the NASA proposal;
- provides summary cost, schedule and employment data; and
- recommends next steps in arriving at decisions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

MR NLN 93-6/3

By AR NARA, Date 2/2/96

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By SG NARA Date 1/22/04

Need an opportunity to reassign Apollo 16 s17 change thru memo

*M-
Pls give m
to mty m
NASA
budget*